The theory on the evolution of preferences deals with the endogenous formation of preference relations in strategic situations. It is related to the field of evolutionary game theory. In this book we analyze the role and the influence of general, possibly non-expected utility preferences in such an evolutionary setup. In particular, we demonstrate that preferences which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility may potentially prove to be successful under evolutionary pressures.

The proceedings of the Los Angeles Caltech-UCLA 'Cabal Seminar' were originally published in the 1970s and 1980s. Games, Scales, and Suslin Cardinals is the first of a series of four books collecting the seminal papers from the original volumes together with extensive unpublished material, new papers on related topics, and discussion of research developments since the publication of the original volumes. Focusing on the subjects of 'Games and Scales' (Part 1) and 'Suslin Cardinals, Partition Properties, and Homogeneity' (Part 2), each of the two sections is preceded by an introductory survey putting the papers into present context. This volume will be an invaluable reference for anyone interested in higher set theory.

Jaroslaw Morawski offers a practicable and theoretically well-founded solution to the problems encountered when investing in illiquid assets and develops a model of the liquidation process for this category of investments. The result is a coherent investment decision framework designed specifically for private real estate but applicable also to other illiquid assets.

Exponential smoothing methods have been around since the 1950s, and are still the most popular forecasting methods used in business and industry. However, a modeling framework incorporating stochastic models, likelihood calculation, prediction intervals and procedures for model selection, was not developed until recently. This book brings together all of the important new results on the state space framework for exponential smoothing. It will be of interest to people wanting to apply the methods in their own area of interest as well as for researchers wanting to take the ideas in new directions. Part 1 provides an introduction to exponential smoothing and the underlying models. The essential details are given in Part 2, which also provide links to the most important papers in the literature. More advanced topics are covered in Part 3, including the mathematical properties of the models and extensions of the models for specific problems. Applications to particular domains are discussed in Part 4.

In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.

The appeal of games and puzzles is timeless and universal. In this unique book, David Wells explores the fascinating connections between games and mathematics, proving that mathematics is not just about tedious calculation but imagination, insight and intuition. The first part of the book introduces games, puzzles and mathematical recreations, including knight tours on a chessboard. The second part explains how thinking about playing games can mirror the thinking of a mathematician, using scientific investigation, tactics and strategy, and sharp observation. Finally the author considers game-like features found in a wide range of human behaviours, illuminating the role of mathematics and helping to explain why it exists at all. This thought-provoking book is perfect for anyone with a thirst for mathematics and its hidden beauty; a good high school grounding in mathematics is all the background that is required, and the puzzles and games will suit pupils from 14 years.

Political Game Theory, first published in 2007, is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

This book examines theology and the idea of a superior being in the context of game theory. The central question posed in this book is: If there existed a superior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us?

The mathematical theory of games is used to define each of these qualities, and different assumptions about the rules of play in several theological games that might be played between ordinary human beings and superior beings like God are posited.

Rooted in Gricean tradition, this book concentrates on game- and decision-theoretic (GDT) approaches to the foundations of pragmatics. An Introduction to GDT, with an overview of GDT pragmatics research to date and its relation to semantics and to Gricean pragmatics is followed by contributions offering a high-level survey of current GDT pragmatics and the field of its applications, demonstrating that this approach provides a sound basis for synchronic and diachronic explanations of language use.

Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do.
A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behavior appreciably. This book develops theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this.
The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing that is, individually rational, collectively rational and fair.
The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three-hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change.
The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they mustrestructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.

