This book presents a systematic overview of cutting-edge research in the field of parametric modeling of personal income and wealth distribution, which allows one to represent how income/wealth is distributed within a given population. The estimated parameters may be used to gain insights into the causes of the evolution of income/wealth distribution over time, or to interpret the differences between distributions across countries. Moreover, once a given parametric model has been fitted to a data set, one can straightforwardly compute inequality and poverty measures. Finally, estimated parameters may be used in empirical modeling of the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the evolution of personal income/wealth distribution. In reviewing the state of the art in the field, the authors provide a thorough discussion of parametric models belonging to the " -generalized" family, a new and fruitful set of statistical models for the size distribution of income and wealth that they have developed over several years of collaborative and multidisciplinary research. This book will be of interest to all who share the belief that problems of income and wealth distribution merit detailed conceptual and methodological attention.

This book proposes several commonly used interval-valued solution concepts of interval-valued cooperative games with transferable utility. It thoroughly investigates these solutions, thereby establishing the properties, models, methods, and applications. The first chapter proposes the interval-valued least square solutions and quadratic programming models, methods, and properties. Next, the satisfactory-degree-based non-linear programming models for computing interval-valued cores and corresponding bisection algorithm are explained. Finally, the book explores several simplification methods of interval-valued solutions: the interval-valued equal division and equal surplus division values; the interval-valued Shapley, egalitarian Shapley, and discounted Shapley values; the interval-valued solidarity and generalized solidarity values; and the interval-valued Banzhaf value. This book is designed for individuals from different fields and disciplines, such as decision science, game theory, management science, operations research, fuzzy sets or fuzzy mathematics, applied mathematics, industrial engineering, finance, applied economics, expert system, and social economy as well as artificial intelligence. Moreover, it is suitable for teachers, postgraduates, and researchers from different disciplines: decision analysis, management, operations research, fuzzy mathematics, fuzzy system analysis, applied mathematics, systems engineering, project management, supply chain management, industrial engineering, applied economics, and hydrology and water resources.

This contributed volume combines approaches of the current inequality debate with aspects of finance based on profound macroeconomic model analyses. Research on inequality has had a long tradition in economics. With the financial crisis from 2007, not only output decreased tremendously, but also inequality has risen since then. The book presents selected contributions of a workshop held at Bielefeld University in 2016 and features additional papers written by experts in the field. A mixture of established researchers and young scholars presents both theoretical and empirical frameworks to analyze the subject.

This book covers recent advances in Complex Automated Negotiations as a widely studied emerging area in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. The book includes selected revised and extended papers from the 7th International Workshop on Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation (ACAN2014), which was held in Paris, France, in May 2014. The book also includes brief introductions about Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiation which are based on tutorials provided in the workshop, and brief summaries and descriptions about the ANAC'14 (Automated Negotiating Agents Competition) competition, where authors of selected finalist agents explain the strategies and the ideas used by them. The book is targeted to academic and industrial researchers in various communities of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, such as agreement technology, mechanism design, electronic commerce, related areas, as well as graduate, undergraduate, and PhD students working in those areas or having interest in them.

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

This book is the fourth in a multidisciplinary series which brings together leading researchers in the STEAM-H disciplines (Science, Technology, Engineering, Agriculture, Mathematics and Health) to present their perspective on advances in their own specific fields, and to generate a genuinely interdisciplinary collaboration that transcends parochial subject-matter boundaries. All contributions are carefully edited, peer-reviewed, reasonably self-contained, and pedagogically crafted for a multidisciplinary readership. Contributions are drawn from a variety of fields including mathematics, statistics, game theory and behavioral sciences, biomathematics and physical chemistry, computer science and human-centered computing. This volume is dedicated to Professor Christiane Rousseau, whose work inspires the STEAM-H series, in recognition of her passion for the mathematical sciences and her on-going initiative, the Mathematics of Planet Earth paradigm of interdisciplinarity. The volume's primary goal is to enhance interdisciplinary understanding between these areas of research by showing how new advances in a particular field can be relevant to open problems in another and how many disciplines contribute to a better understanding of relevant issues at the interface of mathematics and the sciences. The main emphasis is on important methods, research directions and applications of analysis within and beyond each field. As such, the volume aims to foster student interest and participation in the STEAM-H domain, as well as promote interdisciplinary research collaborations. The volume is valuable as a reference of choice and a source of inspiration for a broad spectrum of scientists, mathematicians, research students and postdoctoral fellows.

