Among the myriad of changes that took place in Great Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century, many of particular significance to the historian of science and to the social historian are discernible in that small segment of British society drawn together by a shared interest in natural phenomena and with sufficient leisure or opportunity to investigate and ponder them. This group, which never numbered more than a mere handful in comparison to the whole population, may rightly be characterized as 'scientific'. They and their successors came to occupy an increasingly important place in the intellectual, educational, and developing economic life of the nation. Well before the arrival of mid-century, natural philosophers and inventors were generally hailed as a source of national pride and of national prestige. Scientific society is a feature of nineteenth-century British life, the best being found in London, in the universities, in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and in a few scattered provincial centres.

Only in fairly recent years has History and Philosophy of Science been recognized - though not always under that name - as a distinct field of scholarly endeavour. Previously, in the Australasian region as elsewhere, those few individuals working within this broad area of inquiry found their base, both intellectually and socially, where they could. In fact, the institutionalization of History and Philosophy of Science began compara tively early in Australia. An initial lecturing appointment was made at the University of Melbourne immediately after the Second World War, in 1946, and other appointments followed as the subject underwent an expansion during the 1950s and '60s similar to that which took place in other parts of the world. Today there are major Departments at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales and the University of Wollongong, and smaller groups active in many other parts of Australia, and in New Zealand. "Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science" aims to provide a distinctive publication outlet for Australian and New Zealand scholars working in the general area of history, philosophy and social studies of science. Each volume will comprise a group of essays on a connected theme, edited by an Australian or a New Zealander with special expertise in that particular area. The series should, however, prove of more than merely local interest. Papers will address general issues; parochial topics will be avoided."

This incisive history upends the complacency that confines anti-Judaism to the ideological extremes in the Western tradition. With deep learning and elegance, David Nirenberg shows how foundational anti-Judaism is to the history of the West. Questions of how we are Jewish and, more critically, how and why we are not have been churning within the Western imagination throughout its history. Ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans; Christians and Muslims of every period; even the secularists of modernity have used Judaism in constructing their visions of the world. The thrust of this tradition construes Judaism as an opposition, a danger often from within, to be criticized, attacked, and eliminated. The intersections of these ideas with the world of power the Roman destruction of the Second Temple, the Spanish Inquisition, the German Holocaust are well known. The ways of thought underlying these tragedies can be found at the very foundation of Western history."

This book explores God's use of violence as depicted in the Hebrew Bible. Focusing on the Pentateuch, it reads biblical narratives and codes of law as documenting formations of theopolitical imagination. Ophir deciphers the logic of divine rule that these documents betray, with a special attention to the place of violence within it. The book draws from contemporary biblical scholarship, while also engaging critically with contemporary political theory and political theology, including the work of Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben, Jan Assmann, Regina Schwartz, and Michael Walzer. Ophir focuses on three distinct theocratic formations: the rule of disaster, where catastrophes are used as means of governance; the biopolitical rule of the holy, where divine violence is spatially demarcated and personally targeted; and the rule of law where divine violence is vividly remembered and its return is projected, anticipated, and yet postponed, creating a prolonged lull for the text's present. Different as these formations are, Ophir shows how they share an urform that anticipates the main outlines of the modern European state, which has monopolized the entire globe. A critique of the modern state, the book argues, must begin in revisiting the deification of the state, unpacking its mostly repressed theological dimension.

Gui 11 aume Postel was undoubtedly one of the most remarkab 1 e and interesting scholars and thinkers of the sixteenth century. His know ledge of Hebrew and Arabic was rare among his contemporaries, as was his study and use of the Rabbinical, Cabalistic and Islamic literature pre served in these languages. His attempt to harmonize Christian, Jewish and Mbhammedan thought give him an important place in the history of re ligious tolerance, whereas his prophecies about a universal religion and a universal monarchy seem to anticipate more recent ideas of a world state and of general peace. In his prophecies, Postel assigned a unique role to himself and to a pious 1 ady whom he met in Venice and whom he lavishly praises in all his later writings. Admired and respected by many contemporary scholars and princes in France, Italy and Germany, he also aroused the suspicions of the religious and political authorities of his time who considered him dangerous but mad and thus spared his life, but confined him to a monastery for many years. His numerous writ ings survive in rare editions and manuscripts, and the later copies of some of his works show that he continued to be read and to exercise much influence down to the eighteenth century."

