This is a long-awaited new edition of one of the best known Oxford Logic Guides. The book gives an introduction to intuitionistic mathematics, leading the reader gently through the fundamental mathematical and philosophical concepts. The treatment of various topics, for example Brouwer's proof of the Bar Theorem, valuation systems, and the completeness of intuitionistic first-order logic, have been completely revised.

Reason's Nearest Kin is a critical examination of the most exciting period there has been in the philosophical study of the properties of the natural numbers, from the 1880s to the 1930s. Reassessing the brilliant innovations of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others, which transformed philosophy as well as our understanding of mathematics, Michael Potter places arithmetic at the interface between experience, language, thought, and the world.

Paraconsistent logic makes it possible to study inconsistent theories in a coherent way. From its modern start in the mid-20th century, paraconsistency was intended for use in mathematics, providing a rigorous framework for describing abstract objects and structures where some contradictions are allowed, without collapse into incoherence. Over the past decades, this initiative has evolved into an area of non-classical mathematics known as inconsistent or paraconsistent mathematics. This Element provides a selective introductory survey of this research program, distinguishing between `moderate' and `radical' approaches. The emphasis is on philosophical issues and future challenges.

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of all physical things; no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical predictions. However, if one tries to understand the theory as providing a complete and accurate framework for the description of the behaviour of all physical interactions, it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or even logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem, the quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. Barrett gives a careful and challenging examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and those who have followed him. His informal approach, minimizing technicality, will make the book accessible and illuminating for philosophers and physicists alike. Anyone interested in the interpretation of quantum mechanics should read it.

This book is an original-the first-ever treatment of the mathematics of Luck. Setting out from the principle that luck can be measured by the gap between reasonable expectation and eventual realization, the book develops step-by-step a mathematical theory that accommodates the entire range of our pre-systematic understanding of the way in which luck functions in human affairs. In so moving from explanatory exposition to mathematical treatment, the book provides a clear and accessible account of the way in which luck assessment enters into the calculations of rational decision theory.

The genesis of the digital idea and why it transformed civilization A few short decades ago, we were informed by the smooth signals of analog television and radio; we communicated using our analog telephones; and we even computed with analog computers. Today our world is digital, built with zeros and ones. Why did this revolution occur? The Discrete Charm of the Machine explains, in an engaging and accessible manner, the varied physical and logical reasons behind this radical transformation. The spark of individual genius shines through this story of innovation: the stored program of Jacquard's loom; Charles Babbage's logical branching; Alan Turing's brilliant abstraction of the discrete machine; Harry Nyquist's foundation for digital signal processing; Claude Shannon's breakthrough insights into the meaning of information and bandwidth; and Richard Feynman's prescient proposals for nanotechnology and quantum computing. Ken Steiglitz follows the progression of these ideas in the building of our digital world, from the internet and artificial intelligence to the edge of the unknown. Are questions like the famous traveling salesman problem truly beyond the reach of ordinary digital computers? Can quantum computers transcend these barriers? Does a mysterious magical power reside in the analog mechanisms of the brain? Steiglitz concludes by confronting the moral and aesthetic questions raised by the development of artificial intelligence and autonomous robots. The Discrete Charm of the Machine examines why our information technology, the lifeblood of our civilization, became digital, and challenges us to think about where its future trajectory may lead.

Change, Choice and Inference unifies lively and significant strands of research in logic, philosophy, economics and artificial intelligence.

This is the first book-length analysis of the techniques and procedures of ancient mathematical commentaries. It focuses on examples in Chinese, Sanskrit, Akkadian and Sumerian, and Ancient Greek, presenting the general issues by constant detailed reference to these commentaries, of which substantial extracts are included in the original languages and in translation, sometimes for the first time. This makes the issues accessible to readers without specialized training in mathematics or in the languages involved. The result is a much richer understanding than was hitherto possible of the crucial role of commentaries in the history of mathematics in four different linguistic areas, of the nature of mathematical commentaries in general, of the contribution that the study of mathematical commentaries can make to the history of science and to the study of commentaries in general, and of the ways in which mathematical commentaries are like and unlike other kinds of commentaries.

