Since there is no supranational institution which can enforce international environmental agreements (IEAs), international cooperation proves difficult in practice. Global emissions exhibit negative externalities in countries other than that of their origin and hence there is a high interdependence between countries, and strategic considerations play an important role. Game theory analyses the interaction between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and the final outcomes in games. Hence, international environmental problems are particularly suited for analysis by this method. The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between 'first-best' policy recommendations and 'second-best' designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists' recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more. This book will be of great interest to scholars, researchers and lecturers in the fields of international environmental economics, game theory and international relations.

This book explains, in a straightforward way, the foundations upon which electoral techniques are based in order to shed new light on what we actually do when we vote. The intention is to highlight the fact that no matter how an electoral system has been designed, and regardless of the intentions of those who devised the system, there will be goals that are impossible to achieve but also opportunities for improving the situation in an informed way. While detailed descriptions of electoral systems are not provided, many references are made to current or past situations, both as examples and to underline particular problems and shortcomings. In addition, a new voting method that avoids the many paradoxes of voting theory is described in detail. While some knowledge of mathematics is required in order to gain the most from the book, every effort has been made to ensure that the subject matter is easily accessible for non-mathematicians, too. In short, this is a book for anyone who wants to understand the meaning of voting.

Game-theoretic probability and finance come of age Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk's Probability and Finance, published in 2001, showed that perfect-information games can be used to define mathematical probability. Based on fifteen years of further research, Game-Theoretic Foundations for Probability and Finance presents a mature view of the foundational role game theory can play. Its account of probability theory opens the way to new methods of prediction and testing and makes many statistical methods more transparent and widely usable. Its contributions to finance theory include purely game-theoretic accounts of Ito's stochastic calculus, the capital asset pricing model, the equity premium, and portfolio theory. Game-Theoretic Foundations for Probability and Finance is a book of research. It is also a teaching resource. Each chapter is supplemented with carefully designed exercises and notes relating the new theory to its historical context. Praise from early readers "Ever since Kolmogorov's Grundbegriffe, the standard mathematical treatment of probability theory has been measure-theoretic. In this ground-breaking work, Shafer and Vovk give a game-theoretic foundation instead. While being just as rigorous, the game-theoretic approach allows for vast and useful generalizations of classical measure-theoretic results, while also giving rise to new, radical ideas for prediction, statistics and mathematical finance without stochastic assumptions. The authors set out their theory in great detail, resulting in what is definitely one of the most important books on the foundations of probability to have appeared in the last few decades." - Peter Grunwald, CWI and University of Leiden "Shafer and Vovk have thoroughly re-written their 2001 book on the game-theoretic foundations for probability and for finance. They have included an account of the tremendous growth that has occurred since, in the game-theoretic and pathwise approaches to stochastic analysis and in their applications to continuous-time finance. This new book will undoubtedly spur a better understanding of the foundations of these very important fields, and we should all be grateful to its authors." - Ioannis Karatzas, Columbia University

An authoritative textbook based on the legendary economics course taught at the University of Chicago Price theory is a powerful analytical toolkit for measuring, explaining, and predicting human behavior in the marketplace. This incisive textbook provides an essential introduction to the subject, offering a diverse array of practical methods that empower students to learn by doing. Based on Economics 301, the legendary PhD course taught at the University of Chicago, the book emphasizes the importance of applying price theory in order to master its concepts. Chicago Price Theory features immersive chapter-length examples such as addictive goods, urban-property pricing, the consequences of prohibition, the value of a statistical life, and occupational choice. It looks at human behavior in the aggregate of an industry, region, or demographic group, but also provides models of individuals when they offer insights about the aggregate. The book explains the surprising answers that price theory can provide to practical questions about taxation, education, the housing market, government subsidies, and much more. Emphasizes the application of price theory, enabling students to learn by doing Features chapter-length examples such as addictive goods, urban-property pricing, the consequences of prohibition, and the value of a statistical life Supported by video lectures taught by Kevin M. Murphy and Gary Becker The video course enables students to learn the theory at home and practice the applications in the classroom

Co-opetition offers a new way of thinking that combines competition and cooperation. It is the first book to adapt game theory to the needs of CEOs, managers and entrepreneurs. Though often compared to games like chess or poker, business is different - people are free to change the rules, the players, the boundaries, even the game itself. The essence of business success lies in making sure you are in the right game. Actively shaping which game you play, and how you play it, is the core of the innovative business strategy laid out in Co-opetition. Barry Nalebuff and Adam Brandenburger, professors at Yale and Harvard, are pioneers in the practice of applying the science of game theory to the art of corporate strategy. They have devised a practice-oriented model to help you break out of the traditional win-lose or lose-lose situations. Dozens of companies - including Intel, Nintendo, American Express and Nutrasweet - have been using the strategies of co-opetition to change their game and enjoy the benefits of win-win opportunities.

Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Meeting on Innovation for Systems Information and Decision, INSID 2021, which was held during December 1-3, 2021. The conference was initially planned to take place in Recife, Brazil, but changed to a virtual meeting due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 9 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 76 submissions. They reflect methodological improvements and advances in multi-criteria decision-making/multi-criteria decision-aid (MCDM/MCDA) oriented toward real-world applications, which contribute to the understanding of relevant developments of current research on and future trends of innovation for systems information and decision.

This book presents an interdisciplinary approach to conflict solution focusing on a very specific type of conflict, retributive conflicts . It is unique in the treatment of these and how relative measurement is used to find equilibrium solutions. The authors present an alternative process to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They do so in two ways that are different from past efforts. The first is by formally structuring the conflict and the second is the manner in which discussions were conducted and conclusions drawn. The approach will help create a solution and provide negotiators with a unique pathway to consider the thorny issues and corresponding concessions underlying the deliberations, together with their implementation. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) provides a way to conflict solution with the participation of negotiators for the parties. It is a positive approach that makes it possible to reason and express feelings and judgments with numerical intensities to derive priorities. With the assistance of panels of Israeli participants and Palestinian participants brought together in 2006 to 2017, AHP was applied for the first time in a group setting to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The process makes it clear that moderation in different degrees by both sides is essential to arrive at acceptable agreements on concessions proposed and agreed upon by both sides.

This book about mathematics and methodology for economics is the result of the lifelong experience of the authors. It is written for university students as well as for students of applied sciences. This self-contained book does not assume any previous knowledge of high school mathematics and helps understanding the basics of economic theory-building. Starting from set theory it thoroughly discusses linear and non-linear functions, differential equations, difference equations, and all necessary theoretical constructs for building sound economic models. The authors also present a solid introduction to linear optimisation and game theory using production systems. A detailed discussion on market equilibrium, in particular on Nash Equilibrium, and on non-linear optimisation is also provided. Throughout the book the student is well supplied with numerous examples, some 2000 problems and their solutions to apply the knowledge to economic theories and models.

How does cooperation emerge among selfish individuals? When do people share resources, punish those they consider unfair, and engage in joint enterprises? These questions fascinate philosophers, biologists, and economists alike, for the "invisible hand" that should turn selfish efforts into public benefit is not always at work. "The Calculus of Selfishness" looks at social dilemmas where cooperative motivations are subverted and self-interest becomes self-defeating. Karl Sigmund, a pioneer in evolutionary game theory, uses simple and well-known game theory models to examine the foundations of collective action and the effects of reciprocity and reputation.

Focusing on some of the best-known social and economic experiments, including games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Trust, Ultimatum, Snowdrift, and Public Good, Sigmund explores the conditions leading to cooperative strategies. His approach is based on evolutionary game dynamics, applied to deterministic and probabilistic models of economic interactions.

Exploring basic strategic interactions among individuals guided by self-interest and caught in social traps, "The Calculus of Selfishness" analyzes to what extent one key facet of human nature--selfishness--can lead to cooperation.

This gentle introduction to logic and model theory is based on a systematic use of three important games in logic: the semantic game; the Ehrenfeucht Fraisse game; and the model existence game. The third game has not been isolated in the literature before but it underlies the concepts of Beth tableaux and consistency properties. Jouko Vaananen shows that these games are closely related and in turn govern the three interrelated concepts of logic: truth, elementary equivalence and proof. All three methods are developed not only for first order logic but also for infinitary logic and generalized quantifiers. Along the way, the author also proves completeness theorems for many logics, including the cofinality quantifier logic of Shelah, a fully compact extension of first order logic. With over 500 exercises this book is ideal for graduate courses, covering the basic material as well as more advanced applications.

In this richly illustrated book, Dr Jorma Kyppoe explores the history of board games dating back to Ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China. He provides a description of the evolution and various interpretations of chess. Furthermore, the book offers the study of the old Celtic and Viking board games and the old Hawaiian board game Konane, as well as a new hypothesis about the interpretation of the famous Cretan Phaistos Disk. Descriptions of several chess variations, including some highlights of the game theory and tiling in different dimensions, are followed by a multidimensional symmetrical n-person strategy game model, based on chess. Final chapter (Concluding remarks) offers the new generalizations of the Euler-Poincare's Characteristic, Pi and Fibonacci sequence.