The Center maintained its international contacts in 1979 by inviting num- erous foreign scholars to the National Conference at Viterbo, including H. Kochler (Austria), R. Magliola (U.S.A.), J. C. Piguet (Switzerland), M. R. Barral (U.S.A.) and M. Petit (France), and also by extending hospitality at its April Seminar (held at the Teacher Training Faculty of Rome University) to Prof. H. Meyn of The World Phenomenology Institute, who spoke on His- toricism and the Idea of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science. The activities organized by The Italian Center since its foundation have given a considerable new impulse to phenomenological research in Italy. They have made established contacts between numerous Italian scholars who pre- viously worked in isolation without a continued and effective exchange of the results of their researches, and they have also strengthened and extended relations with the international phenomenological community, thereby creat- ing a cultural pattern of cooperation which becomes more and more concrete and fruitful.

Kantian transcendental idealism is the thesis that fundamental aspects of experience are contributed by the perceiving subject rather than by the things experienced, and are not features of things as they exist independently of sensible perceivers. This is undoubtedly the most striking and at the same time the most puzzling of Kant's Critical views. It is striking because nothing could be less commonsensical than the beliefthat things as we perceive them have nothing in common with things as they are independently ofbeing per ceived. From a more technical point of viewthe doctrine is puzzling because Kant apparently does not support it very well. Beginning with Kant's con temporaries, critics have pointed out that among all the arguments for the theory in the CritiqueofPureReason, none entails the conclusion that things in themselves cannot be like objects of sense experience in any way. So, for example, although transcendental idealism is compatible with Kant's theory of synthetic a priori knowledge, there is nothing in the analysis of the syn thetic a priori ruling out the possibility that features contributed to experi ence by the perceiving subject correspond to characteristics of things in them selves, although we might never know this to be so. And even though Kant sees transcendental idealism as a solution to the Antinomies, this is at best indirect support for the view;there are undoubtedly other ways to get around these traditional metaphysical puzzles."

Hanjo Berressem establishes the notion of a schizoanalytic ecology as the most consistent conceptual spine of Felix Guattari's work. To look at a situation ecologically means to analyze and administer it with the practical aim of creating a space in which it is possible to actualize viable modes of life. To create a multiplicitous, open and elastic milieu that is conducive to processes of both individuation and singularization.Berressem covers the whole range of Guattari's solo work, as well as the books co-authored with Gilles Deleuze. But the core of his argument is developed by a comprehensive explication and analysis of Guattari's Schizoanalytic Cartographies. This reveals an ecological ontology, developed out of key concepts such as the informal diagram, the abstract machine and transversality, that is based on the conceptual complementarity of the world (the given) and its creatures (the giving).

Analysing the work of Schutz, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu, this book considers the historical development of competing philosophies of social science. It examines the relations between phenomenology, Gestalt psychology and empirical social science in the first half of the twentieth century and then explores the way in which Bourdieu responded to this legacy by advocating a form of reflexive social-scientific investigation, which would remain faithful to primary experience without disowning accumulated intellectualism. The book asks whether the Bourdieu 'paradigm' retains value beyond the French conditions of its production. It offers an analysis of the development of Bourdieu's thought and practice which constitutes an invitation to readers generally to reassess the value of the western tradition of the social function of the detached intellectual for mass democratic societies. -- .

Why should the story of a woman's role in the development of a scientific theory be written? Is it to celebrate, as some have done, the heroism of a woman's struggle in a man's world? Or is it, rather to demonstrate that gender is irrelevant to the march of scientific ideas? This book hopes to do neither. Rather, it intends to do justice both to the professional life of a woman in science and to the development of the theory with which she was engaged. Technically, this essay centers on Sophie Germain's analysis of the modes of vibration of elastic surfaces, work which won a competition set by the French Academy of Sciences in 1809. It also evaluates related work on the mathematical theory of elasticity done by men of the Academy. Biographically, it is about a woman who believed in the greatness of science and strove, with some measure of success, to participate in that noble, but wholly male-dominated, enterprise. It explores her failures, analyzes her success, and describes how the members of the Parisian scientific community dealt with her offerings, contributions and demands.

