The book reports experimental studies and a theoretical investigation of non-cooperative bargaining games with joint production. Such games have rarely been studied within laboratory experiments despite being more general and more natural than bargaining without production. It is shown that equity theory is a good predictor of subjects' behavior. Furthermore subjects exhibit different equity notions. One chapter addresses problems of statistical data analysis that are specific to experiments. Applying evolutionary game theory within a model of bargaining with production it is shown theoretically that altruistic preferences, which generate moderate bargaining behavior, can survive the process of evolution.

The alternating double auction market institution is presented as a discrete time version of the open outcry market. The game in extensive form is analyzed in an almost perfect information setting, using the concept of subgame perfectness. By applying two new equilibrium selection criteria, a general existence result is obtained for "impatience equilibria" of the game. All such equilibria are shown to have unique properties concerning the traded quantities and prices. The most important results are that the equilibrium prices are independent of the number of traders and are always very close to - if not inside - the range of competitive prices. The latter can be evaluated as game theoretic support for the convergence of prices to the competitive price. The process of price formation is traced by applying the learning direction theory and introducing the "anchor price hypothesis."

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

This book aims to contribute to the discussion about the implications of fuzzy logic, neural networks, digital era, and other intelligent techniques on organizations. This book will be very useful for academic researchers and postgraduate students aiming to introduce themselves to the field of quantitative techniques for overcoming uncertain environments and developing models to make decisions. Developments in other theories and socioeconomic and computational changes have shed light on the importance of fuzzy applications in social sciences. The treatment of uncertainty in the economic and business analysis is fundamental and requires instruments compatible with the uncertain environment of economics and business, because most of the traditional models have been overtaken by this reality when trying to make decisions with uncertain information. In the face of information technology, digitization, and uncertainty, organizations confront new opportunities and challenges. In order to take advantage of these opportunities and overcome current and future challenges, it is needed to understand the evolution of these phenomenon.

The structure of a Silverman game can be explained very quickly: Each of two players independently selects a number out of a prede termined set, not necessarily the same one for both of them. The higher number wins unless it is at least k times as high as the other one; if this is the case the lower number wins. The game ends in a draw if both numbers are equal. k is a constant greater than 1. The simplicity of the rules stimulates the curiosity of the the orist. Admittedly, Silverman games do not seem to have a direct applied significance, but nevertheless much can be learnt from their study. This book succeeds to give an almost complete overview over the structure of optimal strategies and it reveals a surprising wealth of interesting detail. A field like game theory does not only need research on broad questions and fundamental issues, but also specialized work on re stricted topics. Even if not many readers are interested in the subject matter, those who are will appreciate this monograph."

Evolution and learning in games is a topic of current intense interest. Evolution theory is widely viewed as one of the most promising approaches to understanding learning, bounded rationality, and change in complex social environments. This graduate textbook covers the recent developments with an emphasis on economic contexts and applications. Covering both deterministic and stochastic evolutionary dynamics which play an important role in evolutionary processes, it also includes the recent stochastic evolutionary framework that has been developed (and applied widely) in the last few years. The recent boom experienced by this discipline makes this book's systematic presentation of its essential contributions, using mathematical knowledge only when required, especially useful for any newcomer to the field. Packed with numerous economic applications of the theory, with suggestions for new avenues of research, it will prove invaluable to postgraduate economists.

Game theory is a fascinating subject. We all know many entertaining games, such as chess, poker, tic-tac-toe, bridge, baseball, computer games - the list is quite varied and almost endless. In addition, there is a vast area of economic games, discussed in Myerson (1991) and Kreps (1990), and the related political games [Ordeshook (1986), Shubik (1982), and Taylor (1995)]. The competition between firms, the conflict between management and labor, the fight to get bills through congress, the power of the judiciary, war and peace negotiations between countries, and so on, all provide examples of games in action. There are also psychological games played on a personal level, where the weapons are words, and the payoffs are good or bad feelings [Berne (1964)]. There are biological games, the competition between species, where natural selection can be modeled as a game played between genes [Smith (1982)]. There is a connection between game theory and the mathematical areas of logic and computer science. One may view theoretical statistics as a two-person game in which nature takes the role of one of the players, as in Blackwell and Girshick (1954) and Ferguson (1968).Games are characterized by a number of players or decision makers who interact, possibly threaten each other and form coalitions, take actions under uncertain conditions, and finally receive some benefit or reward or possibly some punishment or monetary loss. In this text, we present various mathematical models of games and study the phenomena that arise. In some cases, we will be able to suggest what courses of action should be taken by the players. In others, we hope simply to be able to understand what is happening in order to make better predictions about the future.

