This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.

This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously exploring cooperative games, repeated play, correlated equilibrium, and a range of applications.

This book presents Martin Shubik's important contribution to the development of game theory, and shows how game theory methods can be used in the study of prices, money and financial institutions. After introducing the reader to his career and the influences which developed his research, Professor Martin Shubik addresses the price system considering issues such as competitive equilibrium, economic exchange and production. He explores the competitive price system and the emergence of money and financial systems to develop a theory of monetary and financial institutions. Specifically, he examines the role of money in the economy using both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in game theory. Throughout the book Martin Shubik stresses that the value of games, which can be both played and analysed, provides an important link between theory and process and institutional studies. This book will be welcomed by economists, especially those interested in game theory, as well as by money and banking professionals.

This original new book offers a comprehensive and engaging perspective on the theory of vertical differentiation. It enables the reader to grasp the key concepts and effects that product quality has both on firms' behaviour and market structure, and the ways in which this relationship has evolved. With contributions from prominent figures in the field, the book investigates a number of important topics, such as the choice of the optimal product range, profit sharing, the existence of equilibrium in duopoly games, positional effects attached to status goods, international trade, collusion, advertising and the dynamics of capital accumulation for quality improvement and product innovation. Using both static and dynamic approaches, these aspects are assessed in relation to the manifold issues of regulation, competition policy and trade policy. Product differentiation and its influence on consumer behaviour and the performance of firms is a core topic in the existing literature in the fields of industrial organization, international trade and economic growth. This book will be an essential read for researchers, students and professional scholars working in these areas, especially those with an interest in antitrust regulation.

Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen.Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels. It includes an advanced material not yet reflected in standard textbooks, providing links with the exciting modern developments in financial mathematics (rainbow option pricing), tropical mathematics, statistical physics (interacting particles) and discusses structural stability, multi-criteria differential games and turnpikes.To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 3, the authors examine Games played in Clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games, such as Dots-and-Boxes and Nimstring. From the Table of Contents: - Turn and Turn About - Chips and Strips - Dots-and-Boxes - Spots and Sprouts - The Emperor and His Money - The King and the Consumer - Fox and Geese; Hare and Hounds - Lines and Squares

To make the best decisions, you need the best information. However, because most issues in game theory are grey, nearly all recent research has been carried out using a simplified method that considers grey systems as white ones. This often results in a forecasting function that is far from satisfactory when applied to many real situations. Grey Game Theory and Its Applications in Economic Decision Making introduces classic game theory into the realm of grey system theory with limited knowledge. The book resolves three theoretical issues:

• A game equilibrium of grey game
• A reasonable explanation for the equilibrium of a grey matrix of static nonmatrix game issues based on incomplete information
• The Centipede Game paradox, which has puzzled theory circles for a long time and greatly enriched and developed the core methods of subgame Nash perfect equilibrium analysis as a result

The book establishes a grey matrix game model based on pure and mixed strategies. The author proposes the concepts of grey saddle points, grey mixed strategy solutions, and their corresponding structures and also puts forward the models and methods of risk measurement and evaluation of optimal grey strategies. He raises and solves the problems of grey matrix games. The book includes definitions of the test rules of information distortion experienced during calculation, the design of tokens based on new interval grey numbers, and new arithmetic laws to manipulate grey numbers. These features combine to provide a practical and efficient tool for forecasting real-life economic problems.

Game theory is the study of strategic behavior in situations in which the decision makers are aware of the interdependence of their actions. This innovative textbook introduces students to the most basic principles of game theory - move and countermove - with an emphasis on real-world business and economic applications. Students with a background in principles of economics and business mathematics can readily understand most of the material.Demonstration problems in each chapter are designed to enhance the student's understanding of the concepts presented in the text. Many chapters include non-technical applications designed to further the student's intuitive understanding of strategic behavior. Case studies help underscore the usefulness of game theory for analyzing real-world situations. Each chapter concludes with a review and questions and exercises. An online Instructor's Manual with test bank is available to professors who adopt the text.

This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.

Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is "the theory of the core of the market," and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.

Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.

"Lester G. Telser" is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Chicago. He is one of the world's leading mathematical economists; he has been a Visiting Research Fellow, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University; Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow; and assistant professor of economics, Iowa State University. In 2005 he received the St. Clair Drake award from Roosevelt University.