Why should the story of a woman's role in the development of a scientific theory be written? Is it to celebrate, as some have done, the heroism of a woman's struggle in a man's world? Or is it, rather to demonstrate that gender is irrelevant to the march of scientific ideas? This book hopes to do neither. Rather, it intends to do justice both to the professional life of a woman in science and to the development of the theory with which she was engaged. Technically, this essay centers on Sophie Germain's analysis of the modes of vibration of elastic surfaces, work which won a competition set by the French Academy of Sciences in 1809. It also evaluates related work on the mathematical theory of elasticity done by men of the Academy. Biographically, it is about a woman who believed in the greatness of science and strove, with some measure of success, to participate in that noble, but wholly male-dominated, enterprise. It explores her failures, analyzes her success, and describes how the members of the Parisian scientific community dealt with her offerings, contributions and demands.

The copy of A Letter to Peter du Moulin from which this facsimile is taken is in the National Library of Scotland, pressmark NG.1341.c.1(8). The first and only issue, it runs to 36 pages with a title page and blank preliminary leaf, and cost sixpence; it is coarsely and probably hurriedly printed, with an error on the title page: to make sense of 'Prebendarie of the same Church, ' the &c. after Casaubon's name should have been expanded to read 'and Prebendarie of Christ-Church, Canterbury.' An obliging contemporary has annotated the copy with the names of those whom Casaubon alludes to indirectly. There is no date in the pamphlet other than on the title page, and the only evidence for a more precise dating, in the absence of any ms. or notes for it, is in a letter written by Casaubon to J.G. Graevius on July 19th, 1668, from Cambridge. Casaubon and Graevius (1632-1703), Professor of Politics, History and Eloquence in the University of Utrecht, were accustomed to bewail the contemporary state of the republic of letters in their correspondence, and on this occasion Casaubon wrote: Prima mali labes a Philosophia Cartesiana, quae stultae iuventuti et novitatis avidae bonos lade ad Experimenta ventum est, in quibus nunc omnis eruditio, tibros excussit e manibus.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE brings to students, researchers and practitioners in all of the social and language-related sciences carefully selected book-length publications dealing with sociolinguistic theory, methods, findings and applications. It approaches the study of language in society in its broadest sense, as a truly international and interdisciplinary field in which various approaches, theoretical and empirical, supplement and complement each other. The series invites the attention of linguists, language teachers of all interests, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, historians etc. to the development of the sociology of language.

2 Peter of Aillyl wrote his Concepts and Insolubles, according to the best 3 estimate, in 1372. He was at that time only about twenty-two years old. He was born around 1350" in Compiegne in the De de France, although his 5 family name associates him with the village of Ailly in Picardy. In 1364 he entered the University of Paris as a 'bursar' (i. e., the recipient of a scholarship) at the College de Navarre. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in 1367 and taught there until 1368, when he entered the Faculty of Theology. He became a Doctor of Theology in 1381. In the years that followed, Peter was very active in the 'conciliar' movement and in negotiations to bring about the end of the Great Schism of the West. He was elevated to the rank of Cardinal in 1411 by Pope John XXIII, the successor of Alexander V in the 'Pisa' line of Popes. He took an active part in the Council of Constance (1414-1418), which ended the Great Schism and elected Pope Martin V. Peter died on August 9, 1420. Most of the secondary literature on Peter of Ailly concerns his role in church politics, his writings on the Schism and on ecclesiastical reform, and various aspects of his theology. But Peter was active in a number of other areas as well. He wrote several works, for instance, on geography and astron 6 omy, including an Imago mundi read by Christopher Columbus."

