This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the properties of decision rules and of the functioning of modern democracies. In particular, it focuses on the legacy of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, two prominent scholars who have made important contributions to this field over the last fifty years. It covers a range of topics, including (but not limited to) computational and technical aspects of probability approaches, evaluation of the likelihood of voting paradoxes, power indices, empirical evaluations of voting rules, models of voters' behavior, and strategic voting. The book gathers articles written in honor of Gehrlein and Lepelley along with original works written by the two scholars themselves.

This monograph introduces a novel multiset-based conceptual, mathematical and knowledge engineering paradigm, called multigrammatical framework (MGF), used for planning and scheduling in resource-consuming, resource-producing (industrial) and resource-distributing (economical) sociotechnological systems (STS). This framework is meant to enable smart operation not only in a "business-as-usual" mode, but also in extraordinary, highly volatile or hazardous environments. It is the result of convergence and deep integration into a unified, flexible and effectively implemented formalism operating on multisets of several well-known paradigms from classical operations research and modern knowledge engineering, such as: mathematical programming, game theory, optimal scheduling, logic programming and constraint programming. The mathematical background needed for MGF, its algorithmics, applications, implementation issues, as well as its nexus with known models from operations research and theoretical computer science areas are considered. The resilience and recovery issues of an STS are studied by applying the MGF toolkit and on paying special attention to the multigrammatical assessment of resilience of energy infrastructures. MGF-represented resource-based games are introduced, and directions for further development are discussed. The author presents multiple applications to business intelligence, critical infrastructure, ecology, economy and industry. This book is addressed to scholars working in the areas of theoretical and applied computer science, artificial intelligence, systems analysis, operations research, mathematical economy and critical infrastructure protection, to engineers developing software-intensive solutions for implementation of the knowledge-based digital economy and Industry 4.0, as well as to students, aspirants and university staff. Foundational knowledge of set theory, mathematical logic and routine operations on data bases is needed to read this book. The content of the monograph is gradually presented, from simple to complex, in a well-understandable step-by-step manner. Multiple examples and accompanying figures are included in order to support the explanation of the various notions, expressions and algorithms.

This textbook provides a comprehensive overview of noncooperative and cooperative dynamic games involving uncertain parameter values, with the stochastic process being described by an event tree. Primarily intended for graduate students of economics, management science and engineering, the book is self-contained, as it defines and illustrates all relevant concepts originally introduced in static games before extending them to a dynamic framework. It subsequently addresses the sustainability of cooperative contracts over time and introduces a range of mechanisms to help avoid such agreements breaking down before reaching maturity. To illustrate the concepts discussed, the book provides various examples of how dynamic games played over event trees can be applied to environmental economics, management science, and engineering.

This book covers recent advances in Complex Automated Negotiations as a widely studied emerging area in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. The book includes selected revised and extended papers from the 7th International Workshop on Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation (ACAN2014), which was held in Paris, France, in May 2014. The book also includes brief introductions about Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation which are based on tutorials provided in the workshop, and brief summaries and descriptions about the ANAC'14 (Automated Negotiating Agents Competition) competition, where authors of selected finalist agents explain the strategies and the ideas used by them. The book is targeted to academic and industrial researchers in various communities of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, such as agreement technology, mechanism design, electronic commerce, related areas, as well as graduate, undergraduate, and PhD students working in those areas or having interest in them.

This book offers a unique and insightful econometric evaluation of the policies used to fight transnational terrorism between 1990 and 2014. It uses the tools of modern economics, game theory and structural econometrics to analyze the roles of foreign aid, educational capital, and military intervention. Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen analyze panel data over 25 years across 124 countries. They prove that foreign aid plays a key role in inducing recipient governments to protect the donors' political and economic interests within their sphere of influence. Demonstrating that countries endowed with better educational capital export fewer terrorist attacks, they also illustrate that, in contrast, military intervention is counter-productive in abating terrorism. Recognizing the strides taken by the Obama administration to increase the role of foreign aid and reduce the use of military interventions, this book shows the significant impact this has had in reducing the number of transnational terrorist attacks per source country, and suggests further developments in this vein. Practical and timely, this book will be of particular interest to students and scholars of economics and political science, as well as those working on the wider issue of terrorism. Presenting a series of new findings, the book will also appeal to international policy makers and government officials.

Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.

Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is a unique blend of decision theory and game theory. From classical optimization to modern game theory, authors Charalambos D. Aliprantis and Subir K. Chakrabarti show the importance of mathematical knowledge in understanding and analyzing issues in decision making. Through an imaginative selection of topics, Aliprantis and Chakrabarti treat decision and game theory as part of one body of knowledge. They move from problems involving the individual decision-maker to progressively more complex problems such as sequential rationality, auctions, and bargaining. By building each chapter on material presented earlier, the authors offer a self-contained and comprehensive treatment of these topics. Successfully class-tested in an advanced undergraduate course at the Krannert School of Management and in a graduate course in economics at Indiana University, Games and Decision Making, Second Edition, is an essential text for advanced undergraduates and graduate students of decision theory and game theory. The book is accessible to students who have a good basic understanding of elementary calculus and probability theory. New to this Edition * Chapter 2 includes new sections on two-person games, best-response strategies, mixed strategies, and incomplete information * Chapter 4 has been expanded to provide new material on behavior strategies and applications * The chapter on auctions (5) includes a new section on revenue equivalence * Offers two new chapters, on repeated games (7) and existence results (9) * New applications have been added to all the chapters

Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is a seminal volume which introduces a model providing solutions to economic games subject to repeated play. It develops a link between strategic bargaining and the theory of self-enforcing contracts to give insights into the long-term relationships between two parties, such as firms or governments, who meet in a negotiating situation. The author provides an original approach to strategic bargaining to find a solution to economic games in which cooperation cannot be enforced by a third party. He then applies this approach to a wide range of real life situations including international environmental agreements, bilateral trade agreements, collusion between firms in industry and bargaining between buyers and sellers in the market place. The author also discusses important policy implications as well as setting an agenda for future research. Economic Games and Strategic Behaviour is an original contribution to the existing literature which will be welcomed for providing accurate outcomes for situations in which conventional theories produce ambiguous results. It will be of great interest to students and scholars of microeconomics, game theory and industrial economics.

Energy production and supply, as well as sourcing and consumption, are becoming evermore important in a volatile world. In this book, attention is paid to prevalent energy issues from a finance perspective. The topics discussed cover markets, prices, regulations and firms. An international group of authors from both academia and energy practice provides in twelve chapters a state of the art of the energy markets in a finance environment. They do so by discussing the current knowledge and presenting empirical research in this quickly changing and developing field. This book is the first in a planned series on energy at a high scientific level organized by the Centre for Energy and Value Issues (CEVI).

This book presents the fundamentals of evolutionary game theory and applies them to the analysis of epidemics, which is of paramount importance in the aftermath of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic. The primary objective of this monograph is to deliver a powerful tool to model and analyze the spread of an infectious disease during a pandemic as well as the human decision dynamics. The book employs a variant of the "vaccination game," in which a mathematical epidemiological model dovetails with evolutionary game theory. From a social physics standpoint, this book introduces an extended concept of the vaccination game starting from the fundamental issues and touching on the newest practical applications. The book first outlines the fundamental basis of evolutionary game theory, in which a two-player and two-strategy game, the so-called 2 x 2 game, and a multi-player game are concisely introduced, and the important issue of how social dilemmas are quantified is highlighted. Subsequently, the book discusses various recent applications of the extended concept of the vaccination game so as to quantitatively evaluate provisions other than vaccination, including practical intermediate protective measures such as mask-wearing, efficiency of quarantine compared with that of isolation policies for suppressing epidemics, efficiency of preemptive versus late vaccination, and optimal subsidy policies for vaccination.

This contributed volume presents the state-of-the-art of games and dynamic games, featuring several chapters based on plenary sessions at the ISDG-China Chapter Conference on Dynamic Games and Game Theoretic Analysis, which was held from August 3-5, 2017 at the Ningbo campus of the University of Nottingham, China. The chapters in this volume will provide readers with paths to further research, serving as a testimony to the vitality of the field. Experts cover a range of theory and applications related to games and dynamic games, with topics including: Dynamically stable cooperative provision of public goods under non-transferable utility Strongly time-consistent solutions in cooperative dynamic games Incentive Stackelberg games for stochastic systems Static and inverse Stackelberg games in political economy Cournot and Betrand competition on symmetric R&D networks Numerical Nash equilibria using curvilinear multistart algorithm Markov chain approximation numerical scheme for infinite-horizon mean field games Frontiers in Games and Dynamic Games will appeal to an interdisciplinary audience of researchers, practitioners, and graduate students interested in games and dynamic games.

This book provides a timely and comprehensive overview of current theories and methods in fuzzy logic, as well as relevant applications in a variety of fields of science and technology. Dedicated to Lotfi A. Zadeh on his one year death anniversary, the book goes beyond a pure commemorative text. Yet, it offers a fresh perspective on a number of relevant topics, such as computing with words, theory of perceptions, possibility theory, and decision-making in a fuzzy environment. Written by Zadeh's closest colleagues and friends, the different chapters are intended both as a timely reference guide and a source of inspiration for scientists, developers and researchers who have been dealing with fuzzy sets or would like to learn more about their potential for their future research.

