Used to explain complicated economic behavior for decades, game theory is quickly becoming a tool of choice for those serious about optimizing next generation wireless systems. Illustrating how game theory can effectively address a wide range of issues that until now remained unresolved, Game Theory for Wireless Communications and Networking provides a systematic introduction to the application of this powerful and dynamic tool. This comprehensive technical guide explains game theory basics, architectures, protocols, security, models, open research issues, and cutting-edge advances and applications. It describes how to employ game theory in infrastructure-based wireless networks and multihop networks to reduce power consumption-while improving system capacity, decreasing packet loss, and enhancing network resilience. Providing for complete cross-referencing, the text is organized into four parts: Fundamentals-introduces the fundamental issues and solutions in applying different games in different wireless domains, including wireless sensor networks, vehicular networks, and OFDM-based wireless systems Power Control Games-considers issues and solutions in power control games Economic Approaches-reviews applications of different economic approaches, including bargaining and auction-based approaches Resource Management-explores how to use the game theoretic approach to address radio resource management issues The book explains how to apply the game theoretic model to address specific issues, including resource allocation, congestion control, attacks, routing, energy management, packet forwarding, and MAC. Facilitating quick and easy reference to related optimization and algorithm methodologies, it supplies you with the background and tools required to use game theory to drive the improvement and development

In recent years there has been a substantial global increase in interest in the study of gambling. To some extent this has mirrored seismic changes in the way that betting and gaming markets worldwide are taxed and regulated. This has heightened interest in a wide range of issues related to this sector including its regulation, public policy and commercial strategy as well as the ideal structure of gambling taxes and devising optimal responses to environmental changes, such as the growth of online gambling. This volume, by bringing together the work of leading scholars, will cover the spectrum of such perspectives, as well as examining the efficiency of betting markets, to provide an assessment of developments and current understanding in the study of the economics of gambling. This timely collection will be an immensely valuable resource for academics, policy-makers, those commercially involved in the betting and gaming sectors as well as the interested layman.

The ancient game of Go is one of the less obvious candidates for mathematical analysis. With the development of new concepts in combinatorial game theory, the authors have been able to analyze Go games and find solutions to real endgame problems that have stumped professional Go players. Go players with an interest in mathematics and mathematicians who work in game theory will not want to miss this book because it describes substantial connections between the two subjects that have been, until now, largely unrecognized.

Today it appears that we understand more about the universe than about our interconnected socio-economic world. In order to uncover organizational structures and novel features in these systems, we present the first comprehensive complex systems analysis of real-world ownership networks. This effort lies at the interface between the realms of economics and the emerging field loosely referred to as complexity science. The structure of global economic power is reflected in the network of ownership ties of companies and the analysis of such ownership networks has possible implications for market competition and financial stability. Thus this work presents powerful new tools for the study of economic and corporate networks that are only just beginning to attract the attention of scholars.

This book discusses mathematical models for various applications in economics, with a focus on non-linear dynamics. Based on the author's over 50 years of active work in the field, the book has been inspired by models from the period between 1920 and 1950. Following a brief introduction to economics for mathematicians and other modelers, it assembles a repository of useful specific functions for global dynamic modeling. Furthermore, twelve "research stubs" - outlined research agendas that have not yet been fully worked on - are suggested for further study and could even be expanded to entire research projects. The book is a valuable resource, particularly for young scientists who are skilled in mathematical and computational techniques and are looking for applications in economics.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.

This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.

This book provides readers with a comprehensive survey of models of dynamic games in economics, including an extensive coverage of numerous fields of applications. It will also discuss and explain main concepts and techniques used in dynamic games, and inform readers of its major developments while equipping them with tools and ideas that will aid in the formulation of solutions for problems. A Survey of Dynamic Games in Economics will interest those who wish to study more about the conceptions, approaches and models that are applied in the domain of dynamic games.

This book serves as an introduction to game theory for students with no prior game theory knowledge, or with limited background in economics and mathematics. It is specifically designed to provide an intuitive and accessible interdisciplinary approach to game theory, while simultaneously exploring cooperative games, repeated play, correlated equilibrium, and a range of applications.

