The objective of this book is to provide a valuable compendium of problems as a reference for undergraduate and graduate students, faculty, researchers and practitioners of operations research and management science. These problems can serve as a basis for the development or study of assignments and exams. Also, they can be useful as a guide for the first stage of the model formulation, i.e. the definition of a problem. The book is divided into 11 chapters that address the following topics: Linear programming, integer programming, non linear programming, network modeling, inventory theory, queue theory, tree decision, game theory, dynamic programming and markov processes. Readers are going to find a considerable number of statements of operations research applications for management decision-making. The solutions of these problems are provided in a concise way although all topics start with a more developed resolution. The proposed problems are based on the research experience of the authors in real-world companies so much as on the teaching experience of the authors in order to develop exam problems for industrial engineering and business administration studies.

The goal in putting together this unique compilation was to present the current status of the solutions to some of the most essential open problems in pure and applied mathematics. Emphasis is also given to problems in interdisciplinary research for which mathematics plays a key role. This volume comprises highly selected contributions by some of the most eminent mathematicians in the international mathematical community on longstanding problems in very active domains of mathematical research. A joint preface by the two volume editors is followed by a personal farewell to John F. Nash, Jr. written by Michael Th. Rassias. An introduction by Mikhail Gromov highlights some of Nash's legendary mathematical achievements. The treatment in this book includes open problems in the following fields: algebraic geometry, number theory, analysis, discrete mathematics, PDEs, differential geometry, topology, K-theory, game theory, fluid mechanics, dynamical systems and ergodic theory, cryptography, theoretical computer science, and more. Extensive discussions surrounding the progress made for each problem are designed to reach a wide community of readers, from graduate students and established research mathematicians to physicists, computer scientists, economists, and research scientists who are looking to develop essential and modern new methods and theories to solve a variety of open problems.

Dynamics, Games and Science I and II are a selection of surveys and research articles written by leading researchers in mathematics. The majority of the contributions are on dynamical systems and game theory, focusing either on fundamental and theoretical developments or on applications to modeling in biology, ecomonics, engineering, finances and psychology.

The papers are based on talks given at the International Conference DYNA 2008, held in honor of Mauricio Peixoto and David Rand at the University of Braga, Portugal, on September 8-12, 2008.

The aim of these volumes is to present cutting-edge research in these areas to encourage graduate students and researchers in mathematics and other fields to develop them further.

Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.

Differential Game Theory with Applications to Missiles and Autonomous Systems explains the use of differential game theory in autonomous guidance and control systems. The book begins with an introduction to the basic principles before considering optimum control and game theory. Two-party and multi-party game theory and guidance are then covered and, finally, the theory is demonstrated through simulation examples and models and the simulation results are discussed. Recent developments in the area of guidance and autonomous systems are also presented. Key features: * Presents new developments and how they relate to established control systems knowledge. * Demonstrates the theory through simulation examples and models. * Covers two-party and multi-party game theory and guidance. * Accompanied by a website hosting MATLAB(R) code. The book is essential reading for researchers and practitioners in the aerospace and defence industries as well as graduate students in aerospace engineering.

The Mathematics of Finance has been a hot topic ever since the discovery of the Black-Scholes option pricing formulas in 1973. Unfortunately, there are very few undergraduate textbooks in this area. This book is specifically written for advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students in mathematics, finance or economics. This book concentrates on discrete derivative pricing models, culminating in a careful and complete derivation of the Black-Scholes option pricing formulas as a limiting case of the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein discrete model.

This second edition is a complete rewrite of the first edition with significant changes to the topic organization, thus making the book flow much more smoothly. Several topics have been expanded such as the discussions of options, including the history of options, and pricing nonattainable alternatives. In this edition the material on probability has been condensed into fewer chapters, and the material on the capital asset pricing model has been removed.

