The ambition of the theory of imperfectly competitive markets is to explain the working of markets in which the issue of strategic interaction among firms is central. Our analysis of this problem will be based on equilibrium concepts borrowed from Game Theory. This research program arises several questions on its feasibility like the empirical relevance of the results, the substantial theoretical insights obtained in this way, etc. Unfortunately, most of these questions can not be answered in the short run. This book is written in the hope that this research strategy is meaningful, but about its final success no body can tell. Another important question is if simpler models could deliver the essential insights offered by the theory of imperfectly competitive mar kets. This Introduction will be devoted to argue that, currently, there is no alternative to the approach presented in this book. Consider the following fact: A square inch of soil in the Explanada of Ali cante (located in front of the sea, right in the middle of downtown) cost several times more than a square inch of soil in San Vicente del Raspeig (located sev eral miles toward the interior of the peninsula). l How can we explain such a thing? First notice that because of the large quantity of possible traders involved in this market, we can safely assume that any agent has to accept the market price, i. e. is a price-taker."

These proceedings are from a conference held at the Centre for Regional Science (CERUM) at Umea Umea University, Sweden, 17-18 June 2001. Unlike Un1ike many conference proceedings, this volume contains only on1y invited invited contribu- contribu- tions tions on specified topics so as to make the book coherent and self-contained. The authors and editors hope that this coherence will make the volume use- fu1 fuI also as a text for courses in industrial organisation. To this end two chap- ters on the history of oligopoly theory, from the beginnings with Cournot 1838, to the present day, and one chapter on modem methods for analysing iterated discrete time maps, have been inserted at the beginning ofthe book. Unlike Un1ike most current literature on games and oligopoly, this book is not focused on the usual topics of game theory: optimal strategies, dominance, and equilibrium. Rather it is the evolutionary dynamics, often of a complex type, inc1uding deterministic chaos, which are in focus. The contributions, after the historical and the methodological introductions, represent various segments of the research frontier in this area, though pains have been taken to tie some of the models to a number of most promising contributions from the frugal period 1929-1941, which have suffered from unjust neglect in the following industrial organisation literature.

This text examines new research at the interface of operations research, behavioral and cognitive sciences, and decision analysis. From the cognitive behaviorist who collects empirical evidence as to how people make decisions to the engineer and economist who are the consumers of such understanding, the reader encounters the familiar Traveling Salesman Problem and Prisoner's dilemma, how agricultural decisions are made in Argentina's Pampas region, and some social goals that come into play as an element of rational decision-making.

In these 14 self-contained chapters, broad topics covered include the integration of decision analysis and behavioral models, innovations in behavioral models, exploring descriptive behavior models, and experimental studies.

OndrejMajer, Ahti-VeikkoPietarinen, andTeroTulenheimo 1 Games and logic in philosophy Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the unifying methodo- gies over what have been perceived as pretty disparate logical 'systems', or else merely an assortment of formal and mathematical 'approaches' to phi- sophical inquiry. This development has largely been fueled by an increasing dissatisfaction to what has earlier been taken to be a straightforward outcome of 'logical pluralism' or 'methodological diversity'. These phrases appear to re ect the everyday chaos of our academic pursuits rather than any genuine attempt to clarify the general principles underlying the miscellaneous ways in which logic appears to us. But the situation is changing. Unity among plurality is emerging in c- temporary studies in logical philosophy and neighbouring disciplines. This is a necessary follow-up to the intensive research into the intricacies of logical systems and methodologies performed over the recent years. The present book suggests one such peculiar but very unrestrained meth- ological perspective over the eld of logic and its applications in mathematics, language or computation: games. An allegory for opposition, cooperation and coordination, games are also concrete objects of formal study.

Attractors, Bifurcations, & Chaos - now in its second edition - begins with an introduction to mathematical methods in modern nonlinear dynamics and deals with differential equations. Phenomena such as bifurcations and deterministic chaos are given considerable emphasis, both in the methodological part, and in the second part, containing various applications in economics and in regional science. Coexistence of attractors and the multiplicity of development paths in nonlinear systems are central topics. The applications focus on issues such as business cycles, oligopoly, interregional trade dynamics, and economic development theory.

