The rapid developments in new communication technologies have facilitated the popularization of digital games, which has translated into an exponential growth of the game industry in recent decades. The ubiquitous presence of digital games has resulted in an expansion of the applications of these games from mere entertainment purposes to a great variety of serious purposes. In this edited volume, we narrow the scope of attention by focusing on what game theorist Ian Bogost has called 'persuasive games', that is, gaming practices that combine the dissemination of information with attempts to engage players in particular attitudes and behaviors. This volume offers a multifaceted reflection on persuasive gaming, that is, on the process of these particular games being played by players. The purpose is to better understand when and how digital games can be used for persuasion by further exploring persuasive games and some other kinds of persuasive playful interaction as well. The book critically integrates what has been accomplished in separate research traditions to offer a multidisciplinary approach to understanding persuasive gaming that is closely linked to developments in the industry by including the exploration of relevant case studies.

This book addresses two disciplines that have traditionally occupied completely different realms: quantum information and computation, and game theory. Helping readers connect these fields, it appeals to a wide audience, including computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians, physicists, biologists or economists. The book is richly illustrated and basic concepts are accessible to readers with basic training in science. As such it is useful for undergraduate students as well as established academicians and researchers. Further, the didactic and tutorial-like style makes it ideal supplementary reading for courses on quantum information and computation, game theory, cellular automata and simulation.

The combined efforts of the Physicists and the Economists in recent years in a- lyzing and modeling various dynamic phenomena in monetary and social systems have led to encouragingdevelopments,generally classi?ed under the title of Eco- physics. These developmentsshare a commonambitionwith the alreadyestablished ?eld of Quantitative Economics. This volume intends to offer the reader a glimpse of these two parallel initiatives by collecting review papers written by well-known experts in the respective research frontiers in one cover. This massive book presents a unique combination of research papers contributed almost equally by Physicists and Economists. Additional contributions from C- puter Scientists and Mathematicians are also included in this volume. It consists of two parts: The ?rst part concentrates on econophysics of games and social choices and is the proceedings of the Econophys-Kolkata IV workshop held at the Indian Statistical Institute and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, both in Kolkata, d- ing March 9-13, 2009. The second part consists of contributionsto quantitative e- nomics by experts in connection with the Platinum Jubilee celebration of the Indian Statistical Institute. In this connectiona Forewordfor the volume, written by Sankar K. Pal, Director of the Indian Statistical Institute, is put forth. Both parts specialize mostly on frontier problems in games and social choices. The?rst partofthebookdealswith severalrecentdevelopmentsineconophysics. Game theory is integral to the formulation of modern economic analysis. Often games display a situation where the social optimal could not be reached as a - sult of non co-operation between different agents.

This book is a collection of certain lectures given at the Economics Department at Stanford University on the game theory. It contains material on this theory of rational behavior of people with nonidentical interests whose area of application includes economics, politics, and war.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 3, the authors examine Games played in Clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games, such as Dots-and-Boxes and Nimstring. From the Table of Contents: - Turn and Turn About - Chips and Strips - Dots-and-Boxes - Spots and Sprouts - The Emperor and His Money - The King and the Consumer - Fox and Geese; Hare and Hounds - Lines and Squares

In today's confrontational and connected world, communication is the key strategic act. This book uses drama theory-a radical extension of game theory-to show how best to communicate so as to manage the emotionally charged confrontations occurring in any worthwhile relationship. Alongside a toolset that provides a systematic framework for analysing conflicts, drama theory explains why people need to listen to, and rely on, their feelings to help shake themselves out of fixed, unproductive positions and to find new ways of solving tough problems. This guide provides a sufficient grounding in the approach to enable you to apply it immediately for your own benefit and for the benefit of those with whom you work. A host of inspirational examples are included based upon actual situations in social and personal relations, business and organisational relations, defence and political management. These will give you an entirely fresh way of seeing how power is exercised in everyday interpersonal exchanges and a greater critical awareness of such factors as subtext and plotholes in public narratives. Using this approach you will be able to overcome the dilemmas of credibility and disbelief to build compelling messages that underpin your strategic intent. Moving beyond the vague platitudes of concepts like emotional intelligence, drama theory will also help you to avoid the pathologies that bedevil the process of managing conflicts and find ways of achieving authentic resolutions.

Game theory is a rich and active area of research of which this new volume of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games is yet fresh evidence. Since the second half of the 20th century, the area of dynamic games has man aged to attract outstanding mathematicians, who found exciting open questions requiring tools from a wide variety of mathematical disciplines; economists, so cial and political scientists, who used game theory to model and study competition and cooperative behavior; and engineers, who used games in computer sciences, telecommunications, and other areas. The contents of this volume are primarily based on selected presentation made at the 8th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications, held in Chateau Vaalsbroek, Maastricht, the Netherlands, July 5-8, 1998; this conference took place under the auspices of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG), established in 1990. The conference has been cosponsored by the Control Systems Society of the IEEE, IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Con trol), INRIA (Institute National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique), and the University of Maastricht. One ofthe activities of the ISDG is the publica tion of the Annals. Every paper that appears in this volume has passed through a stringent reviewing process, as is the case with publications for archival journals."