A comprehensive look at four of the most famous problems in mathematics Tales of Impossibility recounts the intriguing story of the renowned problems of antiquity, four of the most famous and studied questions in the history of mathematics. First posed by the ancient Greeks, these compass and straightedge problems-squaring the circle, trisecting an angle, doubling the cube, and inscribing regular polygons in a circle-have served as ever-present muses for mathematicians for more than two millennia. David Richeson follows the trail of these problems to show that ultimately their proofs-which demonstrated the impossibility of solving them using only a compass and straightedge-depended on and resulted in the growth of mathematics. Richeson investigates how celebrated luminaries, including Euclid, Archimedes, Viete, Descartes, Newton, and Gauss, labored to understand these problems and how many major mathematical discoveries were related to their explorations. Although the problems were based in geometry, their resolutions were not, and had to wait until the nineteenth century, when mathematicians had developed the theory of real and complex numbers, analytic geometry, algebra, and calculus. Pierre Wantzel, a little-known mathematician, and Ferdinand von Lindemann, through his work on pi, finally determined the problems were impossible to solve. Along the way, Richeson provides entertaining anecdotes connected to the problems, such as how the Indiana state legislature passed a bill setting an incorrect value for pi and how Leonardo da Vinci made elegant contributions in his own study of these problems. Taking readers from the classical period to the present, Tales of Impossibility chronicles how four unsolvable problems have captivated mathematical thinking for centuries.

Not all scientific explanations work by describing causal connections between events or the world's overall causal structure. Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems being proved hold. In this book, Marc Lange proposes philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics. These topics have been unjustly neglected in the philosophy of science and mathematics. One important kind of non-causal scientific explanation is termed explanation by constraint. These explanations work by providing information about what makes certain facts especially inevitable - more necessary than the ordinary laws of nature connecting causes to their effects. Facts explained in this way transcend the hurly-burly of cause and effect. Many physicists have regarded the laws of kinematics, the great conservation laws, the coordinate transformations, and the parallelogram of forces as having explanations by constraint. This book presents an original account of explanations by constraint, concentrating on a variety of examples from classical physics and special relativity. This book also offers original accounts of several other varieties of non-causal scientific explanation. Dimensional explanations work by showing how some law of nature arises merely from the dimensional relations among the quantities involved. Really statistical explanations include explanations that appeal to regression toward the mean and other canonical manifestations of chance. Lange provides an original account of what makes certain mathematical proofs but not others explain what they prove. Mathematical explanation connects to a host of other important mathematical ideas, including coincidences in mathematics, the significance of giving multiple proofs of the same result, and natural properties in mathematics. Introducing many examples drawn from actual science and mathematics, with extended discussions of examples from Lagrange, Desargues, Thomson, Sylvester, Maxwell, Rayleigh, Einstein, and Feynman, Because Without Cause's proposals and examples should set the agenda for future work on non-causal explanation.

Chemists, working with only mortars and pestles, could not get very far unless they had mathematical models to explain what was happening "inside" of their elements of experience -- an example of what could be termed mathematical learning.
This volume contains the proceedings of Work Group 4: Theories of Mathematics, a subgroup of the Seventh International Congress on Mathematical Education held at Universite Laval in Quebec. Bringing together multiple perspectives on mathematical thinking, this volume presents elaborations on principles reflecting the progress made in the field over the past 20 years and represents starting points for understanding mathematical learning today. This volume will be of importance to educational researchers, math educators, graduate students of mathematical learning, and anyone interested in the enterprise of improving mathematical learning worldwide.

Logical monism is the claim that there is a single correct logic, the 'one true logic' of our title. The view has evident appeal, as it reflects assumptions made in ordinary reasoning as well as in mathematics, the sciences, and the law. In all these spheres, we tend to believe that there are determinate facts about the validity of arguments. Despite its evident appeal, however, logical monism must meet two challenges. The first is the challenge from logical pluralism, according to which there is more than one correct logic. The second challenge is to determine which form of logical monism is the correct one. One True Logic is the first monograph to explicitly articulate a version of logical monism and defend it against the first challenge. It provides a critical overview of the monism vs pluralism debate and argues for the former. It also responds to the second challenge by defending a particular monism, based on a highly infinitary logic. It breaks new ground on a number of fronts and unifies disparate discussions in the philosophical and logical literature. In particular, it generalises the Tarski-Sher criterion of logicality, provides a novel defence of this generalisation, offers a clear new argument for the logicality of infinitary logic and replies to recent pluralist arguments.

