Numerical methods in finance have emerged as a vital field at the crossroads of probability theory, finance and numerical analysis. Based on presentations given at the workshop Numerical Methods in Finance held at the INRIA Bordeaux (France) on June 1-2, 2010, this book provides an overview of the major new advances in the numerical treatment of instruments with American exercises. Naturally it covers the most recent research on the mathematical theory and the practical applications of optimal stopping problems as they relate to financial applications. By extension, it also provides an original treatment of Monte Carlo methods for the recursive computation of conditional expectations and solutions of BSDEs and generalized multiple optimal stopping problems and their applications to the valuation of energy derivatives and assets. The articles were carefully written in a pedagogical style and a reasonably self-contained manner. The book is geared toward quantitative analysts, probabilists, and applied mathematicians interested in financial applications.

Drawing on a wealth of new archival material, including personal correspondence and diaries, Robert Leonard tells the fascinating story of the creation of game theory by Hungarian Jewish mathematician John von Neumann and Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern. Game theory first emerged amid discussions of the psychology and mathematics of chess in Germany and fin-de-siecle Austro-Hungary. In the 1930s, on the cusp of anti-Semitism and political upheaval, it was developed by von Neumann into an ambitious theory of social organization. It was shaped still further by its use in combat analysis in World War II and during the Cold War. Interweaving accounts of the period s economics, science, and mathematics, and drawing sensitively on the private lives of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Robert Leonard provides a detailed reconstruction of a complex historical drama.

The study of M-matrices, their inverses and discrete potential theory is now a well-established part of linear algebra and the theory of Markov chains. The main focus of this monograph is the so-called inverse M-matrix problem, which asks for a characterization of nonnegative matrices whose inverses are M-matrices. We present an answer in terms of discrete potential theory based on the Choquet-Deny Theorem. A distinguished subclass of inverse M-matrices is ultrametric matrices, which are important in applications such as taxonomy. Ultrametricity is revealed to be a relevant concept in linear algebra and discrete potential theory because of its relation with trees in graph theory and mean expected value matrices in probability theory. Remarkable properties of Hadamard functions and products for the class of inverse M-matrices are developed and probabilistic insights are provided throughout the monograph.

Search games and rendezvous problems have received growing attention in computer science within the past few years. Rendezvous problems emerge naturally, for instance, to optimize performance and convergence of mobile robots. This gives a new algorithmic point of view to the theory. Furthermore, modern topics such as the spreading of gossip or disease in social networks have lead to new challenging problems in search and rendezvous. Search Theory: A Game Theoretic Perspective introduces the first integrated approach to Search and Rendezvous from the perspectives of biologists, computer scientists and mathematicians. This contributed volume covers a wide range of topics including rendezvous problems and solutions, rendezvous on graphs, search games on biology, mobility in governed social networks, search and security, and more. Most chapters also include case studies or a survey, in addition to a chapter on the future direction of Search and Rendezvous research. This book targets researchers and practitioners working in computer science, mathematics and biology as a reference book. Advanced level students focused on these fields will also find this book valuable as a secondary text book or reference.

One of the core building blocks of traditional economic theory is the concept of equilibrium, a state of the world in which economic forces are balanced and in the absence of external influences the values of economic variables remain static. Many traditional equilibrium models, or equilibria, are established based on the rational behavior of individuals within financial markets, such as traders, market analysts, and investing firms, and their ability to maximize profits, no matter the cost. Yet what happens when these market participants behave in an irrational manner, and how does this impact economic equilibria? Contemporary economists have agreed that a process similar to Darwin's Theory of Natural Selection takes over, whereby equilibria are shaped not by the behavior of individual participants but by an environment outside its control (i.e., an environment with little concern for maximizing profits). It is an environment in which those "selected" produce positive financial gains, but have no regard for how it was obtained or underlying motivations-and those participants suffering losses disappear altogether. Evolutionary Foundations of Equilibria in Irrational Markets proves traditional economic equilibria continue to occur despite natural selection in irrational markets. It covers a wide sampling of equilibria under various scenarios, and each chapter addresses the results of these models at an aggregate level. The text is supplemented with charts and figures to drive home key findings and proofs, making it of interest to students and researchers in the areas of economics and behavioral finance.

Game theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games.

Energy issues feature frequently in the economic and financial press. Specific examples of topical energy issues come from around the globe and often concern economics and finance. The importance of energy production, consumption and trade raises fundamental economic issues that impact the global economy and financial markets. This volume presents research on energy economics and financial markets related to the themes of supply and demand, environmental impact and renewables, energy derivatives trading, and finance and energy. The contributions by experts in their fields take a global perspective, as well as presenting cases from various countries and continents.

