Mathematische Modelle und Methoden sind in weiten Teilen der Wirtschaftswissenschaften unverzichtbar; dabei dient die Mathematik einerseits als Sprache zur Modellierung komplexer wirtschaftlicher Zusammenh nge, andererseits als Werkzeug zur Analyse wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Modelle. Dieses Buch behandelt die wichtigsten Aspekte der Linearen Algebra und der Analysis. Schwerpunkte sind lineare Gleichungssysteme, lineare Differenzen- und Differentialgleichungen sowie lineare und nichtlineare Optimierungsprobleme unter Nebenbedingungen. Die dargestellten Konzepte werden anhand zahlreicher Beispiele verdeutlicht.

Market Structure and Competition Policy applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy.

Multivariate Datenanalysen untersuchen Datensatze mit Beobachtungen von in der Regel drei oder mehr Variablen. Die jeweiligen Analyseverfahren sind Interdependenz- oder Dependenzverfahren. Dependenzverfahren erfordern mindestens zwei abhangige Variablen. Die "Multivariate Datenanalyse" stellt diese Verfahren am Beispiel eines einheitlichen Datensatzes vor. Alle Anwendungen nutzen Prozeduren des statistischen Programmpakets SPSS. Im Einzelnen unterscheidet die "Multivariate Datenanlyse" zwischen explorativen und konfirmatorischen Verfahren. Alle Verfahren werden in einer einheitlichen Darstellungsform prasentiert. So wird vom Ziel uber Daten, Vorbereitung und Modell zum eigentlichen statischen Verfahren vorangeschritten. Anschliessend wird jeweils mit Hilfe des statistischen Programmpakets SPSS ein Beispiel vorgestellt, dessen Interpretation das jeweilige Kapitel abschliesst.

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Finanzmarktoekonometrie bietet eine umfassende Darstellung des zeitkontinuierlichen Modellierungsansatzes und seiner Anwendung in OEkonometrie, empirischer Kapitalmarktforschung und Optionsbewertung. Dabei liegt ein Schwerpunkt auf der Theorie, Simulation, Filterung und Parameterschatzung zeitstetiger Systeme. Besonders praxisrelevant ist hierbei die Annahme, dass Daten nur zu bestimmten Zeitpunkten als Panel oder Zeitreihen erhaltlich sind. Zusatzlich wird davon ausgegangen, dass nur Teile des Systemzustands messbar und mit Messfehlern behaftet sind. Der aus der System- und Kontrolltheorie stammende kontinuierlich-diskrete Zustandsraum-Ansatz wird in Finanzmarktoekonometrie konsequent auf Modellierungsprobleme derivativer Finanzprodukte angewandt. Umfangreiche graphische Darstellungen erlautern und verdeutlichen dem Leser die mathematische Formulierung der Thematik.

Casino games and traditional card games have rich and idiosyncratic histories, complex subcultures and player practices, and facilitate the flow of billions of dollars each year through casinos and card rooms, and between professional players and amateurs. They have nevertheless been overlooked by game scholars due to the negative ethical weight of “gambling” – with such games pathologized and labelled as deviance or mental illness, few look beyond to unpick the games, their players, and their communities. The Casino, Card and Betting Game Reader offers 25 chapters studying the communities playing these games, the distinctive cultures and practices that have emerged around them, their activities and beliefs and interpersonal relationships, and how these games influence – both positively and negatively – the lives and careers of millions of game players around the world. It is the first of a new series of edited collections, Play Beyond the Computer, dedicated to exploring the play of games beyond computers and games consoles.

Die State-Preference-Theorie bildet eine ideale analytische Basis zum Verstandnis der oekonomischen Struktur moderner Kapitalmarktmodelle. Dieses Buch zeigt, wie ein einfaches State-Preference-Modell herangezogen werden kann, um die Bedingungen des Kapitalmarktgleichgewichts in diskreter und stetiger Zeit zu analysieren. Es handelt sich hierbei um einen einfuhrenden Text, der zwar auf Mathematik und Statistik nicht verzichten kann, bei welchem allerdings oekonomische UEberlegungen einen ebenso breiten Raum einnehmen. Das Buch schliesst damit eine Lucke zwischen volkswirtschaftlichen, finanzmarkttheoretischen und auf stochastische Fragen ausgerichteten Lehrtexten.

