Birkhauser Boston, Inc., will publish a series of carefully selected mono graphs in the area of mathematical modeling to present serious applications of mathematics for both the undergraduate and the professional audience. Some of the monographs to be selected and published will appeal more to the professional mathematician and user of mathematics, serving to familiarize the user with new models and new methods. Some, like the present monograph, will stress the educational aspect and will appeal more to a student audience, either as a textbook or as additional reading. We feel that this first volume in the series may in itself serve as a model for our program. Samuel Goldberg attaches a high priority to teaching stu dents the art of modeling, that is, to use his words, the art of constructing useful mathematical models of real-world phenomena. We concur. It is our strong conviction as editors that the connection between the actual problems and their mathematical models must be factually plausible, if not actually real. As this first volume in the new series goes to press, we invite its readers to share with us both their criticisms and their constructive suggestions."

Since the first Congress in Zurich in 1897, the ICM has been an eagerly awaited event every four years. Many of these occasions are celebrated for historie developments and seminal contributions to mathematics. 2002 marks the year of the 24th ICM, the first of the new millennium. Also historie is the first ICM Satellite Conference devoted to game theory and applications. It is one of those rare occasions, in which masters of the field are able to meet under congenial surroundings to talk and share their gathered wisdom. As is usually the case in ICM meetings, participants of the ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications (Qingdao, August 2(02) hailed from the four corners of the world. In addition to presentations of high qual ity research, the program also included twelve invited plenary sessions with distinguished speakers. This volume, which gathers together selected papers read at the conference, is divided into four sections: (I) Foundations, Concepts, and Structure. (II) Equilibrium Properties. (III) Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences. (IV) Computational Aspects of Games."

The ?nite-dimensional nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) is a s- tem of ?nitely many nonlinear inequalities in ?nitely many nonnegative variables along with a special equation that expresses the complementary relationship between the variables and corresponding inequalities. This complementarity condition is the key feature distinguishing the NCP from a general inequality system, lies at the heart of all constrained optimi- tion problems in ?nite dimensions, provides a powerful framework for the modeling of equilibria of many kinds, and exhibits a natural link between smooth and nonsmooth mathematics. The ?nite-dimensional variational inequality (VI), which is a generalization of the NCP, provides a broad unifying setting for the study of optimization and equilibrium problems and serves as the main computational framework for the practical solution of a host of continuum problems in the mathematical sciences. The systematic study of the ?nite-dimensional NCP and VI began in the mid-1960s; in a span of four decades, the subject has developed into a very fruitful discipline in the ?eld of mathematical programming. The - velopments include a rich mathematical theory, a host of e?ective solution algorithms, a multitude of interesting connections to numerous disciplines, and a wide range of important applications in engineering and economics. As a result of their broad associations, the literature of the VI/CP has bene?ted from contributions made by mathematicians (pure, applied, and computational), computer scientists, engineers of many kinds (civil, ch- ical, electrical, mechanical, and systems), and economists of diverse exp- tise (agricultural, computational, energy, ?nancial, and spatial).

Trans-boundary water resources are often a cause of conflict among riparian entities. Increasing demand for water resources and deterioration of existing water sources underscore the need to resolve conflicts over the allocation of consumption and pollution rights among conflicting uses and users. Because economic growth of the entities that share a water resource depends on sustainability of the resource, water has great potential as a basis for cooperation among political entities. However, enforcement of cooperation particularly in international settings is limited. Thus, parties sharing a water resource will form and remain in a cooperating coalition only when economic incentives for each can be identified. This book offers an economic approach to resolution of conflicts by identifying economic mechanisms that encourage sustainable cooperation. The book includes discussions on international, interstate, and intrastate disputes regarding both water quantity and water quality issues. It presents mechanisms for facilitating cooperation among users from agricultural, industrial, domestic, and environmental sectors.It considers the experience and potential in many regions around the world including Australia (the Muray-Darling Basin), Latin America (Chile), the Middle East (Israel and the Palestinian Authority), the U.S. (California, Florida's Everglades, Hawaii, and the Chesapeake Bay), and Africa (South Africa, Lesotho). Part I of the book discusses international experience in forming water coalitions and offers an illustrative model of water quality coalitions. It emphasizes the dependence of sustainability of international agreements on the practical ability to create incentives through economic mechanisms and political linkages that overcome the problem of limited enforcement due to sovereignty claims. Part II of the book discusses management of intrastate U.S. water resources involving competing local jurisdictions or user groups and the U.S. and Australian attempts to facilitate state management of interstate water resources through federal cooperation. Part III of the book explores the expanding scope of trans-boundary water resource issues that contribute to complexity of conflict beyond traditional interests such as allocation and navigation rights.In particular, it analyzes the economic implications of nutrient, land, and airshed management in an environment where the interaction of trans-boundary water resources with the ecological system is considered. Trans-boundary water usage and infrastructure are discussed in the context of privatization and political uncertainty. Part IV of the book examines economic solutions to trans-boundary water allocation including water markets, tradable water permits, contractual arrangements, and coordinated management. The interaction between ground and surface water and the interaction between desalinated, recycled, and fresh water is analyzed in the context of optimal water allocation. The book concludes with a critical discussion of the role and potential of the economics profession in contributing to conflict resolution and management of trans-boundary water resources. The strengths and weaknesses of economic analysis are discussed with special consideration of the modern tools of bargaining theory and game theory that go beyond economic efficiency in considering political realities.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 18th International Symposium Fundamentals of Computation Theory, FCT 2011, held in Oslo, Norway, in August 2011. The 28 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 78 submissions. FCT 2011 focused on algorithms, formal methods, and emerging fields, such as ad hoc, dynamic and evolving systems; algorithmic game theory; computational biology; foundations of cloud computing and ubiquitous systems; and quantum computation.