This state-of-the art collection of papers analyses various aspects of the theory of externalities and public goods. The contributions employ new analytical techniques like the aggregative game approach, and discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the theory. Furthermore, they highlight a range of topical empirical applications including climate policy and counterterrorism. This contributed volume was written in memory of Richard C. Cornes, a pioneer in the theory of externalities and public goods.

There are thousands of books relating to poker, blackjack, roulette and baccarat, including strategy guides, statistical analysis, psychological studies, and much more. However, there are no books on Pell, Rouleno, Street Dice, and many other games that have had a short life in casinos! While this is understandable - most casino gamblers have not heard of these games, and no one is currently playing them - their absence from published works means that some interesting mathematics and gaming history are at risk of being lost forever. Table games other than baccarat, blackjack, craps, and roulette are called carnival games, as a nod to their origin in actual traveling or seasonal carnivals. Mathematics of Casino Carnival Games is a focused look at these games and the mathematics at their foundation. Features * Exercises, with solutions, are included for readers who wish to practice the ideas presented * Suitable for a general audience with an interest in the mathematics of gambling and games * Goes beyond providing practical 'tips' for gamblers, and explores the mathematical principles that underpin gambling games

Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises. The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories.

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

This book gathers carefully selected works in Mathematical Economics, on myriad topics including General Equilibrium, Game Theory, Economic Growth, Welfare, Social Choice Theory, Finance. It sheds light on the ongoing discussions that have brought together leading researchers from Latin America and Southern Europe at recent conferences in venues like Porto, Portugal; Athens, Greece; and Guanajuato, Mexico. With this volume, the editors not only contribute to the advancement of research in these areas, but also inspire other scholars around the globe to collaborate and research these vibrant, emerging topics.

The H control has been one of the important robust control approaches since the 1980s. This book extends the area to nonlinear stochastic H2/H control, and studies more complex and practically useful mixed H2/H controller synthesis rather than the pure H control. Different from the commonly used convex optimization method, this book applies the Nash game approach to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the mixed H2/H control. Researchers will benefit from our detailed exposition of the stochastic mixed H2/H control theory, while practitioners can apply our efficient algorithms to address their practical problems.

This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner's dilemma, chicken (hawk-dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author's own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.

Computing Equilibria and Fixed Points is devoted to the computation of equilibria, fixed points and stationary points. This volume is written with three goals in mind: (i) To give a comprehensive introduction to fixed point methods and to the definition and construction of Gr bner bases; (ii) To discuss several interesting applications of these methods in the fields of general equilibrium theory, game theory, mathematical programming, algebra and symbolic computation; (iii) To introduce several advanced fixed point and stationary point theorems. These methods and topics should be of interest not only to economists and game theorists concerned with the computation and existence of equilibrium outcomes in economic models and cooperative and non-cooperative games, but also to applied mathematicians, computer scientists and engineers dealing with models of highly nonlinear systems of equations (or polynomial equations).

This book presents a novel unified treatment of inverse problems in optimal control and noncooperative dynamic game theory. It provides readers with fundamental tools for the development of practical algorithms to solve inverse problems in control, robotics, biology, and economics. The treatment involves the application of Pontryagin's minimum principle to a variety of inverse problems and proposes algorithms founded on the elegance of dynamic optimization theory. There is a balanced emphasis between fundamental theoretical questions and practical matters. The text begins by providing an introduction and background to its topics. It then discusses discrete-time and continuous-time inverse optimal control. The focus moves on to differential and dynamic games and the book is completed by consideration of relevant applications. The algorithms and theoretical results developed in Inverse Optimal Control and Inverse Noncooperative Dynamic Game Theory provide new insights into information requirements for solving inverse problems, including the structure, quantity, and types of state and control data. These insights have significant practical consequences in the design of technologies seeking to exploit inverse techniques such as collaborative robots, driver-assistance technologies, and autonomous systems. The book will therefore be of interest to researchers, engineers, and postgraduate students in several disciplines within the area of control and robotics.

