Joel Watson has refined his successful text to make it even more student-friendly. A number of sections have been added, and numerous chapters have been substantially revised. Dozens of new exercises have been added, along with solutions to selected exercises. Chapters are short and focused, with just the right amount of mathematical content and end-of-chapter exercises. New passages walk students through tricky topics.

Stochastic games have an element of chance: the state of the next round is determined probabilistically depending upon players' actions and the current state. Successful players need to balance the need for short-term payoffs while ensuring future opportunities remain high. The various techniques needed to analyze these often highly non-trivial games are a showcase of attractive mathematics, including methods from probability, differential equations, algebra, and combinatorics. This book presents a course on the theory of stochastic games going from the basics through to topics of modern research, focusing on conceptual clarity over complete generality. Each of its chapters introduces a new mathematical tool - including contracting mappings, semi-algebraic sets, infinite orbits, and Ramsey's theorem, among others - before discussing the game-theoretic results they can be used to obtain. The author assumes no more than a basic undergraduate curriculum and illustrates the theory with numerous examples and exercises, with solutions available online.

Stochastic games have an element of chance: the state of the next round is determined probabilistically depending upon players' actions and the current state. Successful players need to balance the need for short-term payoffs while ensuring future opportunities remain high. The various techniques needed to analyze these often highly non-trivial games are a showcase of attractive mathematics, including methods from probability, differential equations, algebra, and combinatorics. This book presents a course on the theory of stochastic games going from the basics through to topics of modern research, focusing on conceptual clarity over complete generality. Each of its chapters introduces a new mathematical tool - including contracting mappings, semi-algebraic sets, infinite orbits, and Ramsey's theorem, among others - before discussing the game-theoretic results they can be used to obtain. The author assumes no more than a basic undergraduate curriculum and illustrates the theory with numerous examples and exercises, with solutions available online.

Agent systems are being used to model complex systems like societies, markets and biological systems. In this book we investigate issues of agent systems related to convergence and interactivity using techniques from agent based modelling to simulate complex systems, and demonstrate that interactivity/exchange and convergence in multi-agent systems are issues that are significantly interrelated.

Topic and features: - Introduces the state of the art in multi-agent systems, with an emphasis on agent-based computational economics. - Sheds light on the fundamental concepts behind the stability of multi-agent systems. - Investigates knowledge exchange among agents, the rationale behind it and its effects on the ecosystem. - Explores how information provided through interaction with the system can be used to optimise its performance. - Describes a pricing strategy for a realistic large-scale distributed system.

This book supplies a comprehensive resource and will be invaluable reading for researchers and postgraduates studying this topic.

This volume brings together the collected contributions of Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki, on the theme of learning, experimentation and intertemporal incentives, spanning over two decades of thought (1996 to 2019).The collection starts with a comprehensive introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. The authors describe socially optimal and revenue optimal dynamic mechanism. They cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types, and also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types.Consolidating the research agenda on learning, experimentation, and dynamic mechanism design, which has been prominent in the area of economic theory, the authors present for the first time the main results of the research agenda in this volume.

A host of digital affordances, including reduced cost production tools, open distribution platforms, and ubiquitous connectivity, have engendered the growth of indie games among makers and users, forcing critics to reconsider the question of who makes games and why. Taking seriously this new mode of cultural produciton compells analysts to reconsider the blurred boundaries and relations of makers, users and texts as well as their respective relationship to cultural power and hierarchy. The contributions to Indie Games in the Digital Age consider these questions and examine a series of firms, makers, games and scenes, ranging from giants like Nintendo and Microsoft to grassroots games like Cards Against Humanity and Stardew Valley, to chart more precisely the productive and instructive disruption that this new site of cultural production offers.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.

This book develops a mathematical framework for modeling and optimizing interference-coupled multiuser systems. At the core of this framework is the concept of general interference functions, which provides a simple means of characterizing interdependencies between users. The entire analysis builds on the two core axioms scale-invariance and monotonicity.
The proposed network calculus has its roots in power control theory and wireless communications. It adds theoretical tools for analyzing the typical behavior of interference-coupled networks. In this way it complements existing game-theoretic approaches.
The framework should also be viewed in conjunction with optimization theory. There is a fruitful interplay between the theory of interference functions and convex optimization theory. By jointly exploiting the properties of interference functions, it is possible to design algorithms that outperform general-purpose techniques that only exploit convexity.
The title "network calculus" refers to the fact that the theory of interference functions constitutes a generic theoretical framework for the analysis of interference coupled systems. Certain operations within the framework are "closed," that is, combinations of interference functions are interference functions again. Also, certain properties are preserved under such operations. This, provides a methodology for analyzing different multiuser performance measures that can be expressed as interference functions or combinations of interference functions.

