Written by one of the preeminent researchers in the field, this book provides a comprehensive exposition of modern analysis of causation. It shows how causality has grown from a nebulous concept into a mathematical theory with significant applications in the fields of statistics, artificial intelligence, economics, philosophy, cognitive science, and the health and social sciences. Judea Pearl presents and unifies the probabilistic, manipulative, counterfactual, and structural approaches to causation and devises simple mathematical tools for studying the relationships between causal connections and statistical associations. The book will open the way for including causal analysis in the standard curricula of statistics, artificial intelligence, business, epidemiology, social sciences, and economics. Students in these fields will find natural models, simple inferential procedures, and precise mathematical definitions of causal concepts that traditional texts have evaded or made unduly complicated. The first edition of Causality has led to a paradigmatic change in the way that causality is treated in statistics, philosophy, computer science, social science, and economics. Cited in more than 5,000 scientific publications, it continues to liberate scientists from the traditional molds of statistical thinking. In this revised edition, Judea Pearl elucidates thorny issues, answers readers questions, and offers a panoramic view of recent advances in this field of research. Causality will be of interests to students and professionals in a wide variety of fields. Anyone who wishes to elucidate meaningful relationships from data, predict effects of actions and policies, assess explanations of reported events, or form theories of causal understanding and causal speech will find this book stimulating and invaluable."

This book considers the manifold possible approaches, past and present, to our understanding of the natural numbers. They are treated as epistemic objects: mathematical objects that have been subject to epistemological inquiry and attention throughout their history and whose conception has evolved accordingly. Although they are the simplest and most common mathematical objects, as this book reveals, they have a very complex nature whose study illuminates subtle features of the functioning of our thought. Using jointly history, mathematics and philosophy to grasp the essence of numbers, the reader is led through their various interpretations, presenting the ways they have been involved in major theoretical projects from Thales onward. Some pertain primarily to philosophy (as in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein...), others to general mathematics (Euclid's Elements, Cartesian algebraic geometry, Cantorian infinities, set theory...). Also serving as an introduction to the works and thought of major mathematicians and philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, Husserl and Weyl, this book will be of interest to a wide variety of readers, from scholars with a general interest in the philosophy or mathematics to philosophers and mathematicians themselves.

In this illuminating collection, Charles Parsons surveys the contributions of philosophers and mathematicians who shaped the philosophy of mathematics over the course of the past century. Parsons begins with a discussion of the Kantian legacy in the work of L. E. J. Brouwer, David Hilbert, and Paul Bernays, shedding light on how Bernays revised his philosophy after his collaboration with Hilbert. He considers Hermann Weyl's idea of a "vicious circle" in the foundations of mathematics, a radical claim that elicited many challenges. Turning to Kurt Goedel, whose incompleteness theorem transformed debate on the foundations of mathematics and brought mathematical logic to maturity, Parsons discusses his essay on Bertrand Russell's mathematical logic--Goedel's first mature philosophical statement and an avowal of his Platonistic view. Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century insightfully treats the contributions of figures the author knew personally: W. V. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Hao Wang, and William Tait. Quine's early work on ontology is explored, as is his nominalistic view of predication and his use of the genetic method of explanation in the late work The Roots of Reference. Parsons attempts to tease out Putnam's views on existence and ontology, especially in relation to logic and mathematics. Wang's contributions to subjects ranging from the concept of set, minds, and machines to the interpretation of Goedel are examined, as are Tait's axiomatic conception of mathematics, his minimalist realism, and his thoughts on historical figures.

Fifty years ago when Jacques Hadamard set out to explore how mathematicians invent new ideas, he considered the creative experiences of some of the greatest thinkers of his generation, such as George Polya, Claude Levi-Strauss, and Albert Einstein. It appeared that inspiration could strike anytime, particularly after an individual had worked hard on a problem for days and then turned attention to another activity. In exploring this phenomenon, Hadamard produced one of the most famous and cogent cases for the existence of unconscious mental processes in mathematical invention and other forms of creativity. Written before the explosion of research in computers and cognitive science, his book, originally titled "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field," remains an important tool for exploring the increasingly complex problem of mental life.

The roots of creativity for Hadamard lie not in consciousness, but in the long unconscious work of incubation, and in the unconscious aesthetic selection of ideas that thereby pass into consciousness. His discussion of this process comprises a wide range of topics, including the use of mental images or symbols, visualized or auditory words, "meaningless" words, logic, and intuition. Among the important documents collected is a letter from Albert Einstein analyzing his own mechanism of thought."

