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Books > Science & Mathematics > Mathematics > Optimization > Game theory
Many of today's most commercially successful videogames, from Call
of Duty to Company of Heroes, are war-themed titles that play out
in what are framed as authentic real-world settings inspired by
recent news headlines or drawn from history. While such games are
marketed as authentic representations of war, they often provide a
selective form of realism that eschews problematic, yet salient
aspects of war. In addition, changes in the way Western states wage
and frame actual wars makes contemporary conflicts increasingly
resemble videogames when perceived from the vantage point of
Western audiences. This interdisciplinary volume brings together
scholars from games studies, media and cultural studies, politics
and international relations, and related fields to examine the
complex relationships between military-themed videogames and
real-world conflict, and to consider how videogames might deal with
history, memory, and conflict in alternative ways. It asks: What is
the role of videogames in the formation and negotiation of cultural
memory of past wars? How do game narratives and designs position
the gaming subject in relation to history, war and militarism? And
how far do critical, anti-war/peace games offer an alternative or
challenge to mainstream commercial titles?
The newest addition to our Influential Video Game Designers series
explores the work of Todd Howard, executive producer at Bethesda
Studios, known for how he consistently pushes the boundaries of
open-world gaming and player agency. Howard’s games create worlds
in which players can design their own characters and tell their own
stories. While many games tell the story of the game’s main
character, Todd Howard’s worldbuilding approach to game design
focuses more on telling the story of the game’s world, whether it
be the high fantasy environments of the Elder Scrolls series or the
post-apocalyptic wasteland of the Fallout series. This focus on
sculpting the world allows for remarkable amounts of player freedom
and choice in an expansive game environment by creating a landscape
rich with open opportunity. Drawing on both academic discussions of
narrative, world design, and game design, as well as on officially
released interviews, speeches, and presentations given by Howard
and other designers at Bethesda Games, Wendi Sierra highlights
three core areas set Howard’s design perspective apart from other
designers: micronarratives, iterative design, and the sharing of
design tools. Taken as a whole, these three elements demonstrate
how Howard has used a worldbuilding perspective to shape his games.
In doing so, he has impacted not only Bethesda Studios, but also
the landscape of game design itself.
Das Lehrbuch gibt eine anwendungsorientierte Einfuhrung in alle
wichtigen Teilbereiche des Operation Research. Im Einzelnen werden
lineare, ganzzahlige und nichtlineare Optimierungsansatze, Methoden
der Projektplanung und Netzplantechnik, stochastische Modelle sowie
nichtexakte Losungsverfahren behandelt. Die jeweiligen Methoden
werden anhand zahlreicher betrieblicher Anwendungsbeispiele aus den
Bereichen Produktion, Logistik, Marketing und Finanzwirtschaft
illustriert. Entsprechende Ubungsaufgaben mit ausfuhrlichen
Losungen tragen zur Vertiefung des Stoffes bei und helfen bei der
Vorbereitung auf Klausuren.
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory.
Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless
applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets,
(human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks,
nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade
ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into
question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate
complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an
intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed
algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect
distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope
was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently
computed.Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for
approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in
this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong
evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is
intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different
settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models
(computational complexity, query complexity, and communication
complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a
plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time
Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for
finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The
problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses
a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD,
which captures the complexity of several fundamental total
problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also
admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is
believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the
complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just
above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability.
Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this
frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of
several other important problems whose complexity lies between P
and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch
(A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and
Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.
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