Why do some games seem to be universal while others have a particular connection to the culture of the people playing them? Around the World in 80 Games is about the mathematics of chance, game theory, gamification, gaming strategies and computer games. Traversing the globe, Marcus du Sautoy looks at the genesis of games new and old, explores how to invent a good game and explains the fascination of a popular lockdown game. The most simple games endure: board games, card games and dice games have captivated us for centuries and the acclaimed mathematician and author of The Creativity Code (among many others) will once again bring mathematics to the fore with insight and aplomb in Around the World in 80 Games.

Steadily growing applications of game theory in modern science (including psychology, biology and economics) require sources to provide rapid access in both classical tools and recent developments to readers with diverse backgrounds. This book on game theory, its applications and mathematical methods, is written with this objective in mind.The book gives a concise but wide-ranging introduction to games including older (pre-game theory) party games and more recent topics like elections and evolutionary games and is generously spiced with excursions into philosophy, history, literature and politics. A distinguished feature is the clear separation of the text into two parts: elementary and advanced, which makes the book ideal for study at various levels.Part I displays basic ideas using no more than four arithmetic operations and requiring from the reader only some inclination to logical thinking. It can be used in a university degree course without any (or minimal) prerequisite in mathematics (say, in economics, business, systems biology), as well as for self-study by school teachers, social and natural scientists, businessmen or laymen.Part II is a rapid introduction to the mathematical methods of game theory, suitable for a mathematics degree course of various levels. It includes an advanced material not yet reflected in standard textbooks, providing links with the exciting modern developments in financial mathematics (rainbow option pricing), tropical mathematics, statistical physics (interacting particles) and discusses structural stability, multi-criteria differential games and turnpikes.To stimulate the mathematical and scientific imagination, graphics by a world-renowned mathematician and mathematics imaging artist, A T Fomenko, are used. The carefully selected works of this artist fit remarkably into the many ideas expressed in the book.

To make the best decisions, you need the best information. However, because most issues in game theory are grey, nearly all recent research has been carried out using a simplified method that considers grey systems as white ones. This often results in a forecasting function that is far from satisfactory when applied to many real situations. Grey Game Theory and Its Applications in Economic Decision Making introduces classic game theory into the realm of grey system theory with limited knowledge. The book resolves three theoretical issues:

• A game equilibrium of grey game
• A reasonable explanation for the equilibrium of a grey matrix of static nonmatrix game issues based on incomplete information
• The Centipede Game paradox, which has puzzled theory circles for a long time and greatly enriched and developed the core methods of subgame Nash perfect equilibrium analysis as a result

The book establishes a grey matrix game model based on pure and mixed strategies. The author proposes the concepts of grey saddle points, grey mixed strategy solutions, and their corresponding structures and also puts forward the models and methods of risk measurement and evaluation of optimal grey strategies. He raises and solves the problems of grey matrix games. The book includes definitions of the test rules of information distortion experienced during calculation, the design of tokens based on new interval grey numbers, and new arithmetic laws to manipulate grey numbers. These features combine to provide a practical and efficient tool for forecasting real-life economic problems.

This book presents the best papers from the 1st International Conference on Mathematical Research for Blockchain Economy (MARBLE) 2019, held in Santorini, Greece. While most blockchain conferences and forums are dedicated to business applications, product development or Initial Coin Offering (ICO) launches, this conference focused on the mathematics behind blockchain to bridge the gap between practice and theory. Every year, thousands of blockchain projects are launched and circulated in the market, and there is a tremendous wealth of blockchain applications, from finance to healthcare, education, media, logistics and more. However, due to theoretical and technical barriers, most of these applications are impractical for use in a real-world business context. The papers in this book reveal the challenges and limitations, such as scalability, latency, privacy and security, and showcase solutions and developments to overcome them.

