Our everyday life is in?uenced by many unexpected (dif?cult to predict) events usually referred as a chance. Probably, we all are as we are due to the accumulation point of a multitude of chance events. Gambling games that have been known to human beings nearly from the beginning of our civilization are based on chance events. These chance events have created the dream that everybody can easily become rich. This pursuit made gambling so popular. This book is devoted to the dynamics of the mechanical randomizers and we try to solve the problem why mechanical device (roulette) or a rigid body (a coin or a die) operating in the way described by the laws of classical mechanics can behave in such a way and produce a pseudorandom outcome. During mathematical lessons in primary school we are taught that the outcome of the coin tossing experiment is random and that the probability that the tossed coin lands heads (tails) up is equal to 1/2. Approximately, at the same time during physics lessons we are told that the motion of the rigid body (coin is an example of suchabody)isfullydeterministic. Typically,studentsarenotgiventheanswertothe question Why this duality in the interpretation of the simple mechanical experiment is possible? Trying to answer this question we describe the dynamics of the gambling games based on the coin toss, the throw of the die, and the roulette run.

Are people ever rational? Consider this: You auction off a one-dollar bill to the highest bidder, but you set the rules so that the second highest bidder also has to pay the amount of his last bid, even though he gets nothing. Would people ever enter such an auction? Not only do they, but according to Martin Shubik, the game's inventor, the average winning bid (for a dollar, remember) is $3.40. Many winners report that they bid so high only because their opponent "went completely crazy." This game lies at the intersection of three subjects of eternal fascination: human psychology, morality, and John von Neumann's game theory. Hungarian game-theorist Laszlo Mero introduces us to the basics of game theory, including such concepts as zero-sum games, Prisoner's Dilemma and the origins of altruism; shows how game theory is applicable to fields ranging from physics to politics; and explores the role of rational thinking in the context of many different kinds of thinking. This fascinating, urbane book will interest everyone who wonders what mathematics can tell us about the human condition.

Issues relating to the emergence, persistence, and stability of cooperation among social agents of every type are widely recognized to be of paramount importance. They are also analytically difficult and intellectually challenging. This book, arising from a NATO Advanced Study Institute held at SUNY in 1994, is an up-to-date presentation of the contribution of game theory to the subject. The contributors are leading specialists who focus on the problem from the many different angles of game theory, including axiomatic bargaining theory, the Nash program of non-cooperative foundations, game with complete information, repeated and sequential games, bounded rationality methods, evolutionary theory, experimental approaches, and others. Together they offer significant progress in understanding cooperation.

Applications of operant techniques in treatment and education have proliferated in recent years. Among the various techniques, the token economy has been particu larly popular. The token economy has been extended to many populations included in psychiatry, clinical psychology, education, and the mental health fields in general. Of course, merely because a technique is applied widely does not neces sarily argue for its efficacy. Yet, the token economy has been extensively re searched. The main purpose of this book is to review, elaborate, and evaluate critically research bearing on the token economy. The book examines several features of the token economy including the variables that contribute to its efficacy, the accomplishments, limitations, and potential weaknesses, and recent advances. Because the token economy literature is vast, the book encompasses programs in diverse treatment, rehabilitation, and educational settings across a wide range of populations and behaviors. Within the last few years, a small number of books on token economies have appeared. Each of these books describes a particular token economy in one treatment, etting, details practical problems encountered, and provides suggestions for ad ministering the program. This focus is important but neglects the extensive scholarly research on token economies. The present book reviews research across diverse settings and clients. Actually, this focus is quite relevant for implementing token economies because the research reveals those aspects and treatment variations that contribute to or enhance client performance."

Max-Min problems are two-step allocation problems in which one side must make his move knowing that the other side will then learn what the move is and optimally counter. They are fundamental in parti cular to military weapons-selection problems involving large systems such as Minuteman or Polaris, where the systems in the mix are so large that they cannot be concealed from an opponent. One must then expect the opponent to determine on an optlmal mixture of, in the case men tioned above, anti-Minuteman and anti-submarine effort. The author's first introduction to a problem of Max-Min type occurred at The RAND Corporation about 1951. One side allocates anti-missile defenses to various cities. The other side observes this allocation and then allocates missiles to those cities. If F(x, y) denotes the total residual value of the cities after the attack, with x denoting the defender's strategy and y the attacker's, the problem is then to find Max MinF(x, y) = Max MinF(x, y)] ."