The mathematics is not watered down, but it is appropriate for the intended audience. Previous knowledge of measure theory is not needed and only a small amount of linear algebra is required. All necessary probability theory is developed throughout the book on a "need-to-know" basis. No background in finance is required, since the book contains a chapter on options. "

This book provides the first comprehensive introduction to multi-agent, multi-choice repetitive games, such as the Kolkata Restaurant Problem and the Minority Game. It explains how the tangible formulations of these games, using stochastic strategies developed by statistical physicists employing both classical and quantum physics, have led to very efficient solutions to the problems posed. Further, it includes sufficient introductory notes on information-processing strategies employing both classical statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Games of this nature, in which agents are presented with choices, from among which their goal is to make the minority choice, offer effective means of modeling herd behavior and market dynamics and are highly relevant to assessing systemic risk. Accordingly, this book will be of interest to economists, physicists, and computer scientists alike.

This book provides a contemporary treatment of quantitative economics, with a focus on data science. The book introduces the reader to R and RStudio, and uses expert Hadley Wickham's tidyverse package for different parts of the data analysis workflow. After a gentle introduction to R code, the reader's R skills are gradually honed, with the help of "your turn" exercises. At the heart of data science is data, and the book equips the reader to import and wrangle data, (including network data). Very early on, the reader will begin using the popular ggplot2 package for visualizing data, even making basic maps. The use of R in understanding functions, simulating difference equations, and carrying out matrix operations is also covered. The book uses Monte Carlo simulation to understand probability and statistical inference, and the bootstrap is introduced. Causal inference is illuminated using simulation, data graphs, and R code for applications with real economic examples, covering experiments, matching, regression discontinuity, difference-in-difference, and instrumental variables. The interplay of growth related data and models is presented, before the book introduces the reader to time series data analysis with graphs, simulation, and examples. Lastly, two computationally intensive methods-generalized additive models and random forests (an important and versatile machine learning method)-are introduced intuitively with applications. The book will be of great interest to economists-students, teachers, and researchers alike-who want to learn R. It will help economics students gain an intuitive appreciation of applied economics and enjoy engaging with the material actively, while also equipping them with key data science skills.

Explores the history, business, and technology of video games, including social, political, and economic motivations Facilitates learning with clear objectives, key terms, illustrative timelines, color images, tables and graphs Highlights the technical specifications and key titles of all major game consoles, handhelds, personal computers, and mobile platforms Reinforces material with market summaries, reviews of breakthroughs and trends, as well as end-of-chapter activities and quizzes New content in every chapter, from the PC-98, MSX, Amstrad, and ZX Spectrum to expanded coverage on mobile gaming, virtual reality, Steam Deck, Nintendo Switch, Xbox Series X|S, and PlayStation 5

In his book "Marktform und Gleichgewicht", published initially in 1934, Heinrich von Stackelberg presented his groundbreaking leadership model of firm competition. In a work of great originality and richness, he described and analyzed a market situation in which the leader firm moves first and the follower firms then move sequentially. This game-theoretic model, now widely known as Stackelberg competition, has had tremendous impact on the theory of the firm and economic analysis in general, and has been applied to study decision-making in various fields of business. As the first translation of von Stackelberg's book into English, this volume makes his classic work available in its original form to an English-speaking audience for the very first time.

This book provides the fundamental theory of distributed optimization, game and learning. It includes those working directly in optimization,-and also many other issues like time-varying topology, communication delay, equality or inequality constraints,-and random projections. This book is meant for the researcher and engineer who uses distributed optimization, game and learning theory in fields like dynamic economic dispatch, demand response management and PHEV routing of smart grids.

This book surveys new algorithmic approaches and applications to natural and man-made disasters such as oil spills, hurricanes, earthquakes and wildfires. Based on the "Third International Conference on Dynamics of Disasters" held in Kalamata, Greece, July 2017, this Work includes contributions in evacuation logistics, disaster communications between first responders, disaster relief, and a case study on humanitarian logistics. Multi-disciplinary theories, tools, techniques and methodologies are linked with disasters from mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. The interdisciplinary approach to problems in economics, optimization, government, management, business, humanities, engineering, medicine, mathematics, computer science, behavioral studies, emergency services, and environmental studies will engage readers from a wide variety of fields and backgrounds.

Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed.Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.