The purpose of this book is to present unpublished papers at the cutting edge of research on dialetheism and to reflect recent work on the applications of the theory. It includes contributions from some of the most respected scholars in the field, as well as from young, up-and-coming philosophers working on dialetheism. Moving from the fringes of philosophy to become a main player in debates concerning truth and the logical paradoxes, dialetheism has thrived since the publication of Graham Priest's In Contradiction, and several of the papers find their roots in a conference on dialetheism held in Glasgow to mark the 25th anniversary of Priest's book. The content presented here demonstrates the considerable body of work produced in this field in recent years. With a broad focus, this book also addresses the applications of dialetheism outside the more familiar area of the logical paradoxes, and includes pieces discussing the application of dialetheism in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.

The starting point for this monograph is the previously unknown connection between the Continuum Hypothesis and the saturation of the non-stationary ideal on 1; and the principle result of this monograph is the identification of a canonical model in which the Continuum Hypothesis is false. This is the first example of such a model and moreover the model can be characterized in terms of maximality principles concerning the universal-existential theory of all sets of countable ordinals. This model is arguably the long sought goal of the study of forcing axioms and iterated forcing but is obtained by completely different methods, for example no theory of iterated forcing whatsoever is required. The construction of the model reveals a powerful technique for obtaining independence results regarding the combinatorics of the continuum, yielding a number of results which have yet to be obtained by any other method. This monograph is directed to researchers and advanced graduate students in Set Theory. The second edition is updated to take into account some of the developments in the decade since the first edition appeared, this includes a revised discussion of -logic and related matters.

Written in a conversational tone, this classroom-tested text introduces the fundamentals of linear programming and game theory, showing readers how to apply serious mathematics to practical real-life questions by modelling linear optimization problems and strategic games. The treatment of linear programming includes two distinct graphical methods. The game theory chapters include a novel proof of the minimax theorem for 2x2 zero-sum games. In addition to zero-sum games, the text presents variable-sum games, ordinal games, and n-player games as the natural result of relaxing or modifying the assumptions of zero-sum games. All concepts and techniques are derived from motivating examples, building in complexity, which encourages students to think creatively and leads them to understand how the mathematics is applied. With no prerequisite besides high school algebra, the text will be useful to motivated high school students and undergraduates studying business, economics, mathematics, and the social sciences.

Written in a conversational tone, this classroom-tested text introduces the fundamentals of linear programming and game theory, showing readers how to apply serious mathematics to practical real-life questions by modelling linear optimization problems and strategic games. The treatment of linear programming includes two distinct graphical methods. The game theory chapters include a novel proof of the minimax theorem for 2x2 zero-sum games. In addition to zero-sum games, the text presents variable-sum games, ordinal games, and n-player games as the natural result of relaxing or modifying the assumptions of zero-sum games. All concepts and techniques are derived from motivating examples, building in complexity, which encourages students to think creatively and leads them to understand how the mathematics is applied. With no prerequisite besides high school algebra, the text will be useful to motivated high school students and undergraduates studying business, economics, mathematics, and the social sciences.

Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises. The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories.

This book presents the essential concepts of operations research and engineering management in a structured manner. Starting with the basic functions of management - planning, organizing, leading and controlling - it introduces the reader to the process of strategic decision-making, covering the essentials of technological invention management, innovation and entrepreneurship, with ample examples of decision-making under certainty, uncertainty and risk conditions. It also exposes the reader to the fundamentals of managing projects and professional communication. In order to reinforce the theory used, practical case studies taken from relevant disciplines are introduced. For instance, case studies from the retail sector have been appended to the assignment problem and cases related to traffic have been introduced for queuing formulation. The concept of game theory is discussed in greater detail with an introduction to topics such as incentive compatibility, Bayesian representations for different games, budget balance, auctions and a broad coverage of mechanism design. While a few of these problems have been solved in the book, a few others have been left un-solved to promote readers' understanding. The mix of theoretical and practical examples reveals to the reader the underlying complexities and highlights the challenges entailed by field implementation.