The Traite des systemes is a milestone in the intellectual history of the eighteenth century. This is a study of its content, structure, sources and importance. It includes a discussion of Condillac's analysis of good and bad systems, the adequacy of his knowledge and under standing of the speculative metaphysics of the preceding century, the effectiveness of his method of attack on seventeenth-century metaphysical systems, his conception of empirical and scientific method, and in particular his understanding of the role of hypotheses, his application of the Newtonian scientific method to politics, physics, and the arts, and, finally, his preoccupation with the meaning of words and with the origin and purpose oflanguage. Speculative metaphysical systems, such as those of Descartes, Malebranche, Boursier, Leibniz and Spinoza, are attacked by Con dillac, as are popular superstitions and prejudices, with the weapon of linguistic criticism. It is the systematic use of this weapon which makes the Traite des systemes more than a reflection of his contem poraries' antipathy towards speculative metaphysics. In memory of my MOTHER and FATHER ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to several people. I should like first and foremost to thank Dr. W. H. Barber, who has for many years tirelessly given me encouragement and invaluable assistance. I wish to thank also Professors RH. Rasmussen, A. D. Wilshere and C. Wake for their help and their support in the early days of the preparation of this study. lowe special thanks also to Mrs. M. V."

It is my hope that this publication of a "lost" work by Galiani will interest scholars of many nations and disciplines. Few writers could make a more compelling claim upon such a cosmopolitan audience. An Italian with deep roots in his homeland, Galiani achieved celebrity in the salons of Paris. An ecclesiastic, his most notable concerns were worldly, to say the least. An erudite classicist, Galiani was passionately concerned about economics and technology. A philosophe and ostensibly something of a subversive, he was enthralled by power and he served for many years as a government agent and adviser at home and abroad. Galiani embodied many of the preoccupations and paradoxes of the Enlightenment. His torians and literary analysts devoted to the study of the lumie'res through out Europe are bound to find Galiani's work important. In recent years there has been an efflorescence of interest in the history of political economy and its relationship not only to the history of ideas but also to the history of social structure, economic development, admin istrative institutions, collective mentalities, and political mobilization. Galiani's work helps to crystalize many of these connections which scholarly specialization has tended to obscure. Galiani had a leading voice in one of the most significant debates in the eighteenth century on the implications of radical economic, social, and institutional change."

The humanist treatises presented here are only peripheral to the history of logic, but I think historians of logic may read them with interest, if perhaps with irritation. In the early sixteenth century the humanists set about to demolish medieval logic based on syllogistic and disputation, and to replace it in the university curriculum with a 'rhetorical' logic based on the use of topics and persuasion. To a very large extent they succeeded. Although Aris totelian logic retained a vigorous life in the schools, it never again attained to the overwhelming primacy it had so long enjoyed in the northern universities. It has been the custom to take the arguments of the humanists at face value, and the word 'scholastic' has continued to have pejorative overtones. This is easy to understand, because until recently our knowledge of the high period of medieval logic has been slight, and the humanists' testimony as to its decadent state in the sixteenth century has, for the most part, been accepted uncritically. Within the past two decades important work on medieval logic has recovered the brilliant achievement of thirteenth and fourteenth century logicians, philosophers, and natural scientists. New studies are constantly appearing, and the logico-semantic system of the terminists has become fruitful territory not only for historians of logic but also for students of modern linguistics and semiotics."

When this book was first published, more than five years ago, I added an appendix on How the Pythagoreans discovered Proposition 11.5 of the 'Elements'. I hoped that this appendix, although different in some ways from the rest of the book, would serve to illustrate the kind of research which needs to be undertaken, if we are to acquire a new understanding of the historical development of Greek mathematics. It should perhaps be mentioned that this book is not intended to be an introduction to Greek mathematics for the general reader; its aim is to bring the problems associated with the early history of deductive science to the attention of classical scholars, and historians and philos ophers of science. I should like to conclude by thanking my translator, Mr. A. M. Ungar, who worked hard to produce something more than a mechanical translation. Much of his work was carried out during the year which I spent at Stanford as a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. This enabled me to supervise the work of transla tion as it progressed. I am happy to express my gratitude to the Center for providing me with this opportunity. Arpad Szabo NOTE ON REFERENCES The following books are frequently referred to in the notes. Unless otherwise stated, the editions are those given below. Burkert, W. Weisheit und Wissensclzaft, Studien zu Pythagoras, Philo laos und Platon, Nuremberg 1962."

