Jaroslaw Morawski offers a practicable and theoretically well-founded solution to the problems encountered when investing in illiquid assets and develops a model of the liquidation process for this category of investments. The result is a coherent investment decision framework designed specifically for private real estate but applicable also to other illiquid assets.

Long-rangedependent, or long-memory, time seriesarestationarytime series displaying a statistically signi?cant dependence between very distant obs- vations. We formalize this dependence by assuming that the autocorrelation function of these stationary series decays very slowly, hyperbolically, as a function of the time lag. Many economic series display these empirical features: volatility of asset prices returns, future interest rates, etc. There is a huge statistical literature on long-memory processes, some of this research is highly technical, so that it is cited, but often misused in the applied econometrics and empirical e- nomics literature. The ?rst purpose of this book is to present in a formal and pedagogical way some statistical methods for studying long-range dependent processes. Furthermore, the occurrence of long-memory in economic time series might be a statistical artefact as the hyperbolic decay of the sample autoc- relation function does not necessarily derive from long-range dependent p- cesses. Indeed, the realizations of non-homogeneous processes, e.g., switching regime and change-point processes, display the same empirical features. We thus also present in this book recent statistical methods able to discriminate between the long-memory and change-point alternatives. Going beyond the purely statistical analysis of economic series, it is of interest to determine which economic mechanisms are generating the strong dependence properties of economic series, whether they are genuine, or spu- ous. The regularities of the long-memory and change-point properties across economic time series, e.g., common degree of long-range dependence and/or common change-points, suggest the existence of a common economic cause

For the last few years researchers in business administration have increasingly become aware of the central role of small and medium enterprises for the prosperity of an economy. As a consequence, "entrepeneurship" has grown a most relevant sub-discipline in business administration. This special issue focuses on the specific problems in the field of finance that are essential for small and medium enterprises. The articles offer an excellent overview of research questions lying at the very heart of entrepreneurial finance and thus may serve as the starting point for further interesting investigations.

The theory on the evolution of preferences deals with the endogenous formation of preference relations in strategic situations. It is related to the field of evolutionary game theory. In this book we analyze the role and the influence of general, possibly non-expected utility preferences in such an evolutionary setup. In particular, we demonstrate that preferences which diverge from von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility may potentially prove to be successful under evolutionary pressures.

Exponential smoothing methods have been around since the 1950s, and are still the most popular forecasting methods used in business and industry. However, a modeling framework incorporating stochastic models, likelihood calculation, prediction intervals and procedures for model selection, was not developed until recently. This book brings together all of the important new results on the state space framework for exponential smoothing. It will be of interest to people wanting to apply the methods in their own area of interest as well as for researchers wanting to take the ideas in new directions. Part 1 provides an introduction to exponential smoothing and the underlying models. The essential details are given in Part 2, which also provide links to the most important papers in the literature. More advanced topics are covered in Part 3, including the mathematical properties of the models and extensions of the models for specific problems. Applications to particular domains are discussed in Part 4.

This book examines theology and the idea of a superior being in the context of game theory. The central question posed in this book is: If there existed a superior being who possessed the supernatural qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility, how would he/she act differently from us?

The mathematical theory of games is used to define each of these qualities, and different assumptions about the rules of play in several theological games that might be played between ordinary human beings and superior beings like God are posited.

The Great War is an immense, confusing and overwhelming historical conflict - the ideal case study for teaching game theory and international relations. Using thirteen historical puzzles, from the outbreak of the war and the stability of attrition, to unrestricted submarine warfare and American entry into the war, this book provides students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory. Each chapter shows, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles, shedding light on the role of individual leaders in world politics, cooperation between coalitions partners, the effectiveness of international law, the termination of conflict, and the challenges of making peace. Its analytical history of World War I also surveys cutting edge political science research on international relations and the causes of war. Written by a leading game theorist known for his expertise of the war, this textbook includes useful student features such as chapter key terms, contemporary maps, a timeline of events, a list of key characters and additional end-of-chapter game-theoretic exercises.

Rooted in Gricean tradition, this book concentrates on game- and decision-theoretic (GDT) approaches to the foundations of pragmatics. An Introduction to GDT, with an overview of GDT pragmatics research to date and its relation to semantics and to Gricean pragmatics is followed by contributions offering a high-level survey of current GDT pragmatics and the field of its applications, demonstrating that this approach provides a sound basis for synchronic and diachronic explanations of language use.

Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do.
A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behavior appreciably. This book develops theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this.
The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing that is, individually rational, collectively rational and fair.
The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three-hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change.
The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they mustrestructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.