This volume brings together a collection of essays on the history and philosophy of probability and statistics by one of the eminent scholars in these subjects. Written over the last fifteen years, they fall into three broad categories. The first deals with the use of symmetry arguments in inductive probability, in particular, their use in deriving rules of succession (Carnap's 'continuum of inductive methods'). The second group deals with four outstanding individuals who made lasting contributions to probability and statistics in very different ways: Frank Ramsey, R. A. Fisher, Alan Turing, and Abraham de Moivre. The last group of essays deals with the problem of 'predicting the unpredictable' - making predictions when the range of possible outcomes is unknown in advance. The essays weave together the history and philosophy of these subjects and document the fascination that they have exercised for more than three centuries.

This volume brings together a collection of essays on the history and philosophy of probability and statistics by one of the eminent scholars in these subjects. Written over the last fifteen years, they fall into three broad categories. The first deals with the use of symmetry arguments in inductive probability, in particular, their use in deriving rules of succession (Carnap's 'continuum of inductive methods'). The second group deals with four outstanding individuals who made lasting contributions to probability and statistics in very different ways: Frank Ramsey, R. A. Fisher, Alan Turing, and Abraham de Moivre. The last group of essays deals with the problem of 'predicting the unpredictable' - making predictions when the range of possible outcomes is unknown in advance. The essays weave together the history and philosophy of these subjects and document the fascination that they have exercised for more than three centuries.

This book is a collection of fifteen essays that deal with issues at the intersection of phenomenology, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, Reason, Science, and Mathematics contains a general essay on Husserl's conception of science and logic, an essay of mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, and an essay of phenomenology and modern pure geometry. Part II is focused on Kurt Godel's interest in phenomenology. It explores Godel's ideas and also some work of Quine, Penelope Maddy and Roger Penrose. Part III deals with elementary, constructive areas of mathematics. These are areas of mathematics that are closer to their origins in simple cognitive activities and in everyday experience. This part of the book contains essays on intuitionism, Hermann Weyl, the notion of constructive proof, Poincave and Frege.

Belief revision is a topic of much interest in theoretical computer science and logic, and it forms a central problem in research into artificial intelligence. In simple terms: how do you update a database of knowledge in the light of new information? What if the new information is in conflict with something that was previously held to be true? An intelligent system should be able to accommodate all such cases. This book contains a collection of research articles on belief revision that are completely up to date and an introductory chapter that presents a survey of current research in the area and the fundamentals of the theory. Thus this volume will be useful as a textbook on belief revision.

Michael Potter presents a comprehensive new philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. Potter offers a thorough account of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the various axiom candidates. He discusses in detail the project of set-theoretic reduction, which aims to interpret the rest of mathematics in terms of set theory. The key question here is how to deal with the paradoxes that bedevil set theory. Potter offers a strikingly simple version of the most widely accepted response to the paradoxes, which classifies sets by means of a hierarchy of levels. What makes the book unique is that it interweaves a careful presentation of the technical material with a penetrating philosophical critique. Potter does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true. Set Theory and its Philosophy is a key text for philosophy, mathematical logic, and computer science.

Philosophical considerations, which are often ignored or treated casually, are given careful consideration in this introduction. Thomas Forster places the notion of inductively defined sets (recursive datatypes) at the center of his exposition resulting in an original analysis of well established topics. The presentation illustrates difficult points and includes many exercises. Little previous knowledge of logic is required and only a knowledge of standard undergraduate mathematics is assumed.

David Corfield provides a variety of innovative approaches to research in the philosophy of mathematics. His study ranges from an exploration of whether computers producing mathematical proofs or conjectures are doing real mathematics to the use of analogy; the prospects for a Bayesian confirmation theory; the notion of a mathematical research program; and the ways in which new concepts are justified. This highly original book will challenge philosophers as well as mathematicians to develop the broadest and most complete philosophical resources for research in their disciplines.

The Philosophy of Mathematics Today gives a panorama of the best current work in this lively field, through twenty essays specially written for this collection by leading figures. The topics include indeterminacy, logical consequence, mathematical methodology, abstraction, and both Hilbert's and Frege's foundational programmes. The collection will be an important source for research in the philosophy of mathematics for years to come.

Contributors Paul Benacerraf, George Boolos, John P. Burgess, Charles S. Chihara, Michael Detlefsen, Michael Dummett, Hartry Field, Kit Fine, Bob Hale, Richard G. Heck, Jnr., Geoffrey Hellman, Penelope Maddy, Karl-Georg Niebergall, Charles D. Parsons, Michael D. Resnik, Matthias Schirn, Stewart Shapiro, Peter Simons, W.W. Tait, Crispin Wright.

Philosophy of Science Today offers a state-of-the-art guide to this fast-developing area. An eminent international team of authors covers a wide range of topics at the intersection of philosophy and the sciences, including causation, realism, methodology, epistemology, and the philosophical foundations of physics, biology, and psychology.