In many ways set theory lies at the heart of modern mathematics, and it does powerful work both philosophical and mathematical - as a foundation for the subject. However, certain philosophical problems raise serious doubts about our acceptance of the axioms of set theory. In a detailed and original reassessment of these axioms, Sharon Berry uses a potentialist (as opposed to actualist) approach to develop a unified determinate conception of set-theoretic truth that vindicates many of our intuitive expectations regarding set theory. Berry further defends her approach against a number of possible objections, and she shows how a notion of logical possibility that is useful in formulating Potentialist set theory connects in important ways with philosophy of language, metametaphysics and philosophy of science. Her book will appeal to readers with interests in the philosophy of set theory, modal logic, and the role of mathematics in the sciences.

Chihara here develops a mathematical system in which there are no existence assertions but only assertions of the constructibility of certain sorts of things. He utilizes this system in the analysis of the nature of mathematics, and discusses many recent works in the philosophy of mathematics from the viewpoint of the constructibility theory developed. This innovative analysis will appeal to mathematicians and philosophers of logic, mathematics, and science.

Apart from its foray into technical issues of risk assessment and management, this book has one principal aim. With situations of chancy outcomes certain key factors-including outcome possibilities, overall expectation, threat, and even luck-are measurable parameters. But risk is something different: it is not measurable a single parametric quantity, but a many-sided factor that has several different components, and constitutes a complex phenomenon that must be assessed judgmentally in a highly contextualized way. This book explains and analyzes how this works out in practice. Topics in this work include choice and risk, chance and likelihood, as well as outcome-yield evaluation and risk. It takes into account abnormal situations and eccentric measurements, situational evaluation and expectation and scrutinizes the social aspect of risk. The book is of interest to logicians, philosophers of mathematics, and researchers of risk assessment. The project is a companion piece to the author's LUCK THEORY, also published by Springer.

This book examines the birth of the scientific understanding of motion. It investigates which logical tools and methodological principles had to be in place to give a consistent account of motion, and which mathematical notions were introduced to gain control over conceptual problems of motion. It shows how the idea of motion raised two fundamental problems in the 5th and 4th century BCE: bringing together being and non-being, and bringing together time and space. The first problem leads to the exclusion of motion from the realm of rational investigation in Parmenides, the second to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Methodological and logical developments reacting to these puzzles are shown to be present implicitly in the atomists, and explicitly in Plato who also employs mathematical structures to make motion intelligible. With Aristotle we finally see the first outline of the fundamental framework with which we conceptualise motion today.

Kant's Mathematical World aims to transform our understanding of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his account of the mathematical character of the world. Daniel Sutherland reconstructs Kant's project of explaining both mathematical cognition and our cognition of the world in terms of our most basic cognitive capacities. He situates Kant in a long mathematical tradition with roots in Euclid's Elements, and thereby recovers the very different way of thinking about mathematics which existed prior to its 'arithmetization' in the nineteenth century. He shows that Kant thought of mathematics as a science of magnitudes and their measurement, and all objects of experience as extensive magnitudes whose real properties have intensive magnitudes, thus tying mathematics directly to the world. His book will appeal to anyone interested in Kant's critical philosophy -- either his account of the world of experience, or his philosophy of mathematics, or how the two inform each other.

Building on the seminal work of Kit Fine in the 1980s, Leon Horsten here develops a new theory of arbitrary entities. He connects this theory to issues and debates in metaphysics, logic, and contemporary philosophy of mathematics, investigating the relation between specific and arbitrary objects and between specific and arbitrary systems of objects. His book shows how this innovative theory is highly applicable to problems in the philosophy of arithmetic, and explores in particular how arbitrary objects can engage with the nineteenth-century concept of variable mathematical quantities, how they are relevant for debates around mathematical structuralism, and how they can help our understanding of the concept of random variables in statistics. This fully worked through theory will open up new avenues within philosophy of mathematics, bringing in the work of other philosophers such as Saul Kripke, and providing new insights into the development of the foundations of mathematics from the eighteenth century to the present day.

Logical paradoxes - like the Liar, Russell's, and the Sorites - are notorious. But in Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics, it is argued that they are only the noisiest of many. Contradictions arise in the everyday, from the smallest points to the widest boundaries. In this book, Zach Weber uses "dialetheic paraconsistency" - a formal framework where some contradictions can be true without absurdity - as the basis for developing this idea rigorously, from mathematical foundations up. In doing so, Weber directly addresses a longstanding open question: how much standard mathematics can paraconsistency capture? The guiding focus is on a more basic question, of why there are paradoxes. Details underscore a simple philosophical claim: that paradoxes are found in the ordinary, and that is what makes them so extraordinary.