Research from the neurosciences and behavioural sciences highlights the importance of individual differences in explaining human behaviour. Individual differences in core psychological constructs, such as intelligence or personality, account for meaningful variations in a vast range of responses and behaviours. Aspects of chess have been increasingly used in the past to evaluate a myriad of psychological theories, and several of these studies consider individual differences to be key constructs in their respective fields. This book summarizes the research surrounding the psychology of chess from an individual- differences perspective. The findings accumulated from nearly forty years' worth of research about chess and individual differences are brought together to show what is known - and still unknown - about the psychology of chess, with an emphasis on how people differ from one another.

This book arose out of a conference on "Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions" that took place in January 1994 at the Centre Inter- national de Recherches Mathematiques in Marseille. The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades. The aim of the conference was to explore this rapprochement further by gathering spe- cialists from different professional communities, i. e. , economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. Also, the organizors aimed at fostering the work centered on the issues of knowledge and belief that has recently been pursued amongst game theorists and decision theorists. The conference was funded by the following institutions: Centre National de la Recherche Sci- entifique (France), Ministere de l'Enseignement Superieur et de la Recherche (France), Association pour Ie Developpement de la Recherche en Economie et Statistique (France). It was also supported by the Human Capital and Mobility Programme of the EU, as well as, locally, by the Ville de Marseille. We would like to express our gratitude to these institutions for their generous help. Despite the success of the conference, it was not the editors' intention to circulate just another volume of proceedings in the usual style. Throughout the more than two-year editorial process, they have pursued the goal of providing a no doubt non-exhaustive, but hopefully thorough and accurate, state of the art account of a promising field of research.

The principles of game theory apply to a wide range of topics in biology. This book presents the central concepts in evolutionary game theory and provides an authoritative and up-to-date account. The focus is on concepts that are important for biologists in their attempts to explain observations. This strong connection between concepts and applications is a recurrent theme throughout the book which incorporates recent and traditional ideas from animal psychology, neuroscience, and machine learning that provide a mechanistic basis for behaviours shown by players of a game. The approaches taken to modelling games often rest on idealized and unrealistic assumptions whose limitations and consequences are not always appreciated. The authors provide a novel reassessment of the field, highlighting how to overcome limitations and identifying future directions. Game Theory in Biology is an advanced textbook suitable for graduate level students as well as professional researchers (both empiricists and theoreticians) in the fields of behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology. It will also be of relevance to a broader interdisciplinary audience including psychologists and neuroscientists.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2019, held in Loughborough, UK, in June 2019. The field of Group Decision and Negotiation focuses on decision processes with at least two participants and a common goal but conflicting individual goals. Research areas of Group Decision and Negotiation include electronic negotiations, experiments, the role of emotions in group decision and negotiations, preference elicitation and decision support for group decisions and negotiations, and conflict resolution principles. The 17 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 98 submissions. They were organized in topical sections named: preference modeling for group decision and negotiations; collaborative decision making processes; conflict resolution; behavioral OR, and negotiation support systems and studies.

This Palgrave Pivot examines monotone games and studies incentives and outcomes when there are multiple players, and how the decision of each player affects the well-being of others in particular ways. Games with strategic complements exhibit codirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the same direction as other players. Games with strategic substitutes exhibit contradirectional incentives, or incentives for each player to move in the direction opposite to other players. Monotone games include both types of players: some players have incentives to move in the same direction as other players and some players have incentives to move in the direction opposite to other players. This book develops the theory of monotone games in a new and unified manner and presents many applications. Incentives and outcomes studied in monotone games occur in a variety of disciplines, including biology, business, computer science, economics, mathematics, medicine, philosophy, political science, and psychology, among others. The book identifies unifying threads across different cases, showing how newer results are similar to or different from previous results, and how readers may better understand them under the umbrella of monotone games.

These Proceedings offer a selection of peer-reviewed research and survey papers by some of the foremost international researchers in the fields of finance, energy, stochastics and risk, who present their latest findings on topical problems. The papers cover the areas of stochastic modeling in energy and financial markets; risk management with environmental factors from a stochastic control perspective; and valuation and hedging of derivatives in markets dominated by renewables, all of which further develop the theory of stochastic analysis and mathematical finance. The papers were presented at the first conference on "Stochastics of Environmental and Financial Economics (SEFE)", being part of the activity in the SEFE research group of the Centre of Advanced Study (CAS) at the Academy of Sciences in Oslo, Norway during the 2014/2015 academic year.