Game theory is the study of strategic behavior in situations in which the decision makers are aware of the interdependence of their actions. This innovative textbook introduces students to the most basic principles of game theory - move and countermove - with an emphasis on real-world business and economic applications. Students with a background in principles of economics and business mathematics can readily understand most of the material.Demonstration problems in each chapter are designed to enhance the student's understanding of the concepts presented in the text. Many chapters include non-technical applications designed to further the student's intuitive understanding of strategic behavior. Case studies help underscore the usefulness of game theory for analyzing real-world situations. Each chapter concludes with a review and questions and exercises. An online Instructor's Manual with test bank is available to professors who adopt the text.

Features Provides a uniquely historical perspective on the mathematical underpinnings of a comprehensive list of games Suitable for a broad audience of differing mathematical levels. Anyone with a passion for games, game theory, and mathematics will enjoy this book, whether they be students, academics, or game enthusiasts Covers a wide selection of topics at a level that can be appreciated on a historical, recreational, and mathematical level.

The Distinguished Dissertation series is published on behalf of the Conference of Professors and Heads of Computing and The British Computer Society, who annually select the best British PhD dissertations in computer science for publication. The dissertations are selected on behalf of the CPHC by a panel of eight academics. Each dissertation chosen makes a noteworthy contribution to the subject and reaches a high standard of exposition, placing all results clearly in the context of computer science as a whole. In this way computer scientists with significantly different interests are able to grasp the essentials - or even find a means of entry - to an unfamiliar research topic. This book develops a theory of game semantics, a recently discovered setting for modelling and reasoning about sequential programming languages, suitable for interpreting higher-order functional languages with rich type structure, and applies it to constr uct a fully abstract model of the metalanguage FPC.

This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.

Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is "the theory of the core of the market," and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.

Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.

"Lester G. Telser" is professor emeritus of economics at the University of Chicago. He is one of the world's leading mathematical economists; he has been a Visiting Research Fellow, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University; Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow; and assistant professor of economics, Iowa State University. In 2005 he received the St. Clair Drake award from Roosevelt University.

Hex Strategy is the first book to offer a comprehensive look at the game of Hex, from its history and mathematical underpinnings to discussions of advanced playing techniques. This is first and foremost a book on strategy aimed at providing sufficient knowledge to play the game at any level desired. Numerous examples illustrate an algorithmic approach to the game. Hex Strategy is a book for board game enthusiasts, recreational mathematicians and programmers, or simply those who enjoy games and puzzles.

This book discusses imaginary future generations and how current decision-making will influence those future generations. Markets and democracies focus on the present and therefore tend to make us forget that we are living in the present, with ancestors preceding and descendants succeeding us. Markets are excellent devices to equate supply and demand in the short term, but not for allocating resources between current and future generations, since future generations do not exist yet. Democracy is also not "applicable" for future generations, since citizens vote for candidates who will serve members of their, i.e., the current, generation. In order to overcome these shortcomings, the authors discusses imaginary future generations and future ministries in the context of current decision-making in fields such as the environment, urban management, forestry, water management, and finance. The idea of imaginary future generations comes from the Native American Iroquois, who had strong norms that compelled them to incorporate the interests of people seven generations ahead when making decisions.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 4, the authors present a Diamond of a find, covering one-player games such as Solitaire.