Are you looking for new lectures for your course on algorithms, combinatorial optimization, or algorithmic game theory? Maybe you need a convenient source of relevant, current topics for a graduate student or advanced undergraduate student seminar? Or perhaps you just want an enjoyable look at some beautiful mathematical and algorithmic results, ideas, proofs, concepts, and techniques in discrete mathematics and theoretical computer science? Gems of Combinatorial Optimization and Graph Algorithms is a handpicked collection of up-to-date articles, carefully prepared by a select group of international experts, who have contributed some of their most mathematically or algorithmically elegant ideas. Topics include longest tours and Steiner trees in geometric spaces, cartograms, resource buying games, congestion games, selfish routing, revenue equivalence and shortest paths, scheduling, linear structures in graphs, contraction hierarchies, budgeted matching problems, and motifs in networks. This volume is aimed at readers with some familiarity of combinatorial optimization, and appeals to researchers, graduate students, and advanced undergraduate students alike.

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

This book presents an introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) which is an emerging field in the area of complex systems attracting the attention of researchers from disparate scientific communities. EGT allows one to represent and study several complex phenomena, such as the emergence of cooperation in social systems, the role of conformity in shaping the equilibrium of a population, and the dynamics in biological and ecological systems.Since EGT models belong to the area of complex systems, statistical physics constitutes a fundamental ingredient for investigating their behavior. At the same time, the complexity of some EGT models, such as those realized by means of agent-based methods, often require the implementation of numerical simulations. Therefore, beyond providing an introduction to EGT, this book gives a brief overview of the main statistical physics tools (such as phase transitions and the Ising model) and computational strategies for simulating evolutionary games (such as Monte Carlo algorithms on lattices). This book will appeal to students and researchers in this burgeoning field of complex systems.

This Brief uses game-theoretic analysis to debunk the turnout paradox and offers an alternative economic model to elucidate the patterns behind the socioeconomic bias in turnout. The author argues that the turnout paradox-the idea that rational, strategic actors would not vote in an election-is an overstated problem, and that, contrary to widespread belief, game-theoretic models of elections with highly realistic parameters are compatible with high turnout. The author applies the method of stability sets to the study of voting games so as to characterize the behavior of electoral turnout in response to the game's structural parameters. To illustrate the power and potential of this framework, the author then develops a politico-economic model that generates testable theories about the way in which the modern welfare state and redistribution of wealth can shape the patterns of biased turnout that exist in most democracies. By turning a classic problem of rational choice into a source of new methods of analysis this Brief allows game theory to intervene in relevant conversations about the political economy of electoral participation, creating an opportunity for formal methods to make a welcome contribution to the discipline. As such, this Brief will be of use to scholars and student of political science, economics, political economy, and public policy, especially those who work in the tradition of formal methods.

This book develops a machine-learning framework for predicting economic growth. It can also be considered as a primer for using machine learning (also known as data mining or data analytics) to answer economic questions. While machine learning itself is not a new idea, advances in computing technology combined with a dawning realization of its applicability to economic questions makes it a new tool for economists.

