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Books > Science & Mathematics > Mathematics > Optimization > Game theory
Leading expert Paul Booth explores the growth in popularity of board games today, and unpacks what it means to read a board game. What does a game communicate? How do games play us? And how do we decide which games to play and which are just wastes of cardboard? With little scholarly research in this still-emerging field, Board Games as Media underscores the importance of board games in the ever-evolving world of media.
Sociological theories of crime include: theories of strain blame crime on personal stressors; theories of social learning blame crime on its social rewards, and see crime more as an institution in conflict with other institutions rather than as in- vidual deviance; and theories of control look at crime as natural and rewarding, and explore the formation of institutions that control crime. Theorists of corruption generally agree that corruption is an expression of the Patron-Client relationship in which a person with access to resources trades resources with kin and members of the community in exchange for loyalty. Some approaches to modeling crime and corruption do not involve an explicit simulation: rule based systems; Bayesian networks; game theoretic approaches, often based on rational choice theory; and Neoclassical Econometrics, a rational choice-based approach. Simulation-based approaches take into account greater complexities of interacting parts of social phenomena. These include fuzzy cognitive maps and fuzzy rule sets that may incorporate feedback; and agent-based simulation, which can go a step farther by computing new social structures not previously identified in theory. The latter include cognitive agent models, in which agents learn how to perceive their en- ronment and act upon the perceptions of their individual experiences; and reactive agent simulation, which, while less capable than cognitive-agent simulation, is adequate for testing a policy's effects with existing societal structures. For example, NNL is a cognitive agent model based on the REPAST Simphony toolkit.
"Decision Systems and Non-stochastic Randomness" presents the first mathematical formalization of the statistical regularities of non-stochastic randomness and demonstrates how these regularities extend the standard probability-based model of decision making under uncertainty, allowing for the description of uncertain mass events that do not fit standard stochastic models. The formalism of statistical regularities developed in this book will have a significant influence on decision theory and information theory as well as numerous other disciplines.
This book will present the papers delivered at the first U.S. conference devoted exclusively to global optimization and will thus provide valuable insights into the significant research on the topic that has been emerging during recent years. Held at Princeton University in May 1991, the conference brought together an interdisciplinary group of the most active developers of algorithms for global optimization in order to focus the attention of the mathematical programming community on the unsolved problems and diverse applications of this field. The main subjects addressed at the conference were advances in deterministic and stochastic methods for global optimization, parallel algorithms for global optimization problems, and applications of global optimization. Although global optimization is primarily a mathematical problem, it is relevant to several other disciplines, including computer science, applied mathematics, physical chemistry, molecular biology, statistics, physics, engineering, operations research, communication theory, and economics. Global optimization problems originate from a wide variety of mathematical models of real-world systems. Some of its applications are allocation and location problems and VLSI and data-base design problems. Originally published in 1991. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Over the last two decades there has been a great deal of research into nonlinear dynamic models in economics, finance and the social sciences. This book contains twenty papers that range over very recent applications in these areas. Topics covered include structural change and economic growth, disequilibrium dynamics and economic policy as well as models with boundedly rational agents. The book illustrates some of the most recent research tools in this area and will be of interest to economists working in economic dynamics and to mathematicians interested in seeing ideas from nonlinear dynamics and complexity theory applied to the economic sciences.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2014, held in Los Angeles, CA, USA, in November 2014. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 7 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The covered topics cover multiple facets of cyber security that include: rationality of adversary, game-theoretic cryptographic techniques, vulnerability discovery and assessment, multi-goal security analysis, secure computation, economic-oriented security, and surveillance for security. Those aspects are covered in a multitude of domains that include networked systems, wireless communications, border patrol security, and control systems.