This book, following the three published volumes of the book, provides the main purpose to collect research papers and review papers to provide an overview of the main issues, results, and open questions in the cutting-edge research on the fields of modeling, optimization, and dynamics and their applications to biology, economy, energy, industry, physics, psychology and finance. Assuming the scientific relevance of the presenting innovative applications as well as merging issues in these areas, the purpose of this book is to collect papers of the world experts in mathematics, economics, and other applied sciences that is seminal to the future research developments. The majority of the papers presented in this book is authored by the participants in The Joint Meeting 6th International Conference on Dynamics, Games, and Science - DGSVI - JOLATE and in the 21st ICABR Conference. The scientific scope of the conferences is focused on the fields of modeling, optimization, and dynamics and their applications to biology, economy, energy, industry, physics, psychology, and finance. Assuming the scientific relevance of the presenting innovative applications as well as merging issues in these areas, the purpose of the conference is to bring together some of the world experts in mathematics, economics, and other applied sciences that reinforce ongoing projects and establish future works and collaborations.

Game Theory in Action is a textbook about using game theory across a range of real-life scenarios. From traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards, Stephen Schecter and Herbert Gintis show students how game theory can be applied in diverse areas including animal behavior, political science, and economics. The book's examples and problems look at such fascinating topics as crime-control strategies, climate-change negotiations, and the power of the Oracle at Delphi. The text includes a substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory, where strategies are not chosen through rational analysis, but emerge by virtue of being successful. This is the side of game theory that is most relevant to biology; it also helps to explain how human societies evolve. Aimed at students who have studied basic calculus and some differential equations, Game Theory in Action is the perfect way to learn the concepts and practical tools of game theory. * Aimed at students who have studied calculus and some differential equations* Examples are drawn from diverse scenarios, ranging from traffic accidents to the sex lives of lizards* A substantial treatment of evolutionary game theory* Useful problem sets at the end of each chapter

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments? Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social (non-selfish) preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced. The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project.

How to Divide When There Isn't Enough develops a rigorous yet accessible presentation of the state-of-the-art for the adjudication of conflicting claims and the theory of taxation. It covers all aspects one may wish to know about claims problems: the most important rules, the most important axioms, and how these two sets are related. More generally, it also serves as an introduction to the modern theory of economic design, which in the last twenty years has revolutionized many areas of economics, generating a wide range of applicable allocations rules that have improved people's lives in many ways. In developing the theory, the book employs a variety of techniques that will appeal to both experts and non-experts. Compiling decades of research into a single framework, William Thomson provides numerous applications that will open a large number of avenues for future research.

This textbook offers a comprehensive overview of the main developments in game theory since the 1950s. It provides a wide variety of examples and exercises, mostly drawn from applications in economics, to illustrate key concepts and ideas in the field. The book will be an invaluable reference tool for teachers, students, and researchers of microeconomics and game theory.

State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions provides an introduction to the applications of game theory to a series of questions that are fundamental in political economy. These questions include: Why do we need states? What might happen without protection for life and property? How might tribes or criminal gangs behave in struggles over material possessions? Would people tell the truth if asked what they wanted?

This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

Game theory has revolutionized the study of animal behavior. The fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory--that the strategy adopted by one individual depends on the strategies exhibited by others--has proven a powerful tool in uncovering the forces shaping otherwise mysterious behaviors. In this volume, the first since 1982 devoted to evolutionary game theory, leading researchers describe applications of the theory to diverse types of behavior, providing an overview of recent discoveries and a synthesis of current research. The volume begins with a clear introduction to game theory and its explanatory scope. This is followed by a series of chapters on the use of game theory to understand a range of behaviors: social foraging, cooperation, animal contests, communication, reproductive skew and nepotism within groups, sibling rivalry, alternative life-histories, habitat selection, trophic-level interactions, learning, and human social behavior. In addition, the volume includes a discussion of the relations among game theory, optimality, and quantitative genetics, and an assessment of the overall utility of game theory to the study of social behavior. Presented in a manner accessible to anyone interested in animal behavior but not necessarily trained in the mathematics of game theory, the book is intended for a wide audience of undergraduates, graduate students, and professional biologists pursuing the evolutionary analysis of animal behavior.