This volume contains a selection consisting of the best papers presented at the FUR XII conference, held at LUISS in Roma, Italy, in June 2006, organized by John Hey and Daniela Di Cagno. The objectives of the FUR (Foundations of Utility and Risk theory) conferences have always been to bring together leading academics from Economics, Psychology, Statistics, Operations Research, Finance, Applied Mat- matics, and other disciplines, to address the issues of decision-making from a g- uinely multi-disciplinary point of view. This twelfth conference in the series was no exception. The early FUR conferences - like FUR I (organized by Maurice Allais and Ole Hagen) and FUR III (organized by Bertrand Munier) - initiated the move away from the excessively rigid and descriptively-inadequate modelling of beh- iour under risk and uncertainty that was in vogue in conventional economics at that time. More than twenty years later, things have changed fundamentally, and now - novations arising from the FUR conferences, and manifesting themselves in the new behavioural economics, are readily accepted by the profession. Working with new models of ambiguity, and bounded rationality, for example, behavioural decision making is no longer considered a sign of mere non-standard intellectual diversi?- tion. FUR XII was organised with this new spirit. In the sense that the behavioural concerns initiated by the ?rst FUR conferences are now part of conventional e- nomics, and the design and organisation of FUR XII re?ects this integration, FUR XII represents a key turning point in the FUR conference series.

In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. All the authors are prominent scholars from these disciplines. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems. Applications to concrete settings such as EU, American Congress, regional, and committee voting are discussed.

This work systematically investigates a large number of oscillatory network configurations that are able to describe many real systems such as electric power grids, lasers or even the heart muscle, to name but a few. The book is conceived as an introduction to the field for graduate students in physics and applied mathematics as well as being a compendium for researchers from any field of application interested in quantitative models.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Reprinted by popular demand, this monograph presents a comprehensive study of positive operators between Riesz spaces and Banach lattices. Since publication of this book in 1985, the subject of positive operators and Riesz spaces has found practical applications in disciplines including social sciences and engineering. This book examines positive operators in the setting of Riesz spaces and Banach lattices, from both the algebraic and topological points of view.

The book compiles research on Condorcet's Paradox over some two centuries. It begins with a historical overview of the discovery of Condorcet's Paradox in the 18th Century, reviews numerous studies conducted to find actual occurrences of the paradox, and compiles research that has been done to develop mathematical representations for the probability that the paradox will be observed. Combines all approaches that have been used to study this very interesting phenomenon.

The mechanisms of protest and revolution have been the subject of theoretical research for over a century, yet the lack of data has hindered the empirical validation of conflicting theories. In this book, the author presents a unique new set of sub-daily data from over thirty countries and seven civil wars and uses them to test two models of conflict, the predator-prey model and the competing species model. The dynamic nature of the data modelling and the novelty of the dataset make this work a unique contribution to the field of conflict research. Dynamics of Conflict will help to re-evaluate existing theories and chart a new course towards the formal and statistical modelling of conflict.

Social computing concerns the study of social behavior and context based on computational systems. Behavioral modeling reproduces the social behavior, and allows for experimenting with and deep understanding of behavior, patterns, and potential outcomes. The pervasive use of computer and Internet technologies provides an unprecedented environment where people can share opinions and experiences, offer suggestions and advice, debate, and even conduct experiments. Social computing facilitates behavioral modeling in model building, analysis, pattern mining, anticipation, and prediction. The proceedings from this interdisciplinary workshop provide a platform for researchers, practitioners, and graduate students from sociology, behavioral and computer science, psychology, cultural study, information systems, and operations research to share results and develop new concepts and methodologies aimed at advancing and deepening our understanding of social and behavioral computing to aid critical decision making.