This work aims to foster the interdisciplinary dialogue between mathematicians and socio-economic scientists. Interaction among scholars and practitioners traditionally coming from different research areas is necessary more than ever in order to better understand many real-world problems we face today. On the one hand, mathematicians need economists and social scientists to better address the methodologies they design in a more realistic way; on the other hand, economists and social scientists need to be aware of sound mathematical modelling tools in order to understand and, ultimately, solve the complex problems they encounter in their research. With this goal in mind, this work is designed to take into account a multidisciplinary approach that will encourage the transfer of knowledge, ideas, and methodology from one discipline to the other. In particular, the work has three main themes: Demystifying and unravelling complex systems; Introducing models of individual behaviours in the social and economic sciences; Modelling socio-economic sciences as complex living systems. Specific tools examined in the work include a recently developed modelling approach using stochastic game theory within the framework of statistical mechanics and progressing up to modeling Darwinian evolution. Special attention is also devoted to social network theory as a fundamental instrument for the understanding of socio-economic systems.
Fascinating, accessible introduction to enormously important intellectual system with numerous applications to social, economic, political problems. Newly revised edition offers overview of game theory, then lucid coverage of the two-person zero-sum game with equilibrium points; the general, two-person zero-sum game; utility theory; other topics. Problems at start of each chapter. Foreword to First Edition by Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliography.
1 feel privileged that the J(jh Advances in Computer Games Conference (ACG 10) takes place in Graz, Styria, Austria. It is the frrst time that Austria acts as host country for this major event. The series of conferences started in Edinburgh, Scotland in 1975 and was then held four times in England, three times in The Netherlands, and once in Germany. The ACG-10 conference in Graz is special in that it is organised together with the 11th World Computer Chess Championship (WCCC), the Sth Computer Olympiad (CO), and the European Union Y outh Chess Championship. The 11 th WCCC and ACG 10 take place in the Dom im Berg (Dome in the Mountain), a high-tech space with multimedia equipment, located in the Schlossberg, in the centre of the city. The help of many sponsors (large and small) is gratefully acknowledged. They will make the organisation of this conference a success. In particular, 1 would like to thank the European Union for designating Graz as the Cultural Capital of Europe 2003. There are 24 accepted contributions by participants from all over the world: Europe, Japan, USA, and Canada. The specific research results ofthe ACG 10 are expected to tind their way to general applications. The results are described in the pages that follow. The international stature together with the technical importance of this conference reaffrrms the mandate of the International Computer Games Association (ICGA) to represent the computer-games community.
Games, Norms, and Reasons: Logic at the Crossroads provides an overview of modern logic focusing on its relationships with other disciplines, including new interfaces with rational choice theory, epistemology, game theory and informatics. This book continues a series called "Logic at the Crossroads" whose title reflects a view that the deep insights from the classical phase of mathematical logic can form a harmonious mixture with a new, more ambitious research agenda of understanding and enhancing human reasoning and intelligent interaction. The editors have gathered together articles from active authors in this new area that explore dynamic logical aspects of norms, reasons, preferences and beliefs in human agency, human interaction and groups. The book pays a special tribute to Professor Rohit Parikh, a pioneer in this movement.
The likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters' preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters' preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters' preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
The theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be- ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L. S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton- Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe- sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv- ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P. P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, N. N. Krasovskii, and A. I. Subbotin (see their book Po- sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L. D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M. G. Crandall and P. -L.
Modem game theory has evolved enonnously since its inception in the 1920s in the works ofBorel and von Neumann and since publication in the 1940s of the seminal treatise "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern. The branch of game theory known as dynamic games is-to a significant extent-descended from the pioneering work on differential games done by Isaacs in the 1950s and 1960s. Since those early decades game theory has branched out in many directions, spanning such diverse disciplines as math ematics, economics, electrical and electronics engineering, operations research, computer science, theoretical ecology, environmental science, and even political science. The papers in this volume reflect both the maturity and the vitalityofmodem day game theoryin general, andofdynamic games, inparticular. The maturitycan be seen from the sophistication ofthe theorems, proofs, methods, and numerical algorithms contained in these articles. The vitality is manifested by the range of new ideas, new applications, the numberofyoung researchers among the authors, and the expanding worldwide coverage of research centers and institutes where the contributions originated."
