This volume contains the proceedings of the XII Symposium of Probability and Stochastic Processes which took place at Universidad Autonoma de Yucatan in Merida, Mexico, on November 16-20, 2015. This meeting was the twelfth meeting in a series of ongoing biannual meetings aimed at showcasing the research of Mexican probabilists as well as promote new collaborations between the participants. The book features articles drawn from different research areas in probability and stochastic processes, such as: risk theory, limit theorems, stochastic partial differential equations, random trees, stochastic differential games, stochastic control, and coalescence. Two of the main manuscripts survey recent developments on stochastic control and scaling limits of Markov-branching trees, written by Kazutoshi Yamasaki and Benedicte Haas, respectively. The research-oriented manuscripts provide new advances in active research fields in Mexico. The wide selection of topics makes the book accessible to advanced graduate students and researchers in probability and stochastic processes.

This volume presents 38 classic texts in formal epistemology, and strengthens the ties between research into this area of philosophy and its neighbouring intellectual disciplines. The editors provide introductions to five subsections: Bayesian Epistemology, Belief Change, Decision Theory, Interactive Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. 'Formal epistemology' is a term coined in the late 1990s for a new constellation of interests in philosophy, the origins of which are found in earlier works of epistemologists, philosophers of science and logicians. It addresses a growing agenda of problems concerning knowledge, belief, certainty, rationality, deliberation, decision, strategy, action and agent interaction - and it does so using methods from logic, probability, computability, decision and game theory. The volume also includes a thorough index and suggestions for further reading, and thus offers a complete teaching and research package for students as well as research scholars of formal epistemology, philosophy, logic, computer science, theoretical economics and cognitive psychology.

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

The primary purpose in this book is to present an integrated and innovative methodological approach for the construction and selection of equity portfolios. The approach takes into account the inherent multidimensional nature of the problem, while allowing the decision makers to incorporate specified preferences in the decision processes. A fundamental principle of modern portfolio theory is that comparisons between portfolios are generally made using two criteria; the expected return and portfolio variance. According to most of the portfolio models derived from the stochastic dominance approach, the group of portfolios open to comparisons is divided into two parts: the efficient portfolios, and the dominated. This work integrates the two approaches providing a unified model for decision making in portfolio management with multiple criteria.

The purpose of the science of complexity is to provide, if not a unified approach, at least useful tools to tackling complex problems in various scientific domains. Generally, complexity is considered a fundamental challenge to the reductionist approach in science as a whole and to its ideas of certainty and randomness.

The overall behaviour of a complex system is different from and more than the sum of its parts. The behaviour of non-linear complex systems depends on the interaction (often with retroactive effects) among its constituent parts and not so much (or not only) on the characteristics of these parts themselves; the sum of the behaviour of single parts does not necessarily provide us with an explanation of the aggregate behaviour of a system.

All this is true for economic systems. These are based on the activities of single economic agents. Each individual can obtain only partial knowledge that is focussed around its "world" (local information) and react to external shocks in different ways (local rationality).

The aim of this book is to provide an overview to recent developments in theory and empirical research that view economic systems as complex phenomena whose aggregate dynamics can often not be inferred from its microscopic (microeconomic) building blocks. The collection of papers represented in this volume is dedicated to the memory of Massimo Salzano, who has been a fervent and eloquent advocate of the complexity approach.

The contributions have been presented at a conference held to celebrate Massimo's 60th birthday (Ecople -Economics: From Tradition of Complexity, Capri, 2-4 June, 2006), one year before he unexpectedly passed away in 2007.

The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who are seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking effective mathematical tools for their research. A lot of economic problems can be formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories.

Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed.Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.

