The book compiles research on Condorcet's Paradox over some two centuries. It begins with a historical overview of the discovery of Condorcet's Paradox in the 18th Century, reviews numerous studies conducted to find actual occurrences of the paradox, and compiles research that has been done to develop mathematical representations for the probability that the paradox will be observed. Combines all approaches that have been used to study this very interesting phenomenon.

Efficiency and Equity of Climate Change Policy is a comprehensive assessment of the economic effects of climate change policy, addressing the issues with a quantitative modelling approach. The book thus goes beyond the usual statements on the efficiency of economic instruments to identify the way gains and losses are distributed; who gains and who loses. Both the costs and benefits of climate change policies are analyzed. Most papers also provide useful information on the economic features of the Kyoto Protocol, its possible extensions, and the effect of different implementation strategies (such as the debate on emissions trading ceilings). Readership: Scientists and policy makers, students and specialists in climate related industries, members of NGOs, and policy advisors.

Due to the ability to handle specific characteristics of economics and finance forecasting problems like e.g. non-linear relationships, behavioral changes, or knowledge-based domain segmentation, we have recently witnessed a phenomenal growth of the application of computational intelligence methodologies in this field.

In this volume, Chen and Wang collected not just works on traditional computational intelligence approaches like fuzzy logic, neural networks, and genetic algorithms, but also examples for more recent technologies like e.g. rough sets, support vector machines, wavelets, or ant algorithms. After an introductory chapter with a structural description of all the methodologies, the subsequent parts describe novel applications of these to typical economics and finance problems like business forecasting, currency crisis discrimination, foreign exchange markets, or stock markets behavior.

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.

Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science.

Dynamic Games Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.

The mechanisms of protest and revolution have been the subject of theoretical research for over a century, yet the lack of data has hindered the empirical validation of conflicting theories. In this book, the author presents a unique new set of sub-daily data from over thirty countries and seven civil wars and uses them to test two models of conflict, the predator-prey model and the competing species model. The dynamic nature of the data modelling and the novelty of the dataset make this work a unique contribution to the field of conflict research. Dynamics of Conflict will help to re-evaluate existing theories and chart a new course towards the formal and statistical modelling of conflict.

Social computing concerns the study of social behavior and context based on computational systems. Behavioral modeling reproduces the social behavior, and allows for experimenting with and deep understanding of behavior, patterns, and potential outcomes. The pervasive use of computer and Internet technologies provides an unprecedented environment where people can share opinions and experiences, offer suggestions and advice, debate, and even conduct experiments. Social computing facilitates behavioral modeling in model building, analysis, pattern mining, anticipation, and prediction. The proceedings from this interdisciplinary workshop provide a platform for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students from sociology, behavioral and computer science, psychology, cultural study, information systems, and operations research to share results and develop new concepts and methodologies aimed at advancing and deepening our understanding of social and behavioral computing to aid critical decision making.

Linear programming attracted the interest of mathematicians during and after World War II when the first computers were constructed and methods for solving large linear programming problems were sought in connection with specific practical problems for example, providing logistical support for the U.S. Armed Forces or modeling national economies. Early attempts to apply linear programming methods to solve practical problems failed to satisfy expectations. There were various reasons for the failure. One of them, which is the central topic of this book, was the inexactness of the data used to create the models. This phenomenon, inherent in most pratical problems, has been dealt with in several ways. At first, linear programming models used "average" values of inherently vague coefficients, but the optimal solutions of these models were not always optimal for the original problem itself. Later researchers developed the stochastic linear programming approach, but this too has its limitations. Recently, interest has been given to linear programming problems with data given as intervals, convex sets and/or fuzzy sets. The individual results of these studies have been promising, but the literature has not presented a unified theory. Linear Optimization Problems with Inexact Data attempts to present a comprehensive treatment of linear optimization with inexact data, summarizing existing results and presenting new ones within a unifying framework."

Modern option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. e. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. How ever, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of cor porate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, very few attempts have been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of contin uous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr."

Each concept is discussed from the basics and supported by sufficient mathematical background and worked examples.

Suitable for individual or group learning, the book offers numerous end-of-chapter problems for study and review.

This Report contains a Consensus Report and the papers submitted to the April 6 -10, 1995 NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Strategic Stability In The Post-Cold War World And The Future Of Nuclear Disarmament, held in Washington D. C., United States Of America of at The Airlie Conference Center. The workshop was sponsored by the NATO Division Scientific and Environmental Affairs as part of its ongoing outreach programme to widen and deepen scientific contacts between NATO member countries and the Cooperation Partner countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The participants recognize that the collapse of the former Soviet Union has left a conceptual vacuum in the definition of a new world order. Never before have the components of world order all changed so rapidly, so deeply, or so globally. As Henry Kissinger points out, the emergence of the new world order will have answered three fundamental questions: " What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? and What are the goals on behalf of which they interact? " The main question is whether the establishment and maintenance of an international system will turn out to be a conscious design, or the outgrowth of a test of strength. The concept of a planning framework that could shape or govern these interactions is emerging and may now be at hand. Capturing this emerging framework is the thrust of this NATO-sponsored Advanced Research Workshop.

