This book analyzes coalitional control schemes by incorporating concepts of cooperative game theory into a distributed control framework. It considers a networked architecture where the nodes are the agents and the edges are their communication links and either the agents or the links are established as the players of cooperative games related to the cost function of the coalitional schemes. The book discusses various cooperative game theory tools that are used to measure/analyze the players' features, impose constraints on them, provide alternative methods of game computation, detect critical players inside the control scheme, and perform system partitioning of large-scale systems, such as the Barcelona drinking water network, which is described in a case study.

Game Theoretical Applications to Economics and Operations Research deals with various aspects of game theory and their applications to Economics and OR related problems. It brings together the contributions of a wide spectrum of disciplines such as Statistics, Mathematics, Mathematical Economics and OR. The contributions include decision theory, stochastic games, cooperative and noncooperative games. The papers in the volume are classified under five different sections. The first four sections are devoted to the theory of two-person games, linear complimentarity problems and game theory, cooperative and noncooperative games. The fifth section contains diverse applications of these various theories. Taken together they exhibit a rich versatility of these theories and lively interaction between the mathematical theory of games and significant economic problems.

This book is focused on the discussion of the traffic assignment problem, the mathematical and practical meaning of variables, functions and basic principles. This work gives information about new approaches, methods and algorithms based on original methodological technique, developed by authors in their publications for the past several years, as well as corresponding prospective implementations. The book may be of interest to a wide range of readers, such as civil engineering students, traffic engineers, developers of traffic assignment algorithms etc. The obtained results here are to be used in both practice and theory. This book is devoted to the traffic assignment problem, formulated in a form of nonlinear optimization program. The most efficient solution algorithms related to the problem are based on its structural features and practical meaning rather than on standard nonlinear optimization techniques or approaches. The authors have carefully considered the meaning of the traffic assignment problem for efficient algorithms development.

The uneven geographical distribution of economic activities is a huge challenge worldwide and also for the European Union. In Krugman's New Economic Geography economic systems have a simple spatial structure. This book shows that more sophisticated models should visualise the EU as an evolving trade network with a specific topology and different aggregation levels. At the highest level, economic geography models give a bird eye's view of spatial dynamics. At a medium level, institutions shape the economy and the structure of (financial and labour) markets. At the lowest level, individual decisions interact with the economic, social and institutional environment; the focus is on firms' decision on location and innovation. Such multilevel models exhibit complex dynamic patterns - path dependence, cumulative causation, hysteresis - on a network structure; and specific analytic tools are necessary for studying strategic interaction, heterogeneity and nonlinearities.

The roles and applications of various modeling approaches, aimed at improving the usefulness of energy policy models in public decision making, are covered by this book. The development, validation, and applications of system dynamics and agent-based models in service of energy policy design and assessment in the 21st century is a key focus. A number of modeling approaches and models for energy policy, with a particular focus on low-carbon economic development of regions and states are covered. Chapters on system dynamics methodology, model-based theory, fuzzy system dynamics frame-work, and optimization modeling approach are presented, along with several chapters on future research opportunities for the energy policy modeling community. The use of model-based analysis and scenarios in energy policy design and assessment has seen phenomenal growth during the past several decades. In recent years, renewed concerns about climate change and energy security have posed unique modeling challenges. By utilizing the validation techniques and procedures which are effectively demonstrated in these contributions, researchers and practitioners in energy systems domain can increase the appeal and acceptance of their policy models.

Durable strategies that have prolonged effects are prevalent in real-world situations. Revenue-generating investments, toxic waste disposal, long-lived goods, regulatory measures, coalition agreements, diffusion of knowledge, advertisement and investments to accumulate physical capital are concrete and common examples of durable strategies. This book provides an augmentation of dynamic game theory and advances a new game paradigm with durable strategies in decision-making schemes. It covers theories, solution techniques, and the applications of a general class of dynamic games with multiple durable strategies. Non-cooperative equilibria and cooperative solutions are derived, along with advanced topics including random termination, asynchronous game horizons, and stochastic analysis. The techniques presented here will enable readers to solve numerous practical dynamic interactive problems with durable strategies. This book not only expands the scope of applied dynamic game theory, but also provides a solid foundation for further theoretical and technical advancements. As such, it will appeal to scholars and students of quantitative economics, game theory, operations research, and computational mathematics. "Not too many new concepts have been introduced in dynamic games since their inception. The introduction of the concept of durable strategies changes this trend and yields important contributions to environmental and business applications." Dusan M Stipanovic, Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign "Before this book, the field simply did not realize that most of our strategies are durable and entail profound effects in the future. Putting them into the mathematical framework of dynamic games is a great innovative effort." Vladimir Turetsky, Professor, Ort Braude College "Durable-strategies Dynamic Games is truly a world-leading addition to the field of dynamic games. It is a much needed publication to tackle increasingly crucial problems under the reality of durable strategies." Vladimir Mazalov, Director of Mathematical Research, Russian Academy of Sciences & President of the International Society of Dynamic Games