Die Theorie strategischen Handelns pr gt die moderne sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung. Angesichts deren extremer Pr missen hat sich, ausgehend von biologischen Ans tzen zur Entwicklung der Arten, eine alternative Theorie zur Erkl rung individuellen Verhaltens entwickelt. Die Evolution re Spieltheorie verzichtet auf die, empirisch fragw rdigen, Pr missen vollkommener Rationalit t, vollkommener Information und perfekter Verhaltenskoordinierung. Diese werden durch die Annahme von Anpassungsprozessen, die der biologischen Evolution nachempfunden sind, ersetzt. Das Buch dokumentiert die Entstehung dieser Richtung und zeigt dem Leser die M glichkeiten auf, die diese Theorie er ffnet.
Das Werk zeichnet sich durch seine gute Verst ndlichkeit aus und eignet sich unter anderem dadurch f r den Einsatz als studienbegleitendes Lehrbuch.

In einem strategischen Spiel gibt es stets mehrere autonom entscheidende Akteure, die ihre individuellen Interessen verfolgen. Jede soziale Konfliktsituation mit opportunistisch handelnden Individuen erweist sich daher als strategisches Spiel. In diesem Lehrbuch werden strategische Spiele exakt beschrieben und das individuell rationale Entscheidungsverhalten aller Beteiligten determiniert. Beschrieben werden Spiele in Stufenform, in extensiver Form, in Agentennormalform, in Normalform sowie in charakteristischer Funktionsform. Alle Konzepte zur Darstellung und Loesung strategischer Spiele werden durch vielfaltige oekonomische (Bei)Spiele veranschaulicht, wodurch auch das konstruktive Vorgehen bei Anwendung dieser Konzepte vorgefuhrt wird.

Every form of behavior is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of evolution. Since the work of Maynard Smith and others, it has been realized how game theory can model this process. Evolutionary game theory replaces the static solutions of classical game theory by a dynamical approach centered not on the concept of rational players but on the population dynamics of behavioral programs. In this book the authors investigate the nonlinear dynamics of the self-regulation of social and economic behavior, and of the closely related interactions among species in ecological communities. Replicator equations describe how successful strategies spread and thereby create new conditions that can alter the basis of their success, i.e., to enable us to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions that punctuate evolution. In short, evolutionary game theory describes when to escalate a conflict, how to elicit cooperation, why to expect a balance of the sexes, and how to understand natural selection in mathematical terms.

Known as the science of strategy, game theory is a branch of mathematics that has gained broad acceptance as a legitimate methodological tool, and has been widely adapted by a number of other fields. Frank C. Zagare provides an introduction to the application of game theory in the fields of security studies and diplomatic history, demonstrating the advantages of using a formal game-theoretic framework to explain complex events and strategic relationships. Comprised of three parts, the first illustrates the basic concepts of game theory, initially with abstract examples but later in the context of real world foreign policy decision-making. The author highlights the methodological problems of using game theory to construct an analytic narrative and the advantages of working around these obstacles. Part II develops three extended case studies that illustrate the theory at work: the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905-1906, the July Crisis of 1914, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Finally, in Part III, Zagare describes a general theory of interstate conflict initiation, limitation, escalation, and resolution and rebuts criticisms of the methodology. Logically demanding, Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies conveys an intuitive understanding of the theory of games through the use of real-world examples to exemplify the 'theory in action'.

These two new collections, numbers 28 and 29 respectively in the Annals of Mathematics Studies, continue the high standard set by the earlier Annals Studies 20 and 24 by bringing together important contributions to the theories of games and of nonlinear differential equations.