Linear programming attracted the interest of mathematicians during and after World War II when the first computers were constructed and methods for solving large linear programming problems were sought in connection with specific practical problems for example, providing logistical support for the U.S. Armed Forces or modeling national economies. Early attempts to apply linear programming methods to solve practical problems failed to satisfy expectations. There were various reasons for the failure. One of them, which is the central topic of this book, was the inexactness of the data used to create the models. This phenomenon, inherent in most pratical problems, has been dealt with in several ways. At first, linear programming models used "average" values of inherently vague coefficients, but the optimal solutions of these models were not always optimal for the original problem itself. Later researchers developed the stochastic linear programming approach, but this too has its limitations. Recently, interest has been given to linear programming problems with data given as intervals, convex sets and/or fuzzy sets. The individual results of these studies have been promising, but the literature has not presented a unified theory. Linear Optimization Problems with Inexact Data attempts to present a comprehensive treatment of linear optimization with inexact data, summarizing existing results and presenting new ones within a unifying framework."

In complementarity theory, which is a relatively new domain of applied mathematics, several kinds of mathematical models and problems related to the study of equilibrium are considered from the point of view of physics as well as economics. In this book the authors have combined complementarity theory, equilibrium of economical systems, and efficiency in Pareto's sense. The authors discuss the use of complementarity theory in the study of equilibrium of economic systems and present results they have obtained. In addition the authors present several new results in complementarity theory and several numerical methods for solving complementarity problems associated with the study of economic equilibrium. The most important notions of Pareto efficiency are also presented.
Audience: Researchers and graduate students interested in complementarity theory, in economics, in optimization, and in applied mathematics.

The aim of this volume is to make available to a large audience recent material in nonlinear functional analysis that has not been covered in book format before. Here, several topics of current and growing interest are systematically presented, such as fixed point theory, best approximation, the KKM-map principle, and results related to optimization theory, variational inequalities and complementarity problems. Illustrations of suitable applications are given, the links between results in various fields of research are highlighted, and an up-to-date bibliography is included to assist readers in further studies. Audience: This book will be of interest to graduate students, researchers and applied mathematicians working in nonlinear functional analysis, operator theory, approximations and expansions, convex sets and related geometric topics and game theory.

Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science.

Dynamic Games Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.

Due to the ability to handle specific characteristics of economics and finance forecasting problems like e.g. non-linear relationships, behavioral changes, or knowledge-based domain segmentation, we have recently witnessed a phenomenal growth of the application of computational intelligence methodologies in this field.

In this volume, Chen and Wang collected not just works on traditional computational intelligence approaches like fuzzy logic, neural networks, and genetic algorithms, but also examples for more recent technologies like e.g. rough sets, support vector machines, wavelets, or ant algorithms. After an introductory chapter with a structural description of all the methodologies, the subsequent parts describe novel applications of these to typical economics and finance problems like business forecasting, currency crisis discrimination, foreign exchange markets, or stock markets behavior.

Modern option pricing theory was developed in the late sixties and early seventies by F. Black, R. e. Merton and M. Scholes as an analytical tool for pricing and hedging option contracts and over-the-counter warrants. How ever, already in the seminal paper by Black and Scholes, the applicability of the model was regarded as much broader. In the second part of their paper, the authors demonstrated that a levered firm's equity can be regarded as an option on the value of the firm, and thus can be priced by option valuation techniques. A year later, Merton showed how the default risk structure of cor porate bonds can be determined by option pricing techniques. Option pricing models are now used to price virtually the full range of financial instruments and financial guarantees such as deposit insurance and collateral, and to quantify the associated risks. Over the years, option pricing has evolved from a set of specific models to a general analytical framework for analyzing the production process of financial contracts and their function in the financial intermediation process in a continuous time framework. However, very few attempts have been made in the literature to integrate game theory aspects, i. e. strategic financial decisions of the agents, into the continuous time framework. This is the unique contribution of the thesis of Dr. Alexandre Ziegler. Benefiting from the analytical tractability of contin uous time models and the closed form valuation models for derivatives, Dr."