Contents:
1. Overview 1.1 Introduction 1.1.1 Why Study Game Theory? 1.1.2 What is Game Theory? 1.1.3 Why this Book? 1.1.4 Why a Second Edition? 1.2 The Assumptions of Game Theory 1.2.1 Individual Action is Instrumentally Rational 1.2.2 Common Knowledge of Rationality 1.2.3 Common Priors 1.2.4 Action Within the Rules of the Game 1.3 Liberal Individualism, The State and Game Theory 1.3.1 Methodological Individualism 1.3.2 Game Theory's Contribution to Liberal Individualism 1.4 A Guide to the Rest of the Book 1.4.1 Three Classic Games: Hawk-Dove, Co-ordination and the Prisoner's Dilemma 1.4.2 Chapter-by-Chapter Guide 1.5 Conclusion 2. The Elements of Game Theory 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Representation of Strategies, Games and Information Sets 2.2.1 Pure and Mixed Strategies 2.2.2 The Normal Form, the Extensive Form and the Information Set 2.3 Dominance Reasoning 2.3.1 Strict and Weak Dominance 2.3.2 Degrees of Common Knowledge of Instrumental Rationality 2.4 Rationalisable Beliefs and Actions 2.4.1 The Successive Elimination of Strategically Inferior Moves 2.4.2 Rationalisable Strategies and their Connection with Nash's Equilibrium 2.5 Nash Equilibrium 2.5.1 John Nash's Beautiful Idea 2.5.2 Consistently Aligned Beliefs, the Hidden Principle of Rational Determinacy and the Harsanyi-Aumann Doctrine 2.5.3 Some Objections to Nash: Part I 2.6 Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies 2.6.1 The Scope and Derivation of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies 2.6.2 The Reliance of NEMS on CAB and the Harsanyi Doctrine 2.6.3 Aumann's Defence of CAB and NEMS 2.7 Conclusion 3. Battling Indeterminacy - Refinements of Nash's Equilibrium in Static and Dynamic Games 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Stability of Nash Equilibria 3.2.1 Trembling Hand Perfect Nash Equilibria 3.2.2 Harsanyi's Bayesian Nash Equilibria and his Defence of NEMS 3.3 Dynamic Games 3.3.1 Extensive Form and Backward Induction 3.3.2 Subgame Perfection, Nash and CKR 3.3.3 Sequential Equilibria 3.3.4 Bayesian Learning, Sequential Equilibrium and the Importance of Reputation 3.3.5 Signalling Equilibria 3.4 Further Refinements 3.4.2 Forward Induction 3.5 Some Logical Objections to Nash, Part III 3.5.1 A Critique of Subgame Perfection 3.5.2 A Negative Rejoinder (based on the Harsanyi-Aumann Doctrine) 3.5.3 A Positive Rejoinder (based on Sequential Equilibrium) 3.5.4 Conclusion: Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs, Patterned Trembles and Consistency 3.6 Conclusion 3.6.1 The Status of Nash and Nash Refinements 3.6.2 In Defence of Nash 3.6.3 Why has Game Theory been Attracted 'so Uncritically' to Nash? 4. Bargaining Games- Rational Agreements, Bargaining Power and the Social Contract 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Credible and Incredible Talk in Simple Bargaining Games 4.3 John Nash's Generic Bargaining Problem and his Solution 4.3.1 The Bargaining Problem 4.3.2 Nash's Solution as an Equilibrium of Fear 4.3.3 Nash's Solution - An Example 4.3.4 Nash's Axiomatic Account 4.3.5 Do the Axioms Apply? 4.3.6 Nash's Solution - a Summary 4.4 Ariel Rubinstein and the Bargaining Process: The Return of Nash Backward Induction 4.4.1 Rubinstein's Solution to the Bargaining Problem 4.4.2 A Proof of Rubinstein's Theorem 4.4.3 The (Trembling Hand) Defence of Rubinstein's Solution 4.4.4 A Final Word on Nash, Trembling Hands and Rubinstein's Bargaining Solution 4.5 Justice in Political and Moral Philosophy 4.5.1 The Negative Result and the Opening to Rawls and Nozick 4.5.2 Procedures and Outcomes (or 'Means' and Ends) and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory 4.6 Conclusion 5. The Prisoner's Dilemma - The Riddle of Co-operation and its Implications for Collective Agency 5.1 Introduction: The State and the Game that Popularised Game Theory 5.2 Examples of Hidden Prisoner's Dilemmas and Free Riders in Social Life 5.3 Some Evidence on How People Play the Game 5.4 Explaining Co-operation 5.4.1 Kant and Morality: Is it Rational to Defect? 5.4.2 Altruism 5.4.3 Inequality Aversion 5.4.4 Choosing a Co-operative Dsposition Instrumentally 5.5 Conditional Co-operation in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas 5.5.1 Tit-for-Tat in Axelrod's Tournaments 5.5.2 Tit-for-Tat as a Nash Equilibrium Strategy When the Horizon is Unknown 5.5.3 Spontaneous Public Good Provision 5.5.4 The Folk Theorem, Indeterminacy and the State 5.5.5 Does a Finite Horizon Wreck Co-operation? The Theory and the Evidence 5.6 Conclusion: Co-operation and the State in Liberal Theory 5.6.1 Rational Co-operation? 