Complex-Valued Modeling in Economics and Finance outlines the theory, methodology, and techniques behind modeling economic processes using complex variables theory. The theory of complex variables functions is widely used in many scientific fields, since work with complex variables can appropriately describe different complex real-life processes. Many economic indicators and factors reflecting the properties of the same object can be represented in the form of complex variables. By describing the relationship between various indicators using the functions of these variables, new economic and financial models can be created which are often more accurate than the models of real variables. This book pays critical attention to complex variables production in stock market modeling, modeling illegal economy, time series forecasting, complex auto-aggressive models, and economic dynamics modeling. Very little has been published on this topic and its applications within the fields of economics and finance, and this volume appeals to graduate-level students studying economics, academic researchers in economics and finance, and economists.

The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all. From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation. In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book.

Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality.

This book covers some important topics in the construction of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and examines use of these models for the analysis of economic policies, their properties, and their implications. Readers will find explanation and discussion of the theoretical structure and practical application of several model typologies, including dynamic, stochastic, micro-macro, and simulation models, as well as different closure rules and policy experiments. The presentation of applications to various country and problem-specific case studies serves to provide an informed and clearly articulated summary of the state of the art and the most important methodological advancements in the field of policy modeling within the framework of general equilibrium analysis. The book is an outcome of a recent workshop of the Italian Development Economists Association attended by a group of leading practitioners involved in the generation of CGE models and research on modeling the economy and policy making. It will be of interest to researchers, professional economists, graduate students, and knowledgeable policy makers.

There is a widening gap between the current organizational reality and the tools and methods available to managers for addressing its challenges. Game Based Organization Design shows that one of the ways to bridge this gap is to introduce insights and approaches from video game design into the design of organizational systems. This book takes basic ideas such as games, play, and rules as the foundation for a new approach to organizational design and strategy formulation. Based on seven years of research and consulting work, this is the first time these original ideas have been made available in such a comprehensive and accessible manner to both executives and students of management. Game Based Organization Design combines a sound theoretical basis with many examples of practical application as well as useful pointers for readers who wish to put these ideas into action.

This book features contributions from the GTM 2020 International Meeting on Game Theory held virtually from St. Petersburg, Russia, including presentations by plenary speakers. The topics cover a wide range of game-theoretic models and include both theory and applications, including applications to management.

This book focuses on the latest advances in nonlinear dynamic modeling in economics and finance, mainly-but not solely-based on the description of strategic interaction by using concepts and methods from dynamic and evolutionary game theory. The respective chapters cover a range of theoretical issues and examples concerning how the qualitative theory of dynamical systems is used to analyze the local and global bifurcations that characterize complex behaviors observed in social systems where heterogeneous and boundedly rational economic agents interact. Nonlinear dynamical systems, represented by difference and differential and functional equations, are extensively used to simulate the behavior of time-evolving economic systems, also in the presence of time lags, discontinuities, and hysteresis phenomena. In addition, some theoretical issues and particular applications are discussed, as well. The contributions gathered here offer an up-to-date review of the latest research in this rapidly developing research area.

The aim of Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures is to analyze conflict situations in which two or more players can make coalitions and obtain prizes and penalties. This approach to situations of competition and cooperation was given in the seminal treatise by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Cooperative game theory has succeeded in providing many applications of game theory. In this volume, games defined on combinatorial structures will be analyzed, i.e. a set system over a set of players. In many situations the author will work in a closure space. Examples of closure operators are the spanning operator of linear algebra and all convex hull operators. Chapters 1-4 constitute a review of mathematical concepts from Cooperative Game Theory, Graph Theory, Linear and Integer Programming, Combinatorial Optimization, Discrete Convex Analysis and Computational Complexity. The table of contents is a short guide to the topics and methods covered in this book. In Chapters 11 and 12, several notebooks are presented with the system Mathematica by Wolfram in the contexts of the packages DiscreteMath (Skiena) and Cooperative (Carter). There will also be found in the book several research projects. These are intended to offer new ideas that the reader should consider with caution. This book will be of interest to graduate students with some experience in game theory or mathematical programming and professional researchers in game theory, operational research and its applications in economic theory, and the political and social sciences. In addition, it will be especially useful for professionals who are interested in models for understanding and managing conflicts: management and operational research scientists, political and military scientists, and professional negotiators.

The paradigms of dynamic games play an important role in the development of multi-agent models in engineering, economics, and management science. The applicability of their concepts stems from the ability to encompass situations with uncertainty, incomplete information, fluctuating coalition structure, and coupled constraints imposed on the strategies of all the players. This book - an outgrowth of the 10th International Symposium on Dynamic Games - presents current developments of the theory of dynamic games and its applications to various domains, in particular energy-environment economics and management sciences. The volume uses dynamic game models of various sorts to approach and solve several problems pertaining to pursuit-evasion, marketing, finance, climate and environmental economics, resource exploitation, as well as auditing and tax evasions. In addition, it includes some chapters on cooperative games, which are increasingly drawing dynamic approaches to their classical solutions. dynamic game theory and its applications for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students in applied mathematics, engineering, economics, as well as environmental and management sciences.