This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2016, held in New York, NY, USA, in November 2016. The 18 revised full papers presented together with 8 short papers and 5 poster papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 40 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on network security; security risks and investments; special track-validating models; decision making for privacy; security games; incentives and cybersecurity mechanisms; and intrusion detection and information limitations in security.

Beginning with a concise introduction to the theory of mean-field games (MFGs), this book presents the key elements of the regularity theory for MFGs. It then introduces a series of techniques for well-posedness in the context of mean-field problems, including stationary and time-dependent MFGs, subquadratic and superquadratic MFG formulations, and distinct classes of mean-field couplings. It also explores stationary and time-dependent MFGs through a series of a-priori estimates for solutions of the Hamilton-Jacobi and Fokker-Planck equation. It shows sophisticated a-priori systems derived using a range of analytical techniques, and builds on previous results to explain classical solutions. The final chapter discusses the potential applications, models and natural extensions of MFGs. As MFGs connect common problems in pure mathematics, engineering, economics and data management, this book is a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students in these fields.

This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner's dilemma, chicken (hawk-dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner's dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author's own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.

Renowned probability theorist Edward O. Thorp revolutionized the casino industry by developing card counting systems for the casino game of blackjack. Les Golden, the celebrated blackjack, roulette, and craps columnist for Bluff Europe, Gambling.com, iGaming Business, GamblingOnline, and Jackpots Review magazines, tells Thorp's incredible true story of lucrative applied probability with charm, wit, and humor. Whether you visit casinos for fun, dinner money, or a living, or whether you're simply interested in a story of romance and casino intrigue, this lively biographical novel will capture and delight you. Illustrations by the author. "I found the story tremendously entertaining, with a pantheon of compelling characters such as gambler Ed Thorp and bookie Manny Kimmel taking us from the casinos of Nevada to those of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Les Golden's novel is a triumph begging for adaptation to the screen."- LANA WOOD, Film and T.V. Producer, Actress ("Diamonds Are Forever") Best-selling Author, Natalie, a Memoir "Les Golden has an ever-increasing influence and burgeoning popularity.A significant name in the industry, the 'go to' man for strategy and anecdotal literarydexterity. I cannot acclaim his star highly enough."- JAMES MCKEOWN, Editor, iGaming Business Magazine and Gambling.com Magazine "Les Golden is a comedy genius. It really is as simple as that. An expert in the field,he makes getting educated not only painless but actually funny."- DAVE BLAND, Editor, Flush Magazine, British television pundit "I learn more about strategy through Les' writings than I do through many failed tripsto Vegas. Always concise, easy-to-read, and intelligent."- JON YOUNG, Editor WPT (World Poker Tour) Magazine "Les Golden makes numbers hilarious. He's simply the funniest gaming strategy writer there is. His writing is 'rakish' and 'bond-esque.' "- PHILIP CONNELLER, Editor, Bluff Europe Magazine "The dialog crackles and the fictional elements brilliantly illuminate how cool Ed Thorp is. And there's just the right amount of blackjack and math. I love it."- AARON BROWN, Professional gambler, Wall Street risk managerAuthor, The Poker Face of Wall Street

Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.

This book covers microeconomic theory at the Master's and Ph.D levels for students in business schools and economics departments. It concisely covers major mainstream microeconomic theories today, including neoclassical microeconomics, game theory, information economics, and contract theory. The revamped, 3rd edition of "Microeconomic Theory" offers faculty, graduate and upper undergraduate students with a comprehensive curriculum solution.

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2015, held in London, UK, in November 2015. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 5 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 37 submissions. Game and decision theory has emerged as a valuable systematic framework with powerful analytical tools in dealing with the intricacies involved in making sound and sensible security decisions. For instance, game theory provides methodical approaches to account for interdependencies of security decisions, the role of hidden and asymmetric information, the perception of risks and costs in human behaviour, the incentives/limitations of the attackers, and much more. Combined with our classical approach to computer and network security, and drawing from various fields such as economic, social and behavioural sciences, game and decision theory is playing a fundamental role in the development of the pillars of the "science of security".

This title links two of the most dominant research streams in philosophy of logic, namely game theory and proof theory. As the work's subtitle expresses, the authors will build this link by means of the dialogical approach to logic. One important aspect of the present study is that the authors restrict themselves to the logically valid fragment of Constructive Type Theory (CTT). The reason is that, once that fragment is achieved the result can be extended to cover the whole CTT system. The first chapters in the brief offer overviews on the two frameworks discussed in the book with an emphasis on the dialogical framework. The third chapter demonstrates the left-to-right direction of the equivalence result. This is followed by a chapter that demonstrates the use of the algorithm in showing how to transform a specific winning strategy into a CCT-demonstration of the axiom of choice. The fifth chapter develops the algorithm from CTT-demonstrations to dialogical strategies. This brief concludes by introducing elements of discussion which are to be developed in subsequent work.