This volume contains a selection consisting of the best papers presented at the FUR XII conference, held at LUISS in Roma, Italy, in June 2006, organized by John Hey and Daniela Di Cagno. The objectives of the FUR (Foundations of Utility and Risk theory) conferences have always been to bring together leading academics from Economics, Psychology, Statistics, Operations Research, Finance, Applied Mat- matics, and other disciplines, to address the issues of decision-making from a g- uinely multi-disciplinary point of view. This twelfth conference in the series was no exception. The early FUR conferences - like FUR I (organized by Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen) and FUR III (organized by Bertrand Munier) - initiated the move away from the excessively rigid and descriptively-inadequate modelling of beh- iour under risk and uncertainty that was in vogue in conventional economics at that time. More than twenty years later, things have changed fundamentally, and now - novations arising from the FUR conferences, and manifesting themselves in the new behavioural economics, are readily accepted by the profession. Working with new models of ambiguity, and bounded rationality, for example, behavioural decision making is no longer considered a sign of mere non-standard intellectual diversi?- tion. FUR XII was organised with this new spirit. In the sense that the behavioural concerns initiated by the ?rst FUR conferences are now part of conventional e- nomics, and the design and organisation of FUR XII re?ects this integration, FUR XII represents a key turning point in the FUR conference series.

The aim of this book is to incorporate Marshallian ideas such as external increasing returns and monopolistic competitions into the general equilibrium framework of Walrasian tradition. New chapters and sections have been added to this revised and expanded edition of General Equilibrium Analysis of Production and Increasing Returns (World Scientific, 2009).The new material includes a presentation of equilibrium existence and core equivalence theorems for an infinite horizon economy with a measure space of consumers. These results are currently the focus of extensive studies by mathematical theorists, and are obtained by an application of an advanced mathematical concept called saturated (super-atomless) measure space.The second major change is the inclusion of a simple toy model of a liberal society which implements the difference principle proposed by J Rawls as a principle of distributive justice. This new section opens up a possibility to connect theoretical economics and political philosophy.Thirdly, the author presents the marginal cost pricing equilibrium and discusses welfare properties of the external increasing returns, which also belong to Marshall/ Pigou tradition of the Cambridge school.Finally, a new mathematical appendix treats basics of singular homology theory. Although the fixed point theorem is originally a theorem of algebraic topology, most economic students know its proof only in the context of the differentiable manifold theory presented by J Milnor. Considering the significance of the fixed point theorem and its playing a key role in general equilibrium theory, the purpose of this new appendix is to provide readers with the idea of a proof of Brower's fixed point theorem from the 'right place'.This volume will be helpful for graduate students and researchers of mathematical economics, game theory, and microeconomics.

Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen. Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels.To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book.This new edition has been updated and enlarged. In particular, two new chapters were added on statistical limit of games with many agents and on quantum games, reflecting possibly the two most stunning trends in the game theory of the 21st century.

Born of a belief that economic insights should not require much mathematical sophistication, this book proposes novel and parsimonious methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling, without complex mathematics. Economics has made great strides over the past several decades in modeling agents' decisions when they are incompletely informed, but many economists believe that there are aspects of these models that are less than satisfactory. Among the concerns are that ignorance is not captured well in most models, that agents' presumed cognitive ability is implausible, and that derived optimal behavior is sometimes driven by the fine details of the model rather than the underlying economics. Compte and Postlewaite lay out a tractable way to address these concerns, and to incorporate plausible limitations on agents' sophistication. A central aspect of the proposed methodology is to restrict the strategies assumed available to agents.

This book surveys new algorithmic approaches and applications to natural and man-made disasters such as oil spills, hurricanes, earthquakes and wildfires. Based on the "Third International Conference on Dynamics of Disasters" held in Kalamata, Greece, July 2017, this Work includes contributions in evacuation logistics, disaster communications between first responders, disaster relief, and a case study on humanitarian logistics. Multi-disciplinary theories, tools, techniques and methodologies are linked with disasters from mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. The interdisciplinary approach to problems in economics, optimization, government, management, business, humanities, engineering, medicine, mathematics, computer science, behavioral studies, emergency services, and environmental studies will engage readers from a wide variety of fields and backgrounds.