Human development from birth through adulthood is a complex interplay of many interacting forces. Children's internal processes are manifest in behaviors that are sculpted by their experiences, most notably with primary caregivers. Because the discipline of psychology explores human behavior and cognition, the techniques employed for developmental analysis must be able to describe, depict, and quantify these complex processes. State Space Grids provides the framework, basic method, rationale, and advanced techniques for translating the behavior of children, adolescents, and parents into visible, traceable data. This seminar-between-covers takes readers step by step from conceptualization through implementation of projects, with examples from a range of current research within and outside child development. Links are included for the GridWare software program and related user resources. And although state space grids need not be used only to analyze dynamic systems, they serve as an excellent tool for honing systemic thinking. Key coverage in this volume includes: Dynamic systems and the origins of state space grids. The state of research using state space grids. Introducing GridWare and how it works. How to use state space grids, from idea through finished project. Within-grid and between-grid analysis. Conducting advanced analysis. State Space Grids is an essential reference for researchers across such disciplines as psychology, neuroscience, economics, computer science, and agricultural science.

"Decision Systems and Non-stochastic Randomness" presents the first mathematical formalization of the statistical regularities of non-stochastic randomness and demonstrates how these regularities extend the standard probability-based model of decision making under uncertainty, allowing for the description of uncertain mass events that do not fit standard stochastic models. The formalism of statistical regularities developed in this book will have a significant influence on decision theory and information theory as well as numerous other disciplines.

Market failure at medium intervals is inevitable in a capitalist economy. Such failures may not be seriously seen in the short run because market adjusts demand through hoarding of inventory or import of required goods and services. The market also adjusts demand in the long run through expansion of concerned industrial output and also by the entry of new firms. The crucial variable is price which also adjusts the commodity and the labor market. The problem comes when there are issues of overproduction, over capacity utilization of plants, over liquidation and excess supply of money, change in demand because of change in tastes and habits of consumers, households and the public. All these create knife edge disturbances in the economy. As a consequence they need adjustment through some variables such as employment and growth of population, saving propensity, technology, exhaustion of existing inventory, monetary and fiscal balancing. In this volume an attempt has been made to appraise the working of a market economy where short term disturbances may occur, market efficiency reduces, recessionary cycle emerges and after certain fundamental measures the market recovers. Starting with a brief recent history of the crisis and the recession, discussions in this volume turn to how deliberations in macroeconomics yield implications for specific policies, some of which have been tried and others still to be tested. Further in the volume we propose policies necessary for efficient regulation of the economic system, and give a brief assessment of the extent to which global policy coordination has been mulled in policy circles even if these are not seriously practiced.

Over the last two decades there has been a great deal of research into nonlinear dynamic models in economics, finance and the social sciences. This book contains twenty papers that range over very recent applications in these areas. Topics covered include structural change and economic growth, disequilibrium dynamics and economic policy as well as models with boundedly rational agents. The book illustrates some of the most recent research tools in this area and will be of interest to economists working in economic dynamics and to mathematicians interested in seeing ideas from nonlinear dynamics and complexity theory applied to the economic sciences.

The book is a benefit for graduate and postgraduate students in the areas of operations research, decision theory, optimization theory, linear algebra, interval analysis and fuzzy sets. The book will also be useful for the researchers in the respective areas. The first part of the book deals with decision making problems and procedures that have been established to combine opinions about alternatives related to different points of view. Procedures based on pairwise comparisons are thoroughly investigated. In the second part we investigate optimization problems where objective functions and constraints are characterized by extremal operators such as maximum, minimum or various triangular norms (t-norms). Matrices in max-min algebra are useful in applications such as automata theory, design of switching circuits, logic of binary relations, medical diagnosis, Markov chains, social choice, models of organizations, information systems, political systemsand clustering. The input data in real problems are usually not exact and can be characterized by interval values."

Oligopoly theory is one of the most intensively studied areas of mathematical economics. On the basis of the pioneering works of Cournot (1838), many res- rchers have developed and extensively examined the different variants of oligopoly models. Initially, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the different types of oligopolies was the main concern, and later the dynamic extensions of these models became the focus. The classical result of Theocharis (1960) asserts that under discrete time scales and static expectations, the equilibrium of a sing- product oligopoly without product differentiation and with linear price and cost functions is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a duopoly. In the continuous time case, asymptotic stability is guaranteed for any number of ?rms. In these cases the resulting dynamical systems are also linear, where local and global asymptotic stability are equivalent to each other. The classical book of Okuguchi (1976) gives a comprehensive summary of the earlier results and developments. The multipr- uct extensionshave been discussed in Okuguchiand Szidarovszky(1999);however, nonlinear features were barely touched upon in these contributions. WiththedevelopmentofthecriticalcurvemethodbyGumowskiandMira(1980) (see also Mira et al. (1996))fordiscrete time systemsand the introductionof cont- uously distributed information lags by Invernizzi and Medio (1991) in continuous time systems, increasing attention has been given to the global dynamics of n- linear oligopolies. The authors of this book have devoted a great deal of research effort to this area.