The late 1960s saw the emergence of new philosophical interest in Kant's philosophy of mathematics, and since then this interest has developed into a major and dynamic field of study. In this state-of-the-art survey of contemporary scholarship on Kant's mathematical thinking, Carl Posy and Ofra Rechter gather leading authors who approach it from multiple perspectives, engaging with topics including geometry, arithmetic, logic, and metaphysics. Their essays offer fine-grained analysis of Kant's philosophy of mathematics in the context of his Critical philosophy, and also show sensitivity to its historical background. The volume will be important for readers seeking a comprehensive picture of the current scholarship about the development of Kant's philosophy of mathematics, its place in his overall philosophy, and the Kantian themes that influenced mathematics and its philosophy after Kant.

From his return to Cambridge in 1929 to his death in 1951, Wittgenstein influenced philosophy almost exclusively through teaching and discussion. These lecture notes indicate what he considered to be salient features of his thinking in this period of his life.

As discrete fields of inquiry, rhetoric and mathematics have long been considered antithetical to each other. That is, if mathematics explains or describes the phenomena it studies with certainty, persuasion is not needed. This volume calls into question the view that mathematics is free of rhetoric. Through nine studies of the intersections between these two disciplines, Arguing with Numbers shows that mathematics is in fact deeply rhetorical. Using rhetoric as a lens to analyze mathematically based arguments in public policy, political and economic theory, and even literature, the essays in this volume reveal how mathematics influences the values and beliefs with which we assess the world and make decisions and how our worldviews influence the kinds of mathematical instruments we construct and accept. In addition, contributors examine how concepts of rhetoric-such as analogy and visuality-have been employed in mathematical and scientific reasoning, including in the theorems of mathematical physicists and the geometrical diagramming of natural scientists. Challenging academic orthodoxy, these scholars reject a math-equals-truth reduction in favor of a more constructivist theory of mathematics as dynamic, evolving, and powerfully persuasive. By bringing these disparate lines of inquiry into conversation with one another, Arguing with Numbers provides inspiration to students, established scholars, and anyone inside or outside rhetorical studies who might be interested in exploring the intersections between the two disciplines. In addition to the editors, the contributors to this volume are Catherine Chaput, Crystal Broch Colombini, Nathan Crick, Michael Dreher, Jeanne Fahnestock, Andrew C. Jones, Joseph Little, and Edward Schiappa.

Sets are central to mathematics and its foundations, but what are they? In this book Luca Incurvati provides a detailed examination of all the major conceptions of set and discusses their virtues and shortcomings, as well as introducing the fundamentals of the alternative set theories with which these conceptions are associated. He shows that the conceptual landscape includes not only the naive and iterative conceptions but also the limitation of size conception, the definite conception, the stratified conception and the graph conception. In addition, he presents a novel, minimalist account of the iterative conception which does not require the existence of a relation of metaphysical dependence between a set and its members. His book will be of interest to researchers and advanced students in logic and the philosophy of mathematics.

What are the meanings of number expressions, and what can they tell us about questions of central importance to the philosophy of mathematics, specifically 'Do numbers exist?' This Element attempts to shed light on this question by outlining a recent debate between substantivalists and adjectivalists regarding the semantic function of number words in numerical statements. After highlighting their motivations and challenges, I develop a comprehensive polymorphic semantics for number expressions. I argue that accounting for the numerous meanings and how they are related leads to a strengthened argument for realism, one which renders familiar forms of nominalism highly implausible.

This edited work presents contemporary mathematical practice in the foundational mathematical theories, in particular set theory and the univalent foundations. It shares the work of significant scholars across the disciplines of mathematics, philosophy and computer science. Readers will discover systematic thought on criteria for a suitable foundation in mathematics and philosophical reflections around the mathematical perspectives. The volume is divided into three sections, the first two of which focus on the two most prominent candidate theories for a foundation of mathematics. Readers may trace current research in set theory, which has widely been assumed to serve as a framework for foundational issues, as well as new material elaborating on the univalent foundations, considering an approach based on homotopy type theory (HoTT). The third section then builds on this and is centred on philosophical questions connected to the foundations of mathematics. Here, the authors contribute to discussions on foundational criteria with more general thoughts on the foundations of mathematics which are not connected to particular theories. This book shares the work of some of the most important scholars in the fields of set theory (S. Friedman), non-classical logic (G. Priest) and the philosophy of mathematics (P. Maddy). The reader will become aware of the advantages of each theory and objections to it as a foundation, following the latest and best work across the disciplines and it is therefore a valuable read for anyone working on the foundations of mathematics or in the philosophy of mathematics.