This book comprises selected papers of the 25th International Conference on Difference Equations and Applications, ICDEA 2019, held at UCL, London, UK, in June 2019. The volume details the latest research on difference equations and discrete dynamical systems, and their application to areas such as biology, economics, and the social sciences. Some chapters have a tutorial style and cover the history and more recent developments for a particular topic, such as chaos, bifurcation theory, monotone dynamics, and global stability. Other chapters cover the latest personal research contributions of the author(s) in their particular area of expertise and range from the more technical articles on abstract systems to those that discuss the application of difference equations to real-world problems. The book is of interest to both Ph.D. students and researchers alike who wish to keep abreast of the latest developments in difference equations and discrete dynamical systems.

This book includes papers presented at the ISDG12-GTM2019 International Meeting on Game Theory, as a joint meeting of the 12th International ISDG Workshop and the 13th "International Conference on Game Theory and Management", held in St. Petersburg in July 2019. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

This book about mathematics and methodology for economics is the result of the lifelong experience of the authors. It is written for university students as well as for students of applied sciences. This self-contained book does not assume any previous knowledge of high school mathematics and helps understanding the basics of economic theory-building. Starting from set theory it thoroughly discusses linear and non-linear functions, differential equations, difference equations, and all necessary theoretical constructs for building sound economic models. The authors also present a solid introduction to linear optimisation and game theory using production systems. A detailed discussion on market equilibrium, in particular on Nash Equilibrium, and on non-linear optimisation is also provided. Throughout the book the student is well supplied with numerous examples, some 2000 problems and their solutions to apply the knowledge to economic theories and models.

This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.

This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the properties of decision rules and of the functioning of modern democracies. In particular, it focuses on the legacy of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, two prominent scholars who have made important contributions to this field over the last fifty years. It covers a range of topics, including (but not limited to) computational and technical aspects of probability approaches, evaluation of the likelihood of voting paradoxes, power indices, empirical evaluations of voting rules, models of voters' behavior, and strategic voting. The book gathers articles written in honor of Gehrlein and Lepelley along with original works written by the two scholars themselves.

This book provides a modern and comprehensive presentation of a wide variety of problems arising in nonlinear analysis, game theory, engineering, mathematical physics and contact mechanics. It includes recent achievements and puts them into the context of the existing literature. The volume is organized in four parts. Part I contains fundamental mathematical results concerning convex and locally Lipschits functions. Together with the Appendices, this foundational part establishes the self-contained character of the text. As the title suggests, in the following sections, both variational and topological methods are developed based on critical and fixed point results for nonsmooth functions. The authors employ these methods to handle the exemplary problems from game theory and engineering that are investigated in Part II, respectively Part III. Part IV is devoted to applications in contact mechanics. The book will be of interest to PhD students and researchers in applied mathematics as well as specialists working in nonsmooth analysis and engineering.

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the "New York Times," tthe "American Economic Review," and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.

This book develops a detailed, disaggregated theoretical and empirical framework that explains variations in mass killing by authoritarian regimes globally, with a specific focus on Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Using a combination of game-theoretic, statistical, and qualitative approaches, this project explicates when civilians within nondemocratic states will mobilize against the ruling elite, and when such mobilization will result in mass killing. In doing so, it illustrates the important role urbanization and food insecurity historically played, and will continue to play, in generating extreme forms of civilian victimization.

Economic archaeology and ancient economic history have boomed the past decades. The former thanks to greatly enhanced techniques to identify, collect, and interpret material remains as proxies for economic interactions and performance; the latter by embracing the frameworks of new institutional economics. Both disciplines, however, still have great difficulty talking with each other. There is no reliable method to convert ancient proxy-data into the economic indicators used in economic history. In turn, the shared cultural belief-systems underlying institutions and the symbolic ways in which these are reproduced remain invisible in the material record. This book explores ways to bring both disciplines closer together by building a theoretical and methodological framework to evaluate and integrate archaeological proxy-data in economic history research. Rather than the linear interpretations offered by neoclassical or neomalthusian models, we argue that complexity economics, based on system theory, offers a promising way forward.

The purpose of this book is to present unpublished papers at the cutting edge of research on dialetheism and to reflect recent work on the applications of the theory. It includes contributions from some of the most respected scholars in the field, as well as from young, up-and-coming philosophers working on dialetheism. Moving from the fringes of philosophy to become a main player in debates concerning truth and the logical paradoxes, dialetheism has thrived since the publication of Graham Priest's In Contradiction, and several of the papers find their roots in a conference on dialetheism held in Glasgow to mark the 25th anniversary of Priest's book. The content presented here demonstrates the considerable body of work produced in this field in recent years. With a broad focus, this book also addresses the applications of dialetheism outside the more familiar area of the logical paradoxes, and includes pieces discussing the application of dialetheism in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.