This book is devoted to the study of dynamical models of decentralized economic systems. The models considered are based on the Leontief simple dynamic model with various mechanisms for decentralized planning and management. Branches of the economic system are treated as fully independent economic agents that plan their work according to their own purposes. It is shown that the lack of coordination between economic agents leads to a limit cycle for some economic indicators. Conversely, the exchange of information between the economic agents enables a move toward balanced growth. These results are generalized for the model with dynamics of the productive assets and for the model with the final consumption. The analysis also considers a problem of endogenous technological progress in a decentralized economy. The appendix includes a short review of non-negative matrices. The book offers a valuable resource for mathematical economists and graduate students specializing in mathematical economics.

This unified treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. Future networks will rely on autonomous and distributed architectures to improve the efficiency and flexibility of mobile applications, and game theory provides the ideal framework for designing efficient and robust distributed algorithms. This book enables readers to develop a solid understanding of game theory, its applications and its use as an effective tool for addressing wireless communication and networking problems. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies including 3G networks, wireless LANs, sensor networks, dynamic spectrum access and cognitive networks. The book also covers a wide range of techniques for modeling, designing and analysing communication networks using game theory, as well as state-of-the-art distributed design techniques. This is an ideal resource for communications engineers, researchers, and graduate and undergraduate students.

There are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study. The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.

What are the principles that keep our society together? This question is even more difficult to answer than the long-standing question, what are the forces that keep our world together. However, the social challenges of humanity in the 21st century ranging from the financial crises to the impacts of globalization, require us to make fast progress in our understanding of how society works, and how our future can be managed in a resilient and sustainable way. This book can present only a few very first steps towards this ambitious goal. However, based on simple models of social interactions, one can already gain some surprising insights into the social, ``macro-level'' outcomes and dynamics that is implied by individual, ``micro-level'' interactions. Depending on the nature of these interactions, they may imply the spontaneous formation of social conventions or the birth of social cooperation, but also their sudden breakdown. This can end in deadly crowd disasters or tragedies of the commons (such as financial crises or environmental destruction). Furthermore, we demonstrate that classical modeling approaches (such as representative agent models) do not provide a sufficient understanding of the self-organization in social systems resulting from individual interactions. The consideration of randomness, spatial or network interdependencies, and nonlinear feedback effects turns out to be crucial to get fundamental insights into how social patterns and dynamics emerge. Given the explanation of sometimes counter-intuitive phenomena resulting from these features and their combination, our evolutionary modeling approach appears to be powerful and insightful. The chapters of this book range from a discussion of the modeling strategy for socio-economic systems over experimental issues up the right way of doing agent-based modeling. We furthermore discuss applications ranging from pedestrian and crowd dynamics over opinion formation, coordination, and cooperation up to conflict, and also address the response to information, issues of systemic risks in society and economics, and new approaches to manage complexity in socio-economic systems. Selected parts of this book had been previously published in peer reviewed journals.

The primary purpose in this book is to present an integrated and innovative methodological approach for the construction and selection of equity portfolios. The approach takes into account the inherent multidimensional nature of the problem, while allowing the decision makers to incorporate specified preferences in the decision processes. A fundamental principle of modern portfolio theory is that comparisons between portfolios are generally made using two criteria; the expected return and portfolio variance. According to most of the portfolio models derived from the stochastic dominance approach, the group of portfolios open to comparisons is divided into two parts: the efficient portfolios, and the dominated. This work integrates the two approaches providing a unified model for decision making in portfolio management with multiple criteria.

Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an election are playing a political game. The supermarket's price for corn flakes is decided by playing an economic game. Game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way. Even when the players have not thought everything out in advance, game theory often works for the same reason that mindless animals sometimes end up behaving very cleverly: evolutionary forces eliminate irrational play because it is unfit. Game theory has seen spectacular successes in evolutionary biology and economics, and is beginning to revolutionize other disciplines from psychology to political science. This Very Short Introduction introduces the fascinating world of game theory, showing how it can be understood without mathematical equations, and revealing that everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees can be understood by anyone willing to think seriously about the problem. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues."