In everyday life we must often reach decisions while knowing that the outcome will not only depend on our own choice, but also on the choices of others. These situations are the focus of epistemic game theory. Unlike classical game theory, it explores how people may reason about their opponents before they make their final choice in a game. Packed with examples and practical problems based on stories from everyday life, this is the first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory. Each chapter is dedicated to one particular, natural way of reasoning. The book then shows how each of these ways of reasoning will affect the final choices that can rationally be made and how these choices can be found by iterative procedures. Moreover, it does so in a way that uses elementary mathematics and does not presuppose any previous knowledge of game theory.

The management of financial portfolios or funds constitutes a widely known problematic in financial markets which normally requires a rigorous analysis in order to select the most profitable assets. This subject is becoming popular among computer scientists which try to adapt known Intelligent Computation techniques to the market's domain. This book proposes a potential system based on Genetic Algorithms, which aims to manage a financial portfolio by using technical analysis indicators. The results are promising since the approach clearly outperforms the remaining approaches during the recent market crash.

Changing interest rates constitute one of the major risk sources for banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. Modeling the term-structure movements of interest rates is a challenging task. This volume gives an introduction to the mathematics of term-structure models in continuous time. It includes practical aspects for fixed-income markets such as day-count conventions, duration of coupon-paying bonds and yield curve construction; arbitrage theory; short-rate models; the Heath-Jarrow-Morton methodology; consistent term-structure parametrizations; affine diffusion processes and option pricing with Fourier transform; LIBOR market models; and credit risk.

The focus is on a mathematically straightforward but rigorous development of the theory. Students, researchers and practitioners will find this volume very useful. Each chapter ends with a set of exercises, that provides source for homework and exam questions. Readers are expected to be familiar with elementary Ito calculus, basic probability theory, and real and complex analysis."

Groups of people perform acts that are subject to standards of rationality. A committee may sensibly award fellowships, or may irrationally award them in violation of its own policies. A theory of collective rationality defines collective acts that are evaluable for rationality and formulates principles for their evaluation. This book argues that a group's act is evaluable for rationality if it is the products of acts its members fully control. It also argues that such an act is collectively rational if the acts of the group's members are rational. Efficiency is a goal of collective rationality, but not a requirement, except in cases where conditions are ideal for joint action and agents have rationally prepared for joint action. The people engaged in a game of strategy form a group, and the combination of their acts yields a collective act. If their collective act is rational, it constitutes a solution to their game. A theory of collective rationality yields principles concerning solutions to games. One principle requires that a solution constitute an equilibrium among the incentives of the agents in the game. In a cooperative game some agents are coalitions of individuals, and it may be impossible for all agents to pursue all incentives. Because rationality is attainable, the appropriate equilibrium standard for cooperative games requires that agents pursue only incentives that provide sufficient reasons to act. The book's theory of collective rationality supports an attainable equilibrium-standard for solutions to cooperative games and shows that its realization follows from individuals' rational acts. By extending the theory of rationality to groups, this book reveals the characteristics that make an act evaluable for rationality and the way rationality's evaluation of an act responds to the type of control its agent exercises over the act. The book's theory of collective rationality contributes to philosophical projects such as contractarian ethics and to practical projects such as the design of social institutions.