This Brief provides a cross-sectional analysis of development-directed investments in the wider Mekong region. The wider Mekong region includes Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, and the Chinese province of Yunnan. Evidence highlights that a few critical dynamics, including human migration, natural resource flows, and financial investments, generate a high level of connectivity between these countries. Such high levels of connectivity increase complexity and the potential for ripple effects of national decisions. The emerging links between countries can unfold in financial investments, migration, or the flow of resources. As these links intensify the regional connectivity increases and over time a highly connected region can emerge, as experienced by the Mekong region. This Brief also contains a chapter at the end of the book featuring numerous charts and diagrams further illustrating the impact of development activities in the area.

This title takes an in-depth look at the mathematics in the context of voting and electoral systems, with focus on simple ballots, complex elections, fairness, approval voting, ties, fair and unfair voting, and manipulation techniques. The exposition opens with a sketch of the mathematics behind the various methods used in conducting elections. The reader is lead to a comprehensive picture of the theoretical background of mathematics and elections through an analysis of Condorcet's Principle and Arrow's Theorem of conditions in electoral fairness. Further detailed discussion of various related topics include: methods of manipulating the outcome of an election, amendments, and voting on small committees.In recent years, electoral theory has been introduced into lower-level mathematics courses, as a way to illustrate the role of mathematics in our everyday life. Few books have studied voting and elections from a more formal mathematical viewpoint. This text will be useful to those who teach lower level courses or special topics courses and aims to inspire students to understand the more advanced mathematics of the topic. The exercises in this text are ideal for upper undergraduate and early graduate students, as well as those with a keen interest in the mathematics behind voting and elections.

This brief presents a general unifying perspective on the fractional calculus. It brings together results of several recent approaches in generalizing the least action principle and the Euler-Lagrange equations to include fractional derivatives. The dependence of Lagrangians on generalized fractional operators as well as on classical derivatives is considered along with still more general problems in which integer-order integrals are replaced by fractional integrals. General theorems are obtained for several types of variational problems for which recent results developed in the literature can be obtained as special cases. In particular, the authors offer necessary optimality conditions of Euler-Lagrange type for the fundamental and isoperimetric problems, transversality conditions, and Noether symmetry theorems. The existence of solutions is demonstrated under Tonelli type conditions. The results are used to prove the existence of eigenvalues and corresponding orthogonal eigenfunctions of fractional Sturm-Liouville problems. Advanced Methods in the Fractional Calculus of Variations is a self-contained text which will be useful for graduate students wishing to learn about fractional-order systems. The detailed explanations will interest researchers with backgrounds in applied mathematics, control and optimization as well as in certain areas of physics and engineering.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013, held in Fort Worth, TX, USA, in November 2013. The 15 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The conference focuses on analytical models based on game, information, communication, optimization, decision, and control theories that are applied to diverse security topics. At the same time, the connection between theoretical models and real world security problems are emphasized to establish the important feedback loop between theory and practice. Observing the scarcity of venues for researchers who try to develop a deeper theoretical understanding of the underlying incentive and resource allocation issues in security, we believe that GameSec will fill an important void and serve as a distinguished forum of highest standards for years to come.

Game theory explains how to make good choices when different decision makers have conflicting interests. The classical approach assumes that decision makers are committed to making the best choices for themselves regardless of the effect on others, but such an approach is less appropriate when cooperation, compromise and negotiation are important. This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. Using classical binary preference relations as a point of departure, the book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others. As these conditional preferences propagate through a group of decision makers, they create social bonds that lead to notions of group concordance. This book is intended for all students and researchers of decision theory and game theory.

Toward the late 1990s, several research groups independently began developing new, related theories in mathematical finance. These theories did away with the standard stochastic geometric diffusion "Samuelson" market model (also known as the Black-Scholes model because it is used in that most famous theory), instead opting for models that allowed minimax approaches to complement or replace stochastic methods. Among the most fruitful models were those utilizing game-theoretic tools and the so-called interval market model. Over time, these models have slowly but steadily gained influence in the financial community, providing a useful alternative to classical methods. A self-contained monograph, The Interval Market Model in Mathematical Finance: Game-Theoretic Methods assembles some of the most important results, old and new, in this area of research. Written by seven of the most prominent pioneers of the interval market model and game-theoretic finance, the work provides a detailed account of several closely related modeling techniques for an array of problems in mathematical economics. The book is divided into five parts, which successively address topics including: * probability-free Black-Scholes theory; * fair-price interval of an option; * representation formulas and fast algorithms for option pricing; * rainbow options; * tychastic approach of mathematical finance based upon viability theory. This book provides a welcome addition to the literature, complementing myriad titles on the market that take a classical approach to mathematical finance. It is a worthwhile resource for researchers in applied mathematics and quantitative finance, and has also been written in a manner accessible to financially-inclined readers with a limited technical background.