Arguably, many industrial optimization problems are of the
multiobjective type. The present work, after providing a survey of
the state of the art in multiobjective optimization, gives new
insight into this important mathematical field by consequently
taking up the viewpoint of differential geometry. This approach,
unprecedented in the literature, very naturally results in a
generalized homotopy method for multiobjective optimization which
is theoretically well-founded and numerically efficient. The power
of the new method is demonstrated by solving two real-life problems
of industrial optimization.
This book was written mainly during the Spring periods of 2008 and 2009, when the ?rst author was visiting Maastricht University. Financial s- port both from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO (grants 040. 11. 013 and 0. 40. 11. 082) and from the research institute METEOR (Maastricht Univ- sity) is gratefully acknowledged. Jerusalem Bezalel Peleg Maastricht Hans Peters April 2010 v Contents Preview to this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Part I Representations of constitutions 1 Introduction to Part I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 2 Arrow's constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 3 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its implications. . . . . . . . . 4 1. 4 Ga ]rdenfors's model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. 5 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 Constitutions, e?ectivity functions, and game forms . . . . . . 7 2. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. 2 Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. 3 Constitutions and e?ectivity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. 4 Game forms and a representation theorem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2. 5 Representation and simultaneous exercising of rights. . . . . . . . 19 2. 6 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 Nash consistent representations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 2 Existence of Nash consistent representations: a general result 22 3. 3 The case of ?nitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. 4 Nash consistent representations of topological e?ectivity functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3. 5 Veto functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 1 Finitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 2 Topological veto functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. 6 Liberalism and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria. . . . . . . . . 40 3. 7 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 vii viii Contents 4 Acceptable representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."
Agent-based modeling and social simulation have emerged as an interdisciplinary area of social science that includes computational economics, organizational science, social dynamics, and complex systems. This area contributes to enriching our understanding of the fundamental processes of social phenomena caused by complex interactions among agents. Bringing together diverse approaches to social simulation and research agendas, this book presents a unique collection of contributions from the Second World Congress on Social Simulation, held in 2008 at George Mason University in Washington DC, USA. This book in particular includes articles on norms, diffusion, social networks, economy, markets and organizations, computational modeling, and programming environments, providing new hypotheses and theories, new simulation experiments compared with various data sets, and new methods for model design and development. These works emerged from a global and interdisciplinary scientific community of the three regional scientific associations for social simulation: the North American Association for Computational Social and Organizational Science (NAACSOS; now the Computational Social Science Society, CSSS), the European Social Simulation Association (ESSA), and the Pacific Asian Association for Agent-bBased Approach in Social Systems Sciences (PAAA)."
Game Theory And Decision Theory In Agent-Based Systems is a collection of papers from international leading researchers, that offers a broad view of the many ways game theory and decision theory can be applied in agent-based systems, from standard applications of the core elements of the theory to more cutting edge developments. The range of topics discussed in this book provide the reader with the first comprehensive volume that reflects both the depth and breadth of work in applying techniques from game theory and decision theory to design agent-based systems.Chapters include: * Selecting Partners; * Evolution of Agents with Moral Sentiments in an IPD Exercise; * Dynamic Desires; * Emotions and Personality; * Decision-Theoretic Approach to Game Theory; * Shopbot Economics; * Finding the Best Way to Join in; * Shopbots and Pricebots in Electronic Service Markets; * Polynomial Time Mechanisms; * Multi-Agent Q-learning and Regression Trees; * Satisficing Equilibria; * Investigating Commitment Flexibility in Multi-agent Contracts; * Pricing in Agent Economies using Multi-agent Q-learning; * Using Hypergames to Increase Planned Payoff and Reduce Risk; * Bilateral Negotiation with Incomplete and Uncertain Information; * Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids.
The international conference on which the book is based brought together many of the world's leading experts, with particular effort on the interaction between established scientists and emerging young promising researchers, as well as on the interaction of pure and applied mathematics. All material has been rigorously refereed. The contributions contain much material developed after the conference, continuing research and incorporating additional new results and improvements. In addition, some up-to-date surveys are included.