This book discusses imaginary future generations and how current decision-making will influence those future generations. Markets and democracies focus on the present and therefore tend to make us forget that we are living in the present, with ancestors preceding and descendants succeeding us. Markets are excellent devices to equate supply and demand in the short term, but not for allocating resources between current and future generations, since future generations do not exist yet. Democracy is also not "applicable" for future generations, since citizens vote for candidates who will serve members of their, i.e., the current, generation. In order to overcome these shortcomings, the authors discusses imaginary future generations and future ministries in the context of current decision-making in fields such as the environment, urban management, forestry, water management, and finance. The idea of imaginary future generations comes from the Native American Iroquois, who had strong norms that compelled them to incorporate the interests of people seven generations ahead when making decisions.

The goal of this book is to elaborate on the main principles of the theory of the Berge equilibrium by answering the following two questions: What are the basic properties of the Berge equilibrium? Does the Berge equilibrium exist, and how can it be calculated? The Golden Rule of ethics, which appears in Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism and other world religions, states the following: "Behave towards others as you would like them to behave towards you." In any game, each party of conflict seeks to maximize some payoff. Therefore, for each player, the Golden Rule is implemented through the maximization of his/her payoff by all other players, which matches well with the concept of the Berge equilibrium. The approach presented here will be of particular interest to researchers (including undergraduates and graduates) and economists focused on decision-making under complex conflict conditions. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is the cornerstone of the approach: as a matter of fact, the Golden Rule precludes military clashes and violence. In turn, the new approach requires new methods; in particular, the existence problems are reduced to saddle point design for the Germeier convolution of payoff functions, with further transition to mixed strategies in accordance with the standard procedure employed by E. Borel, J. von Neumann, J. Nash, and their followers. Moreover, this new approach has proven to be efficient and fruitful with regard to a range of other important problems in mathematical game theory, which are considered in the Appendix.

This textbook covers microeconomic theory at the level of intermediate and advanced undergraduates. It is also intended as an introduction for those with other intellectual and academic backgrounds who may not necessarily agree with "mainstream" economists but at least are interested knowing how they think and see things. The book provides thorough explanations of definitions and assumptions that the theory is based upon. It provides comprehensive accounts of motivations and reservations behind the theory. As well, it precisely presents the logical process of how the assumptions lead to the conclusion, conveying the intuition and the key of the arguments. An abundance of topics is included here: individual choice, general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, game theory, imperfect competition, transaction under incomplete information, market failures, welfare economics, social choice and mechanism design. The book is a valuable resource for any reader studying or simply interested in microeconomic theory.

Als mehrbandiges Nachschlagewerk ist das Springer-Handbuch der Mathematik in erster Linie fur wissenschaftliche Bibliotheken, akademische Institutionen und Firmen sowie interessierte Individualkunden in Forschung und Lehregedacht. Es erganzt das einbandige themenumfassende Springer-Taschenbuch der Mathematik (ehemaliger Titel Teubner-Taschenbuch der Mathematik), das sich in seiner begrenzten Stoffauswahl besonders an Studierende richtet. Teil III des Springer-Handbuchs enthalt neben den Kapiteln 5-9 des Springer-Taschenbuchs zusatzliches Material zu stochastischen Prozessen.

This textbook for master programs in economics offers a comprehensive overview of microeconomics. It employs a carefully graded approach where basic game theory concepts are already explained within the simpler decision framework. The unavoidable mathematical content is supplied when needed, not in an appendix. The book covers a lot of ground, from decision theory to game theory, from bargaining to auction theory, from household theory to oligopoly theory, and from the theory of general equilibrium to regulation theory. Additionally, cooperative game theory is introduced. This textbook has been recommended and developed for university courses in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.

This contributed volume presents the state-of-the-art of games and dynamic games, featuring several chapters based on plenary sessions at the ISDG-China Chapter Conference on Dynamic Games and Game Theoretic Analysis, which was held from August 3-5, 2017 at the Ningbo campus of the University of Nottingham, China. The chapters in this volume will provide readers with paths to further research, serving as a testimony to the vitality of the field. Experts cover a range of theory and applications related to games and dynamic games, with topics including: Dynamically stable cooperative provision of public goods under non-transferable utility Strongly time-consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games Incentive Stackelberg games for stochastic systems Static and inverse Stackelberg games in political economy Cournot and Betrand competition on symmetric R&D networks Numerical Nash equilibria using curvilinear multistart algorithm Markov chain approximation numerical scheme for infinite-horizon mean field games Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games will appeal to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in games and dynamic games.

Market Structure and Competition Policy applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy.

