Bob Hale and Crispin Wright draw together here the key writings in which they have worked out their distinctive approach to the fundamental questions: what is mathematics about, and how do we know it? The volume features much new material: introduction, postscript, bibliographies, and a new essay on a key problem. The Reason's Proper Study is the strongest presentation yet of the controversial neo-Fregean view that mathematical knowledge may be based a priori on logic and definitional abstraction principles. It will prove indispensable reading not just to philosophers of mathematics but to all who are interested in the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological issues which the programme raises.

A state-of-the-art guide to the fast-developing area of the philosophy of science. An eminent international team of authors covers a wide range of topics at the intersection of philosophy and the sciences, including causation, realism, methodology, epistemology and the philosophical foundations of physics, biology and psychology. An expanded version of a special issue of the journal "BJPS", this collection should be valuable to advanced students as well as to scholars.

McCarthy develops a theory of Radical Interpertation - The project of characterizing from scratch the language and attituteds of an agent or population - and applies the theory to the problems of indeterminacy of interperation first descrided in the writings of Quine. The major theme in McCarthy's study is that a relatively modest set of interpertive principles, properly applied, can serve to resolve the major indeterminacies of interperation. Its most substantive contribution is in proposing a solution to problems of indeterminacy that remain unsloved in the literature.

2013 Reprint of 1931 edition. Full facsimile of the original edition, not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930) was a British mathematician who also made significant and precocious contributions in philosophy and economics before his death at the age of 26. He was a close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, and was instrumental in translating Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" into English, and in persuading Wittgenstein to return to philosophy and to Cambridge. This volume collects Ramsey's most important papers. Contents: The foundations of mathematics.--Mathematical logic.--On a problem of formal logic.--Universals.--Note on the preceding paper.--Facts and propositions.--Truth and probability.--Further considerations.--Last papers.

Jeffrey Barrett presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. Quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, accurately predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of matter. But it has an apparent ambiguity or inconsistency at its heart; Barrett gives a careful, clear, and challenging evaluation of attempts to deal with this problem.

Hartry Field presents a selection of thirteen of his most important essays on a set of related topics at the foundations of philosophy; one essay is previously unpublished, and eight are accompanied by substantial new postscripts. Five of the essays are primarily about truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes, five are primarily about semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of 'factual defectiveness' in our discourse, and three are primarily about issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. This influential work by a key figure in contemporary philosophy will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.

Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the relation between them. The rise of analytic philosophy decisively marked the end of the hundred-year dominance of Kant's philosophy in Europe. But Hanna shows that the analytic tradition also emerged from Kant's philosophy in the sense that its members were able to define and legitimate their ideas only by means of an intensive, extended engagement with, and a partial or complete rejection of, the Critical Philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defence of Kant's theory of analytic and synthetic necessary truth. These will make Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy compelling reading not just for specialists in the history of philosophy, but for all who are interested in these fundamental philosophical issues.

In The Non-Local Universe, Nadeau and Kafatos offer a revolutionary look at the breathtaking implications of non-locality. They argue that since every particle in the universe has been "entangled" with other particles, physical reality on the most basic level is an undivided wholeness. In addition to demonstrating that physical processes are vastly interdependent and interactive, they also show that more complex systems in both physics and biology display emergent properties and/or behaviours that cannot be explained in terms of the sum of the parts. One of the most startling implications of nonlocality in human, terms, claim the authors, is that there is no longer any basis for believing in the stark division between mind and world that has preoccupied much of Western thought since the seventeenth century.

Throughout his career, Keith Hossack has made outstanding contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of previously unpublished papers begins with a focus on Hossack's conception of the nature of knowledge, his metaphysics of facts and his account of the relations between knowledge, agents and facts. Attention moves to Hossack's philosophy of mind and the nature of consciousness, before turning to the notion of necessity and its interaction with a priori knowledge. Hossack's views on the nature of proof, logical truth, conditionals and generality are discussed in depth. In the final chapters, questions about the identity of mathematical objects and our knowledge of them take centre stage, together with questions about the necessity and generality of mathematical and logical truths. Knowledge, Number and Reality represents some of the most vibrant discussions taking place in analytic philosophy today.