This book is the result of a four years' research project at the European Uni versity Institute in Florence, Italy. I am grateful to my supervisor, Mark Salmon, for his many ideas. I am also indebted to my co-supervisor, Aart de Zeeuw, for his and Alister Ulph. unfailing support and to Carlo Carraro, Louis Phlips I gratefully acknowledge the help and assistance of many people that advised at some stage, Scott Barrett, Peter Bohm, Lans Bovenberg, Partha Dasgupta, me Klaus Hasselman, Peter Kort, alIi Tahvonen, Cees Withagen and Clifford Wymer. Thanks also to the faculty and students of the Department of Economics of the European University Institute and especially to Jacqueline, Jessica, Marcia and Barbara for their moral support; my Italian teacher Camilla; my 'Gruppo di Lavoro' Tilman, Peter and Luisa; my dear Dutch friends Yvo, Pieter, Ida and Ellen; international friends Bogdan, Stuart, Melanie, Henning, Anantha, Paolo, Pompeo, Nikos, Christian, Analisa, Dorothea, Valeria and Stefani a; the members of the Working Group of Environmental Studies; and finally my girlfriends who gave up on me because they thought I was working too hard and not spending enough time with them. Also many thanks to my landlady Olga, who taught me the beauty of Italian literature and opera and my landlord Emilio and their dog Igor. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Larry Susskind and to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where I spent an extremely inspiring semester."

This advanced textbook covers the central topics in game theory and provides a strong basis from which readers can go on to more advanced topics. The subject matter is approached in a mathematically rigorous, yet lively and interesting way. New definitions and topics are motivated as thoroughly as possible. Coverage includes the idea of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (super games) and challenging game-playing computer programs.

Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Used to explain complicated economic behavior for decades, game theory is quickly becoming a tool of choice for those serious about optimizing next generation wireless systems. Illustrating how game theory can effectively address a wide range of issues that until now remained unresolved, Game Theory for Wireless Communications and Networking provides a systematic introduction to the application of this powerful and dynamic tool. This comprehensive technical guide explains game theory basics, architectures, protocols, security, models, open research issues, and cutting-edge advances and applications. It describes how to employ game theory in infrastructure-based wireless networks and multihop networks to reduce power consumption-while improving system capacity, decreasing packet loss, and enhancing network resilience. Providing for complete cross-referencing, the text is organized into four parts: Fundamentals-introduces the fundamental issues and solutions in applying different games in different wireless domains, including wireless sensor networks, vehicular networks, and OFDM-based wireless systems Power Control Games-considers issues and solutions in power control games Economic Approaches-reviews applications of different economic approaches, including bargaining and auction-based approaches Resource Management-explores how to use the game theoretic approach to address radio resource management issues The book explains how to apply the game theoretic model to address specific issues, including resource allocation, congestion control, attacks, routing, energy management, packet forwarding, and MAC. Facilitating quick and easy reference to related optimization and algorithm methodologies, it supplies you with the background and tools required to use game theory to drive the improvement and development

In a book sure to stir argument for years to come, Robert Wright challen+ges the conventional view that biological evolution and human history are aimless. Ingeniously employing game theory – the logic of ‘zero-sum’ and ‘non-zero-sum’ games – Wright isolates the impetus behind life’s basic direction: the impetus that, via biological evolution, created complex, intelligent animals, and then via cultural evolution, pushed the human species towards deeper and vaster social complexity. In this view, the coming of today’s independent global society was ‘in the cards’ – not quite inevitable, but, as Wright puts it, ‘so probable as to inspire wonder’. In a narrative of breathtaking scope and erudition, yet pungent wit, Wright takes on some of the past century’s most prominent thinkers, including Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper, Stephen Jay Gould, and Richard Dawkins. Wright argues that a coolly specific appraisal of humanity’s three-billion-year past can give new spiritual meaning to the present and even offer political guidance for the future. This book will change the way people think about the human prospect.
 