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

The Mathematics of Finance has been a hot topic ever since the discovery of the Black-Scholes option pricing formulas in 1973. Unfortunately, there are very few undergraduate textbooks in this area. This book is specifically written for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in mathematics, finance or economics. This book concentrates on discrete derivative pricing models, culminating in a careful and complete derivation of the Black-Scholes option pricing formulas as a limiting case of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein discrete model.

This second edition is a complete rewrite of the first edition with significant changes to the topic organization, thus making the book flow much more smoothly. Several topics have been expanded such as the discussions of options, including the history of options, and pricing nonattainable alternatives. In this edition the material on probability has been condensed into fewer chapters, and the material on the capital asset pricing model has been removed.

The mathematics is not watered down, but it is appropriate for the intended audience. Previous knowledge of measure theory is not needed and only a small amount of linear algebra is required. All necessary probability theory is developed throughout the book on a "need-to-know" basis. No background in finance is required, since the book contains a chapter on options. "

Traditional game theory has been successful at developing strategy in games of incomplete information: when one player knows something that the other does not. But it has little to say about games of complete information, for example, tic-tac-toe, solitaire and hex. The main challenge of combinatorial game theory is to handle combinatorial chaos, where brute force study is impractical. In this comprehensive volume, Jozsef Beck shows readers how to escape from the combinatorial chaos via the fake probabilistic method, a game-theoretic adaptation of the probabilistic method in combinatorics. Using this, the author is able to determine the exact results about infinite classes of many games, leading to the discovery of some striking new duality principles. Available for the first time in paperback, it includes a new appendix to address the results that have appeared since the book's original publication.

Numerical methods in finance have emerged as a vital field at the crossroads of probability theory, finance and numerical analysis. Based on presentations given at the workshop Numerical Methods in Finance held at the INRIA Bordeaux (France) on June 1-2, 2010, this book provides an overview of the major new advances in the numerical treatment of instruments with American exercises. Naturally it covers the most recent research on the mathematical theory and the practical applications of optimal stopping problems as they relate to financial applications. By extension, it also provides an original treatment of Monte Carlo methods for the recursive computation of conditional expectations and solutions of BSDEs and generalized multiple optimal stopping problems and their applications to the valuation of energy derivatives and assets. The articles were carefully written in a pedagogical style and a reasonably self-contained manner. The book is geared toward quantitative analysts, probabilists, and applied mathematicians interested in financial applications.

One of the core building blocks of traditional economic theory is the concept of equilibrium, a state of the world in which economic forces are balanced and in the absence of external influences the values of economic variables remain static. Many traditional equilibrium models, or equilibria, are established based on the rational behavior of individuals within financial markets, such as traders, market analysts, and investing firms, and their ability to maximize profits, no matter the cost. Yet what happens when these market participants behave in an irrational manner, and how does this impact economic equilibria? Contemporary economists have agreed that a process similar to Darwin's Theory of Natural Selection takes over, whereby equilibria are shaped not by the behavior of individual participants but by an environment outside its control (i.e., an environment with little concern for maximizing profits). It is an environment in which those "selected" produce positive financial gains, but have no regard for how it was obtained or underlying motivations-and those participants suffering losses disappear altogether. Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibria in Irrational Markets proves traditional economic equilibria continue to occur despite natural selection in irrational markets. It covers a wide sampling of equilibria under various scenarios, and each chapter addresses the results of these models at an aggregate level. The text is supplemented with charts and figures to drive home key findings and proofs, making it of interest to students and researchers in the areas of economics and behavioral finance.

This Brief provides a cross-sectional analysis of development-directed investments in the wider Mekong region. The wider Mekong region includes Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and the Chinese province of Yunnan. Evidence highlights that a few critical dynamics, including human migration, natural resource flows, and financial investments, generate a high level of connectivity between these countries. Such high levels of connectivity increase complexity and the potential for ripple effects of national decisions. The emerging links between countries can unfold in financial investments, migration, or the flow of resources. As these links intensify the regional connectivity increases and over time a highly connected region can emerge, as experienced by the Mekong region. This Brief also contains a chapter at the end of the book featuring numerous charts and diagrams further illustrating the impact of development activities in the area.