The aim of" the present monograph is two-fold: (a) to give a short account of the main results concerning the theory of random systems with complete connections, and (b) to describe the general learning model by means of random systems with complete connections. The notion of chain with complete connections has been introduced in probability theory by ONICESCU and MIHOC (1935a). These authors have set themselves the aim to define a very broad type of dependence which takes into account the whole history of the evolution and thus includes as a special case the Markovian one. In a sequel of papers of the period 1935-1937, ONICESCU and MIHOC developed the theory of these chains for the homogeneous case with a finite set of states from differ ent points of view: ergodic behaviour, associated chain, limit laws. These results led to a chapter devoted to these chains, inserted by ONI CESCU and MIHOC in their monograph published in 1937. Important contributions to the theory of chains with complete connections are due to DOEBLIN and FORTET and refer to the period 1937-1940. They consist in the approach of chains with an infinite history (the so-called chains of infinite order) and in the use of methods from functional analysis."

Recent years have witnessed a surge of activity in the field of dynamic both theory and applications. Theoretical as well as practical games, in problems in zero-sum and nonzero-sum games, continuous time differential and discrete time multistage games, and deterministic and stochastic games games are currently being investigated by researchers in diverse disciplines, such as engineering, mathematics, biology, economics, management science, and political science. This surge of interest has led to the formation of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG) in 1990, whose primary goal is to foster the development of advanced research and applications in the field of game theory. One important activity of the Society is to organize biannually an international symposium which aims at bringing together all those who contribute to the development of this active field of applied science. In 1992 the symposium was organized in Grimentz, Switzerland, under the supervision of an international scientific committee and with the help of a local organizing committee based at University of Geneva. This book, which is the first volume in the new Series, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (see the Preface to the Series), is based on presentations made at this symposium. It is however more than a book of proceedings for a conference. Every paper published in this volume has passed through a very selective refereeing process, as in an archival technical journal.

Risk has become one of the main topics in fields as diverse as engineering, medicine and economics, and it is also studied by social scientists, psychologists and legal scholars. This Springer Essentials version offers an overview of the in-depth handbook and highlights some of the main points covered in the Handbook of Risk Theory. The topic of risk also leads to more fundamental questions such as: What is risk? What can decision theory contribute to the analysis of risk? What does the human perception of risk mean for society? How should we judge whether a risk is morally acceptable or not? Over the last couple of decades questions like these have attracted interest from philosophers and other scholars into risk theory. This brief offers the essentials of the handbook provides for an overview into key topics in a major new field of research and addresses a wide range of topics, ranging from decision theory, risk perception to ethics and social implications of risk. It aims to promote communication and information among all those who are interested in theoretical issues concerning risk and uncertainty. The Essentials of Risk Theory brings together internationally leading philosophers and scholars from other disciplines who work on risk theory. The contributions are accessibly written and highly relevant to issues that are studied by risk scholars. The Essentials of Risk Theory will be a helpful starting point for all risk scholars who are interested in broadening and deepening their current perspectives.

Predation is an ecological factor of almost universal importance for the biol ogist who aims at an understanding of the habits and structures of animals. Despite its pervasive nature opinions differ as to what predation really is. So far it has been defined only in negative terms; it is thought not to be par asitism, the other great process by which one organism harms another, nor filter-feeding, carrion-eating, or browsing. Accordingly, one could define predation as a process by which an animal spends some effort to locate a live prey and, in addition, spends another effort to mutilate or kill it. Ac cording to this usage of the word a nudibranch, for example, that feeds on hydroids would be a predator inasmuch as it needs some time to locate col onies of its prey which, after being located, scarcely demand more than eating, which differs little from browsing. From the definition just proposed consumption of the prey following its capture has been intentionally omit ted. Indeed, an animal may be disposed of without being eaten. Hence the biological significance of predation may be more than to maintain nutrition al homeostasis. In fact, predation may have something in common with the more direct forms of competition, a facet that will be only cursorily touched upon in this book."

The developments within the computationally and numerically oriented ar eas of Operations Research, Finance, Statistics and Economics have been sig nificant over the past few decades. Each area has been developing its own computer systems and languages that suit its needs, but there is relatively little cross-fertilization among them yet. This volume contains a collection of papers that each highlights a particular system, language, model or paradigm from one of the computational disciplines, aimed at researchers and practitioners from the other fields. The 15 papers cover a number of relevant topics: Models and Modelling in Operations Research and Economics, novel High-level and Object-Oriented approaches to programming, through advanced uses of Maple and MATLAB, and applications and solution of Differential Equations in Finance. It is hoped that the material in this volume will whet the reader's appetite for discovering and exploring new approaches to old problems, and in the longer run facilitate cross-fertilization among the fields. We would like to thank the contributing authors, the reviewers, the publisher, and last, but not least, Jesper Saxtorph, Anders Nielsen, and Thomas Stidsen for invaluable technical assistance.