This compelling book advances utilitarianism as the basis for a viable public philosophy, effectively rebutting the common charge that, as moral doctrine, utilitarian thought permits cruel acts, justifies unfair distribution of wealth, and demands too much of moral agents.
James Wood Bailey defends utilitarianism through novel use of game theory insights regarding feasible equilibria and evolutionary stability, elaborating a sophisticated account of institutions that real-world utilitarians would want to foster. If utilitarianism seems in principle to dictate that we make each and every choice such that it leads to the best consequences overall, game theory emphasizes that no choice has consequences in isolation, but only in conjunction with many other choices of other agents. Viewing institutions as equilibria in complex games, Bailey negotiates the paradox of individual responsibilities, arguing that if individuals within institutions have specific responsibilities they cannot get from the principle of utility alone, the utility principle nevertheless holds great value in that it allows us to identify morally desirable institutions. Far from recommending cruel acts, utilitarianism, understood this way, actually runs congruent to our basic moral intuitions.
A provocative attempt to support the practical use of utilitarian ethics in a world of conflicting interests and competing moral agents, Bailey's book employs the work of social scientists to tackle problems traditionally given abstract philosophical attention. Vividly illustrating its theory with concrete moral dilemmas and taking seriously our moral common sense, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice is an accessible, groundbreaking work that will richly reward students and scholars of political science, political economy, and philosophy.

Building on the success of the first edition, Game Theory and Public Policy, Second Edition provides a critical, selective review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their applications in public policy. The author further suggests modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy. Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches. This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly policy and labor market policies. Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.

The definitive guide to the game theoretic and probabilistic underpinning for Bitcoin's security model. Discusses, how Bitcoin works, includes an overview of probability and game theory and provides a quantitative analysis for Bitcoin security under attack modes. Explains, possible attacks on Bitcoin as its influence grows and includes breakdown of how the how the block reward schedule and adoption will affect the vulnerability of the network.

This volume constitutes the refereed post-conference proceedings of the 3rd Joint China-Dutch Workshop on Game Theory and Applications and the 7th China Meeting on Game Theory and Applications, GTA 2016, held in Fuzhou, China, in November 2016. The 25 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 60 full paper submissions. They deal with a broad range of topics in the areas of non-cooperative and cooperative games, non-cooperative and cooperative games under uncertainty and their applications.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017, held in Vienna, Austria, in October 2017. The 24 revised full papers presented together with 4 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 71 submissions.The papers address topics such as Game theory and mechanism design for security and privacy; Pricing and economic incentives for building dependable and secure systems; Dynamic control, learning, and optimization and approximation techniques; Decision making and decision theory for cybersecurity and security requirements engineering; Socio-technological and behavioral approaches to security; Risk assessment and risk management; Security investment and cyber insurance; Security and privacy for the Internet-of-Things (IoT), cyber-physical systems, resilient control systems; New approaches for security and privacy in cloud computing and for critical infrastructure; Security and privacy of wireless and mobile communications, including user location privacy; Game theory for intrusion detection; and Empirical and experimental studies with game-theoretic or optimization analysis for security and privacy.

Hex: The Full Story is for anyone - hobbyist, professional, student, teacher - who enjoys board games, game theory, discrete math, computing, or history. hex was discovered twice, in 1942 by Piet Hein and again in 1949 by John F. nash. How did this happen? Who created the puzzle for Hein's Danish newspaper column? How are Martin Gardner, David Gale, Claude Shannon, and Claude Berge involved? What is the secret to playing Hex well? The answers are inside... Features New documents on Hein's creation of Hex, the complete set of Danish puzzles, and the identity of their composer Chapters on Gale's game Bridg-it, the game Rex, computer Hex, open Hex problems, and more Dozens of new puzzles and solutions Study guide for Hex players Supplemenetary text for a course in game theory, discrete math, computer science, or science history

ONAG, as the book is commonly known, is one of those rare publications that sprang to life in a moment of creative energy and has remained influential for over a quarter of a century. Originally written to define the relation between the theories of transfinite numbers and mathematical games, the resulting work is a mathematically sophisticated but eminently enjoyable guide to game theory. By defining numbers as the strengths of positions in certain games, the author arrives at a new class, the surreal numbers, that includes both real numbers and ordinal numbers. These surreal numbers are applied in the author's mathematical analysis of game strategies. The additions to the Second Edition present recent developments in the area of mathematical game theory, with a concentration on surreal numbers and the additive theory of partizan games.