This book was written mainly during the Spring periods of 2008 and 2009, when the ?rst author was visiting Maastricht University. Financial s- port both from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO (grants 040. 11. 013 and 0. 40. 11. 082) and from the research institute METEOR (Maastricht Univ- sity) is gratefully acknowledged. Jerusalem Bezalel Peleg Maastricht Hans Peters April 2010 v Contents Preview to this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Part I Representations of constitutions 1 Introduction to Part I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 2 Arrow's constitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. 3 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and its implications. . . . . . . . . 4 1. 4 Ga ]rdenfors's model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. 5 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 Constitutions, e?ectivity functions, and game forms . . . . . . 7 2. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. 2 Constitutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. 3 Constitutions and e?ectivity functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2. 4 Game forms and a representation theorem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2. 5 Representation and simultaneous exercising of rights. . . . . . . . 19 2. 6 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 Nash consistent representations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3. 2 Existence of Nash consistent representations: a general result 22 3. 3 The case of ?nitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3. 4 Nash consistent representations of topological e?ectivity functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3. 5 Veto functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 1 Finitely many alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 3. 5. 2 Topological veto functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3. 6 Liberalism and Pareto optimality of Nash equilibria. . . . . . . . . 40 3. 7 Notes and comments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 vii viii Contents 4 Acceptable representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 4. 1 Motivation and summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."

This book describes argumentative tools and strategies that can be used to guide policy decisions under conditions of great uncertainty. Contributing authors explore methods from philosophical analysis and in particular argumentation analysis, showing how it can be used to systematize discussions about policy issues involving great uncertainty. The first part of the work explores how to deal in a systematic way with decision-making when there may be plural perspectives on the decision problem, along with unknown consequences of what we do. Readers will see how argumentation tools can be used for prioritizing among uncertain dangers, for determining how decisions should be framed, for choosing a suitable time frame for a decision, and for systematically choosing among different decision options. Case studies are presented in the second part of the book, showing argumentation in practice in the areas of climate geoengineering, water governance, synthetic biology, nuclear waste, and financial markets. In one example, argumentation analysis is applied to proposals to solve the climate problem with various technological manipulations of the natural climate system, such as massive dispersion of reflective aerosols into the stratosphere. Even after a thorough investigation of such a proposal, doubt remains as to whether all the potential risks have been identified. In such discussions, conventional risk analysis does not have much to contribute since it presupposes that the risks have been identified, whereas the argumentative approach to uncertainty management can be used to systematize discussions.

Selected papers submitted by participants of the international Conference "Stochastic Analysis and Applied Probability 2010" ( www.saap2010.org ) make up the basis of this volume.

The SAAP 2010 was held in Tunisia, from 7-9 October, 2010, and was organized by the "Applied Mathematics & Mathematical Physics" research unit of the preparatory institute to the military academies of Sousse (Tunisia), chaired by Mounir Zili.

The papers cover theoretical, numerical and applied aspects of stochastic processes and stochastic differential equations. The study of such topic is motivated in part by the need to model, understand, forecast and control the behavior of many natural phenomena that evolve in time in a random way. Such phenomena appear in the fields of finance, telecommunications, economics, biology, geology, demography, physics, chemistry, signal processing and modern control theory, to mention just a few.

As this book emphasizes the importance of numerical and theoretical studies of the stochastic differential equations and stochastic processes, it will be useful for a wide spectrum of researchers in applied probability, stochastic numerical and theoretical analysis and statistics, as well as for graduate students.

To make it more complete and accessible for graduate students, practitioners and researchers, the editors Mounir Zili and Daria Filatova have included a survey dedicated to the basic concepts of numerical analysis of the stochastic differential equations, written by Henri Schurz.

This book studies storage policies in warehousing systems and maintenance-support strategies for critical operational systems in warehouses, which are the most important issues affecting operational efficiency of warehousing systems. It expands on the theory of class-based storage by considering a finite number of items in store, and also introduces the maintenance-support strategy founded on performance-based contract theory. It is a valuable resource for researchers, practitioners and engineers in the fields of industrial engineering, operations management, operations research and management science.