Social Networks and Trust discusses two possible explanations for the emergence of trust via social networks. If network members can sanction untrustworthiness of actors, these actors may refrain from acting in an untrustworthy manner. Moreover, if actors are informed regularly about trustworthy behavior of others, trust will grow among these actors.
A unique combination of formal model building and empirical methodology is used to derive and test hypotheses about the effects of networks on trust. The models combine elements from game theory, which is mainly used in economics, and social network analysis, which is mainly used in sociology.
The hypotheses are tested (1) by analyzing contracts in information technology transactions from a survey on small and medium-sized enterprises and (2) by studying judgments of subjects in a vignette experiment related to hypothetical transactions with a used-car dealer.

The theory of dynamic games is very rich in nature and very much alive If the reader does not already agree with this statement, I hope he/she will surely do so after having consulted the contents of the current volume. The activities which fall under the heading of 'dynamic games' cannot easily be put into one scientific discipline. On the theoretical side one deals with differential games, difference games (the underlying models are described by differential, respec tively difference equations) and games based on Markov chains, with determin istic and stochastic games, zero-sum and nonzero-sum games, two-player and many-player games - all under various forms of equilibria. On the practical side, one sees applications to economics (stimulated by the recent Nobel prize for economics which went to three prominent scientists in game theory), biology, management science, and engineering. The contents of this volume are primarily based on selected presentations made at the Sixth International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applica tions, held in St Jovite, Quebec, Canada, 13-15 July 1994. Every paper that appears in this volume has passed through a stringent reviewing process, as is the case with publications for archival technical journals. This conference, as well as its predecessor which was held in Grimentz, 1992, took place under the auspices of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG), established in 1990. One of the activities of the ISDG is the publication of these Annals. The contributions in this volume have been grouped around five themes."

This book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accounting. The main focus traditionally has been on the field of non-cooperative behaviour, but the area of cooperative game theory has developed rapidly and has received increasing attention. Intensive research, in combination with the changing culture of publishing, has produced a nearly unmanageable number of publications in the areas concerned. Therefore, one main purpose of this volume is providing an intensive analysis of the intersection of these areas. In addition, the book strengthens the relationship between the theory and the practical applications and it illustrates the two-sided relationship between game theory and management accounting: new game theoretic models offer new fields of applications and these applications raise new questions for the theory.

An innovative feature of this book is its econocentric structure, focusing on digital designs. From the outset, econocentrism is assumed to be a core engine of capitalism, like money. The new coronavirus pandemic has changed lifestyles worldwide, which are unlikely ever to return in their original form. This great transformation will change the nature of the socio-economic system itself and will be centered on digital designs. At present, money already is beginning to undergo a major revolution in that sense. Many books dealing with digital designs and innovations have been published, but few if any of them focus on monetary and analytical methods in the way that this present volume does.The book then contains 6 parts: Evolution of money and thinking complexities in the AI era; Goods market and the future of labor market; Computational social approaches to social dilemmas, smart city, cryptocurrencies; Artificial market experiments; The randomness and high frequencies in financial data; Other trading strategy issues and the effects of AI usage. These issues may be indispensable subjects in our age. Study these subject, and have a step forward to the future society!

Does game theory ? the mathematical theory of strategic interaction ? provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory ? the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory ? is a bold attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to investigate the applicability of game theory in such fields as economics, philosophy and strategic consultancy. De Bruin proves new mathematical theorems about the beliefs, desires and rationality principles of individual human beings, and he explores in detail the logical form of game theory as it is used in explanatory and normative contexts. He argues that game theory reduces to rational choice theory if used as an explanatory device, and that game theory is nonsensical if used as a normative device. A provocative account of the history of game theory reveals that this is not bad news for all of game theory, though. Two central research programmes in game theory tried to find the ultimate characterisation of strategic interaction between rational agents. Yet, while the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme has done badly thanks to such research habits as overmathematisation, model-tinkering and introversion, the Epistemic Programme, De Bruin argues, has been rather successful in achieving this aim.

There has been an increase in attention toward systems involving large numbers of small players, giving rise to the theory of mean field games, mean field type control and nonlinear Markov games. Exhibiting various real world problems involving major and minor agents, this book presents a systematic continuous-space approximation approach for mean-field interacting agents models and mean-field games models. After describing Markov-chain methodology and a modeling of mean-field interacting systems, the text presents various structural conditions on the chain to yield respective socio-economic models, focusing on migration models via binary interactions. The specific applications are wide-ranging - including inspection and corruption, cyber-security, counterterrorism, coalition building and network growth, minority games, and investment policies and optimal allocation - making this book relevant to a wide audience of applied mathematicians interested in operations research, computer science, national security, economics, and finance.