The central question I pose in this book is: If there existed a supe rior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omni science, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us, and would these differences be knowable? (ssecause God, the superior being in the Judeo Christian tradition, is generally described as a male, I shall hence forth use the masculine pronoun form for convenience, but I intend no invidious gender distinctions, whether applied to super natural or natural beings.l Theologians, philosophers of religion, and erudite scholars in other disciplines have addressed this and related questions before, but their answers, generally speaking, have not been informed by any systematic or rigorous theory. I believe the mathematical theory of games, which has little to do with the frivolity and playfulness we normally associate with games, provides a powerful tool for clarifying the key theo logical concepts in my central question and drawing out their implications in games played between human and superior beings. I am fully aware that not everybody will agree that omni science, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility are what I say they are, but I invite them to propose their own defi- Preface viii nitions and derive their own conclusions with the aid of the theory. By endowing these protean concepts with unambiguous meanings, I will try to show how game theory can breathe life into questions that have been dismissed too quickly simply because they are metaphysical-outside the world of experience.

The book presents a peer-reviewed collection of papers presented during the 10th issue of the Artificial Economics conference, addressing a variety of issues related to macroeconomics, industrial organization, networks, management and finance, as well as purely methodological issues. The field of artificial economics covers a broad range of methodologies relying on computer simulations in order to model and study the complexity of economic and social phenomena. The grounding principle of artificial economics is the analysis of aggregate properties of simulated systems populated by interacting adaptive agents that are equipped with heterogeneous individual behavioral rules. These macroscopic properties are neither foreseen nor intended by the artificial agents but generated collectively by them. They are emerging characteristics of such artificially simulated systems.

This Brief introduces the wireless spectrum market and discusses the current research for spectrum auctions. It covers the unique properties of spectrum auction, such as interference relationship, reusability, divisibility, composite effect and marginal effect, while also proposing how to build economic incentives into the network architecture and protocols in order to optimize the efficiency of wireless systems. Three scenarios for designing new auctions are demonstrated. First, a truthful double auction scheme for spectrum trading considering both the heterogeneous propagation properties of channels and spatial reuse is proposed. In the second scenario, a framework is designed to enable spectrum group secondary users with a limited budget. Finally, a flexible auction is created enabling operators to purchase the right amounts of spectrum at the right prices according to their users dynamic demands. Both concise and comprehensive, Auction Design for the Wireless Spectrum Market is suited for professionals and researchers working with wireless communications and networks. It is also a useful tool for advanced-level students interested in spectrum and networking issues."

Sociological theories of crime include: theories of strain blame crime on personal stressors; theories of social learning blame crime on its social rewards, and see crime more as an institution in conflict with other institutions rather than as in- vidual deviance; and theories of control look at crime as natural and rewarding, and explore the formation of institutions that control crime. Theorists of corruption generally agree that corruption is an expression of the Patron-Client relationship in which a person with access to resources trades resources with kin and members of the community in exchange for loyalty. Some approaches to modeling crime and corruption do not involve an explicit simulation: rule based systems; Bayesian networks; game theoretic approaches, often based on rational choice theory; and Neoclassical Econometrics, a rational choice-based approach. Simulation-based approaches take into account greater complexities of interacting parts of social phenomena. These include fuzzy cognitive maps and fuzzy rule sets that may incorporate feedback; and agent-based simulation, which can go a step farther by computing new social structures not previously identified in theory. The latter include cognitive agent models, in which agents learn how to perceive their en- ronment and act upon the perceptions of their individual experiences; and reactive agent simulation, which, while less capable than cognitive-agent simulation, is adequate for testing a policy's effects with existing societal structures. For example, NNL is a cognitive agent model based on the REPAST Simphony toolkit.

"Decision Systems and Non-stochastic Randomness" presents the first mathematical formalization of the statistical regularities of non-stochastic randomness and demonstrates how these regularities extend the standard probability-based model of decision making under uncertainty, allowing for the description of uncertain mass events that do not fit standard stochastic models. The formalism of statistical regularities developed in this book will have a significant influence on decision theory and information theory as well as numerous other disciplines.