This book presents high-quality original contributions on positive systems, including topics such as: monotone dynamical systems in mathematical biology and game theory; mathematical developments for networked systems in biology, chemistry and the social sciences; linear and nonlinear positive operators; dynamical analysis, observation and control of positive distributed parameter systems; stochastic realization theory; biological systems with positive variables and positive controls; iterated function systems; nonnegative dynamic processes; and dimensioning problems for collaborative systems. The book comprises a selection of the best papers presented at the POSTA 2016, the 5th International Symposium on Positive Systems, which was held in Rome, Italy, in September 2016. This conference series represents a targeted response to the growing need for research that reports on and critically discusses a wide range of topics concerning the theory and applications of positive systems.

The scientific study of complex systems has transformed a wide range of disciplines in recent years, enabling researchers in both the natural and social sciences to model and predict phenomena as diverse as earthquakes, global warming, demographic patterns, financial crises, and the failure of materials. In this book, Didier Sornette boldly applies his varied experience in these areas to propose a simple, powerful, and general theory of how, why, and when stock markets crash. Most attempts to explain market failures seek to pinpoint triggering mechanisms that occur hours, days, or weeks before the collapse. Sornette proposes a radically different view: the underlying cause can be sought months and even years before the abrupt, catastrophic event in the build-up of cooperative speculation, which often translates into an accelerating rise of the market price, otherwise known as a "bubble." Anchoring his sophisticated, step-by-step analysis in leading-edge physical and statistical modeling techniques, he unearths remarkable insights and some predictions--among them, that the "end of the growth era" will occur around 2050. Sornette probes major historical precedents, from the decades-long "tulip mania" in the Netherlands that wilted suddenly in 1637 to the South Sea Bubble that ended with the first huge market crash in England in 1720, to the Great Crash of October 1929 and Black Monday in 1987, to cite just a few. He concludes that most explanations other than cooperative self-organization fail to account for the subtle bubbles by which the markets lay the groundwork for catastrophe. Any investor or investment professional who seeks a genuine understanding of looming financial disasters should read this book. Physicists, geologists, biologists, economists, and others will welcome Why Stock Markets Crash as a highly original "scientific tale," as Sornette aptly puts it, of the exciting and sometimes fearsome--but no longer quite so unfathomable--world of stock markets.

This book gathers a selection of refereed papers presented at the "International Conference on Operations Research OR2015," which was held at the University of Vienna, Austria, September 1-4, 2015. Over 900 scientists and students from 50 countries attended this conference and presented more than 600 papers in parallel topic streams as well as special award sessions. Though the guiding theme of the conference was "Optimal Decision and Big Data," this volume also includes papers addressing practically all aspects of modern Operations Research.

This volume is a user-friendly presentation of the main theoretical properties of the Fourier-Malliavin volatility estimation, allowing the readers to experience the potential of the approach and its application in various financial settings. Readers are given examples and instruments to implement this methodology in various financial settings and applications of real-life data. A detailed bibliographic reference is included to permit an in-depth study.

This book constitutes revised selected papers from the 16th International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation, GDN 2016, held in Bellingham, WA, USA, in June 2016. The GDN meetings aim to bring together researchers and practitioners from a wide spectrum of fields, including economics, management, computer science, engineering, and decision science. The 12 papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 70 submissions. They deal with the fundamental part of all decision processes and individual preferences; the situations of group decision making; the collective decision making in situations characterized by a higher level of conflict; and the group processes and negotiations in different subject areas.

This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior." In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.

This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the "New York Times," tthe "American Economic Review," and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.