5.6.2 Liberalism and the prisoners' dilemma 5.6.3 The limits of the prisoners' dilemma 6. Evolutionary Games - Evolution, Games and Social Theory 6.1 Game Theory's Encounter with Evolutionary Biology 6.1.1 The Origins of Evolutionary Game Theory 6.1.2 Evolutionary stability and equilibrium: An introduction 6.1.3 Spontaneous Order Versus Political Rationalism 6.2 Symmetrical Evolution in Homogenous Populations 6.2.1 Static Games 6.2.1 Dynamic Games 6.3 Evolution in Heterogeneous Populations 6.3.1 Asymmetrical (or two-dimensional) Evolution and the Demise of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies (NEMS) 6.3.2 Does Evolutionary Game Theory Apply to Humans as well as it does to Birds, Ants, etc.? An Experiment with 2-Dimensional Evolution in the Hawk-Dove Game 6.3.3 Multi-Dimensional Evolution and the Conflict of Conventions 6.3.4 The Origin of Conventions and the Challenge to MethodologicalIndividualism 6.3.5 The Politics of Mutations: Conventions, Inequality and Revolt 6.3.6 Discriminatory Conventions: A Brief Synopsis 6.4 Social Evolution: Power, Morality and History 6.4.1 Social Versus Natural Selection 6.4.2 Conventions as Covert Social Power 6.4.3 The Evolution of Predictions into Moral Beliefs: Hume on Morality 6.4.4 Gender, Class and Functionalism 6.4.5 The Evolution of Predictions into Ideology: Marx against Morality 6.5 Conclusion 7. Psychological Games - Demolishing the Divide between Motives and Beliefs 7.1 Introduction 7.2 Different Kinds of 'Other Regarding' Motives 7.2.1 The 'Other'-Regarding Motives of Homo Economicus 7.2.2 Beliefs as Predictions and as Motives 7.3 The Motivating Power of Normative Beliefs 7.3.1 Fairness Equilibria 7.3.2 Computing Fairness Equilibria 7.3.3 Assessing Rabin 7.3.4 An Alternative Formulation Linking Entitlements to Intentions 7.3.5 Team Thinking 7.4 Psychology and Evolution 7.4.1 On the Origins of Normative Beliefs: An Adaptation to Experience 7.4.2 On the Origins of Normative Beliefs: The Resentment-Aversion Versus the Subversion-Proclivity Hypotheses 7.5 Conclusion: Shared Praxes, Shared Meanings Postscript Solutions to Problems Notes Authors' Index Subject Index References

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 3, the authors examine Games played in Clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games, such as Dots-and-Boxes and Nimstring. From the Table of Contents: - Turn and Turn About - Chips and Strips - Dots-and-Boxes - Spots and Sprouts - The Emperor and His Money - The King and the Consumer - Fox and Geese; Hare and Hounds - Lines and Squares

The rise of game theory has made bargaining one of the core issues in economic theory. Written at a theoretical and conceptual level, this book develops a framework for the analysis of bargaining processes. The framework focuses on the dynamic of the bargaining process, which is in contrast to much previous theoretical work on the subject, and most notably to the approaches stemming from game theory. Chapters include: decision-making and expectations in theories of bargaining; decision-making and expectations in a game theory model; limitations of the environment concept; game theory as a basis for a theory of bargaining; the decision/expectation/adjustment approach; the adjustment process; direct interdependence and the consistency of decisions.

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:
*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203167406

Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory presents a coherent overview of theoretical literature that studies the influence and formation of networks in social and economic situations in which the relations between participants who are not included in a particular participant's network are not of consequence to this participant. The material is organized in two parts. In Part I the authors concentrate on the question how network structures affect economic outcomes. Part II of the book presents the formation of networks by agents who engage in a network-formation process to be able to realize the possible gains from cooperation.