Is Nine-Men's Morris, in the hands of perfect players, a win for white or for black--or a draw? Can king, rook, and knight always defeat king and two knights in chess? What can Go players learn from economists? What are nimbers, tinies, switches, minies? This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full analysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full anlaysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. The first part of this book will be accessible to anyone, regardless of background: it contains introductory expositions, reports of unusual contest between an angel and a devil. For those who want to delve more deeply, the book also contains combinatorial studies of chess and Go; reports on computer advances such as the solution of Nine-Men's Morris and Pentominoes; and new theoretical approaches to such problems as games with many players. If you have read and enjoyed Martin Gardner, or if you like to learn and analyze new games, this book is for you.

'Reflection on the ''history of opinion'', and its application to our contemporary world and controversies over technology and our environmental difficulties, is the distinguishing feature of the thoughtful economist. If the reader of this book is moved to reflect on the work of Schumpeter and Kalecki, the author of this book will have succeeded. Even more important than this, if the reader of this book comes to a changed and deeper understanding of how technology changes in our faltering capitalist economies, and of how the environment is affected by production and may be improved with better ways of satisfying our personal and productive needs, then the author will have done an even greater service to his profession and humanity.' - From the foreword by Jan Toporowski, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK 'Jerry Courvisanos provides us with a timely analysis of the forces behind the crises of capitalism and the tendency towards ecologically unsustainable growth. He draws on the work of two of most creative, if not most recognized, economists of the 20th Century, Micha Kalecki and Joseph Schumpeter. In place of mainstream analysis with its emphasis on marginal conditions for optimisation around well-defined equilibrium, we have a world of innovation, structural change, creative destruction, business cycles, financial crises, changing income distribution and many other inconvenient developments that plague modern economies.' - From the foreword by Harry Bloch, Curtin University, Australia Cycles, crises and innovation are the major economic forces that shape capitalist economies. Using a critical realist political economy approach, the analysis in this fine work is based on the works of Michal Kalecki and Joseph Schumpeter - both of whom identify these three dynamic forces as plotting the path of economic development. Jerry Courvisanos' thought-provoking book examines how the rise of capital through investment enshrines innovation in profit and power which in turn determines the course of cycles and crises. The author concludes by arguing for strategic intervention by transformative eco-innovation as a public policy path to ecologically sustainable development. This interdisciplinary book will appeal to economists, innovation and entrepreneurship-based scholars, postgraduate students studying the political economy of both innovation and entrepreneurship, regional development planners and economic development policy makers. Anyone with a general interest in economics, politics and innovation or looking for a path out of the economic and ecological morass of current capitalism, will also find much to interest them in this book.

The book treats two approaches to decision theory: (1) the normative, purporting to determine how a 'perfectly rational' actor ought to choose among available alternatives; (2) the descriptive, based on observations of how people actually choose in real life and in laboratory experiments. The mathematical tools used in the normative approach range from elementary algebra to matrix and differential equations. Sections on different levels can be studied independently. Special emphasis is made on 'offshoots' of both theories to cognitive psychology, theoretical biology, and philosophy.

Game Theory: Introduction and Applications provides the student of business studies or economics with an introduction to the applications of game theory in a wide range of situations. Dr Romp avoids advanced mathematics, developing arguments with the extensive use of examples and diagrams to provide a textbook aimed at the second and third year undergraduate.

Is Nine-Men's Morris, in the hands of perfect players, a win for white or for black--or a draw? Can king, rook, and knight always defeat king and two knights in chess? What can Go players learn from economists? What are nimbers, tinies, switches, minies? This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full analysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. This book deals with combinatorial games, that is, games not involving chance or hidden information. Their study is at once old and young: though some games, such as chess, have been analyzed for centuries, the first full anlaysis of a nontrivial combinatorial game (Nim) only appeared in 1902. The first part of this book will be accessible to anyone, regardless of background: it contains introductory expositions, reports of unusual contest between an angel and a devil. For those who want to delve more deeply, the book also contains combinatorial studies of chess and Go; reports on computer advances such as the solution of Nine-Men's Morris and Pentominoes; and new theoretical approaches to such problems as games with many players. If you have read and enjoyed Martin Gardner, or if you like to learn and analyze new games, this book is for you.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.