Shapiro argues that both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics are problematic. To resolve this dilemma, he articulates a 'structuralist' approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.

Stewart Shapiro presents a distinctive original view of the foundations of mathematics, arguing that second-order logic has a central role to play in laying these foundations. He gives an accessible account of second-order and higher-order logic, paying special attention to philosophical and historical issues. Foundations without Foundationalism is a key contribution both to philosophy of mathematics and to mathematical logic.

'In this excellent treatise Shapiro defends the use of second-order languages and logic as frameworks for mathematics. His coverage of the wide range of logical and philosophical . . . is thorough, clear, and persuasive.' Michael D. Resnik, History and Philosophy of Logic

Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no abstract entities, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. A Subject With No Object cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous discussions of these projects, and presents clear, concise accounts, with minimal prerequisites, of a dozen strategies for nominalistic interpretation of mathematics, thus equipping the reader to evaluate each and to compare different ones. The authors also offer critical discussion, rare in the literature, of the aims and claims of nominalistic interpretation, suggesting that it is significant in a very different way from that usually assumed.

Mathematics as a Science of Patterns is the definitive exposition of Michael Resnik's distinctive view of the nature of mathematics. He calls mathematics a science on the grounds that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a defence of realism about the metaphysics of mathematics - the view that mathematics is about things that really exist.

'interesting, well written . . . [a] timely and important addition to contemporary philosophy of mathematics.' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

}There are two kinds of people: those who can do mathematics, and then theres the rest of us.Math is boring.Females have no facility for mathematics (and really dont need it, anyway).For many people who do not like math, these myths ring true.Calvin Clawson, the celebrated author of Mathematical Mysteries , has a unique talent for opening the door for the uninitiated to the splendors of mathematics. A writer in love with his subject, Clawson offers readers the perfect antidote to the phobias and misconceptions surrounding mathematics in MATHEMATICAL SORCERY . Contending that the power and beauty of mathematics are gifts in which we all can partake, he shows that the field of mathematics holds a bounty of wonder that can be reaped by any one of us in the hopes of discovering new truths.In this captivating quest for pure knowledge, Clawson takes us on a journey to the amazing discoveries of our ancient ancestors. He divulges the wisdom of the Ancient Greeks, Sumerians, Babylonians, and Egyptians, whose stunning revelations still have deep meaning to us today. The secrets of the constellations, the enigma of the golden mean, and the brilliance of a proof are just some of the breakthroughs he explores with unbridled delight.Enabling us to appreciate the achievements of Newton and other intellectual giants, Clawson inspires us through his eloquence and zeal to actually do mathematics, urging us to leap to the next level. He helps us intuitively comprehend and follow the very building blocks that too long have been a mystery to most of us, including infinity, functions, and the limit. As he elegantly states: Mathematics is pursued not only for the sheer joy of the pursuit, as with the Ancient Greeks, but for the truths it reveals about our universe. Through MATHEMATICAL SORCERY , we taste the fruit of knowledge that has eluded us until now. }

Mancosu provides the first comprehensive account of the relationship between mathematical advances of the seventeenth century and the philosophy of mathematics of the period. Starting with the Renaissance debates on the certainty of mathematics, Mancosu leads the reader through the foundational issues raised by the emergence of these new mathematical techniques. He draws a sophisticated picture of the subtle dependencies between technical development and philosophical reflection in seventeenth century mathematics.

To many outsiders, mathematicians appear to think like computers, grimly grinding away with a strict formal logic and moving methodically--even algorithmically--from one black-and-white deduction to another. Yet mathematicians often describe their most important breakthroughs as creative, intuitive responses to ambiguity, contradiction, and paradox. A unique examination of this less-familiar aspect of mathematics, "How Mathematicians Think" reveals that mathematics is a profoundly creative activity and not just a body of formalized rules and results.

Nonlogical qualities, William Byers shows, play an essential role in mathematics. Ambiguities, contradictions, and paradoxes can arise when ideas developed in different contexts come into contact. Uncertainties and conflicts do not impede but rather spur the development of mathematics. Creativity often means bringing apparently incompatible perspectives together as complementary aspects of a new, more subtle theory. The secret of mathematics is not to be found only in its logical structure.