Game theory is the science of interaction. This textbook, derived from courses taught by the author and developed over several years, is a comprehensive, straightforward introduction to the mathematics of non-cooperative games. It teaches what every game theorist should know: the important ideas and results on strategies, game trees, utility theory, imperfect information, and Nash equilibrium. The proofs of these results, in particular existence of an equilibrium via fixed points, and an elegant direct proof of the minimax theorem for zero-sum games, are presented in a self-contained, accessible way. This is complemented by chapters on combinatorial games like Go; and, it has introductions to algorithmic game theory, traffic games, and the geometry of two-player games. This detailed and lively text requires minimal mathematical background and includes many examples, exercises, and pictures. It is suitable for self-study or introductory courses in mathematics, computer science, or economics departments.

Commissioned by the Society for Modeling and Simulation International (SCS), this needed, useful new 'Body of Knowledge' (BoK) collects and organizes the common understanding of a wide collection of professionals and professional associations. Modeling and simulation (M&S) is a ubiquitous discipline that lays the computational foundation for real and virtual experimentation, clearly stating boundaries-and interactions-of systems, data, and representations. The field is well known, too, for its training support via simulations and simulators. Indeed, with computers increasingly influencing the activities of today's world, M&S is the third pillar of scientific understanding, taking its place along with theory building and empirical observation. This valuable new handbook provides intellectual support for all disciplines in analysis, design and optimization. It contributes increasingly to the growing number of computational disciplines, addressing the broad variety of contributing as well as supported disciplines and application domains. Further, each of its sections provide numerous references for further information. Highly comprehensive, the BoK represents many viewpoints and facets, captured under such topics as: Mathematical and Systems Theory Foundations Simulation Formalisms and Paradigms Synergies with Systems Engineering and Artificial Intelligence Multidisciplinary Challenges Ethics and Philosophy Historical Perspectives Examining theoretical as well as practical challenges, this unique volume addresses the many facets of M&S for scholars, students, and practitioners. As such, it affords readers from all science, engineering, and arts disciplines a comprehensive and concise representation of concepts, terms, and activities needed to explain the M&S discipline. Tuncer OEren is Professor Emeritus at the University of Ottawa. Bernard Zeigler is Professor Emeritus at the University of Arizona. Andreas Tolk is Chief Scientist at The MITRE Corporation. All three editors are long-time members and Fellows of the Society for Modeling and Simulation International. Under the leadership of three SCS Fellows, Dr. OEren, University of Ottawa, Dr. Zeigler, The University of Arizona, and Dr. Tolk, The MITRE Corporation, more than 50 international scholars from 15 countries provided insights and experience to compile this initial M&S Body of Knowledge.

Despite the growing consensus on the need for action to counteract climate change, complex economic and political forces have so far prevented international actors from making much headway toward resolving the problem. Most approaches to climate change are based in economics and environmental science; in this book, Parkash Chander argues that we can make further progress on the climate change impasse by considering a third approach-game theory. Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale.

As with the previous editions, this fourth edition relies on teaching by example and the Karplus Learning Cycle to convey the ideas of game theory in a way that is approachable, intuitive, and interdisciplinary. Noncooperative equilibrium concepts such as Nash equilibrium, mixed strategy equilibria, and subgame perfect equilibrium are systematically introduced in the first half of the book. Bayesian Nash equilibrium is briefly introduced. The subsequent chapters discuss cooperative solutions with and without side payments, rationalizable strategies and correlated equilibria, and applications to elections, social mechanism design, and larger-scale games. New examples include panic buying, supply-chain shifts in the pandemic, and global warming.

We all played tag when we were kids. What most of us don't realize is that this simple chase game is in fact an application of pursuit theory, and that the same principles of games like tag, dodgeball, and hide-and-seek are also at play in military strategy, high-seas chases by the Coast Guard, and even romantic pursuits. In "Chases and Escapes," Paul Nahin gives us the first complete history of this fascinating area of mathematics, from its classical analytical beginnings to the present day.

Drawing on game theory, geometry, linear algebra, target-tracking algorithms, and much more, Nahin also offers an array of challenging puzzles with their historical background and broader applications. "Chases and Escapes" includes solutions to all problems and provides computer programs that readers can use for their own cutting-edge analysis.

Now with a gripping new preface on how the Enola Gay escaped the shock wave from the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, this book will appeal to anyone interested in the mathematics that underlie pursuit and evasion.

The description for this book, Advances in Game Theory. (AM-52), will be forthcoming.