This monograph studies multi-member households or, more generally, socio-economic groups from a purely theoretical perspective and within a general equilibrium framework, in contrast to a sizeable empirical literature. The approach is based on the belief that households, their composition, decisions and behavior within a competitive market economy deserve thorough examination. The authors set out to link the formation, composition, decision-making, and stability of households. They develop general equilibrium models of pure exchange economies in which households can have several, typically heterogeneous members and act as collective decision-making units on the one hand and as competitive market participants on the other hand. Moreover, the more advanced models combine traditional exchange (markets for commodities) and matching (markets for people or partners) and develop implications for welfare, social structures, and economic policy. In the field of family economics, Hans Haller and Hans Gersbach have pioneered a 'market' approach that applies the tools of general equilibrium theory to the analysis of household behavior. This very interesting book presents an overview of their methods and results. This is an inspiring work. Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Columbia University, USA The sophisticated, insightful and challenging analysis presented in this book extends the theory of the multi-person household along an important but relatively neglected dimension, that of general equilibrium theory. It also challenges GE theorists themselves to follow Paul Samuelson in taking seriously the real attributes of that fundamental building block, the household, as a social group whose decisions may not satisfy the standard axioms of individual choice. This synthesis and extension of their earlier work by Gersbach and Haller will prove to be a seminal contribution in its field. Ray Rees, LMU Munich, Germany

This volume is a user-friendly presentation of the main theoretical properties of the Fourier-Malliavin volatility estimation, allowing the readers to experience the potential of the approach and its application in various financial settings. Readers are given examples and instruments to implement this methodology in various financial settings and applications of real-life data. A detailed bibliographic reference is included to permit an in-depth study.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

"Game Theory" will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

The idea of this book is to demonstrate the tendency of modern research in mathematical ecology using the optimal control theory and game-theoretic methods. The book introduces the modelling of environmental systems through conceptual game-theoretic models, showing the importance of the equilibrium behavior under resource extraction. Using discrete and continuous models of biological and physical processes, the behavior of ecological-economic systems is represented by models with analytic or numerical solutions. A range of mathematical methods including analytic and approximate methods for equilibrium definition, cooperative and collective behavior determination are used to explore such models. The main feature of the presented investigations is characterised by time consistent, stabilised, collective and cooperative concepts in ecological-economic systems. This book is recommended for researchers and post-graduate students of management, economic and in the applied mathematics departments.

Game Theory: A Modeling Approach quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of the subject to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The authors match conclusions to real-world scenarios and applications. The text engages students in active learning, group work, in-class discussions and interactive simulations. Each chapter provides foundation pieces or adds more features to help readers build game theoretic models. The chapters include definitions, concepts and illustrative examples. The text will engage and challenge both undergraduate and graduate students. Features: Enables readers to apply game theorty to real-world scenarios Chapters can be used for core course materials or independent stuides Exercises, included at the end of the chapters, follow the order of the sections in the text Select answers and solutions are found at the end of the book Solutions manual for instructors is available from the authors

Game Theory and Exercises introduces the main concepts of game theory, along with interactive exercises to aid readers' learning and understanding. Game theory is used to help players understand decision-making, risk-taking and strategy and the impact that the choices they make have on other players; and how the choices of those players, in turn, influence their own behaviour. So, it is not surprising that game theory is used in politics, economics, law and management. This book covers classic topics of game theory including dominance, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, repeated games, perturbed strategie s, beliefs, perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and replicator dynamics. It also covers recent topics in game theory such as level-k reasoning, best reply matching, regret minimization and quantal responses. This textbook provides many economic applications, namely on auctions and negotiations. It studies original games that are not usually found in other textbooks, including Nim games and traveller's dilemma. The many exercises and the inserts for students throughout the chapters aid the reader's understanding of the concepts. With more than 20 years' teaching experience, Umbhauer's expertise and classroom experience helps students understand what game theory is and how it can be applied to real life examples. This textbook is suitable for both undergraduate and postgraduate students who study game theory, behavioural economics and microeconomics.

This contributed volume focuses on aspects of dynamic game theory including differential games, evolutionary games, and stochastic games. It covers theoretical developments, algorithmic methods, and applications to fields as varied as mathematical biology, environmental management, economics, engineering, guidance and control, and social interaction. It will be of interest to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and advanced graduate students. Advances in Dynamic Games presents state-of-the-art research that serves as a testament to the vitality and growth of the field of dynamic games and their applications. Its contributions, written by experts in their respective disciplines, are outgrowths of presentations originally given at the 15th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications held July 19-22, 2012, in Bysice, Czech Republic.

This book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory. Special attention was given to problems in dynamic games under partial information and to the development of numerical methods for high-dimensional games (there is an increasing focus on this arena as recent theory is leading to solution methods for problems which were heretofore quite intractable). The interdisciplinary aspects touched upon were related to dynamical systems via replicator dynamics, with probability (measure-valued processes), with statistical mechanics (kinetic equation, non-equilibrium behaviour), with max-plus (or tropical, or idempotent) mathematics. In this volume, we publish the review of Martin Shubik (The Present and Future of Game Theory) and the contributions presenting extending versions of the talks given at the workshop "Game Theory for Finance, Social and Biological Sciences", held in Warwick 14-17 April 2010. The conference was exclusively marked by a rare natural event: the eruption of an Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajoekull, which blocked the functioning of most of the airlines, turning the way back for many participants to an adventurous enterprise.