This book discusses imaginary future generations and how current decision-making will influence those future generations. Markets and democracies focus on the present and therefore tend to make us forget that we are living in the present, with ancestors preceding and descendants succeeding us. Markets are excellent devices to equate supply and demand in the short term, but not for allocating resources between current and future generations, since future generations do not exist yet. Democracy is also not "applicable" for future generations, since citizens vote for candidates who will serve members of their, i.e., the current, generation. In order to overcome these shortcomings, the authors discusses imaginary future generations and future ministries in the context of current decision-making in fields such as the environment, urban management, forestry, water management, and finance. The idea of imaginary future generations comes from the Native American Iroquois, who had strong norms that compelled them to incorporate the interests of people seven generations ahead when making decisions.

This book develops the central aspect of fixed point theory - the topological fixed point index - to maximal generality, emphasizing correspondences and other aspects of the theory that are of special interest to economics. Numerous topological consequences are presented, along with important implications for dynamical systems. The book assumes the reader has no mathematical knowledge beyond that which is familiar to all theoretical economists. In addition to making the material available to a broad audience, avoiding algebraic topology results in more geometric and intuitive proofs. Graduate students and researchers in economics, and related fields in mathematics and computer science, will benefit from this book, both as a useful reference and as a well-written rigorous exposition of foundational mathematics. Numerous problems sketch key results from a wide variety of topics in theoretical economics, making the book an outstanding text for advanced graduate courses in economics and related disciplines.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 4, the authors present a Diamond of a find, covering one-player games such as Solitaire.

This textbook provides a one-semester introduction to mathematical economics for first year graduate and senior undergraduate students. Intended to fill the gap between typical liberal arts curriculum and the rigorous mathematical modeling of graduate study in economics, this text provides a concise introduction to the mathematics needed for core microeconomics, macroeconomics, and econometrics courses. Chapters 1 through 5 builds students' skills in formal proof, axiomatic treatment of linear algebra, and elementary vector differentiation. Chapters 6 and 7 present the basic tools needed for microeconomic analysis. Chapter 8 provides a quick introduction to (or review of) probability theory. Chapter 9 introduces dynamic modeling, applicable in advanced macroeconomics courses. The materials assume prerequisites in undergraduate calculus and linear algebra. Each chapter includes in-text exercises and a solutions manual, making this text ideal for self-study.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 3, the authors examine Games played in Clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games, such as Dots-and-Boxes and Nimstring. From the Table of Contents: - Turn and Turn About - Chips and Strips - Dots-and-Boxes - Spots and Sprouts - The Emperor and His Money - The King and the Consumer - Fox and Geese; Hare and Hounds - Lines and Squares

The genre of adventure games is frequently overlooked. Lacking the constantly-evolving graphics and graphic violence of their counterparts in first-person and third-person shooters or role-playing games, they are often marketed to and beloved by players outside of mainstream game communities. While often forgotten by both the industry and academia, adventure games have had (and continue to have) a surprisingly wide influence on contemporary games, in categories including walking simulators, hidden object games, visual novels, and bestselling titles from companies like Telltale and Campo Santo. In this examination of heirs to the genre's legacy, the authors examine the genre from multiple perspectives, connecting technical analysis with critical commentary and social context. This will be the first book to consider this important genre from a comprehensive and transdisciplinary perspective. Drawing upon methods from platform studies, software studies, media studies, and literary studies, they reveal the genre's ludic and narrative origins and patterns, where character (and the player's embodiment of a character) is essential to the experience of play and the choices within a game. A deep structural analysis of adventure games also uncovers an unsteady balance between sometimes contradictory elements of story, exploration, and puzzles: with different games and creators employing a multitude of different solutions to resolving this tension.

This is the third volume of the "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications." Since the publication of multi-Volume 1 a decade ago, game theory has continued to develop at a furious pace, and today it is the dominant tool in economic theory. The three volumes together cover the fundamental theoretical aspects, a wide range of applications to economics, several chapters on applications to political science and individual chapters on applications to disciplines as diverse as evolutionary biology, computer science, law, psychology and ethics. The authors are the most eminent practitioners in the field, including three Nobel Prize winners.

The topics covered in the present volume include strategic ("Nash") equilibrium; incomplete information; two-person non-zero-sum games; noncooperative games with a continuum of players; stochastic games; industrial organization; bargaining, inspection; economic history; the Shapley value and its applications to perfectly competitive economies, to taxation, to public goods and to fixed prices; political science; law mechanism design; and game experimentation.