This book reports on the implementation of evolutionary-game theory in the design of distributed optimization-based controllers. First, it discusses how the classical population-game approach can contribute to and complement the design of optimization-based controllers. It shows how the features of this approach can be exploited to extend their capabilities in the solution of distributed optimization problems, and examines density games in order to consider multiple coupled constraints and preserve the non-centralized information requirements. Furthermore, it establishes a close relationship between the possible interactions among agents in a population with constrained information sharing among different local controllers. It also discusses coalitional games, focusing on the Shapley power index and proposes an alternative method of computing the latter, which reduces computational time, as well as a different way of finding it using distributed communication structures. All the proposed strategies are then tested on various control problems, such as those related to the Barcelona water supply network, multiple continuous stirred tank reactors, various unmanned aerial vehicle systems, and a water distribution system. This thesis, examined at the Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya and Universidad de los Andes in 2017, received the award for best thesis in control from the control group of the Spanish Committee of Automatic Control (CEA) in the same year.

This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book."

This proceedings book presents state-of-the-art developments in theory, methodology, and applications of network analysis across sociology, computational science, education research, literature studies, political science, international relations, social media research, and urban studies. The papers comprising this collection were presented at the Fifth 'Networks in the Global World' conference organized by the Centre for German and European Studies of St. Petersburg University and Bielefeld University and held on July 7-9, 2020. This biannual conference series revolves around key interdisciplinary issues in the focus of network analysts, such as the multidimensional approach to social reality, translation of theories and methods across disciplines, and mixing of data and methods. The distinctive features of this book are the emphasis on in-depth linkages between theory, method, and applications, the blend of qualitative and quantitative methods, and the joint consideration of different network levels, types, and contexts. The topics covered by the papers include interrelation of social and cultural structures, constellations of power, and patterns of interaction in areas ranging from various types of communities (local, international, educational, political, and so on) to social media and literature. The book is useful for practicing researchers, graduate and postgraduate students, and educators interested in network analysis of social relations, politics, economy, and culture. Features that set the book apart from others in the field: * The book offers a unique cross-disciplinary blend of computational and ethnographic network analyses applied to a diverse spectrum of spheres, from literature and education to urban planning and policymaking. * Embracing conceptual, methodological, and empirical works, the book is among the few in network analysis to emphasize connections between theory, method, and applications. * The book brings together authors and empirical contexts from all over the globe, with a particular emphasis on European societies.

This book contains international perspectives that unifies the themes of strategic management, decision theory, and data science. It contains thought-provoking presentations of case studies backed by adequate analysis adding significance to the discussions. Most of the decision-making models in use do take due advantage of collection and processing of relevant data using appropriate analytics oriented to provide inputs into effective decision-making. The book showcases applications in diverse fields including banking and insurance, portfolio management, inventory analysis, performance assessment of comparable economic agents, managing utilities in a health-care facility, reducing traffic snarls on highways, monitoring achievement of some of the sustainable development goals in a country or state, and similar other areas that showcase policy implications. It holds immense value for researchers as well as professionals responsible for organizational decisions.

This book is an original-the first-ever treatment of the mathematics of Luck. Setting out from the principle that luck can be measured by the gap between reasonable expectation and eventual realization, the book develops step-by-step a mathematical theory that accommodates the entire range of our pre-systematic understanding of the way in which luck functions in human affairs. In so moving from explanatory exposition to mathematical treatment, the book provides a clear and accessible account of the way in which luck assessment enters into the calculations of rational decision theory.

This monograph is devoted to the analysis and solution of singular differential games and singular $H_{\inf}$ control problems in both finite- and infinite-horizon settings. Expanding on the authors' previous work in this area, this novel text is the first to study the aforementioned singular problems using the regularization approach. After a brief introduction, solvability conditions are presented for the regular differential games and $H_{\inf}$ control problems. In the following chapter, the authors solve the singular finite-horizon linear-quadratic differential game using the regularization method. Next, they apply this method to the solution of an infinite-horizon type. The last two chapters are dedicated to the solution of singular finite-horizon and infinite-horizon linear-quadratic $H_{\inf}$ control problems. The authors use theoretical and real-world examples to illustrate the results and their applicability throughout the text, and have carefully organized the content to be as self-contained as possible, making it possible to study each chapter independently or in succession. Each chapter includes its own introduction, list of notations, a brief literature review on the topic, and a corresponding bibliography. For easier readability, detailed proofs are presented in separate subsections. Singular Linear-Quadratic Zero-Sum Differential Games and $H_{\inf}$ Control Problems will be of interest to researchers and engineers working in the areas of applied mathematics, dynamic games, control engineering, mechanical and aerospace engineering, electrical engineering, and biology. This book can also serve as a useful reference for graduate students in these area