Complementarity theory is a new domain in applied mathematics and is concerned with the study of complementarity problems. These problems represent a wide class of mathematical models related to optimization, game theory, economic engineering, mechanics, fluid mechanics, stochastic optimal control etc. The book is dedicated to the study of nonlinear complementarity problems by topological methods. Audience: Mathematicians, engineers, economists, specialists working in operations research and anybody interested in applied mathematics or in mathematical modeling.

The ?nite-dimensional nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) is a s- tem of ?nitely many nonlinear inequalities in ?nitely many nonnegative variables along with a special equation that expresses the complementary relationship between the variables and corresponding inequalities. This complementarity condition is the key feature distinguishing the NCP from a general inequality system, lies at the heart of all constrained optimi- tion problems in ?nite dimensions, provides a powerful framework for the modeling of equilibria of many kinds, and exhibits a natural link between smooth and nonsmooth mathematics. The ?nite-dimensional variational inequality (VI), which is a generalization of the NCP, provides a broad unifying setting for the study of optimization and equilibrium problems and serves as the main computational framework for the practical solution of a host of continuum problems in the mathematical sciences. The systematic study of the ?nite-dimensional NCP and VI began in the mid-1960s; in a span of four decades, the subject has developed into a very fruitful discipline in the ?eld of mathematical programming. The - velopments include a rich mathematical theory, a host of e?ective solution algorithms, a multitude of interesting connections to numerous disciplines, and a wide range of important applications in engineering and economics. As a result of their broad associations, the literature of the VI/CP has bene?ted from contributions made by mathematicians (pure, applied, and computational), computer scientists, engineers of many kinds (civil, ch- ical, electrical, mechanical, and systems), and economists of diverse exp- tise (agricultural, computational, energy, ?nancial, and spatial).

During the last decade I have explored the consequences of what I have chosen to call the 'consistent preferences' approach to deductive reasoning in games. To a great extent this work has been done in coop eration with my co-authors Martin Dufwenberg, Andres Perea, and Ylva Sovik, and it has lead to a series of journal articles. This book presents the results of this research program. Since the present format permits a more extensive motivation for and presentation of the analysis, it is my hope that the content will be of interest to a wider audience than the corresponding journal articles can reach. In addition to active researcher in the field, it is intended for graduate students and others that wish to study epistemic conditions for equilibrium and rationalizability concepts in game theory. Structure of the book This book consists of twelve chapters. The main interactions between the chapters are illustrated in Table 0.1. As Table 0.1 indicates, the chapters can be organized into four dif ferent parts. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 analyze games in the strategic form, while the remaining chapters-Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 12-are concerned with games in the extensive form."

STATISTICAL PHYSICS AND ECONOMICS covers systematically and in simple language the physical foundations of evolution equations, stochastic processes, and generalized Master equations applied to complex economic systems. Strong emphasis is placed on concepts, methods, and techniques for modeling, assessment, and solving or estimation of economic problems in an attempt to understand the large variability of financial markets, trading and communication networks, barriers and acceleration of the economic growth as well as the kinetics of product and money flows. The main focus of the book is a clear physical understanding of the self-organizing principles in social and economic systems. This modern introduction will be a useful tool for researchers, engineers, as well as graduate and post-graduate students in econophysics and related topics.

The English edition differs only slightly from the Russian original. The main struc tural difference is that all the material on the theory of finite noncooperative games has been collected in Chapter 2, with renumbering of the material of the remain ing chapters. New sections have been added in this chapter: devoted to general questions of equilibrium theory in nondegenerate games, subsections 3.9-3.17, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr.; and 4, by A.G. Chernyakov; and 5, by N.N. Vorob'ev, Jr., on the computational complexity of the process of finding equilibrium points in finite games. It should also be mentioned that subsections 3.12-3.14 in Chapter 1 were written by E.B. Yanovskaya especially for the Russian edition. The author regrets that the present edition does not reflect the important game-theoretical achievements presented in the splendid monographs by E. van Damme (on the refinement of equilibrium principles for finite games), as well as those by J.e. Harsanyi and R. Selten, and by W. Giith and B. Kalkofen (on equilibrium selection). When the Russian edition was being written, these direc tions in game theory had not yet attained their final form, which appeared only in quite recent monographs; the present author has had to resist the temptation of attempting to produce an elementary exposition of the new theories for the English edition; readers of this edition will find only brief mention of the new material."