This volume contains the proceedings of the XII Symposium of Probability and Stochastic Processes which took place at Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan in Merida, Mexico, on November 16-20, 2015. This meeting was the twelfth meeting in a series of ongoing biannual meetings aimed at showcasing the research of Mexican probabilists as well as promote new collaborations between the participants. The book features articles drawn from different research areas in probability and stochastic processes, such as: risk theory, limit theorems, stochastic partial differential equations, random trees, stochastic differential games, stochastic control, and coalescence. Two of the main manuscripts survey recent developments on stochastic control and scaling limits of Markov-branching trees, written by Kazutoshi Yamasaki and Benedicte Haas, respectively. The research-oriented manuscripts provide new advances in active research fields in Mexico. The wide selection of topics makes the book accessible to advanced graduate students and researchers in probability and stochastic processes.

Reinhard Selten, to date the only German Nobel Prize laureate in economics, celebrates his 80th birthday in 2010. While his contributions to game theory are well-known, the behavioral side of his scientific work has received less public exposure, even though he has been committed to experimental research during his entire career, publishing more experimental than theoretical papers in top-tier journals. This Festschrift is dedicated to Reinhard Selten's exceptional influence on behavioral and experimental economics. In this collection of academic highlight papers, a number of his students are joined by leading scholars in experimental research to document the historical role of the "Meister" in the development of the research methodology and of several sub-fields of behavioral economics. Next to the academic insight in these highly active fields of experimental research, the papers also provide a glance at Reinhard Selten's academic and personal interaction with his students and peers.

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

Agent-based modeling and social simulation have emerged as an interdisciplinary area of social science that includes computational economics, organizational science, social dynamics, and complex systems. This area contributes to enriching our understanding of the fundamental processes of social phenomena caused by complex interactions among agents. Bringing together diverse approaches to social simulation and research agendas, this book presents a unique collection of contributions from the Second World Congress on Social Simulation, held in 2008 at George Mason University in Washington DC, USA. This book in particular includes articles on norms, diffusion, social networks, economy, markets and organizations, computational modeling, and programming environments, providing new hypotheses and theories, new simulation experiments compared with various data sets, and new methods for model design and development. These works emerged from a global and interdisciplinary scientific community of the three regional scientific associations for social simulation: the North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science (NAACSOS; now the Computational Social Science Society, CSSS), the European Social Simulation Association (ESSA), and the Pacific Asian Association for Agent-bBased Approach in Social Systems Sciences (PAAA)."

The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.

"Efficient breach" is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined.

The Distinguished Dissertation series is published on behalf of the Conference of Professors and Heads of Computing and The British Computer Society, who annually select the best British PhD dissertations in computer science for publication. The dissertations are selected on behalf of the CPHC by a panel of eight academics. Each dissertation chosen makes a noteworthy contribution to the subject and reaches a high standard of exposition, placing all results clearly in the context of computer science as a whole. In this way computer scientists with significantly different interests are able to grasp the essentials - or even find a means of entry - to an unfamiliar research topic. This book develops a theory of game semantics, a recently discovered setting for modelling and reasoning about sequential programming languages, suitable for interpreting higher-order functional languages with rich type structure, and applies it to constr uct a fully abstract model of the metalanguage FPC.

This book about mathematics and methodology for economics is the result of the lifelong experience of the authors. It is written for university students as well as for students of applied sciences. This self-contained book does not assume any previous knowledge of high school mathematics and helps understanding the basics of economic theory-building. Starting from set theory it thoroughly discusses linear and non-linear functions, differential equations, difference equations, and all necessary theoretical constructs for building sound economic models. The authors also present a solid introduction to linear optimisation and game theory using production systems. A detailed discussion on market equilibrium, in particular on Nash Equilibrium, and on non-linear optimisation is also provided. Throughout the book the student is well supplied with numerous examples, some 2000 problems and their solutions to apply the knowledge to economic theories and models.

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction - and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology.

The primary purpose in this book is to present an integrated and innovative methodological approach for the construction and selection of equity portfolios. The approach takes into account the inherent multidimensional nature of the problem, while allowing the decision makers to incorporate specified preferences in the decision processes. A fundamental principle of modern portfolio theory is that comparisons between portfolios are generally made using two criteria; the expected return and portfolio variance. According to most of the portfolio models derived from the stochastic dominance approach, the group of portfolios open to comparisons is divided into two parts: the efficient portfolios, and the dominated. This work integrates the two approaches providing a unified model for decision making in portfolio management with multiple criteria.