Game theory now provides the theoretical underpinning for a multitude of courses in economics worldwide. The speed of these developments has been remarkable and they have constituted something of a revolution. Indeed, the basic tenets of game theory have now begun to colonize other social sciences and its proponents have been unified in claiming its natural basis as a rational theory of society.
But the technical demands of the subject and the lack of clarity of many commentators' explanations have been a problem for many. This second edition of Shaun Hargreaves-Heap and Yanis Varoufakis's classic text strips away the mystique and lets the student make his or her own mind up. This new edition:
* lays bear the philosophy behind game theory and explains all its major concepts
* conducts a clear explanation and careful analysis of all the main 'games', such as repeated games and the prisoner's dilemma, as well as less well-trodden topics such as experimental games and issues of rationality
* introduces and analyses new areas of game theory such as "evolutionary games" and "Psychological games"
Retaining the most popular features from the original edition, this latest version offers improved pedagogy, new questions for discussion, new chapters on the latest developments as well as a host of new examples. A new generation of students of game theory will grow to appreciate this superb text whilst fans of the first edition will eagerly devour this long-awaited update.

The book is a collection of contributed papers in honor of Roy Radner. Reflecting Radner's broad range of research interests, the papers cover quite diverse areas, ranging over general equilibrium analysis of the market mechanism, economies undergoing transition, satisficing behavior, markets with asymmetric information, organizational resource allocation and information processing, incentives and implementation, stable sets and the core, stochastic sequential bargaining games, perfect equilibria in a macro growth model, repeated games, and evolutionary games.

Network Science, Nonlinear Science and Infrastructure Systems has been written by leading scholars in these areas. Its express purpose is to develop common theoretical underpinnings to better solve modern infrastructural problems. It is felt by many who work in these fields that many modern communication problems, ranging from transportation networks to telecommunications, Internet, supply chains, etc., are fundamentally infrastructure problems. Moreover, these infrastructure problems would benefit greatly from a confluence of theoretical and methodological work done with the areas of Network Science, Dynamical Systems and Nonlinear Science. This book is dedicated to the formulation of infrastructural tools that will better solve these types of infrastructural problems.

This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.

OndrejMajer, Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen, andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as pretty disparate logical 'systems', or else merely an assortment of formal and mathematical 'approaches' to phi- sophical inquiry. This development has largely been fueled by an increasing dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a straightforward outcome of 'logical pluralism' or 'methodological diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete objects of formal study.

This book treats extensive form game theory in full generality. It provides a framework that does not rely on any finiteness assumptions at all, yet covers the finite case. The presentation starts by identifying the appropriate concept of a game tree. This concept represents a synthesis of earlier approaches, including the graph-theoretical and the decision-theoretical ones. It then provides a general model of sequential, interpersonal decision making, called extensive decision problems. Extensive forms are a special case thereof, which is such that all strategy profiles induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Requiring the existence of immediate predecessors yields discrete extensive forms, which are still general enough to cover almost all applications. The treatment culminates in a characterization of the topologies on the plays of the game tree that admit equilibrium analysis.

Econometric theory, as presented in textbooks and the econometric literature generally, is a somewhat disparate collection of findings. Its essential nature is to be a set of demonstrated results that increase over time, each logically based on a specific set of axioms or assumptions, yet at every moment, rather than a finished work, these inevitably form an incomplete body of knowledge. The practice of econometric theory consists of selecting from, applying, and evaluating this literature, so as to test its applicability and range. The creation, development, and use of computer software has led applied economic research into a new age. This book describes the history of econometric computation from 1950 to the present day, based upon an interactive survey involving the collaboration of the many econometricians who have designed and developed this software. It identifies each of the econometric software packages that are made available to and used by economists and econometricians worldwide.