This is the first comprehensive monograph on the mathematical theory of the solitaire game "The Tower of Hanoi" which was invented in the 19th century by the French number theorist Edouard Lucas. The book comprises a survey of the historical development from the game's predecessors up to recent research in mathematics and applications in computer science and psychology. Apart from long-standing myths it contains a thorough, largely self-contained presentation of the essential mathematical facts with complete proofs, including also unpublished material. The main objects of research today are the so-called Hanoi graphs and the related Sierpinski graphs. Acknowledging the great popularity of the topic in computer science, algorithms and their correctness proofs form an essential part of the book. In view of the most important practical applications of the Tower of Hanoi and its variants, namely in physics, network theory, and cognitive (neuro)psychology, other related structures and puzzles like, e.g., the "Tower of London", are addressed. Numerous captivating integer sequences arise along the way, but also many open questions impose themselves. Central among these is the famed Frame-Stewart conjecture. Despite many attempts to decide it and large-scale numerical experiments supporting its truth, it remains unsettled after more than 70 years and thus demonstrates the timeliness of the topic. Enriched with elaborate illustrations, connections to other puzzles and challenges for the reader in the form of (solved) exercises as well as problems for further exploration, this book is enjoyable reading for students, educators, game enthusiasts and researchers alike.

Contests are prevalent in many areas, including sports, rent seeking, patent races, innovation inducement, labor markets, scientific projects, crowdsourcing and other online services, and allocation of computer system resources. This book provides unified, comprehensive coverage of contest theory as developed in economics, computer science, and statistics, with a focus on online services applications, allowing professionals, researchers and students to learn about the underlying theoretical principles and to test them in practice. The book sets contest design in a game-theoretic framework that can be used to model a wide-range of problems and efficiency measures such as total and individual output and social welfare, and offers insight into how the structure of prizes relates to desired contest design objectives. Methods for rating the skills and ranking of players are presented, as are proportional allocation and similar allocation mechanisms, simultaneous contests, sharing utility of productive activities, sequential contests, and tournaments.

Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman--an economist trained in mathematics--and Barry Sinervo--a biologist trained in mathematics--offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy "; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.

This book covers the modelling of human behaviour in the education and labour markets, which due to their interdependency are viewed as one system. Important factors influencing the decision-making of individuals and firms in this system are discussed. The role of social environment and networks is stressed. The approach of agent-based modelling is presented and compared with standard economic modelling and other simulation techniques in the context of modelling complex adaptive systems. Practical questions in building agent-based models of labour-education market system with social networks are discussed. These questions include modelling the structure of education system and agent behaviour there; modelling and calibrating the labour market without and with firms; generating the social network, defining its behaviour and calibrating it; and embedding the resulting system into a larger model.

This second edition expands the first chapters, which focus on the approach to risk management issues discussed in the first edition, to offer readers a better understanding of the risk management process and the relevant quantitative phases. In the following chapters the book examines life insurance, non-life insurance and pension plans, presenting the technical and financial aspects of risk transfers and insurance without the use of complex mathematical tools. The book is written in a comprehensible style making it easily accessible to advanced undergraduate and graduate students in Economics, Business and Finance, as well as undergraduate students in Mathematics who intend starting on an actuarial qualification path. With the systematic inclusion of practical topics, professionals will find this text useful when working in insurance and pension related areas, where investments, risk analysis and financial reporting play a major role.

Transnational Cooperation: An Issue-Based Approach presents an analysis of transnational cooperation or collective action that stresses basic concepts and intuition. Throughout the book, authors Clint Peinhardt and Todd Sandler identify factors that facilitate and/or inhibit such cooperation. The first four chapters lay the analytical foundations for the book, while the next nine chapters apply the analysis to a host of exigencies and topics of great import. The authors use elementary game theory as a tool for illustrating the ideas put forth in the text. Game theory reminds us that rational actors (for example, countries, firms, or individuals) must account for the responses by other rational actors. The book assumes no prior knowledge of game theory; all game-theoretic concepts and analyses are explained in detail to the reader. Peinhardt and Sandler also employ paired comparisons in illustrating the book's concepts. The book is rich in applications and covers a wide range of topics, including superbugs, civil wars, money laundering, financial crises, drug trafficking, terrorism, global health concerns, international trade liberalization, acid rain, leadership, sovereignty, and many others. Students, researchers, and policymakers alike have much to gain from Transnational Cooperation. It is a crossover book for economics, political science, and public policy.