In the framework of the Diderot Mathematical Forum (DMF) of the European Mathematical Society (EMS), December 19-20, 1997, a Videoconference was held linking three teams of specialists in Amsterdam, Madrid and Venice respectively. The general subject of this videoconference, the second one of the DMF series, was Mathematics and Environment and more specifically, Problems related to Water. This volume contains the texts of the Madrid site contributions with important, new and unpublished, examples on the modeling, mathematical and numerical analysis and treatment of the associated control problems of relevant questions arising in Oceanography and Environment.
This book presents a new computational finance approach combining a Symbolic Aggregate approximation (SAX) technique with an optimization kernel based on genetic algorithms (GA). While the SAX representation is used to describe the financial time series, the evolutionary optimization kernel is used in order to identify the most relevant patterns and generate investment rules. The proposed approach considers several different chromosomes structures in order to achieve better results on the trading platform The methodology presented in this book has great potential on investment markets.
The current volume presents four chapters touching on some of the most important and modern areas of research in Mathematical Finance: asset price bubbles (by Philip Protter); energy markets (by Fred Espen Benth); investment under transaction costs (by Paolo Guasoni and Johannes Muhle-Karbe); and numerical methods for solving stochastic equations (by Dan Crisan, K. Manolarakis and C. Nee).The Paris-Princeton Lecture Notes on Mathematical Finance, of which this is the fifth volume, publish cutting-edge research in self-contained, expository articles from renowned specialists. The aim is to produce a series of articles that can serve as an introductory reference source for research in the field.
One common characteristics of a complex system is its ability to
withstand major disturbances and the capacity to rebuild itself.
Understanding how such systems demonstrate resilience by absorbing
or recovering from major external perturbations requires both
quantitative foundations and a multidisciplinary view on the
topic.
This book collects some recent works on the application of dynamic game and control theory to the analysis of environmental problems. This collec tion of papers is not the outcome of a conference or of a workshop. It is rather the result of a careful screening from among a number of contribu tions that we have solicited across the world. In particular, we have been able to attract the work of some of the most prominent scholars in the field of dynamic analyses of the environment. Engineers, mathematicians and economists provide their views and analytical tools to better interpret the interactions between economic and environmental phenomena, thus achiev ing, through this interdisciplinary effort, new and interesting results. The goal of the book is more normative than descriptive. All papers include careful modelling of the dynamics of the main variables involved in the game between nature and economic agents and among economic agents themselves, as well-described in Vrieze's introductory chapter. Fur thermore, all papers use this careful modelling framework to provide policy prescriptions to the public agencies authorized to regulate emission dy namics. Several diverse problems are addressed: from global issues, such as the greenhouse effect or deforestation, to international ones, such as the management of fisheries, to local ones, for example, the control of effluent discharges. Moreover, pollution problems are not the only concern of this book."
The book brings together an overview of standard concepts in cooperative game theory with applications to the analysis of social networks and hierarchical authority organizations. The standard concepts covered include the multi-linear extension, the Core, the Shapley value, and the cooperative potential. Also discussed are the Core for a restricted collection of formable coalitions, various Core covers, the Myerson value, value-based potentials, and share potentials. Within the context of social networks this book discusses the measurement of centrality and power as well as allocation rules such as the Myerson value and hierarchical allocation rules. For hierarchical organizations, two basic approaches to the exercise of authority are explored; for each approach the allocation of the generated output is developed. Each chapter is accompanied by a problem section, allowing this book to be used as a textbook for an advanced graduate course on game theory.
Swaps, futures, options, structured instruments - a wide range of derivative products is traded in today's financial markets. Analyzing, pricing and managing such products often requires fairly sophisticated quantitative tools and methods. This book serves as an introduction to financial mathematics with special emphasis on aspects relevant in practice. In addition to numerous illustrative examples, algorithmic implementations are demonstrated using "Mathematica" and the software package "UnRisk" (available for both students and teachers). The content is organized in 15 chapters that can be treated as independent modules. In particular, the exposition is tailored for classroom use in a Bachelor or Master program course, as well as for practitioners who wish to further strengthen their quantitative background. |
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