Pestilence in Medieval and Early Modern English Literature examines three diseases--leprosy, bubonic plague, and syphilis--to show how doctors, priests, and literary authors from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance interpreted certain illnesses through a moral filter. Lacking knowledge about the transmission of contagious diseases, doctors and priests saw epidemic diseases as a punishment sent by God for human transgression. Accordingly, their job was to properly read sickness in relation to the sin. By examining different readings of specific illnesses, this book shows how the social construction of epidemic diseases formed a kind of narrative wherein man attempts to take the control of the disease out of God's hands by connecting epidemic diseases to the sins of carnality.

It was probably Rousseau who first thought of dreams as ennobling experiences. Anyone who has ever read Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire must be struck by the dreamlike quality of Rousseau's meditations. This dreamlike quality is still with us, and those who experience it find themselves ennobled by it. Witness Martin Luther King's famous "1 have a dream. " Dreaming and inspiration raise the artist to the top rung in the ladder ofhuman relations. That is probably the prevailing view among educated people of our time. Rousseau made that view respectable and predominant. Yet in another sense, the problem is much older. It is the problem of political philosophy and poetry, the problem of Socrates and Aristophanes, of Plato and Homer. Yet, while antiquity usually gives the crown to philosophy, since Rous seau, the alternative view tends to prevail. The distinction is not, however, a formal one. Sir Philip Sidney enlisted Plato on the side of poetry. The true distinction is between imagination and reason. If reason is to rule, as Aristotle points out, l the most architectonic of the sciences, that is political science, should rule. It is political philosophy which must determine the nature of the arts which will help or which will hinder the good of the city or the polity. That does not mean that a mere professor should stand in judgment of Shake speare, Bacon, and Rembrandt. It means that ifhe studies these three great artists, he is not over-stepping disciplinary limits."

Though with considerable delay, most of the writings of Polish logicians of the inter-war period are now available in English. This is not yet true of Polish philosophy. In the present volume English-speaking readers will fmd, for the first time, a sizeable collection of the articles of one of the most original and distinguished of Poland's philosophers of the present century, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890-1963). To be sure, Ajdukiewicz was a philosopher-logician from the beginning of his career. His first work of some importance, a monograph entitled From the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences (1921 post-dated; two abstracts published in 1919/20) exhibited two features which were to become charac teristic of the style of his later philosophy: On the one hand the monograph was the result of Ajdukiewicz's deep interest in the systems of modern logic, the foundations of mathematics, in the properties of deductive systems and their relevance to philosophy; on the other hand the monograph was an attempt at developing an 'understanding methodology' (in the sense of Gennan 'Verstehende Methodologie') of deductive sciences, i. e. a pragmatic study of axiomatic systems which would supplement purely formal investiga tions of those systems. The fonner made him a close ally oflogical empiricists; the latter was rooted in the henneneutic tradition of the second half of the 19th century (Dilthey) which spilled over into the 20th century (Spranger) and which was not cherished at all by logical empiricists."

VOllS n'avez donne aucune des explications metaphysiques qui otent au mystere de I'Eucharistie ses apparentes im- possibilites. Ce ne sont, il est vrai, que des hypotheses et c'est deja beaucoup que de concevoir un ensemble de rap- ports qui eclaircit certaines difficultes des choses sans etre contredit par aucune loi de la nature et du raisonnement. Lettre du P. Lacordaire II Auguste Nicolas, dans A. Nicolas, Etudes Philosophiques, t. I,P. V, de laseme edition (I847). Specimen Theologiae: les pages qui suivent ne sont guere qu'un echan- tillon, un essai, d'histoire de la theologie post-tridentine. La theologie moderne est ici saisie a son premier age, contemporaine de ces trois remises en cause fondamentales que sont la Reforme, Ie cartesianisme et la renaissance spirituelle du catholicisme. Trois tentatives de renou- veler la vision du monde re