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:
*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203167406

The Unpredictability of Gameplay explores the many forms of unpredictability in games and proposes a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding and categorizing non-deterministic game mechanics. Rather than viewing all game mechanics with unpredictable outcomes as a single concept, Mark R. Johnson develops a three-part typology for such mechanics, distinguishing between randomness, chance, and luck in gameplay, assessing games that range from grand strategy and MMORPGs to slot machines and card games. He also explores forms of unanticipated unpredictability, where elements of games fail to function as intended and create new forms of gameplay in the process. Covering a range of game concepts using these frameworks, The Unpredictability of Gameplay then explores three illustrative case studies: 1) procedural generation, 2) replay value and grinding, and 3) player-made practices designed to reduce the level of luck in non-deterministic games. Throughout, Johnson demonstrates the importance of looking more deeply at unpredictability in games and game design and the various ways in which unpredictability manifests while offering an invaluable tool for game scholars and game designers seeking to integrate unpredictability into their work.

Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of tax consequences in an oligopolistic market. It provides the reader with a systematic and precise way of understanding the research content of tax incidence. A major feature of the book is its analysis of tax incidence from both domestic and international oligopolies. Then, by examining various oligopoly models, it approaches the essence of domestic and multilateral tax issues. Starting with the general theory of commodity tax incidence in an oligopoly, the topics addressed in this book include tax reform, environmental regulation, and policy coordination in international oligopolies. In addition to the usual oligopoly model, managerial oligopoly, the public pricing problem for firms in an oligopoly, and mixed oligopoly are dealt with. By presenting individual issues and explaining the relevance of each topic, this book is highly recommended for readers interested in policymaking and the global market in relation to the interdisciplinary developments of public economics, regional economics, and international economics. This book is also valuable as an advanced textbook on applied economics.

In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. "This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible." Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.

Martin Nowak, one of the world's experts on evolution and game theory, working here with bestselling science writer Roger Highfield, turns an important aspect of evolutionary theory on its head to explain why cooperation, not competition, has always been the key to the evolution of complexity. In his first book written for a wide audience, this hugely influential scientist explains his cutting-edge research into the mysteries of cooperation, from the rise of multicellular life to Good Samaritans, and from cancer treatment to the success of large companies. With wit and clarity, and an eye to its huge implications, Nowak and Highfield make the case that cooperation, not competition, is the defining human trait. "SuperCooperators "will expand our understanding of evolution and provoke debate for years to come.

Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both.
The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.

Stochastic differential games represent one of the most complex forms of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution and stochastic elements have to be considered simultaneously. The complexity of stochastic differential games generally leads to great difficulties in the derivation of solutions. Cooperative games hold out the promise of more socially optimal and group efficient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Despite urgent calls for national and international cooperation, the absence of formal solutions has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem.

The book supplies effective tools for rigorous study of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable "payoff distribution procedure" of subgame consistent solution is presented. Being capable of deriving analytical tractable solutions, the work is not only theoretically interesting but would enable the hitherto intractable problems in cooperative stochastic differential games to be fruitfully explored.

Currently, this book is the first ever volume devoted to cooperative stochastic differential games. It aims to provide its readers an effective tool to analyze cooperative arrangements of conflict situations with uncertainty over time. Cooperative game theory has succeeded in offering many applications of game theory in operations research, management, economics, politics and other disciplines. The extension of these applications to a dynamic environment with stochastic elements should be fruitful. The book will be of interest to game theorists, mathematicians, economists, policy-makers, corporate planners and graduate students.

This book presents the most important published articles of Martin Shubik who has made a path-breaking contribution to game theory and political economy. The volume shows how game theory can be used to explore fundamental problems in economics, political science and operations research.The book opens with an introduction to the career of Martin Shubik and the influences which have shaped his research. In this, and the chapters which follow, Martin Shubik stresses the importance of formulative models as playable games and the treatment of information to describe decision making among individuals, using examples from industrial organization. He demonstrates that games are a fruitful way to extend our knowledge of competition among the few. In addition, he considers the importance of gaming in economics and business suggesting that experimental games can be used to illustrate problems and principles in multi-person decision making. This book will be welcomed by economists, game theorists, political scientists, and operations researchers.