The creative dimensions of mathematical work have great implications for our notions of mathematical and scientific truth, and "How Mathematicians Think" provides a novel approach to many fundamental questions. Is mathematics objectively true? Is it discovered or invented? And is there such a thing as a "final" scientific theory?

Ultimately, "How Mathematicians Think" shows that the nature of mathematical thinking can teach us a great deal about the human condition itself.

In this deft and vigorous book, Mark Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism (ie., the view that abstract, or non-spatio-temporal, mathematical objects exist, and that mathematical theories are descriptions of such objects). Balaguer does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible positions. In Part I, he shows that the former is defensible by introducing a novel version of platonism, which he calls full-blooded platonism, or FBP. He argues that if platonists endorse FBP, they can then solve all of the problems traditionally associated with their view, most notably the two Benacerrafian problems (that is, the epistemological problem and the non-uniqueness problem).
In Part II, Balaguer defends anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, chief among them the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. Balaguer's version of fictionalism bears similarities to Hartry Field's, but the arguments Balaguer uses to defend this view are very different. Parts I and II of this book taken together clearly establish that we do not have any good argument for or against platonism.
In Part III, Balaguer extends his conclusions, arguing that it is not simply that we do not currently have any good argument for or against platonism, but that we could never have such an argument, and indeed, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether platonism is correct (ie., whether there exist any abstract objects).
This lucid and accessibly written book breaks new ground in its area of engagement and makes vital reading for both specialists and anyone else interested in thephilosophy of mathematics or metaphysics in general.

This challenging book argues that a new way of speaking of mathematics and describing it emerged at the end of the sixteenth century. Leading mathematicians like Hariot, Stevin, Galileo, and Cavalieri began referring to their field in terms drawn from the exploration accounts of Columbus and Magellan. As enterprising explorers in search of treasures of knowledge, these mathematicians described themselves as sailing the treacherous seas of mathematics, facing shipwreck on the shoals of paradox, and seeking shelter and refuge on the shores of geometrical demonstrations. Mathematics, formerly praised for its logic, clarity, and inescapable truths, was for them a hazardous voyage in inhospitable geometrical lands.
Significantly, many of the same practitioners who promoted the vision of mathematics as heroic exploration also played central roles in developing the most important mathematical innovation of the period--the infinitesimal methods. This was no coincidence: the heroic tales of exploration and discovery helped shape a new form of mathematical practice, complete with new questions, new acceptable answers, and new standards of evidence. It was this new vision of mathematics as a grand adventure that allowed for the development of the new techniques that led to the Newtonian calculus.
In demonstrating this, the book moves from real voyages to imaginary ones, from the coasts of the Canadian Arctic to the tropical forests of Guyana, and from the inner structure of matter to the intricacies of the mathematical continuum. Throughout, a common rhetoric and imagery of exploration and discovery run like a thread through these diverse elements and bind them together.

Our much-valued mathematical knowledge rests on two supports: the logic of proof and the axioms from which those proofs begin. Naturalism in Mathematics investigates the status of the latter, the fundamental assumptions of mathematics. These were once held to be self-evident, but progress in work on the foundations of mathematics, especially in set theory, has rendered that comforting notion obsolete. Given that candidates for axiomatic status cannot be proved, what sorts of considerations can be offered for or against them? That is the central question addressed in this book. One answer is that mathematics aims to describe an objective world of mathematical objects, and that axiom candidates should be judged by their truth or falsity in that world. This promising view-realism-is assessed and finally rejected in favour of another-naturalism-which attends less to metaphysical considerations of objective truth and falsity, and more to practical considerations drawn from within mathematics itself. Penelope Maddy defines this naturalism, explains the motivation for it, and shows how it can be helpfully applied in the assessment of candidates for axiomatic status in set theory. Maddy's clear, original treatment of this fundamental issue is informed by current work in both philosophy and mathematics, and will be accessible and enlightening to readers from both disciplines.

