This book presents Martin Shubik's important contribution to the development of game theory, and shows how game theory methods can be used in the study of prices, money and financial institutions. After introducing the reader to his career and the influences which developed his research, Professor Martin Shubik addresses the price system considering issues such as competitive equilibrium, economic exchange and production. He explores the competitive price system and the emergence of money and financial systems to develop a theory of monetary and financial institutions. Specifically, he examines the role of money in the economy using both cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in game theory. Throughout the book Martin Shubik stresses that the value of games, which can be both played and analysed, provides an important link between theory and process and institutional studies. This book will be welcomed by economists, especially those interested in game theory, as well as by money and banking professionals.

In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. "This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible." Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.

Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both.
The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.

Game theory explores situations in which agents interact strategically and provides a useful foundation for studying many traditional industrial organization topics. This approach has also enabled the emergence of new areas of enquiry including law and economics, networks, the digital economy, auctions, experimental game theory and many others. This second volume of the Handbook includes original contributions by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical and industrial organization topics such as mergers in markets with homogeneous and differentiated goods, leniency and coordinated effects in cartels and mergers, static and dynamic contests, consumer search and product safety, strategic delegation, platforms and network effects, auctions, environmental and resource economics, intellectual property, healthcare, corruption, experimental industrial organization, and empirical models of research and development. Authoritative and engaging, this unique Handbook will be an indispensable resource for all serious academics, researchers and students of industrial economics and game theory. Contributors incude: S. Anderson, A. Barge-Gil, P. Belleflamme, J. Brandts, R. Burguet, L. Corchon, A. Daughety, N. Fabra, R. Fauli-Oller, J.-J. Ganuza, M.l. Gonzalez Maestre, A. Hernando-Veciana, M. Hoffmann, E. Huergo, M. Kopel, L. Lambertini, A. Lopez, M. Marini, C. Marvao, E. Maskin, J.G. Montalvo, L. Moreno, M. Motta, P. Olivella, M. Peitz, M. Pezzino, M. Polo, J. Potters, J. Reinganum, R. Renault, G. Rota Preziosi, J. Sandonis, M. Serena, G. Spagnolo

Stochastic differential games represent one of the most complex forms of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution and stochastic elements have to be considered simultaneously. The complexity of stochastic differential games generally leads to great difficulties in the derivation of solutions. Cooperative games hold out the promise of more socially optimal and group efficient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Despite urgent calls for national and international cooperation, the absence of formal solutions has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem.

The book supplies effective tools for rigorous study of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable "payoff distribution procedure" of subgame consistent solution is presented. Being capable of deriving analytical tractable solutions, the work is not only theoretically interesting but would enable the hitherto intractable problems in cooperative stochastic differential games to be fruitfully explored.

Currently, this book is the first ever volume devoted to cooperative stochastic differential games. It aims to provide its readers an effective tool to analyze cooperative arrangements of conflict situations with uncertainty over time. Cooperative game theory has succeeded in offering many applications of game theory in operations research, management, economics, politics and other disciplines. The extension of these applications to a dynamic environment with stochastic elements should be fruitful. The book will be of interest to game theorists, mathematicians, economists, policy-makers, corporate planners and graduate students.

This book is an authoritative collection of contributions in the field of soft-computing. Based on selected works presented at the 6th World Conference on Soft Computing, held on May 22-25, 2016, in Berkeley, USA, it describes new theoretical advances, as well as cutting-edge methods and applications. Theories cover a wealth of topics, such as fuzzy logic, cognitive modeling, Bayesian and probabilistic methods, multi-criteria decision making, utility theory, approximate reasoning, human-centric computing and many others. Applications concerns a number of fields, such as internet and semantic web, social networks and trust, control and robotics, computer vision, medicine and bioinformatics, as well as finance, security and e-Commerce, among others. Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of Fuzzy Logic and to the 95th Birthday Anniversary of Lotfi A. Zadeh, the book not only offers a timely view on the field, yet it also discusses thought-provoking developments and challenges, thus fostering new research directions in the diverse areas of soft computing.

This book covers a large spectrum of cutting-edge game theory applications in management science in which Professor Georges Zaccour has made significant contributions. The book consists of 21 chapters and highlights the latest treatments of game theory in various areas, including marketing, supply chains, energy and environmental management, and cyber defense. With this book, former Ph.D. students and successful research collaborators of Professor Zaccour wish to honor his many scientific achievements.