This book presents a compendium of selected game- and decision-theoretic models to achieve and assess the security of critical infrastructures. Given contemporary reports on security incidents of various kinds, we can see a paradigm shift to attacks of an increasingly heterogeneous nature, combining different techniques into what we know as an advanced persistent threat. Security precautions must match these diverse threat patterns in an equally diverse manner; in response, this book provides a wealth of techniques for protection and mitigation. Much traditional security research has a narrow focus on specific attack scenarios or applications, and strives to make an attack "practically impossible." A more recent approach to security views it as a scenario in which the cost of an attack exceeds the potential reward. This does not rule out the possibility of an attack but minimizes its likelihood to the least possible risk. The book follows this economic definition of security, offering a management scientific view that seeks a balance between security investments and their resulting benefits. It focuses on optimization of resources in light of threats such as terrorism and advanced persistent threats. Drawing on the authors' experience and inspired by real case studies, the book provides a systematic approach to critical infrastructure security and resilience. Presenting a mixture of theoretical work and practical success stories, the book is chiefly intended for students and practitioners seeking an introduction to game- and decision-theoretic techniques for security. The required mathematical concepts are self-contained, rigorously introduced, and illustrated by case studies. The book also provides software tools that help guide readers in the practical use of the scientific models and computational frameworks.

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

"Game Theory" will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

This book offers the first systematic analysis of economic thought concerning war. It retraces debates on war from the formation of European states, the rise of Mercantilism, to Colonialism, Imperialism, the World Wars and the Cold War. Allio shows different economic perspectives from which it is possible to study war as a tool to achieve economic ends: causes, consequences, costs, funding methods, and effects on the economic status of the state and on the well-being of citizens. Examining interpretations from Smith, Hobson, Keynes, Kalecki, Stiglitz and many more, this important volume addresses the economic implications of war from the perspectives of many who bore the costs of wars in reality.

This book constitutes revised selected and extended papers presented at track 4 of the Conference on Computer Science and Intelligence Systems, FedCSIS 2020, which took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, during September 6-9, 2020. The FedCSIS Information Systems and Technologies Track included AIST 2020, DSH 2020, ISM 2020, and KAM 2020. For this track, a total of 29 submissions was received from which a total of 5 full and 3 short papers was accepted for publication in this volume. The papers were organized in topical sections named: improving project management methods; numerical methods of solving management problems; and technological infrastructure for business excellence.

This book provides a timely and comprehensive overview of current theories and methods in fuzzy logic, as well as relevant applications in a variety of fields of science and technology. Dedicated to Lotfi A. Zadeh on his one year death anniversary, the book goes beyond a pure commemorative text. Yet, it offers a fresh perspective on a number of relevant topics, such as computing with words, theory of perceptions, possibility theory, and decision-making in a fuzzy environment. Written by Zadeh's closest colleagues and friends, the different chapters are intended both as a timely reference guide and a source of inspiration for scientists, developers and researchers who have been dealing with fuzzy sets or would like to learn more about their potential for their future research.

This book focuses on the latest advances in nonlinear dynamic modeling in economics and finance, mainly-but not solely-based on the description of strategic interaction by using concepts and methods from dynamic and evolutionary game theory. The respective chapters cover a range of theoretical issues and examples concerning how the qualitative theory of dynamical systems is used to analyze the local and global bifurcations that characterize complex behaviors observed in social systems where heterogeneous and boundedly rational economic agents interact. Nonlinear dynamical systems, represented by difference and differential and functional equations, are extensively used to simulate the behavior of time-evolving economic systems, also in the presence of time lags, discontinuities, and hysteresis phenomena. In addition, some theoretical issues and particular applications are discussed, as well. The contributions gathered here offer an up-to-date review of the latest research in this rapidly developing research area.

The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who are seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking effective mathematical tools for their research. A lot of economic problems can be formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories.

This book provides an introduction to the models, methods, and results of some due date-related scheduling problems in the field of multiagent scheduling. In multiagent scheduling, two or more agents share a common processing resource and each agent wants to optimize its own objective function with respect to its own set of jobs. Since the agents have conflicting objective functions, they have to negotiate among themselves with regard to sharing the common resource to optimize their own objective functions. A key feature of due date-related scheduling concerns the way in which due dates are considered: they can be given parameters or decision variables. For the former case, the motivation stems from the need to improve inventory and production management. For the latter case, due date assignment becomes a challenging issue since the decision-maker has to balance inventory holding costs against the benefits of fulfifilling orders in time. As for due dates, this book addresses the following three different scenarios: (i) The due dates of the jobs from either one or both of the two agents are decision variables, which are determined using some due date assignment models; (ii) The due dates of jobs in each job set are considered as given parameters, whereas which due date corresponds to a given job needs to determine; and (iii) The due date of each job is exogenously given. When the last case is involved, the objective function of each agent is related to the number of just-in-time jobs that are completed exactly on their due dates. For each considered scenario, depending on the model settings, and on the objective function of each agent, this book addresses the complexity, and the design of efficient exact or approximated algorithms. This book aims at introducing the author's research achievements in due date-related scheduling with two agents. It is written for researchers and Ph.D. students working in scheduling theory and other members of scientific community who are interested in recent scheduling models. Our goal is to enable the reader to know about some new achievements on this topic.