The Taming of the True poses a broad challenge to the realist views of meaning and truth that have been prominent in recent philosophy. Neil Tennant starts with a careful critical survey of the realism debate, guiding the reader through its complexities; he then presents a sustained defence of the anti-realist view that every truth is knowable in principle, and that grasp of meaning must be able to be made manifest. Sceptical arguments for the indeterminacy or non-factuality of meaning are countered; and the much-maligned notion of analyticity is reinvestigated and rehabilitated. Tennant goes on to show that an effective logical system can be based on his anti-realist view; the logical system that he advocates is justified as a body of analytic truths and inferential principles. Having laid the foundations for global semantic anti-realism, Tennant moves to the world of empirical understanding, and gives an account of the cognitive credentials of natural scientific discourse. He shows that the same canon of constructive and relevant inference suffices both for intuitionistic mathematics and for empirical science. This is an ambitious and contentious book which aims to reform not only theory of meaning, but our deductive practices across a broad range of discourses.

Substance and the Fundamentality of the Familiar explicates and defends a novel neo-Aristotelian account of the structure of material objects. While there have been numerous treatments of properties, laws, causation, and modality in the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics literature, this book is one of the first full-length treatments of wholes and their parts. Another aim of the book is to further develop the newly revived area concerning the question of fundamental mereology, the question of whether wholes are metaphysically prior to their parts or vice versa. Inman develops a fundamental mereology with a grounding-based conception of the structure and unity of substances at its core, what he calls substantial priority, one that distinctively allows for the fundamentality of ordinary, medium-sized composite objects. He offers both empirical and philosophical considerations against the view that the parts of every composite object are metaphysically prior, in particular the view that ascribes ontological pride of place to the smallest microphysical parts of composite objects, which currently dominates debates in metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind. Ultimately, he demonstrates that substantial priority is well-motivated in virtue of its offering a unified solution to a host of metaphysical problems involving material objects.

A book that finally demystifies Newton's experiments in alchemy When Isaac Newton's alchemical papers surfaced at a Sotheby's auction in 1936, the quantity and seeming incoherence of the manuscripts were shocking. No longer the exemplar of Enlightenment rationality, the legendary physicist suddenly became "the last of the magicians." Newton the Alchemist unlocks the secrets of Newton's alchemical quest, providing a radically new understanding of the uncommon genius who probed nature at its deepest levels in pursuit of empirical knowledge. In this evocative and superbly written book, William Newman blends in-depth analysis of newly available texts with laboratory replications of Newton's actual experiments in alchemy. He does not justify Newton's alchemical research as part of a religious search for God in the physical world, nor does he argue that Newton studied alchemy to learn about gravitational attraction. Newman traces the evolution of Newton's alchemical ideas and practices over a span of more than three decades, showing how they proved fruitful in diverse scientific fields. A precise experimenter in the realm of "chymistry," Newton put the riddles of alchemy to the test in his lab. He also used ideas drawn from the alchemical texts to great effect in his optical experimentation. In his hands, alchemy was a tool for attaining the material benefits associated with the philosopher's stone and an instrument for acquiring scientific knowledge of the most sophisticated kind. Newton the Alchemist provides rare insights into a man who was neither Enlightenment rationalist nor irrational magus, but rather an alchemist who sought through experiment and empiricism to alter nature at its very heart.

Reprint. Paperback. 387 pp. Diophantus of Alexandria, sometimes called "the father of algebra," was an Alexandrian mathematician and the author of a series of books called Arithmetica. These texts deal with solving algebraic equations, many of which are now lost. In studying Arithmetica, Pierre de Fermat concluded that a certain equation considered by Diophantus had no solutions, and noted without elaboration that he had found "a truly marvelous proof of this proposition," now referred to as Fermat's Last Theorem. This led to tremendous advances in number theory, and the study of diophantine equations ("diophantine geometry") and of diophantine approximations remain important areas of mathematical research. Diophantus was the first Greek mathematician who recognized fractions as numbers; thus he allowed positive rational numbers for the coefficients and solutions. In modern use, diophantine equations are usually algebraic equations with integer coefficients, for which integer solutions are sought. Diophantus also made advances in mathematical notation. Heath's work is one of the standard books in the field.

This book deals with a crucial period in the formation of twentieth-century analytic philosophy. It discusses the tradition of British Idealism, and the rejection of that tradition by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the beginning of this century. It goes on to examine the very influential work of Russell in the period up to the First World War, and addresses the question of what we can learn about the nature of analytic philosophy through a close examination of its origins.