For decades, casino gaming has been steadily increasing in popularity worldwide. Blackjack is among the most popular of the casino table games, one where astute choices of playing strategy can create an advantage for the player. RISK AND REWARD analyzes the game in depth, pinpointing not just its optimal strategies but also its financial performance, in terms of both expected cash flow and associated risk. The book begins by describing the strategies and their performance in a clear, straightforward style. The presentation is self-contained, non-mathematical, and accessible to readers at all levels of playing skill, from the novice to the blackjack expert. Careful attention is also given to simplified, but still nearly optimal strategies that are easier to use in a casino. Unlike other books in the literature the author then derives each aspect of the strategy mathematically, to justify its claim to optimality. The derivations mostly use algebra and calculus, although some require more advanced analysis detailed in supporting appendices. For easy comprehension, formulae are translated into tables and graphs through extensive computation. This book will appeal to everyone interested in blackjack: those with mathematical training intrigued by its application to this popular game as well as all players seeking to improve their performance.

Steps forward in mathematics often reverberate in other scientific disciplines, and give rise to innovative conceptual developments or find surprising technological applications. This volume brings to the forefront some of the proponents of the mathematics of the twentieth century, who have put at our disposal new and powerful instruments for investigating the reality around us. The portraits present people who have impressive charisma and wide-ranging cultural interests, who are passionate about defending the importance of their own research, are sensitive to beauty, and attentive to the social and political problems of their times. What we have sought to document is mathematics' central position in the culture of our day. Space has been made not only for the great mathematicians but also for literary texts, including contributions by two apparent interlopers, Robert Musil and Raymond Queneau, for whom mathematical concepts represented a valuable tool for resolving the struggle between 'soul and precision.'

This is a book on the basics of mathematics and computation and their uses in economics for modern day students and practitioners. The reader is introduced to the basics of numerical analysis as well as the use of computer programs such as Matlab and Excel in carrying out involved computations. Sections are devoted to the use of Maple in mathematical analysis. Examples drawn from recent contributions to economic theory and econometrics as well as a variety of end of chapter exercises help to illustrate and apply the presented concepts.

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

A lot of economic problems can be formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions. Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories. The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who are seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking effective mathematical tools for their research.

Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

The "Shapley value" of a finite multi- person game associates to each player the amount he should be willing to pay to participate. This book extends the value concept to certain classes of non-atomic games, which are infinite-person games in which no individual player has significance. It is primarily a book of mathematics--a study of non-additive set functions and associated linear operators. Originally published in 1974. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Political Game Theory, first published in 2007, is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

This book constitutes the proceedings of the Joint INFORMS-GDN and EWG-DSS International Conference on Group Decision and Negotiation (GDN), held in Toulouse, France, during June 10 13, 2014.

The GDN meetings aim to bring together researchers and practitioners from a wide spectrum of fields, including economics, management, computer science, engineering and decision science. The contributions report on research on individual and group decision support, negotiation and auction support and the design of systems and agents supporting such processes.

From a total of 88 submissions, 31 papers were accepted for publication in this volume. The papers are organized into topical sections on collaborative decision making, auctions, knowledge decision support systems, multi-criteria decision making, multi-agent systems, negotiation analysis, preference analysis, data analysis, DSS / GDSS use, network analysisand semantic tools for group decision making."

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

Dieses Lehr-, Arbeits- und UEbungsbuch ist vorrangig zum Selbststudium sowie als Begleitlekture zu Vorlesungen "Mathematik fur Wirtschaftswissenschaftler" konzipiert. Das Buch zielt vor allem auf nachhaltiges Verstehen ab und ist daher fur Studienanfanger und Praktiker gleichermassen geeignet: Mathematische Grundelemente und oekonomisch relevante mathematische Techniken werden ausfuhrlich dargestellt, begrundet und eingeubt. Zugunsten der Verstandlichkeit wird dabei punktuell auf theoretischen Ballast - etwa mathematische Details und einzelne Beweise - verzichtet. Im Anschluss werden die zunachst abstrakten Techniken zielgerichtet und sinnvoll fur oekonomische Anwendungen nutzbar gemacht. Zahlreiche Beispiele und UEbungsaufgaben sowie UEbersichtsdarstellungen runden das Gesamtpaket ab. Fur einen gelungenen Einstieg enthalt das Buch zusatzlich einen Intensiv-Bruckenkurs zur elementaren Algebra mit mehr als 500 UEbungsaufgaben, Selbstkontroll-Tests, Eingangs- und Schlusstests. Loesungshinweise zum Bruckenkurs sowie zu allen weiteren UEbungsaufgaben sind im separaten Loesungsanhang zu finden. Fur die vorliegende 18. Auflage wurde das Buch vollstandig aktualisiert und korrigiert.