The project of writing this monograph was conceived in August 2006. It is a m- ter of delight and satisfaction that this monograph would be published during the centenary year (May 27, 2008 - May 26, 2009) of our dear alma mater, the Indian Institute of Science, which is truly a magni cent temple and an eternal source of inspiration, with a splendid ambiance for research. Studying the rational behavior of entities interacting with each other in or- nized or ad-hoc marketplaces has been the bread and butter of our research group here at the Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science. Speci cally, the application of game th- retic modeling and mechanism design principles to the area of network economics was an area of special interest to the authors. In fact, the dissertations of the s- ond, third, and fourth authors (Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, and Hastagiri Prakash) were all in this area. Dinesh Garg's Doctoral Thesis, which later won the Best Dissertation Award at the Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science for the academic year 2006-07, included an interesting chapter on applying the brilliant work of Roger Myerson (Nobel laureate in E- nomic Sciences in 2007) to the topical problem of sponsored search auctions on the web. Ramasuri's Master's work applied mechanism design to develop robust broadcastprotocolsin wireless adhoc networkswhile Hastagiri's Master's work - veloped resource allocation mechanisms for computational grids.

Search Theory is one of the original disciplines within the field of Operations Research. It deals with the problem faced by a Searcher who wishes to minimize the time required to find a hidden object, or "target. " The Searcher chooses a path in the "search space" and finds the target when he is sufficiently close to it. Traditionally, the target is assumed to have no motives of its own regarding when it is found; it is simply stationary and hidden according to a known distribution (e. g. , oil), or its motion is determined stochastically by known rules (e. g. , a fox in a forest). The problems dealt with in this book assume, on the contrary, that the "target" is an independent player of equal status to the Searcher, who cares about when he is found. We consider two possible motives of the target, and divide the book accordingly. Book I considers the zero-sum game that results when the target (here called the Hider) does not want to be found. Such problems have been called Search Games (with the "ze- sum" qualifier understood). Book II considers the opposite motive of the target, namely, that he wants to be found. In this case the Searcher and the Hider can be thought of as a team of agents (simply called Player I and Player II) with identical aims, and the coordination problem they jointly face is called the Rendezvous Search Problem.

Over the past decade, rational agency has come to be recognised as a central theme in artificial intelligence. Drawing upon research on rational action and agency in philosophy, logic, game theory, decision theory, and the philosophy of language, this volume represents an advanced, comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of the field of rational agency as it stands today. It covers the philosophical foundations of rational agency, logical and decision-theoretic approaches to rational agency, multi-agent aspects of rational agency (including speech acts, joint plans, and cooperation protocols), and, finally, describes a number of approaches to programming rational agents. Although written from the standpoint of artificial intelligence, this interdisciplinary text will be of interest to researchers in logic, mainstream computer science, the philosophy of rational action and agency, and economics.

In the first part of this book, we treat interacting and small open economies. We do this from an historical perspective, starting from the Classical model of the gold standard and the specie-flow mechanism and aim to show there that the Dornbusch IS-LM-PC approach, with or without rational expectations, can still be considered as a (if not the) core contribution to contemporaneous open economy macrodynamics, also on the level of structural macroeconometric model building. In the second part we then extend this analysis to the incorporation of more disequilibrium on the real markets, prominent further feedback channels of the macrodynamic literature and integrated macromodel building. We start from the closed economy, consider large open economies in a fixed exchange rate system, small open economies subject to high capital mobility, and finally two large interacting economies like the USA and Euroland. Our macrofounded approach extends and integrates non-market clearing traditions to macrodynamics and can be usefully compared with the New Keynesian approaches which are generally rigorously microfounded, but often much more limited in scope in capturing full market and agent interactions.

Fundamentals of Convex Analysis offers an in-depth look at some of the fundamental themes covered within an area of mathematical analysis called convex analysis. In particular, it explores the topics of duality, separation, representation, and resolution. The work is intended for students of economics, management science, engineering, and mathematics who need exposure to the mathematical foundations of matrix games, optimization, and general equilibrium analysis. It is written at the advanced undergraduate to beginning graduate level and the only formal preparation required is some familiarity with set operations and with linear algebra and matrix theory. Fundamentals of Convex Analysis is self-contained in that a brief review of the essentials of these tool areas is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter exercises are also provided. Topics covered include: convex sets and their properties; separation and support theorems; theorems of the alternative; convex cones; dual homogeneous systems; basic solutions and complementary slackness; extreme points and directions; resolution and representation of polyhedra; simplicial topology; and fixed point theorems, among others. A strength of this work is how these topics are developed in a fully integrated fashion.

This book consists of five acts and two interludes, which are all written as dialogues between three main characters and other supporting characters. Each act discusses the epistemological, institutional and methodological foundations of game theory and economics, while using various stories and examples. A featured aspect of those discussions is that many forms of mutual misunderstanding are involved in social situations as well as in those fields themselves. One Japanese traditional comic story called the Konnyaku Mondo is representative and gives hints of how our thought is constrained by incorrect beliefs. Each dialogue critically examines extant theories and common misunderstanding in game theory and economics in order to find possible future developments of those fields.