These Notes grew from my research in evolutionary biology, specifically on the theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS theory), over the past ten years. Personally, evolutionary game theory has given me the opportunity to transfer my enthusiasm for abstract mathematics to more practical pursuits. I was fortunate to have entered this field in its infancy when many biologists recognized its potential but were not prepared to grant it general acceptance. This is no longer the case. ESS theory is now a rapidly expanding (in both applied and theoretical directions) force that no evolutionary biologist can afford to ignore. Perhaps, to continue the life-cycle metaphor, ESS theory is now in its late adolescence and displays much of the optimism and exuberance of this exciting age. There are dangers in writing a text about a theory at this stage of development. A comprehensive treatment would involve too many loose ends for the reader to appreciate the central message. On the other hand, the current central message may soon become obsolete as the theory matures. Although the restricted topics I have chosen for this text reflect my own research bias, I am confident they will remain the theoretical basis of ESS theory. Indeed, I feel the adult maturity of ESS theory is close at hand and I hope the text will play an important role in this achievement.

This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

In 1984 the German Aerospace Research Establishment - Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fOr Luft-und Raumfahrt e.V. (DLR) -Initiated a series of seminars related to fundamental prob- lems In fluid mechanics, flight mechanics, guidance and control, materials and structures, non-nuclear energetics, communication technology, and remote sensing. The main purpose of the seminars Is to bring modern Ideas and techniques In these fields to the attention of DLR scientists and engineers in order to stimulate internal activities as well as International cooperation. To this end, prominent speakers are Invited to Join In a series of lectures and discussions on topics of mutual Interest. After the preceding seminars 1984 Nonlinear Dynamics In Transcritical Flows 1985 Uncertainty and Control 1986 Artificial Intelligence and Man-Machine-Systems 1987 Parallel Computing in Science and Engineering 1988 Hydrocarbon Oxidation a sixth seminar on HOptimlzation: Methods and Applications, Possibilities and LimitatlonsH Is being conducted In 1989. Optimization takes place wherever a choice among alternatives exists: in daily life, In eco- nomics, In politics, in nature and also in engineering. The availability of powerful computers makes It possible to solve complex optimization problems efficiently, and to react flexibly to changes of reqUirements. The seminar addresses the potential of a systematic, computer-aided approach to optimiza- tion problems. The presentations Include fundamental principles and practical applications to aerospace structures as well as evolution techniques and biotechnological optimization processes.

The book focuses on Pareto optimality in cooperative games. Most of the existing works focus on the Pareto optimality of deterministic continuous-time systems or for the regular convex LQ case. To expand on the available literature, we explore the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in stochastic differential game for more general cases. In addition, the LQ Pareto game for stochastic singular systems, Pareto-based guaranteed cost control for uncertain mean-field stochastic systems, and the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in cooperative difference game are also studied in detail. Addressing Pareto optimality for more general cases and wider systems is one of the major features of the book, making it particularly suitable for readers who are interested in multi-objective optimal control. Accordingly, it offers a valuable asset for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of control theory and control engineering, economics, management science, mathematics, etc.

A comprehensive work in finite-value systems that covers the latest achievements using the semi-tensor product method, on various kinds of finite-value systems. These results occupy the highest position in the analysis and control of this field. It not only covers all aspects of research in finite-value systems, but also presents the mathematical derivation for each conclusion in depth. The book contains examples to provide a better understanding of the practical applications of finite-value systems. It will serve as a textbook for graduate students of Cybernetics, Mathematical, and Biology, and a reference for readers interested in the theory of finite-value systems.

Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships. Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology. Logically demanding, Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies conveys an intuitive understanding of the theory of games through the use of real-world examples to exemplify the 'theory in action'.