This book gathers selected contributions by top Portuguese and international researchers in the field of Operations Research, presented at the 19th Congress of APDIO (Portuguese Association of Operational Research). The papers address a broad range of complex real-world problems, which are approached using recent theoretical techniques. Of particular interest are the applications of e.g. linear, nonlinear and mixed-integer programming, multiobjective optimization, metaheuristics and hybrid heuristics, multicriteria decision analysis, data envelopment analysis, clustering techniques and decision support systems, in such varied contexts as: supply chain management, scheduling problems, production management, logistics, energy, finance and healthcare. This conference, organized by APDIO and held in Aveiro, Portugal in September 2018, offered an ideal opportunity to discuss the latest developments in this field and to build new bridges between academic researchers and practitioners. Summarizing the outcomes, this book offers a valuable tool for all researchers, students and practitioners who wish to learn about the latest trends in this field.

This book is a collection of selected papers presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Academy of Management and Business Economics (AEDEM), held at the Faculty of Economics and Business of the University of Barcelona, 05 - 07 June, 2012. This edition of the conference has been presented with the slogan "Creating new opportunities in an uncertain environment". There are different ways for assessing uncertainty in management but this book mainly focused on soft computing theories and their role in assessing uncertainty in a complex world. The present book gives a comprehensive overview of general management topics and discusses some of the most recent developments in all the areas of business and management including management, marketing, business statistics, innovation and technology, finance, sports and tourism. This book might be of great interest for anyone working in the area of management and business economics and might be especially useful for scientists and graduate students doing research in these fields.

Alternate Reality Games (ARGs) challenge what players understand as "real." Alternate Reality Games and the Cusp of Digital Gameplay is the first collection to explore and define the possibilities of ARGs. Though prominent examples have existed for more than two decades, only recently have ARGs come to the prominence as a unique and highly visible digital game genre. Adopting many of the same strategies as online video games, ARGs blur the distinction between real and fictional. With ARGs continuing to be an important and blurred space between digital and physical gameplay, this volume offers clear analysis of game design, implementation, and ramifications for game studies. Divided into three distinct sections, the contributions include first hand accounts by leading ARG creators, scholarly analysis of the meaning behind ARGs, and explorations of how ARGs are extending digital tools for analysis. By balancing the voices of designers, players, and researchers, this collection highlights how the Alternate Reality Game genre is transforming the ways we play and interact today.

The aim of the book is to present the state of the art of the theory of symmetric (Hermitian) matrix Riccati equations and to contribute to the development of the theory of non-symmetric Riccati equations as well as to certain classes of coupled and generalized Riccati equations occurring in differential games and stochastic control. The volume offers a complete treatment of generalized and coupled Riccati equations. It deals with differential, discrete-time, algebraic or periodic symmetric and non-symmetric equations, with special emphasis on those equations appearing in control and systems theory. Extensions to Riccati theory allow to tackle robust control problems in a unified approach.

The book is intended to make available classical and recent results to engineers and mathematicians alike. It is accessible to graduate students in mathematics, applied mathematics, control engineering, physics or economics. Researchers working in any of the fields where Riccati equations are used can find the main results with the proper mathematical background.

This chapter is organized as follows. The economic problem on which this book focuses is motivated in Section 1. The two tools used to study this economic problem, which are real options theory and game theory, are discussed in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Section 4 surveys the contents of this book. In Section 5 some promising extensions of the research presented in this book are listed. 1. TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT Investment expenditures of companies govern economic growth. Es pecially investments in new and more efficient technologies are an impor tant determinant. In particular, in the last two decades an increasing part of the investment expenditures concerns investments in informa tion and communication technology. Kriebel, 1989 notes that (already) in 1989 roughly 50 percent of new corporate capital expenditures by major United States companies was in information and communication technology. Due to the rapid progress in these technologies, the tech nology investment decision of the individual firm has become a very complex matter. As an example of the very high pace of technological improvement consider the market for personal computers. IBM intro duced its Pentium personal computers in the early 1990s at the same price at which it introduced its 80286 personal computers in the 1980s. Therefore it took less than a decade to improve on the order of twenty times in terms of both speed and memory capacities, without increasing the cost (Yorukoglu, 1998)."