This is a collection of classic research papers on the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. The book is the authoritative reference in the field of evidential reasoning and an important archival reference in a wide range of areas including uncertainty reasoning in artificial intelligence and decision making in economics, engineering, and management. The book includes a foreword reflecting the development of the theory in the last forty years.

Cooperative game theory is a booming research area with many new developments in the last few years. So, our main purpose when prep- ing the second edition was to incorporate as much of these new dev- opments as possible without changing the structure of the book. First, this o?ered us the opportunity to enhance and expand the treatment of traditional cooperative games, called here crisp games, and, especially, that of multi-choice games, in the idea to make the three parts of the monograph more balanced. Second, we have used the opportunity of a secondeditiontoupdateandenlargethelistofreferencesregardingthe threemodels of cooperative games. Finally, we have bene?ted fromthis opportunity by removing typos and a few less important results from the ?rst edition of the book, and by slightly polishing the English style and the punctuation, for the sake of consistency along the monograph. The main changes are: (1) Chapter 3 contains an additional section, Section 3. 3, on the - erage lexicographic value, which is a recent one-point solution concept de?ned on the class of balanced crisp games. (2) Chapter 4 is new. It o?ers a brief overview on solution c- cepts for crisp games from the point of view of egalitarian criteria, and presents in Section 4. 2 a recent set-valued solution concept based on egalitarian considerations, namely the equal split-o? set. (3)Chapter5isbasicallyanenlargedversionofChapter4ofthe?rst edition because Section 5. 4 dealing with the relation between convex games and clan games with crisp coalitions is new.

In many industries the tariffs are not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased, i. e, they are nonlinear. Examples of nonlinear tariffs include railroad and electricity schedules and rental rates for durable goods and space. The major justification for the nonlinear pricing is the existence of private information on the side of consumers. In the early papers on the subject, private information was captured either by assuming a finite number of types (e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976) or by a unidimensional continuum of types (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Economics of the unidimen sional problems is by now well understood. The unidimensional models, however, do not cover all the situations of practical interest. Indeed, often the nonlinear tariffs specify the payment as a function of a variety of characteristics. For example, railroad tariffs spec ify charges based on weight, volume, and distance of each shipment. Dif ferent customers may value each of these characteristics differently, hence the customer's type will not in general be captured by a unidimensional characteristic and a problem of multidimensional screening arises. In such models the consumer's private information (her type) is captured by an m-dimensional vector, while the good produced by the monopolist has n quality dimensions."

Game theory has already proved its tremendous potential for con?ict resolution problems in the ?elds of Decision Theory and Economics. In the recent past, there have been attempts to extend the results of crisp game theory to those con?ict resolution problems which are fuzzy in nature e.g. Nishizaki and Sakawa [61] and references cited there in. These developments have lead to the emergence of a new area in the literature called fuzzy games. Another area in the fuzzy decision theory, which has been growing very fast is the area of fuzzy mathematical programming and its applications to various branches of sciences, Engineering and Management. In the crisp scenario, there exists a beautiful relationship between two person zero sum matrix game theory and duality in linear p- gramming. It is therefore natural to ask if something similar holds in the fuzzy scenario as well. This discussion essentially constitutes the core of our presentation. The objective of this book is to present a systematic and focussed study of the application of fuzzy sets to two very basic areas of decision theory, namely Mathematical Programming and Matrix Game Theory.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.

This work systematically investigates a large number of oscillatory network configurations that are able to describe many real systems such as electric power grids, lasers or even the heart muscle, to name but a few. The book is conceived as an introduction to the field for graduate students in physics and applied mathematics as well as being a compendium for researchers from any field of application interested in quantitative models.

This text examines new research at the interface of operations research, behavioral and cognitive sciences, and decision analysis. From the cognitive behaviorist who collects empirical evidence as to how people make decisions to the engineer and economist who are the consumers of such understanding, the reader encounters the familiar Traveling Salesman Problem and Prisoner's dilemma, how agricultural decisions are made in Argentina's Pampas region, and some social goals that come into play as an element of rational decision-making.

In these 14 self-contained chapters, broad topics covered include the integration of decision analysis and behavioral models, innovations in behavioral models, exploring descriptive behavior models, and experimental studies.

This book introduces the student to numerous modern applications of mathematics in technology. The authors write with clarity and present the mathematics in a clear and straightforward way making it an interesting and easy book to read. Numerous exercises at the end of every section provide practice and reinforce the material in the chapter. An engaging quality of this book is that the authors also present the mathematical material in a historical context and not just the practical one.

Mathematics and Technology is intended for undergraduate students in mathematics, instructors and high school teachers. Additionally, its lack of calculus centricity as well as a clear indication of the more difficult topics and relatively advanced references make it suitable for any curious individual with a decent command of high school math.