Inverse limits with set-valued functions are quickly becoming a popular topic of research due to their potential applications in dynamical systems and economics. This brief provides a concise introduction dedicated specifically to such inverse limits. The theory is presented along with detailed examples which form the distinguishing feature of this work. The major differences between the theory of inverse limits with mappings and the theory with set-valued functions are featured prominently in this book in a positive light. The reader is assumed to have taken a senior level course in analysis and a basic course in topology. Advanced undergraduate and graduate students, and researchers working in this area will find this brief useful.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2012, held in Barcelona, Spain, in October 2012. The 22 revised full papers presented together with 2 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 65 submissions. The papers present original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory and address various current topics such as solution concepts in game theory; efficiency of equilibria and price of anarchy; complexity classes in game theory; computational aspects of equilibria; computational aspects of fixed-point theorems; repeated games; evolution and learning in games; convergence of dynamics; coalitions, coordination and collective action; reputation, recommendation and trust systems; graph-theoretic aspects of social networks; network games; cost-sharing algorithms and analysis; computing with incentives; algorithmic mechanism design; computational social choice; decision theory, and pricing; auction algorithms and analysis; economic aspects of distributed computing; internet economics and computational advertising.

Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book s primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity.

In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including the threats of terrorism and war). A comprehensive treatment of such problems must consider two aspects: (1) the structure of the system to be protected; and (2) the adaptive nature of the threat). The book provides a set of tools for applying game theory TO reliability problems in the presence of intentional, intelligent threats. These tools will help to address problems of global security and also facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.

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This volume contains twelve of my game-theoretical papers, published in the period of 1956-80. It complements my Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation, Reidel, 1976, and my Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations, Cambridge University Press, 1977. These twelve papers deal with a wide range of game-theoretical problems. But there is a common intellectual thread going though all of them: they are all parts of an attempt to generalize and combine various game-theoretical solution concepts into a unified solution theory yielding one-point solutions for both cooperative and noncooperative games, and covering even such 'non-classical' games as games with incomplete information. SECTION A The first three papers deal with bargaining models. The first one discusses Nash's two-person bargaining solution and shows its equivalence with Zeuthen's bargaining theory. The second considers the rationality postulates underlying the Nash-Zeuthen theory and defends it against Schelling's objections. The third extends the Shapley value to games without transferable utility and proposes a solution concept that is at the same time a generaliza tion of the Shapley value and of the Nash bargaining solution."

Climate change is one of the major environmental concern of many countries in the world. Negotiations to control potential climate changes have been taking place, from Rio to Kyoto, for the last five years. There is a widespread consciousness that the risk of incurring in relevant economic and environmental losses due to climate change is high. Scientific analyses have become more and more precise on the likely impacts of climate change. According to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, current trends in greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions may indeed cause the average global temperature to increase by 1-3. 5 DegreesC over the next 100 years. As a result, sea levels are expected to rise by 15 to 95 em and climate zones to shift towards the poles by 150 to 550 km in mid latitudes. In order to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change, the IPCC report concludes that a stabilization of atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide - one of the major GHGs - at 550 parts per million by volume (ppmv) is recommended. This would imply a reduction of global emissions of about 50 per cent with respect to current levels. In this context, countries are negotiating to achieve a world-wide agreement on GHGs emissions control in order to stabilize climate changes. Despite the agreement on targets achieved in Kyoto, many issues still remain unresolved.

The use of the internet for commerce has spawned a variety of auctions, marketplaces, and exchanges for trading everything from bandwidth to books. Mechanisms for bidding agents, dynamic pricing, and combinatorial bids are being implemented in support of internet-based auctions, giving rise to new versions of optimization and resource allocation models. This volume, a collection of papers from an IMA "Hot Topics" workshop in internet auctions, includes descriptions of real and proposed auctions, complete with mathematical model formulations, theoretical results, solution approaches, and computational studies.
This volume also provides a mathematical programming perspective on open questions in auction theory, and provides a glimpse of the growing area of dynamic pricing.

Non-Additive Measure and Integral is the first systematic approach to the subject. Much of the additive theory (convergence theorems, Lebesgue spaces, representation theorems) is generalized, at least for submodular measures which are characterized by having a subadditive integral. The theory is of interest for applications to economic decision theory (decisions under risk and uncertainty), to statistics (including belief functions, fuzzy measures) to cooperative game theory, artificial intelligence, insurance, etc. Non-Additive Measure and Integral collects the results of scattered and often isolated approaches to non-additive measures and their integrals which originate in pure mathematics, potential theory, statistics, game theory, economic decision theory and other fields of application. It unifies, simplifies and generalizes known results and supplements the theory with new results, thus providing a sound basis for applications and further research in this growing field of increasing interest. It also contains fundamental results of sigma-additive and finitely additive measure and integration theory and sheds new light on additive theory. Non-Additive Measure and Integral employs distribution functions and quantile functions as basis tools, thus remaining close to the familiar language of probability theory. In addition to serving as an important reference, the book can be used as a mathematics textbook for graduate courses or seminars, containing many exercises to support or supplement the text.