In the case of completely integrable systems, periodic solutions are found by inspection. For nonintegrable systems, such as the three-body problem in celestial mechanics, they are found by perturbation theory: there is a small parameter EURO in the problem, the mass of the perturbing body for instance, and for EURO = 0 the system becomes completely integrable. One then tries to show that its periodic solutions will subsist for EURO -# 0 small enough. Poincare also introduced global methods, relying on the topological properties of the flow, and the fact that it preserves the 2-form L~=l dPi 1\ dqi' The most celebrated result he obtained in this direction is his last geometric theorem, which states that an area-preserving map of the annulus which rotates the inner circle and the outer circle in opposite directions must have two fixed points. And now another ancient theme appear: the least action principle. It states that the periodic solutions of a Hamiltonian system are extremals of a suitable integral over closed curves. In other words, the problem is variational. This fact was known to Fermat, and Maupertuis put it in the Hamiltonian formalism. In spite of its great aesthetic appeal, the least action principle has had little impact in Hamiltonian mechanics. There is, of course, one exception, Emmy Noether's theorem, which relates integrals ofthe motion to symmetries of the equations. But until recently, no periodic solution had ever been found by variational methods.

Since the introduction of electrosurgery the techniques of surgery on the nervous system have passed through further improvements (bipolar coagulation, microscope), even if the procedure was not substantially modified. Today, laser represents a new "discipline," as it offers a new way of performing all basic maneuvers (dissection, demolition, hemostasis, vessel sutures). Furthermore, laser offers the possibility of a special maneuver, namely reduction of the volume of a tumoral mass through vaporization. Its application is not restricted to traditional neurosurgery but extends also to stereotactic and vascular neurosurgery. Laser surgery has also influenced the anesthesiologic techniques. At the same time new instrumentation has been introduced: CUSA ultrasonic aspiration, echotomography, and Doppler flowmeter. I have had the chance to utilize these new technologies all at a time and have come to the conclusion that we are facing the dawn of a new methodology which has already shown its validity and lack of inconveniences, and whose object is to increase the precision of neurological surgery. The technological development is still going on, and some improvements are to be foreseen. Laser scalpel is splitting the initial laser surgery into NO TOUCH and TOUCH surgery with laser. As new instrumentarium will be developed, a variable and tunable beam will become available. For example, in a few years Free Electron Laser will further add to the progress in this field."

This book was originally conceived as a continuation in theme of the collec- tive monograph Limits of Predictability (Yu. A. Kravtsov, Ed. , Springer Series in Synergetics, Vol. 60, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1993). The main thrust of that book was to examine the various effects and factors (system non- stationarity, measurement noise, predictive model accuracy, and so on) that may limit, in a fundamental fashion, our ability to mathematically predict physical and man-made phenomena and events. Particularly interesting was the diversity of fields from which the papers and examples were drawn, in- cluding climatology, physics, biophysics, cybernetics, synergetics, sociology, and ethnogenesis. Twelve prominant Russian scientists, and one American (Prof. A. J. Lichtman) discussed their philosophical and scientific standpoints on the problem of the limits of predictability in their various fields. During the preparation of that book, the editor (Yu. A. K) had the great pleasure of interacting with world-renowned Russian scientists such as oceanologist A. S. Monin, geophysicist V. I. Keilis-Borok, sociologist I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, histo- rian L. N. Gumilev, to name a few. Dr. Angela M. Lahee, managing editor of the Synergetics Series at Springer, was enormously helpful in the publishing of that book. In 1992, Prof. H. Haken along with Dr. Lahee kindly supported the idea of publishing a second volume on the theme of nonlinear system predictability, this time with a more international flavor.

Econometric theory, as presented in textbooks and the econometric literature generally, is a somewhat disparate collection of findings. Its essential nature is to be a set of demonstrated results that increase over time, each logically based on a specific set of axioms or assumptions, yet at every moment, rather than a finished work, these inevitably form an incomplete body of knowledge. The practice of econometric theory consists of selecting from, applying, and evaluating this literature, so as to test its applicability and range. The creation, development, and use of computer software has led applied economic research into a new age. This book describes the history of econometric computation from 1950 to the present day, based upon an interactive survey involving the collaboration of the many econometricians who have designed and developed this software. It identifies each of the econometric software packages that are made available to and used by economists and econometricians worldwide.