An unabridged, unaltered printing of the Second Edition (1920), with original format, all footnotes and index: The Series of Natural Numbers - Definition of Number - Finitude and Mathematical Induction - The Definition of Order - Kinds of Relations - Similarity of Relations - Rational, Real, and Complex Numbers - Infinite Cardinal Numbers - Infinite Series and Ordinals - Limits and Continuity - Limits and Continuity of Functions - Selections and the Multiplicative Axiom - The Axiom of Infinity and Logical Types - Incompatibility and the Theory of Deductions - Propositional Functions - Descriptions - Classes - Mathematics and Logic - Index

Marcus Giaquinto tells the story of one of the great intellectual adventures of the modern era -- the attempt to find firm foundations for mathematics. From the late nineteenth century to the present day, this project has stimulated some of the most original and influential work in logic and philosophy.

This book studies the important issue of the possibility of conceptual change--a possibility traditionally denied by logicians--from the perspective of philosophy of mathematics. The author also looks at aspects of language, and his conclusions have implications for a theory of concepts, truth and thought. The book will appeal to readers in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, and the philosophy of mind and language.

Charles Chihara gives a thorough critical exposition of modal realism, the philosophical doctrine that there exist many possible worlds of which the actual world--the universe in which we live--is just one. The striking success of possible-worlds semantics in modal logic has made this ontological doctrine attractive. Modal realists maintain that philosophers must accept the existence of possible worlds if they wish to have the benefit of using possible-worlds semantics to assess modal arguments and explain modal principles. Chihara challenges this claim, and argues instead for modality without worlds; he offers a new account of the role of interpretations or structures of the formal languages of logic.

How should we reason in science? Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartmann offer a refreshing take on classical topics in philosophy of science, using a single key concept to explain and to elucidate manifold aspects of scientific reasoning. They present good arguments and good inferences as being characterized by their effect on our rational degrees of belief. Refuting the view that there is no place for subjective attitudes in 'objective science', Sprenger and Hartmann explain the value of convincing evidence in terms of a cycle of variations on the theme of representing rational degrees of belief by means of subjective probabilities (and changing them by Bayesian conditionalization). In doing so, they integrate Bayesian inference-the leading theory of rationality in social science-with the practice of 21st century science. Bayesian Philosophy of Science thereby shows how modeling such attitudes improves our understanding of causes, explanations, confirming evidence, and scientific models in general. It combines a scientifically minded and mathematically sophisticated approach with conceptual analysis and attention to methodological problems of modern science, especially in statistical inference, and is therefore a valuable resource for philosophers and scientific practitioners.

In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument and, indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct.

The initial volume of a comprehensive edition of Gödel's works, this book makes available for the first time in a single source all his publications from 1929 to 1936. The volume begins with an informative overview of Gödel's life and work and features facing English translations for all German originals, extensive explanatory and historical notes, and a complete biography. Volume 2 will contain the remainder of Gödel's published work, and subsequent volumes will include unpublished manuscripts, lectures, correspondence and extracts from the notebooks.

}There are two kinds of people: those who can do mathematics, and then theres the rest of us.Math is boring.Females have no facility for mathematics (and really dont need it, anyway).For many people who do not like math, these myths ring true.Calvin Clawson, the celebrated author of Mathematical Mysteries , has a unique talent for opening the door for the uninitiated to the splendors of mathematics. A writer in love with his subject, Clawson offers readers the perfect antidote to the phobias and misconceptions surrounding mathematics in MATHEMATICAL SORCERY . Contending that the power and beauty of mathematics are gifts in which we all can partake, he shows that the field of mathematics holds a bounty of wonder that can be reaped by any one of us in the hopes of discovering new truths.In this captivating quest for pure knowledge, Clawson takes us on a journey to the amazing discoveries of our ancient ancestors. He divulges the wisdom of the Ancient Greeks, Sumerians, Babylonians, and Egyptians, whose stunning revelations still have deep meaning to us today. The secrets of the constellations, the enigma of the golden mean, and the brilliance of a proof are just some of the breakthroughs he explores with unbridled delight.Enabling us to appreciate the achievements of Newton and other intellectual giants, Clawson inspires us through his eloquence and zeal to actually do mathematics, urging us to leap to the next level. He helps us intuitively comprehend and follow the very building blocks that too long have been a mystery to most of us, including infinity, functions, and the limit. As he elegantly states: Mathematics is pursued not only for the sheer joy of the pursuit, as with the Ancient Greeks, but for the truths it reveals about our universe. Through MATHEMATICAL SORCERY , we taste the fruit of knowledge that has eluded us until now. }

Naturalism in Mathematics investigates how the most fundamental assumptions of mathematics can be justified. One prevalent philosophical approach to the problem--realism--is examined and rejected in favour of another approach--naturalism--which attends more closely to practical considerations drawn from within mathematics itself. Penelope Maddy defines naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be successfully applied in set theory. Her clear, original discussion is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.