The theory of social choice deals with both the processes and results of col lective decision making. In this book, we explore some issues in the theory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals' interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in stitutions? These questions are not new. Philosophers, social scientists have indeed pondered upon them for years. And, in fact, the organizational struc tures of many social institutions -courts, parliaments, committees and reg ulatory boards -often lack a sound theoretical base. This is not surprising, as it is, indeed, difficult to provide for a comprehensive formalization of the activities of such organizations. Nevertheless, there has been a definite trend towards providing clear and unambiguous rules for collective decision mak ing. These very rules constitute the body of social choice theory and its main object. The basic problem of social choice We explain here more precisely what a problem of social choice is, what approaches might be used to tackle it, and what kind of solutions it leads to. We introduce a few basic notions in preliminarily fashion and, in doing so, we stress both motivations and explanations."

In recent years there is a growing interest in generalized convex fu- tions and generalized monotone mappings among the researchers of - plied mathematics and other sciences. This is due to the fact that mathematical models with these functions are more suitable to describe problems of the real world than models using conventional convex and monotone functions. Generalized convexity and monotonicity are now considered as an independent branch of applied mathematics with a wide range of applications in mechanics, economics, engineering, finance and many others. The present volume contains 20 full length papers which reflect c- rent theoretical studies of generalized convexity and monotonicity, and numerous applications in optimization, variational inequalities, equil- rium problems etc. All these papers were refereed and carefully selected from invited talks and contributed talks that were presented at the 7th International Symposium on Generalized Convexity/Monotonicity held in Hanoi, Vietnam, August 27-31, 2002. This series of Symposia is or- nized by the Working Group on Generalized Convexity (WGGC) every 3 years and aims to promote and disseminate research on the field. The WGGC (http: //www.genconv.org) consists of more than 300 researchers coming from 36 countries

This text examines new research at the interface of operations research, behavioral and cognitive sciences, and decision analysis. From the cognitive behaviorist who collects empirical evidence as to how people make decisions to the engineer and economist who are the consumers of such understanding, the reader encounters the familiar Traveling Salesman Problem and Prisoner's dilemma, how agricultural decisions are made in Argentina's Pampas region, and some social goals that come into play as an element of rational decision-making.

In these 14 self-contained chapters, broad topics covered include the integration of decision analysis and behavioral models, innovations in behavioral models, exploring descriptive behavior models, and experimental studies.

OndrejMajer, Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen, andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as pretty disparate logical 'systems', or else merely an assortment of formal and mathematical 'approaches' to phi- sophical inquiry. This development has largely been fueled by an increasing dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a straightforward outcome of 'logical pluralism' or 'methodological diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete objects of formal study.

This volume contains a selection consisting of the best papers presented at the FUR XII conference, held at LUISS in Roma, Italy, in June 2006, organized by John Hey and Daniela Di Cagno. The objectives of the FUR (Foundations of Utility and Risk theory) conferences have always been to bring together leading academics from Economics, Psychology, Statistics, Operations Research, Finance, Applied Mat- matics, and other disciplines, to address the issues of decision-making from a g- uinely multi-disciplinary point of view. This twelfth conference in the series was no exception. The early FUR conferences - like FUR I (organized by Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen) and FUR III (organized by Bertrand Munier) - initiated the move away from the excessively rigid and descriptively-inadequate modelling of beh- iour under risk and uncertainty that was in vogue in conventional economics at that time. More than twenty years later, things have changed fundamentally, and now - novations arising from the FUR conferences, and manifesting themselves in the new behavioural economics, are readily accepted by the profession. Working with new models of ambiguity, and bounded rationality, for example, behavioural decision making is no longer considered a sign of mere non-standard intellectual diversi?- tion. FUR XII was organised with this new spirit. In the sense that the behavioural concerns initiated by the ?rst FUR conferences are now part of conventional e- nomics, and the design and organisation of FUR XII re?ects this integration, FUR XII represents a key turning point in the FUR conference series.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.

This work systematically investigates a large number of oscillatory network configurations that are able to describe many real systems such as electric power grids, lasers or even the heart muscle, to name but a few. The book is conceived as an introduction to the field for graduate students in physics and applied mathematics as well as being a compendium for researchers from any field of application interested in quantitative models.

Reprinted by popular demand, this monograph presents a comprehensive study of positive operators between Riesz spaces and Banach lattices. Since publication of this book in 1985, the subject of positive operators and Riesz spaces has found practical applications in disciplines including social sciences and engineering. This book examines positive operators in the setting of Riesz spaces and Banach lattices, from both the algebraic and topological points of view.

The book compiles research on Condorcet's Paradox over some two centuries. It begins with a historical overview of the discovery of Condorcet's Paradox in the 18th Century, reviews numerous studies conducted to find actual occurrences of the paradox, and compiles research that has been done to develop mathematical representations for the probability that the paradox will be observed. Combines all approaches that have been used to study this very interesting phenomenon.