Game Theory--the formal modelling of conflict and cooperation--first emerged as a recognized field with the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's "Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour" in 1944. Since then, game-theoretic thinking about choice of strategies and the interdependence of people's actions has influenced all the social sciences. However, little is known about the history of the theory of strategic games "prior" to this publication.
In this volume, the history of strategic games--from its origins up to 1945--is traced through the work of 19th Century economists such as Cournot and Edgeworth; voting theorists, including Lewis Carroll; conflict theorists Richardson and Lanchester; probabilists such as Bertrand, Borel, and Ville; and later economists, notably Stackelberg and Zeuthen. This authoritative account of the history of game theory concludes with a historical perspective on the achievement of von Neumann and Morgenstern and an appraisal of the reception of their book.

A lot of economic problems can be formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories. The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who are seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking effective mathematical tools for their research.

This classic on games and how to play them intelligently is being re-issued in a new, four volume edition. This book has laid the foundation to a mathematical approach to playing games. The wise authors wield witty words, which wangle wonderfully winning ways. In Volume 1, the authors do the Spade Work, presenting theories and techniques to "dissect" games of varied structures and formats in order to develop winning strategies.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 2, the authors have a Change of Heart, bending the rules established in Volume 1 to apply them to games such as Cut-cake and Loopy Hackenbush. From the Table of Contents: - If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em! - Hot Bottles Followed by Cold Wars - Games Infinite and Indefinite - Games Eternal--Games Entailed - Survival in the Lost World

Recent books in the Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics Editors Vic Barnett J. Stuart Hunter Adrian F.M. Smith Geoffrey S. Watson Ralph A. Bradley Joseph B. Kadane Stephen M. Stigler Nicholas I. Fisher David G. Kendall Jozef L. Teugels Optimal Design of Experiments Friedrich Pukelsheim, Universität Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Optimal Design of Experiments presents the first complete theoretical development of optimal design for the linear model, a unified exposition that embraces a wide variety of design problems. It describes the statistical theory involved in designing experiments, and applies it to typical special cases. The design problems originating from statistics are solved using tools from linear algebra and convex analysis. The material is presented in a very clear, careful and organized way. Rather than assaulting traditional ways of thinking about optimal design, this book pulls together formerly separate entities to create a common framework for diverse design problems that share a common goal. Statisticians, mathematicians, engineers, and operations research specialists will find this book stimulating, challenging, and an asset to their work. 1993 Statistics for Spatial Data, Revised Edition Noel Cressie, Iowa State University, USA Designed for the scientific and engineering professional eager to exploit its enormous potential, Statistics for Spatial Data is a primer to the theory as well as the nuts-and-bolts of this influential technique. Focusing on the three areas of geostatistical data, lattice data, and point patterns, the book sheds light on the link between data and model, and reveals how spatial statistical models can be used to solve a host of problems in science and engineering. The previous edition was hailed by Mathematical Reviews as "an excellent book which…will become a basic reference". Revised to reflect state-of-the-art developments, this edition also features many detailed examples, numerous illustrations, and over 1000 references. The first fully comprehensive introduction, Statistics for Spatial Data is an essential guide for professionals in biology, earth sciences, civil, electrical and agricultural engineering, geography, epidemiology, and ecology. 1993

A comprehensive study of the connection game genre, Connection Games provides a survey of known connection games while exploring common themes and strategies. This book aims to impose some structure on this increasingly large family of games, and to define exactly what constitutes a connection game. Key games are examined in detail and complete rules for over 200 connection games and variants are provided. A connection game is a board game in which players vie to develop or complete a specific type of connection with their pieces. This might involve forming a path between two or more goals, completing a closed loop, or gathering all pieces together into a single connected group.

The Presidential Election Game may change the way you think about presidential elections and, for that matter, American politics in general. It is not filled with statistics about the voting behavior of citizens, nor does it give detailed histories of past campaigns. Rather, it is an analytic treatment of strategy in the race for the presidency, from the primaries to the general election. Using modern game theory and decision theory, Brams demonstrates why certain campaign strategies are more effective than others and supports his analysis with historical evidence.