It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.

Steps forward in mathematics often reverberate in other scientific disciplines, and give rise to innovative conceptual developments or find surprising technological applications. This volume brings to the forefront some of the proponents of the mathematics of the twentieth century, who have put at our disposal new and powerful instruments for investigating the reality around us. The portraits present people who have impressive charisma and wide-ranging cultural interests, who are passionate about defending the importance of their own research, are sensitive to beauty, and attentive to the social and political problems of their times. What we have sought to document is mathematics' central position in the culture of our day. Space has been made not only for the great mathematicians but also for literary texts, including contributions by two apparent interlopers, Robert Musil and Raymond Queneau, for whom mathematical concepts represented a valuable tool for resolving the struggle between 'soul and precision.'

The solitaire game "The Tower of Hanoi" was invented in the 19th century by the French number theorist Edouard Lucas. The book presents its mathematical theory and offers a survey of the historical development from predecessors up to recent research. In addition to long-standing myths, it provides a detailed overview of the essential mathematical facts with complete proofs, and also includes unpublished material, e.g., on some captivating integer sequences. The main objects of research today are the so-called Hanoi graphs and the related Sierpinski graphs. Acknowledging the great popularity of the topic in computer science, algorithms, together with their correctness proofs, form an essential part of the book. In view of the most important practical applications, namely in physics, network theory and cognitive (neuro)psychology, the book also addresses other structures related to the Tower of Hanoi and its variants. The updated second edition includes, for the first time in English, the breakthrough reached with the solution of the "The Reve's Puzzle" in 2014. This is a special case of the famed Frame-Stewart conjecture which is still open after more than 75 years. Enriched with elaborate illustrations, connections to other puzzles and challenges for the reader in the form of (solved) exercises as well as problems for further exploration, this book is enjoyable reading for students, educators, game enthusiasts and researchers alike. Excerpts from reviews of the first edition: "The book is an unusual, but very welcome, form of mathematical writing: recreational mathematics taken seriously and serious mathematics treated historically. I don't hesitate to recommend this book to students, professional research mathematicians, teachers, and to readers of popular mathematics who enjoy more technical expository detail." Chris Sangwin, The Mathematical Intelligencer 37(4) (2015) 87f. "The book demonstrates that the Tower of Hanoi has a very rich mathematical structure, and as soon as we tweak the parameters we surprisingly quickly find ourselves in the realm of open problems." Laszlo Kozma, ACM SIGACT News 45(3) (2014) 34ff. "Each time I open the book I discover a renewed interest in the Tower of Hanoi. I am sure that this will be the case for all readers." Jean-Paul Allouche, Newsletter of the European Mathematical Society 93 (2014) 56.

This classic on games and how to play them intelligently is being re-issued in a new, four volume edition. This book has laid the foundation to a mathematical approach to playing games. The wise authors wield witty words, which wangle wonderfully winning ways. In Volume 1, the authors do the Spade Work, presenting theories and techniques to "dissect" games of varied structures and formats in order to develop winning strategies.

The contributions included in the volume are drawn from presentations at ODS2019 - International Conference on Optimization and Decision Science, which was the 49th annual meeting of the Italian Operations Research Society (AIRO) held at Genoa, Italy, on 4-7 September 2019. This book presents very recent results in the field of Optimization and Decision Science. While the book is addressed primarily to the Operations Research (OR) community, the interdisciplinary contents ensure that it will also be of very high interest for scholars and researchers from many scientific disciplines, including computer sciences, economics, mathematics, and engineering. Operations Research is known as the discipline of optimization applied to real-world problems and to complex decision-making fields. The focus is on mathematical and quantitative methods aimed at determining optimal or near-optimal solutions in acceptable computation times. This volume not only presents theoretical results but also covers real industrial applications, making it interesting for practitioners facing decision problems in logistics, manufacturing production, and services. Readers will accordingly find innovative ideas from both a methodological and an applied perspective.

Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed.Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.

In contrast to mainstream economics, complexity theory conceives the economy as a complex system of heterogeneous interacting agents characterised by limited information and bounded rationality. Agent Based Models (ABMs) are the analytical and computational tools developed by the proponents of this emerging methodology. Aimed at students and scholars of contemporary economics, this book includes a comprehensive toolkit for agent-based computational economics, now quickly becoming the new way to study evolving economic systems. Leading scholars in the field explain how ABMs can be applied fruitfully to many real-world economic examples and represent a great advancement over mainstream approaches. The essays discuss the methodological bases of agent-based approaches and demonstrate step-by-step how to build, simulate and analyse ABMs and how to validate their outputs empirically using the data. They also present a wide set of applications of these models to key economic topics, including the business cycle, labour markets, and economic growth.