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

"Game Theory" will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

The scientific study of complex systems has transformed a wide range of disciplines in recent years, enabling researchers in both the natural and social sciences to model and predict phenomena as diverse as earthquakes, global warming, demographic patterns, financial crises, and the failure of materials. In this book, Didier Sornette boldly applies his varied experience in these areas to propose a simple, powerful, and general theory of how, why, and when stock markets crash. Most attempts to explain market failures seek to pinpoint triggering mechanisms that occur hours, days, or weeks before the collapse. Sornette proposes a radically different view: the underlying cause can be sought months and even years before the abrupt, catastrophic event in the build-up of cooperative speculation, which often translates into an accelerating rise of the market price, otherwise known as a "bubble." Anchoring his sophisticated, step-by-step analysis in leading-edge physical and statistical modeling techniques, he unearths remarkable insights and some predictions--among them, that the "end of the growth era" will occur around 2050. Sornette probes major historical precedents, from the decades-long "tulip mania" in the Netherlands that wilted suddenly in 1637 to the South Sea Bubble that ended with the first huge market crash in England in 1720, to the Great Crash of October 1929 and Black Monday in 1987, to cite just a few. He concludes that most explanations other than cooperative self-organization fail to account for the subtle bubbles by which the markets lay the groundwork for catastrophe. Any investor or investment professional who seeks a genuine understanding of looming financial disasters should read this book. Physicists, geologists, biologists, economists, and others will welcome Why Stock Markets Crash as a highly original "scientific tale," as Sornette aptly puts it, of the exciting and sometimes fearsome--but no longer quite so unfathomable--world of stock markets.

This book introduces econometric analysis of cross section, time series and panel data with the application of statistical software. It serves as a basic text for those who wish to learn and apply econometric analysis in empirical research. The level of presentation is as simple as possible to make it useful for undergraduates as well as graduate students. It contains several examples with real data and Stata programmes and interpretation of the results. While discussing the statistical tools needed to understand empirical economic research, the book attempts to provide a balance between theory and applied research. Various concepts and techniques of econometric analysis are supported by carefully developed examples with the use of statistical software package, Stata 15.1, and assumes that the reader is somewhat familiar with the Strata software. The topics covered in this book are divided into four parts. Part I discusses introductory econometric methods for data analysis that economists and other social scientists use to estimate the economic and social relationships, and to test hypotheses about them, using real-world data. There are five chapters in this part covering the data management issues, details of linear regression models, the related problems due to violation of the classical assumptions. Part II discusses some advanced topics used frequently in empirical research with cross section data. In its three chapters, this part includes some specific problems of regression analysis. Part III deals with time series econometric analysis. It covers intensively both the univariate and multivariate time series econometric models and their applications with software programming in six chapters. Part IV takes care of panel data analysis in four chapters. Different aspects of fixed effects and random effects are discussed here. Panel data analysis has been extended by taking dynamic panel data models which are most suitable for macroeconomic research. The book is invaluable for students and researchers of social sciences, business, management, operations research, engineering, and applied mathematics.

The definitive guide to the game theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin's security model. Discusses, how Bitcoin works, includes an overview of probability and game theory and provides a quantitative analysis for Bitcoin security under attack modes. Explains, possible attacks on Bitcoin as its influence grows and includes breakdown of how the how the block reward schedule and adoption will affect the vulnerability of the network.

Ken Binmore's previous game theory textbook, Fun and Games (D.C. Heath, 1991), carved out a significant niche in the advanced undergraduate market; it was intellectually serious and more up-to-date than its competitors, but also accessibly written. Its central thesis was that game theory allows us to understand many kinds of interactions between people, a point that Binmore amply demonstrated through a rich range of examples and applications. This replacement for the now out-of-date 1991 textbook retains the entertaining examples, but changes the organization to match how game theory courses are actually taught, making Playing for Real a more versatile text that almost all possible course designs will find easier to use, with less jumping about than before. In addition, the problem sections, already used as a reference by many teachers, have become even more clever and varied, without becoming too technical. Playing for Real will sell into advanced undergraduate courses in game theory, primarily those in economics, but also courses in the social sciences, and serve as a reference for economists.