Games provide mathematical models for interaction. Numerous tasks in computer science can be formulated in game-theoretic terms. This fresh and intuitive way of thinking through complex issues reveals underlying algorithmic questions and clarifies the relationships between different domains. This collection of lectures, by specialists in the field, provides an excellent introduction to various aspects of game theory relevant for applications in computer science that concern program design, synthesis, verification, testing and design of multi-agent or distributed systems. Originally devised for a Spring School organised by the GAMES Networking Programme in 2009, these lectures have since been revised and expanded, and range from tutorials concerning fundamental notions and methods to more advanced presentations of current research topics. This volume is a valuable guide to current research on game-based methods in computer science for undergraduate and graduate students. It will also interest researchers working in mathematical logic, computer science and game theory.

There is a widening gap between the current organizational reality and the tools and methods available to managers for addressing its challenges. Game Based Organization Design shows that one of the ways to bridge this gap is to introduce insights and approaches from video game design into the design of organizational systems.

Selected papers submitted by participants of the international Conference "Stochastic Analysis and Applied Probability 2010" ( www.saap2010.org ) make up the basis of this volume.

The SAAP 2010 was held in Tunisia, from 7-9 October, 2010, and was organized by the "Applied Mathematics & Mathematical Physics" research unit of the preparatory institute to the military academies of Sousse (Tunisia), chaired by Mounir Zili.

The papers cover theoretical, numerical and applied aspects of stochastic processes and stochastic differential equations. The study of such topic is motivated in part by the need to model, understand, forecast and control the behavior of many natural phenomena that evolve in time in a random way. Such phenomena appear in the fields of finance, telecommunications, economics, biology, geology, demography, physics, chemistry, signal processing and modern control theory, to mention just a few.

As this book emphasizes the importance of numerical and theoretical studies of the stochastic differential equations and stochastic processes, it will be useful for a wide spectrum of researchers in applied probability, stochastic numerical and theoretical analysis and statistics, as well as for graduate students.

To make it more complete and accessible for graduate students, practitioners and researchers, the editors Mounir Zili and Daria Filatova have included a survey dedicated to the basic concepts of numerical analysis of the stochastic differential equations, written by Henri Schurz.

One common characteristics of a complex system is its ability to withstand major disturbances and the capacity to rebuild itself. Understanding how such systems demonstrate resilience by absorbing or recovering from major external perturbations requires both quantitative foundations and a multidisciplinary view on the topic.
This book demonstrates how new methods can be used to identify the actions favouring the recovery from perturbations. Examples discussed include bacterial biofilms resisting detachment, grassland savannahs recovering from fire, the dynamics of language competition and Internet social networking sites overcoming vandalism.
The reader is taken through an introduction to the idea of resilience and viability and shown the mathematical basis of the techniques used to analyse systems. The idea of individual or agent-based modelling of complex systems is introduced and related to analytically tractable approximations of such models. A set of case studies illustrates the use of the techniques in real applications, and the final section describes how one can use new and elaborate software tools for carrying out the necessary calculations.
The book is intended for a general scientific audience of readers from the natural and social sciences, yet requires some mathematics to gain a full understanding of the more theoretical chapters.
It is an essential point of reference for those interested in the practical application of the concepts of resilience and viability

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013, held in Fort Worth, TX, USA, in November 2013. The 15 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The conference focuses on analytical models based on game, information, communication, optimization, decision, and control theories that are applied to diverse security topics. At the same time, the connection between theoretical models and real world security problems are emphasized to establish the important feedback loop between theory and practice. Observing the scarcity of venues for researchers who try to develop a deeper theoretical understanding of the underlying incentive and resource allocation issues in security, we believe that GameSec will fill an important void and serve as a distinguished forum of highest standards for years to come.

The central question I pose in this book is: If there existed a supe rior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omni science, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us, and would these differences be knowable? (ssecause God, the superior being in the Judeo Christian tradition, is generally described as a male, I shall hence forth use the masculine pronoun form for convenience, but I intend no invidious gender distinctions, whether applied to super natural or natural beings.l Theologians, philosophers of religion, and erudite scholars in other disciplines have addressed this and related questions before, but their answers, generally speaking, have not been informed by any systematic or rigorous theory. I believe the mathematical theory of games, which has little to do with the frivolity and playfulness we normally associate with games, provides a powerful tool for clarifying the key theo logical concepts in my central question and drawing out their implications in games played between human and superior beings. I am fully aware that not everybody will agree that omni science, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility are what I say they are, but I invite them to propose their own defi- Preface viii nitions and derive their own conclusions with the aid of the theory. By endowing these protean concepts with unambiguous meanings, I will try to show how game theory can breathe life into questions that have been dismissed too quickly simply because they are metaphysical-outside the world of experience.