Oligopoly theory is one of the most intensively studied areas of mathematical economics. On the basis of the pioneering works of Cournot (1838), many res- rchers have developed and extensively examined the different variants of oligopoly models. Initially, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the different types of oligopolies was the main concern, and later the dynamic extensions of these models became the focus. The classical result of Theocharis (1960) asserts that under discrete time scales and static expectations, the equilibrium of a sing- product oligopoly without product differentiation and with linear price and cost functions is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a duopoly. In the continuous time case, asymptotic stability is guaranteed for any number of ?rms. In these cases the resulting dynamical systems are also linear, where local and global asymptotic stability are equivalent to each other. The classical book of Okuguchi (1976) gives a comprehensive summary of the earlier results and developments. The multipr- uct extensionshave been discussed in Okuguchiand Szidarovszky(1999);however, nonlinear features were barely touched upon in these contributions. WiththedevelopmentofthecriticalcurvemethodbyGumowskiandMira(1980) (see also Mira et al. (1996))fordiscrete time systemsand the introductionof cont- uously distributed information lags by Invernizzi and Medio (1991) in continuous time systems, increasing attention has been given to the global dynamics of n- linear oligopolies. The authors of this book have devoted a great deal of research effort to this area.

This book introduces an analytic framework constructed upon the iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game to model and analyze transboundary water interactions along the Nile River. It presents a thorough and in-depth analysis of the historical path through which conflict and cooperation have been generated among the Nile riparians over large-scale developmental schemes. This is done through modeling water interactions in the basin as an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game and employing process-tracing method to compare four distinguishable rounds of the game: the colonial round, the Cold War round, the post-Cold War round, and the post-2011 round. The book examines the influences of the changing political contexts at the domestic, regional, and global levels on the game outcomes. This framework is initially applied on several cases of international rivers worldwide, while the rest of the book is devoted to the Nile case. The book's central argument is that the riparians' interests, capabilities, and beliefs are heterogeneous in varying degrees and that the changing multilevel political contexts influence the level of such heterogeneities among the riparians, which ultimately drive the equilibrium dynamics in the Nile game to generate different conflictive and cooperative outcomes over time. Although the book's main conclusion indicates that the absence of economic interdependence and regional integration will transfer the game into tug-of-war, which will impose harsh punishment on the basin communities and ecosystems on the long term, the final chapter lists a group of recommendations addressed to the riparian states and international donors, exploring the way for boosting cooperation and preventing conflicts in the basin. Presenting clear theoretical, methodological, and policy implications, this book is appropriate for students and scholars of international relations, hydrology, and development studies.

Mathematical Puzzle Tales from Mount Olympus uses fascinating tales from Greek Mythology as the background for introducing mathematics puzzles to the general public. A background in high school mathematics will be ample preparation for using this book, and it should appeal to anyone who enjoys puzzles and recreational mathematics. Features: Combines the arts and science, and emphasizes the fact that mathematics straddles both domains. Great resource for students preparing for mathematics competitions, and the trainers of such students.

This book presents an epistemic framework for dealing with information-knowledge and certainty-uncertainty problems within the space of quality-quantity dualities. It bridges between theoretical concepts of entropy and entropy measurements, proposing the concept and measurement of fuzzy-stochastic entropy that is applicable to all areas of knowing under human cognitive limitations over the epistemological space. The book builds on two previous monographs by the same author concerning theories of info-statics and info-dynamics, to deal with identification and transformation problems respectively. The theoretical framework is developed by using the toolboxes such as those of the principle of opposites, systems of actual-potential polarities and negative-positive dualities, under different cost-benefit time-structures. The category theory and the fuzzy paradigm of thought, under methodological constructionism-reductionism duality, are used in the fuzzy-stochastic and cost-benefit spaces to point to directions of global application in knowing, knowledge and decision-choice actions. Thus, the book is concerned with a general theory of entropy, showing how the fuzzy paradigm of thought is developed to deal with the problems of qualitative-quantitative uncertainties over the fuzzy-stochastic space, which will be applicable to conditions of soft-hard data, fact, evidence and knowledge over the spaces of problem-solution dualities, decision-choice actions in sciences, non-sciences, engineering and planning sciences to abstract acceptable information-knowledge elements.

This book proposes novel methods for solving different types of non-cooperative games with interval/fuzzy/intuitionistic fuzzy payoffs. It starts by discussing several existing methods and shows that some mathematically incorrect assumptions have been considered in all these methods. It then proposes solutions to adapt those methods and validate the new proposed methods, such as Gaurika method Ambika-I-IV, Mehar method and others, by using them for solving existing numerical problems. The book offers a comprehensive guide on non-cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs to both students and researchers. It provides them with the all the necessary tools to understand the methods and the theory behind them.