The scientific and technical development of any kind of germplasm is regulated by a vast network of treaties, conventions, international agreements, and national and regional legislation. These regulations govern biotechnological innovations in plants and microorganisms, access to and use of plant genetic resources, and biosafety. This complex mix has made it difficult to arrive at global interpretations, due to overlaps, gaps, ambiguities, contradictions, and lack of consistency. The big picture is even more complex, as a series of scientific developments - gene editing in particular - have in some cases rendered these international regulatory frameworks obsolete. This book puts forward an innovative approach: a "Comprehensive Plant Germplasm System". The System is a cooperative game theory-based proposal for a binding international convention which would supersede all other conventions, treaties, national and regional legislation covering native varieties and traditional developments, heterogeneous plant varieties, microorganisms, biotechnological inventions, plant genetic resources, and biosafety regulation. In short, it offers a comprehensive framework regarding intellectual property, biosafety, and business regulation and covers all types of germplasm. If applied, the system is expected to yield higher productivity rates in crops and improved food biodiversity, as well as a new paradigm based on the promotion of innovation for "Agriculture 4.0."

Based on the "Fourth International Conference on Dynamics of Disasters" (Kalamata, Greece, July 2019), this volume includes contributions from experts who share their latest discoveries on natural and unnatural disasters. Authors provide overviews of the tactical points involved in disaster relief, outlines of hurdles from mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery, and uses for mathematical models to describe natural and man-made disasters. Topics covered include economics, optimization, machine learning, government, management, business, humanities, engineering, medicine, mathematics, computer science, behavioral studies, emergency services, and environmental studies will engage readers from a wide variety of fields and backgrounds.

This book presents a survey of the aspects of economic complexity, with a focus on foundational, interdisciplinary ideas. The long-awaited follow up to his 2011 volume Complex Evolutionary Dynamics in Urban-Regional and Ecologic-Economic Systems: From Catastrophe to Chaos and Beyond, this volume draws together the threads of Rosser's earlier work on complexity theory and its wide applications in economics and an expanded list of related disciplines. The book begins with a full account of the broader categories of complexity in economics--dynamic, computational, hierarchical, and structural--before shifting to more detailed analysis. The next two chapters address problems associated with computational complexity, especially those of computability, and discuss the Godel Incompleteness Theorem with a focus on reflexivity. The middle chapters discuss the relationship between entropy, econophysics, evolution, and economic complexity, respectively, with applications in urban and regional dynamics, ecological economics, general equilibrium theory, as well as financial market dynamics. The final chapter works to bring together these themes into a broader framework and expose some of the limits concerning analysis of deeper foundational issues. With applications in all disciplines characterized by interconnected nonlinear adaptive systems, this book is appropriate for graduate students, professors and practitioners in economics and related disciplines such as regional science, mathematics, physics, biology, environmental sciences, philosophy, and psychology.

This compelling book advances utilitarianism as the basis for a viable public philosophy, effectively rebutting the common charge that, as moral doctrine, utilitarian thought permits cruel acts, justifies unfair distribution of wealth, and demands too much of moral agents.
James Wood Bailey defends utilitarianism through novel use of game theory insights regarding feasible equilibria and evolutionary stability, elaborating a sophisticated account of institutions that real-world utilitarians would want to foster. If utilitarianism seems in principle to dictate that we make each and every choice such that it leads to the best consequences overall, game theory emphasizes that no choice has consequences in isolation, but only in conjunction with many other choices of other agents. Viewing institutions as equilibria in complex games, Bailey negotiates the paradox of individual responsibilities, arguing that if individuals within institutions have specific responsibilities they cannot get from the principle of utility alone, the utility principle nevertheless holds great value in that it allows us to identify morally desirable institutions. Far from recommending cruel acts, utilitarianism, understood this way, actually runs congruent to our basic moral intuitions.
A provocative attempt to support the practical use of utilitarian ethics in a world of conflicting interests and competing moral agents, Bailey's book employs the work of social scientists to tackle problems traditionally given abstract philosophical attention. Vividly illustrating its theory with concrete moral dilemmas and taking seriously our moral common sense, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice is an accessible, groundbreaking work that will richly reward students and scholars of political science, political economy, and philosophy.

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. It brings together the contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such as Statistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. The contributions include decision theory, stochastic games, cooperative and noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classified under five different sections. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games. The fifth section contains diverse applications of these various theories. Taken together they exhibit a rich versatility of these theories and lively interaction between the mathematical theory of games and significant economic problems.

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action.
The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts.
By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.