Mathematical Game Theory and Applications Mathematical Game Theory and Applications An authoritative and quantitative approach to modern game theory with applications from economics, political science, military science and finance. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications combines both the theoretical and mathematical foundations of game theory with a series of complex applications along with topics presented in a logical progression to achieve a unified presentation of research results. This book covers topics such as two-person games in strategic form, zero-sum games, N-person non-cooperative games in strategic form, two-person games in extensive form, parlor and sport games, bargaining theory, best-choice games, co-operative games and dynamic games. Several classical models used in economics are presented which include Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling and Stackelberg as well as coverage of modern branches of game theory such as negotiation models, potential games, parlor games and best choice games. Mathematical Game Theory and Applications: Presents a good balance of both theoretical foundations and complex applications of game theory. Features an in-depth analysis of parlor and sport games, networking games, and bargaining models. Provides fundamental results in new branches of game theory, best choice games, network games and dynamic games. Presents numerous examples and exercises along with detailed solutions at the end of each chapter. Is supported by an accompanying website featuring course slides and lecture content. Covering a host of important topics, this book provides a research springboard for graduate students and a reference for researchers who might be working in the areas of applied mathematics, operations research, computer science or economical cybernetics.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of tax consequences in an oligopolistic market. It provides the reader with a systematic and precise way of understanding the research content of tax incidence. A major feature of the book is its analysis of tax incidence from both domestic and international oligopolies. Then, by examining various oligopoly models, it approaches the essence of domestic and multilateral tax issues. Starting with the general theory of commodity tax incidence in an oligopoly, the topics addressed in this book include tax reform, environmental regulation, and policy coordination in international oligopolies. In addition to the usual oligopoly model, managerial oligopoly, the public pricing problem for firms in an oligopoly, and mixed oligopoly are dealt with. By presenting individual issues and explaining the relevance of each topic, this book is highly recommended for readers interested in policymaking and the global market in relation to the interdisciplinary developments of public economics, regional economics, and international economics. This book is also valuable as an advanced textbook on applied economics.

The ancient game of Go is one of the less obvious candidates for mathematical analysis. With the development of new concepts in combinatorial game theory, the authors have been able to analyze Go games and find solutions to real endgame problems that have stumped professional Go players. Go players with an interest in mathematics and mathematicians who work in game theory will not want to miss this book because it describes substantial connections between the two subjects that have been, until now, largely unrecognized.

Despite the proliferation of video games in the twenty-first century, the theory of game design is largely underdeveloped, leaving designers on their own to understand what games really are. Helping you produce better games, Game Design Theory: A New Philosophy for Understanding Games presents a bold new path for analyzing and designing games. The author offers a radical yet reasoned way of thinking about games and provides a holistic solution to understanding the difference between games and other types of interactive systems. He clearly details the definitions, concepts, and methods that form the fundamentals of this philosophy. He also uses the philosophy to analyze the history of games and modern trends as well as to design games. Providing a robust, useful philosophy for game design, this book gives you real answers about what games are and how they work. Through this paradigm, you will be better equipped to create fun games.

The H control has been one of the important robust control approaches since the 1980s. This book extends the area to nonlinear stochastic H2/H control, and studies more complex and practically useful mixed H2/H controller synthesis rather than the pure H control. Different from the commonly used convex optimization method, this book applies the Nash game approach to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the mixed H2/H control. Researchers will benefit from our detailed exposition of the stochastic mixed H2/H control theory, while practitioners can apply our efficient algorithms to address their practical problems.

Mathematics in Games, Sports, and Gambling: The Games People Play, Second Edition demonstrates how discrete probability, statistics, and elementary discrete mathematics are used in games, sports, and gambling situations. With emphasis on mathematical thinking and problem solving, the text draws on numerous examples, questions, and problems to explain the application of mathematical theory to various real-life games.This updated edition of a widely adopted textbook considers a number of popular games and diversions that are mathematically based or can be studied from a mathematical perspective. Requiring only high school algebra, the book is suitable for use as a textbook in seminars, general education courses, or as a supplement in introductory probability courses.New in this Edition: Many new exercises, including basic skills exercises More answers in the back of the book Expanded summary exercises, including writing exercises More detailed examples, especially in the early chapters An expansion of the discrete adjustment technique for binomial approximation problems New sections on chessboard puzzles that encourage students to develop graph theory ideas New review material on relations and functions Exercises are included in each section to help students understand the various concepts. The text covers permutations in the two-deck matching game so derangements can be counted. It introduces graphs to find matches when looking at extensions of the five-card trick and studies lexicographic orderings and ideas of encoding for card tricks.The text also explores linear and weighted equations in the section on the NFL passer rating formula and presents graphing to show how data can be compared or displayed. For each topic, the author includes exercises based on real games and actual sports data.

