Energy issues feature frequently in the economic and financial press. Specific examples of topical energy issues come from around the globe and often concern economics and finance. The importance of energy production, consumption and trade raises fundamental economic issues that impact the global economy and financial markets. This volume presents research on energy economics and financial markets related to the themes of supply and demand, environmental impact and renewables, energy derivatives trading, and finance and energy. The contributions by experts in their fields take a global perspective, as well as presenting cases from various countries and continents.

Electoral promises help to win votes and political candidates, or parties should strategically choose what they can deliver to win an election. Past game-theoretical studies tend to ignore electoral promises and this book sheds illuminating light on the functions and effects of electoral promises on policies or electoral outcomes through game theory models. This book provides a basic framework for game-theoretical analysis of electoral promises. The book also includes cases to illustrate real life applications of these theories.

This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.

Modem game theory has evolved enonnously since its inception in the 1920s in the works ofBorel and von Neumann and since publication in the 1940s of the seminal treatise "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" by von Neumann and Morgenstern. The branch of game theory known as dynamic games is-to a significant extent-descended from the pioneering work on differential games done by Isaacs in the 1950s and 1960s. Since those early decades game theory has branched out in many directions, spanning such diverse disciplines as math ematics, economics, electrical and electronics engineering, operations research, computer science, theoretical ecology, environmental science, and even political science. The papers in this volume reflect both the maturity and the vitalityofmodem day game theoryin general, andofdynamic games, inparticular. The maturitycan be seen from the sophistication ofthe theorems, proofs, methods, and numerical algorithms contained in these articles. The vitality is manifested by the range of new ideas, new applications, the numberofyoung researchers among the authors, and the expanding worldwide coverage of research centers and institutes where the contributions originated."

The rapid developments in new communication technologies have facilitated the popularization of digital games, which has translated into an exponential growth of the game industry in recent decades. The ubiquitous presence of digital games has resulted in an expansion of the applications of these games from mere entertainment purposes to a great variety of serious purposes. In this edited volume, we narrow the scope of attention by focusing on what game theorist Ian Bogost has called 'persuasive games', that is, gaming practices that combine the dissemination of information with attempts to engage players in particular attitudes and behaviors. This volume offers a multifaceted reflection on persuasive gaming, that is, on the process of these particular games being played by players. The purpose is to better understand when and how digital games can be used for persuasion by further exploring persuasive games and some other kinds of persuasive playful interaction as well. The book critically integrates what has been accomplished in separate research traditions to offer a multidisciplinary approach to understanding persuasive gaming that is closely linked to developments in the industry by including the exploration of relevant case studies.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 3, the authors examine Games played in Clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games, such as Dots-and-Boxes and Nimstring. From the Table of Contents: - Turn and Turn About - Chips and Strips - Dots-and-Boxes - Spots and Sprouts - The Emperor and His Money - The King and the Consumer - Fox and Geese; Hare and Hounds - Lines and Squares

Understanding human behavior and decision-making processes is a significant challenge within many fields of research. This doctoral thesis shows how human activities are characterized by multiple interconnected contexts and demonstrates the advantages of using a multi-layered model to examine interactions between social, economic and cultural factors. The model presented here offers large benefits for various target groups as it can be applied to a wide range of research fields. Consequently, this analysis supports an interdisciplinary approach to economics.

This book addresses two disciplines that have traditionally occupied completely different realms: quantum information and computation, and game theory. Helping readers connect these fields, it appeals to a wide audience, including computer scientists, engineers, mathematicians, physicists, biologists or economists. The book is richly illustrated and basic concepts are accessible to readers with basic training in science. As such it is useful for undergraduate students as well as established academicians and researchers. Further, the didactic and tutorial-like style makes it ideal supplementary reading for courses on quantum information and computation, game theory, cellular automata and simulation.

The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all. From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation. In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book.

There are thousands of books relating to poker, blackjack, roulette and baccarat, including strategy guides, statistical analysis, psychological studies, and much more. However, there are no books on Pell, Rouleno, Street Dice, and many other games that have had a short life in casinos! While this is understandable - most casino gamblers have not heard of these games, and no one is currently playing them - their absence from published works means that some interesting mathematics and gaming history are at risk of being lost forever. Table games other than baccarat, blackjack, craps, and roulette are called carnival games, as a nod to their origin in actual traveling or seasonal carnivals. Mathematics of Casino Carnival Games is a focused look at these games and the mathematics at their foundation. Features * Exercises, with solutions, are included for readers who wish to practice the ideas presented * Suitable for a general audience with an interest in the mathematics of gambling and games * Goes beyond providing practical 'tips' for gamblers, and explores the mathematical principles that underpin gambling games