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.

Fundamentals of Convex Analysis offers an in-depth look at some of the fundamental themes covered within an area of mathematical analysis called convex analysis. In particular, it explores the topics of duality, separation, representation, and resolution. The work is intended for students of economics, management science, engineering, and mathematics who need exposure to the mathematical foundations of matrix games, optimization, and general equilibrium analysis. It is written at the advanced undergraduate to beginning graduate level and the only formal preparation required is some familiarity with set operations and with linear algebra and matrix theory. Fundamentals of Convex Analysis is self-contained in that a brief review of the essentials of these tool areas is provided in Chapter 1. Chapter exercises are also provided. Topics covered include: convex sets and their properties; separation and support theorems; theorems of the alternative; convex cones; dual homogeneous systems; basic solutions and complementary slackness; extreme points and directions; resolution and representation of polyhedra; simplicial topology; and fixed point theorems, among others. A strength of this work is how these topics are developed in a fully integrated fashion.

This book consists of five acts and two interludes, which are all written as dialogues between three main characters and other supporting characters. Each act discusses the epistemological, institutional and methodological foundations of game theory and economics, while using various stories and examples. A featured aspect of those discussions is that many forms of mutual misunderstanding are involved in social situations as well as in those fields themselves. One Japanese traditional comic story called the Konnyaku Mondo is representative and gives hints of how our thought is constrained by incorrect beliefs. Each dialogue critically examines extant theories and common misunderstanding in game theory and economics in order to find possible future developments of those fields.

In many industries the tariffs are not strictly proportional to the quantity purchased, i. e, they are nonlinear. Examples of nonlinear tariffs include railroad and electricity schedules and rental rates for durable goods and space. The major justification for the nonlinear pricing is the existence of private information on the side of consumers. In the early papers on the subject, private information was captured either by assuming a finite number of types (e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976) or by a unidimensional continuum of types (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Economics of the unidimen sional problems is by now well understood. The unidimensional models, however, do not cover all the situations of practical interest. Indeed, often the nonlinear tariffs specify the payment as a function of a variety of characteristics. For example, railroad tariffs spec ify charges based on weight, volume, and distance of each shipment. Dif ferent customers may value each of these characteristics differently, hence the customer's type will not in general be captured by a unidimensional characteristic and a problem of multidimensional screening arises. In such models the consumer's private information (her type) is captured by an m-dimensional vector, while the good produced by the monopolist has n quality dimensions."

Stochastic differential games represent one of the most complex forms of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, interactions between strategic behaviors, dynamic evolution and stochastic elements have to be considered simultaneously. The complexity of stochastic differential games generally leads to great difficulties in the derivation of solutions. Cooperative games hold out the promise of more socially optimal and group efficient solutions to problems involving strategic actions. Despite urgent calls for national and international cooperation, the absence of formal solutions has precluded rigorous analysis of this problem.

The book supplies effective tools for rigorous study of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, a generalized theorem for the derivation of analytically tractable "payoff distribution procedure" of subgame consistent solution is presented. Being capable of deriving analytical tractable solutions, the work is not only theoretically interesting but would enable the hitherto intractable problems in cooperative stochastic differential games to be fruitfully explored.

Currently, this book is the first ever volume devoted to cooperative stochastic differential games. It aims to provide its readers an effective tool to analyze cooperative arrangements of conflict situations with uncertainty over time. Cooperative game theory has succeeded in offering many applications of game theory in operations research, management, economics, politics and other disciplines. The extension of these applications to a dynamic environment with stochastic elements should be fruitful. The book will be of interest to game theorists, mathematicians, economists, policy-makers, corporate planners and graduate students.

This is a collection of classic research papers on the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. The book is the authoritative reference in the field of evidential reasoning and an important archival reference in a wide range of areas including uncertainty reasoning in artificial intelligence and decision making in economics, engineering, and management. The book includes a foreword reflecting the development of the theory in the last forty years.