The focus of this book is on establishing theories and methods of both decision and game analysis in management using intuitionistic fuzzy sets. It proposes a series of innovative theories, models and methods such as the representation theorem and extension principle of intuitionistic fuzzy sets, ranking methods of intuitionistic fuzzy numbers, non-linear and linear programming methods for intuitionistic fuzzy multi-attribute decision making and (interval-valued) intuitionistic fuzzy matrix games. These theories and methods form the theory system of intuitionistic fuzzy decision making and games, which is not only remarkably different from those of the traditional, Bayes and/or fuzzy decision theory but can also provide an effective and efficient tool for solving complex management problems. Since there is a certain degree of inherent hesitancy in real-life management, which cannot always be described by the traditional mathematical methods and/or fuzzy set theory, this book offers an effective approach to using the intuitionistic fuzzy set expressed with membership and non-membership functions. This book is addressed to all those involved in theoretical research and practical applications from a variety of fields/disciplines: decision science, game theory, management science, fuzzy sets, operational research, applied mathematics, systems engineering, industrial engineering, economics, etc.

The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all. From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation. In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book.

In this path-breaking theoretical work, political scientist Steven Brams and mathematician Mark Kilgour show how game theory can be applied to the rigorous development and thoughtful analysis of several critical problems that afflict the security of nations, from the deterrence of foes who might launch attacks, to the stabilization of crises that could explode into wars. In addition, they analyze a variety of related questions, including the interlocking preferences that fuel arms races, the strategic impact that Star Wars may have on nuclear deterrence, and optimal strategies for verifying arms control treaties.
Of interest to students on international relations and foreign policy as well as those concerned with the formal analysis of conflict, Game Theory and National Security provides new foundations for understanding the rational basis of international conflict.

The solitaire game "The Tower of Hanoi" was invented in the 19th century by the French number theorist Edouard Lucas. The book presents its mathematical theory and offers a survey of the historical development from predecessors up to recent research. In addition to long-standing myths, it provides a detailed overview of the essential mathematical facts with complete proofs, and also includes unpublished material, e.g., on some captivating integer sequences. The main objects of research today are the so-called Hanoi graphs and the related Sierpinski graphs. Acknowledging the great popularity of the topic in computer science, algorithms, together with their correctness proofs, form an essential part of the book. In view of the most important practical applications, namely in physics, network theory and cognitive (neuro)psychology, the book also addresses other structures related to the Tower of Hanoi and its variants. The updated second edition includes, for the first time in English, the breakthrough reached with the solution of the "The Reve's Puzzle" in 2014. This is a special case of the famed Frame-Stewart conjecture which is still open after more than 75 years. Enriched with elaborate illustrations, connections to other puzzles and challenges for the reader in the form of (solved) exercises as well as problems for further exploration, this book is enjoyable reading for students, educators, game enthusiasts and researchers alike. Excerpts from reviews of the first edition: "The book is an unusual, but very welcome, form of mathematical writing: recreational mathematics taken seriously and serious mathematics treated historically. I don't hesitate to recommend this book to students, professional research mathematicians, teachers, and to readers of popular mathematics who enjoy more technical expository detail." Chris Sangwin, The Mathematical Intelligencer 37(4) (2015) 87f. "The book demonstrates that the Tower of Hanoi has a very rich mathematical structure, and as soon as we tweak the parameters we surprisingly quickly find ourselves in the realm of open problems." Laszlo Kozma, ACM SIGACT News 45(3) (2014) 34ff. "Each time I open the book I discover a renewed interest in the Tower of Hanoi. I am sure that this will be the case for all readers." Jean-Paul Allouche, Newsletter of the European Mathematical Society 93 (2014) 56.