This book will present the papers delivered at the first U.S. conference devoted exclusively to global optimization and will thus provide valuable insights into the significant research on the topic that has been emerging during recent years. Held at Princeton University in May 1991, the conference brought together an interdisciplinary group of the most active developers of algorithms for global optimization in order to focus the attention of the mathematical programming community on the unsolved problems and diverse applications of this field. The main subjects addressed at the conference were advances in deterministic and stochastic methods for global optimization, parallel algorithms for global optimization problems, and applications of global optimization. Although global optimization is primarily a mathematical problem, it is relevant to several other disciplines, including computer science, applied mathematics, physical chemistry, molecular biology, statistics, physics, engineering, operations research, communication theory, and economics. Global optimization problems originate from a wide variety of mathematical models of real-world systems. Some of its applications are allocation and location problems and VLSI and data-base design problems.

Originally published in 1991.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Over the last two decades there has been a great deal of research into nonlinear dynamic models in economics, finance and the social sciences. This book contains twenty papers that range over very recent applications in these areas. Topics covered include structural change and economic growth, disequilibrium dynamics and economic policy as well as models with boundedly rational agents. The book illustrates some of the most recent research tools in this area and will be of interest to economists working in economic dynamics and to mathematicians interested in seeing ideas from nonlinear dynamics and complexity theory applied to the economic sciences.

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2014, held in Los Angeles, CA, USA, in November 2014. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 7 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The covered topics cover multiple facets of cyber security that include: rationality of adversary, game-theoretic cryptographic techniques, vulnerability discovery and assessment, multi-goal security analysis, secure computation, economic-oriented security, and surveillance for security. Those aspects are covered in a multitude of domains that include networked systems, wireless communications, border patrol security, and control systems.

This work aims to foster the interdisciplinary dialogue between mathematicians and socio-economic scientists. Interaction among scholars and practitioners traditionally coming from different research areas is necessary more than ever in order to better understand many real-world problems we face today. On the one hand, mathematicians need economists and social scientists to better address the methodologies they design in a more realistic way; on the other hand, economists and social scientists need to be aware of sound mathematical modelling tools in order to understand and, ultimately, solve the complex problems they encounter in their research. With this goal in mind, this work is designed to take into account a multidisciplinary approach that will encourage the transfer of knowledge, ideas, and methodology from one discipline to the other. In particular, the work has three main themes: Demystifying and unravelling complex systems; Introducing models of individual behaviours in the social and economic sciences; Modelling socio-economic sciences as complex living systems. Specific tools examined in the work include a recently developed modelling approach using stochastic game theory within the framework of statistical mechanics and progressing up to modeling Darwinian evolution. Special attention is also devoted to social network theory as a fundamental instrument for the understanding of socio-economic systems.

1 feel privileged that the J(jh Advances in Computer Games Conference (ACG 10) takes place in Graz, Styria, Austria. It is the frrst time that Austria acts as host country for this major event. The series of conferences started in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1975 and was then held four times in England, three times in The Netherlands, and once in Germany. The ACG-10 conference in Graz is special in that it is organised together with the 11th World Computer Chess Championship (WCCC), the Sth Computer Olympiad (CO), and the European Union Y outh Chess Championship. The 11 th WCCC and ACG 10 take place in the Dom im Berg (Dome in the Mountain), a high-tech space with multimedia equipment, located in the Schlossberg, in the centre of the city. The help of many sponsors (large and small) is gratefully acknowledged. They will make the organisation of this conference a success. In particular, 1 would like to thank the European Union for designating Graz as the Cultural Capital of Europe 2003. There are 24 accepted contributions by participants from all over the world: Europe, Japan, USA, and Canada. The specific research results ofthe ACG 10 are expected to tind their way to general applications. The results are described in the pages that follow. The international stature together with the technical importance of this conference reaffrrms the mandate of the International Computer Games Association (ICGA) to represent the computer-games community.

Games, Norms, and Reasons: Logic at the Crossroads provides an overview of modern logic focusing on its relationships with other disciplines, including new interfaces with rational choice theory, epistemology, game theory and informatics. This book continues a series called "Logic at the Crossroads" whose title reflects a view that the deep insights from the classical phase of mathematical logic can form a harmonious mixture with a new, more ambitious research agenda of understanding and enhancing human reasoning and intelligent interaction. The editors have gathered together articles from active authors in this new area that explore dynamic logical aspects of norms, reasons, preferences and beliefs in human agency, human interaction and groups. The book pays a special tribute to Professor Rohit Parikh, a pioneer in this movement.