The combined efforts of the Physicists and the Economists in recent years in a- lyzing and modeling various dynamic phenomena in monetary and social systems have led to encouragingdevelopments,generally classi?ed under the title of Eco- physics. These developmentsshare a commonambitionwith the alreadyestablished ?eld of Quantitative Economics. This volume intends to offer the reader a glimpse of these two parallel initiatives by collecting review papers written by well-known experts in the respective research frontiers in one cover. This massive book presents a unique combination of research papers contributed almost equally by Physicists and Economists. Additional contributions from C- puter Scientists and Mathematicians are also included in this volume. It consists of two parts: The ?rst part concentrates on econophysics of games and social choices and is the proceedings of the Econophys-Kolkata IV workshop held at the Indian Statistical Institute and the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics, both in Kolkata, d- ing March 9-13, 2009. The second part consists of contributionsto quantitative e- nomics by experts in connection with the Platinum Jubilee celebration of the Indian Statistical Institute. In this connectiona Forewordfor the volume, written by Sankar K. Pal, Director of the Indian Statistical Institute, is put forth. Both parts specialize mostly on frontier problems in games and social choices. The?rst partofthebookdealswith severalrecentdevelopmentsineconophysics. Game theory is integral to the formulation of modern economic analysis. Often games display a situation where the social optimal could not be reached as a - sult of non co-operation between different agents.

This state-of-the art collection of papers analyses various aspects of the theory of externalities and public goods. The contributions employ new analytical techniques like the aggregative game approach, and discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the theory. Furthermore, they highlight a range of topical empirical applications including climate policy and counterterrorism. This contributed volume was written in memory of Richard C. Cornes, a pioneer in the theory of externalities and public goods.

Game theory is a rich and active area of research of which this new volume of the Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games is yet fresh evidence. Since the second half of the 20th century, the area of dynamic games has man aged to attract outstanding mathematicians, who found exciting open questions requiring tools from a wide variety of mathematical disciplines; economists, so cial and political scientists, who used game theory to model and study competition and cooperative behavior; and engineers, who used games in computer sciences, telecommunications, and other areas. The contents of this volume are primarily based on selected presentation made at the 8th International Symposium of Dynamic Games and Applications, held in Chateau Vaalsbroek, Maastricht, the Netherlands, July 5-8, 1998; this conference took place under the auspices of the International Society of Dynamic Games (ISDG), established in 1990. The conference has been cosponsored by the Control Systems Society of the IEEE, IFAC (International Federation of Automatic Con trol), INRIA (Institute National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique), and the University of Maastricht. One ofthe activities of the ISDG is the publica tion of the Annals. Every paper that appears in this volume has passed through a stringent reviewing process, as is the case with publications for archival journals."

Explores the history, business, and technology of video games, including social, political, and economic motivations Facilitates learning with clear objectives, key terms, illustrative timelines, color images, tables and graphs Highlights the technical specifications and key titles of all major game consoles, handhelds, personal computers, and mobile platforms Reinforces material with market summaries, reviews of breakthroughs and trends, as well as end-of-chapter activities and quizzes New content in every chapter, from the PC-98, MSX, Amstrad, and ZX Spectrum to expanded coverage on mobile gaming, virtual reality, Steam Deck, Nintendo Switch, Xbox Series X|S, and PlayStation 5

This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations. The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

The H control has been one of the important robust control approaches since the 1980s. This book extends the area to nonlinear stochastic H2/H control, and studies more complex and practically useful mixed H2/H controller synthesis rather than the pure H control. Different from the commonly used convex optimization method, this book applies the Nash game approach to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the mixed H2/H control. Researchers will benefit from our detailed exposition of the stochastic mixed H2/H control theory, while practitioners can apply our efficient algorithms to address their practical problems.

This book gathers carefully selected works in Mathematical Economics, on myriad topics including General Equilibrium, Game Theory, Economic Growth, Welfare, Social Choice Theory, Finance. It sheds light on the ongoing discussions that have brought together leading researchers from Latin America and Southern Europe at recent conferences in venues like Porto, Portugal; Athens, Greece; and Guanajuato, Mexico. With this volume, the editors not only contribute to the advancement of research in these areas, but also inspire other scholars around the globe to collaborate and research these vibrant, emerging topics.

Complex-Valued Modeling in Economics and Finance outlines the theory, methodology, and techniques behind modeling economic processes using complex variables theory. The theory of complex variables functions is widely used in many scientific fields, since work with complex variables can appropriately describe different complex real-life processes. Many economic indicators and factors reflecting the properties of the same object can be represented in the form of complex variables. By describing the relationship between various indicators using the functions of these variables, new economic and financial models can be created which are often more accurate than the models of real variables. This book pays critical attention to complex variables production in stock market modeling, modeling illegal economy, time series forecasting, complex auto-aggressive models, and economic dynamics modeling. Very little has been published on this topic and its applications within the fields of economics and finance, and this volume appeals to graduate-level students studying economics, academic researchers in economics and finance, and economists.

Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in Game Theory. Since Nash's original paper in 1951, it has found countless applications in modeling strategic behavior of traders in markets, (human) drivers and (electronic) routers in congested networks, nations in nuclear disarmament negotiations, and more. A decade ago, the relevance of this solution concept was called into question by computer scientists, who proved (under appropriate complexity assumptions) that computing a Nash equilibrium is an intractable problem. And if centralized, specially designed algorithms cannot find Nash equilibria, why should we expect distributed, selfish agents to converge to one? The remaining hope was that at least approximate Nash equilibria can be efficiently computed.Understanding whether there is an efficient algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium has been the central open problem in this field for the past decade. In this book, we provide strong evidence that even finding an approximate Nash equilibrium is intractable. We prove several intractability theorems for different settings (two-player games and many-player games) and models (computational complexity, query complexity, and communication complexity). In particular, our main result is that under a plausible and natural complexity assumption ("Exponential Time Hypothesis for PPAD"), there is no polynomial-time algorithm for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. The problem of approximate Nash equilibrium in a two-player game poses a unique technical challenge: it is a member of the class PPAD, which captures the complexity of several fundamental total problems, i.e., problems that always have a solution; and it also admits a quasipolynomial time algorithm. Either property alone is believed to place this problem far below NP-hard problems in the complexity hierarchy; having both simultaneously places it just above P, at what can be called the frontier of intractability. Indeed, the tools we develop in this book to advance on this frontier are useful for proving hardness of approximation of several other important problems whose complexity lies between P and NP: Brouwer's fixed point, market equilibrium, CourseMatch (A-CEEI), densest k-subgraph, community detection, VC dimension and Littlestone dimension, and signaling in zero-sum games.

This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner's dilemma, chicken (hawk-dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author's own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.

Computing Equilibria and Fixed Points is devoted to the computation of equilibria, fixed points and stationary points. This volume is written with three goals in mind: (i) To give a comprehensive introduction to fixed point methods and to the definition and construction of Gr bner bases; (ii) To discuss several interesting applications of these methods in the fields of general equilibrium theory, game theory, mathematical programming, algebra and symbolic computation; (iii) To introduce several advanced fixed point and stationary point theorems. These methods and topics should be of interest not only to economists and game theorists concerned with the computation and existence of equilibrium outcomes in economic models and cooperative and non-cooperative games, but also to applied mathematicians, computer scientists and engineers dealing with models of highly nonlinear systems of equations (or polynomial equations).

This book presents a novel unified treatment of inverse problems in optimal control and noncooperative dynamic game theory. It provides readers with fundamental tools for the development of practical algorithms to solve inverse problems in control, robotics, biology, and economics. The treatment involves the application of Pontryagin's minimum principle to a variety of inverse problems and proposes algorithms founded on the elegance of dynamic optimization theory. There is a balanced emphasis between fundamental theoretical questions and practical matters. The text begins by providing an introduction and background to its topics. It then discusses discrete-time and continuous-time inverse optimal control. The focus moves on to differential and dynamic games and the book is completed by consideration of relevant applications. The algorithms and theoretical results developed in Inverse Optimal Control and Inverse Noncooperative Dynamic Game Theory provide new insights into information requirements for solving inverse problems, including the structure, quantity, and types of state and control data. These insights have significant practical consequences in the design of technologies seeking to exploit inverse techniques such as collaborative robots, driver-assistance technologies, and autonomous systems. The book will therefore be of interest to researchers, engineers, and postgraduate students in several disciplines within the area of control and robotics.

During the 1980s, economic theory has been revolutionised by game theory. The game theory approach is now very widely used throughout the profession and has become a major tool for the construction of new economic models. It is the basic tool in the construction of a modern theory of industrial organisation and it has led to important developments in finance, labour economics and international trade. This major new collection - prepared by a leading international authority - is oriented towards researchers, professors and graduate students who are interested in the interface between game theory and economic theory. They include the seminal and most important recent papers on the development and application of game theory in economics.

Dynamic game theory serves the purpose of including strategic interaction in decision making and is therefore often applied to economic problems. This book presents the state-of-the-art and directions for future research in dynamic game theory related to economics. It was initiated by contributors to the 12th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games and Nonlinear Dynamics and combines a selection of papers from the workshop with invited papers of high quality.

This book covers some important topics in the construction of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and examines use of these models for the analysis of economic policies, their properties, and their implications. Readers will find explanation and discussion of the theoretical structure and practical application of several model typologies, including dynamic, stochastic, micro-macro, and simulation models, as well as different closure rules and policy experiments. The presentation of applications to various country and problem-specific case studies serves to provide an informed and clearly articulated summary of the state of the art and the most important methodological advancements in the field of policy modeling within the framework of general equilibrium analysis. The book is an outcome of a recent workshop of the Italian Development Economists Association attended by a group of leading practitioners involved in the generation of CGE models and research on modeling the economy and policy making. It will be of interest to researchers, professional economists, graduate students, and knowledgeable policy makers.