This work is an exploration of the global market dynamics, their intrinsic natures, common trends and dynamic interlinkages during the stock market crises over the last twelve years. The study isolates different phases of crisis and differentiates between any crisis that remains confined to the region and those that take up a global dimension. The latent structure of the global stock market, the inter-regional and intra-regional stock market dynamics around the crises are analyzed to get a complete picture of the structure of the global stock market. The study further probing into the inherent nature of the global stock market in generating crisis finds the global market to be chaotic thus making the system intrinsically unstable or at best to follow knife-edge stability. The findings have significant bearing at theoretical level and on policy decisions.

The theory of dynamic games is very rich in nature and very much alive If the reader does not already agree with this statement, I hope he/she will surely do so after having consulted the contents of the current volume. The activities which fall under the heading of 'dynamic games' cannot easily be put into one scientific discipline. On the theoretical side one deals with differential games, difference games (the underlying models are described by differential, respec tively difference equations) and games based on Markov chains, with determin istic and stochastic games, zero-sum and nonzero-sum games, two-player and many-player games - all under various forms of equilibria. On the practical side, one sees applications to economics (stimulated by the recent Nobel prize for economics which went to three prominent scientists in game theory), biology, management science, and engineering. The contents of this volume are primarily based on selected presentations made at the Sixth International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applica tions, held in St Jovite, Quebec, Canada, 13-15 July 1994. Every paper that appears in this volume has passed through a stringent reviewing process, as is the case with publications for archival technical journals. This conference, as well as its predecessor which was held in Grimentz, 1992, took place under the auspices of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG), established in 1990. One of the activities of the ISDG is the publication of these Annals. The contributions in this volume have been grouped around five themes."

There are problems to whose solution I would attach an infinitely greater import ancf than to those of mathematics, for example touching ethics, or our relation to God, or conceming our destiny and our future; but their solution lies wholly beyond us and completely outside the province 0 f science. J. F. C. Gauss For a1l his prescience in matters physical and mathematieal, the great Gauss apparently did not foresee one development peculiar to OUT own time. The development I have in mind is the use of mathematical reasoning - in partieu lar the axiomatic method - to explicate alternative concepts of rationality and morality. The present bipartite collection of essays (Vol. 11, Nos. 2 and 3 of this journal) is entitled 'Game Theory, Social Choiee, and Ethics'. The eight papers represent state-of-the-art research in formal moral theory. Their intended aim is to demonstrate how the methods of game theory, decision theory, and axiomatic social choice theory can help to illuminate ethical questions central not only to moral theory, but also to normative public policy analysis. Before discussion of the contents of the papers, it should prove helpful to recall a number of pioneering papers that appeared during the decade of the 1950s. These papers contained aseries of mathematical and conceptual break through which laid the basis for much of today's research in formal moral theory. The papers deal with two somewhat distinct topics: the concept of individual and collective rationality, and the concept of social justiee."

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the Third International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012, held in Budapest, Hungary, in November 2012. The 18 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on secret communications, identification of attackers, multi-step attacks, network security, system defense, and applications security.

Our objectives may be briefly stated. They are two. First, we have sought to provide a compact and digestible exposition of some sub-branches of mathematics which are of interest to economists but which are underplayed in mathematical texts and dispersed in the journal literature. Second, we have sought to demonstrate the usefulness of the mathematics by providing a systematic account of modern neoclassical economics, that is, of those parts of economics from which jointness in production has been excluded. The book is introductory not in the sense that it can be read by any high-school graduate but in the sense that it provides some of the mathematics needed to appreciate modern general-equilibrium economic theory. It is aimed primarily at first-year graduate students and final-year honors students in economics who have studied mathematics at the university level for two years and who, in particular, have mastered a full-year course in analysis and calculus. The book is the outcome of a long correspondence punctuated by periodic visits by Kimura to the University of New South Wales. Without those visits we would never have finished. They were made possible by generous grants from the Leverhulme Foundation, Nagoya City University, and the University of New South Wales. Equally indispensible were the expert advice and generous encouragement of our friends Martin Beckmann, Takashi Negishi, Ryuzo Sato, and Yasuo Uekawa.

This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body.