This book, following the three published volumes of the book, provides the main purpose to collect research papers and review papers to provide an overview of the main issues, results, and open questions in the cutting-edge research on the fields of modeling, optimization, and dynamics and their applications to biology, economy, energy, industry, physics, psychology and finance. Assuming the scientific relevance of the presenting innovative applications as well as merging issues in these areas, the purpose of this book is to collect papers of the world experts in mathematics, economics, and other applied sciences that is seminal to the future research developments. The majority of the papers presented in this book is authored by the participants in The Joint Meeting 6th International Conference on Dynamics, Games, and Science - DGSVI - JOLATE and in the 21st ICABR Conference. The scientific scope of the conferences is focused on the fields of modeling, optimization, and dynamics and their applications to biology, economy, energy, industry, physics, psychology, and finance. Assuming the scientific relevance of the presenting innovative applications as well as merging issues in these areas, the purpose of the conference is to bring together some of the world experts in mathematics, economics, and other applied sciences that reinforce ongoing projects and establish future works and collaborations.

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments? Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social (non-selfish) preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced. The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project.

This textbook offers a comprehensive overview of the main developments in game theory since the 1950s. It provides a wide variety of examples and exercises, mostly drawn from applications in economics, to illustrate key concepts and ideas in the field. The book will be an invaluable reference tool for teachers, students, and researchers of microeconomics and game theory.

State, Anarchy and Collective Decisions provides an introduction to the applications of game theory to a series of questions that are fundamental in political economy. These questions include: Why do we need states? What might happen without protection for life and property? How might tribes or criminal gangs behave in struggles over material possessions? Would people tell the truth if asked what they wanted?

Game theory has revolutionized the study of animal behavior. The fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory--that the strategy adopted by one individual depends on the strategies exhibited by others--has proven a powerful tool in uncovering the forces shaping otherwise mysterious behaviors. In this volume, the first since 1982 devoted to evolutionary game theory, leading researchers describe applications of the theory to diverse types of behavior, providing an overview of recent discoveries and a synthesis of current research. The volume begins with a clear introduction to game theory and its explanatory scope. This is followed by a series of chapters on the use of game theory to understand a range of behaviors: social foraging, cooperation, animal contests, communication, reproductive skew and nepotism within groups, sibling rivalry, alternative life-histories, habitat selection, trophic-level interactions, learning, and human social behavior. In addition, the volume includes a discussion of the relations among game theory, optimality, and quantitative genetics, and an assessment of the overall utility of game theory to the study of social behavior. Presented in a manner accessible to anyone interested in animal behavior but not necessarily trained in the mathematics of game theory, the book is intended for a wide audience of undergraduates, graduate students, and professional biologists pursuing the evolutionary analysis of animal behavior.

This book contains invited essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz spanning a large area of economic, social and other sciences where the implementation or enforcement of institutions and rules requires the design of effective mechanisms. The foundations of these articles are set by social choice concepts; game theory; Nash, Bayesian and Walrasian equilibria; complete and incomplete information. Besides in-depth treatments of well-established parts of mechanism and implementation theory, contributions on novel directions deal, for instance, with a quantum approach to game and decision making under uncertainty; digitalization; and the design of block chain for trading. The outstanding competence and reputation of the authors reflect the appreciation of the fundamental contributions and the lasting admiration of the personality and the work of Leonid Hurwicz.

How to Divide When There Isn't Enough develops a rigorous yet accessible presentation of the state-of-the-art for the adjudication of conflicting claims and the theory of taxation. It covers all aspects one may wish to know about claims problems: the most important rules, the most important axioms, and how these two sets are related. More generally, it also serves as an introduction to the modern theory of economic design, which in the last twenty years has revolutionized many areas of economics, generating a wide range of applicable allocations rules that have improved people's lives in many ways. In developing the theory, the book employs a variety of techniques that will appeal to both experts and non-experts. Compiling decades of research into a single framework, William Thomson provides numerous applications that will open a large number of avenues for future research.

The book treats two approaches to decision theory: (1) the normative, purporting to determine how a 'perfectly rational' actor ought to choose among available alternatives; (2) the descriptive, based on observations of how people actually choose in real life and in laboratory experiments. The mathematical tools used in the normative approach range from elementary algebra to matrix and differential equations. Sections on different levels can be studied independently. Special emphasis is made on 'offshoots' of both theories to cognitive psychology, theoretical biology, and philosophy.

Game Theory: Introduction and Applications provides the student of business studies or economics with an introduction to the applications of game theory in a wide range of situations. Dr Romp avoids advanced mathematics, developing arguments with the extensive use of examples and diagrams to provide a textbook aimed at the second and third year undergraduate.

Games of Strategy remains the most accessible principles-level text for courses in game theory, addressing a remarkably broad range of concepts in a narrative that is both clear and compelling. Using resonant real-world examples, the authors simplify difficult theoretic ideas, helping students see the value of strategic thinking in a variety of situations. The text has been carefully updated for this new] edition, including thorough revisions of the sections on sequential- and simultaneous-move games and those on voting and auctioning.

Game theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory.

Game Theory isn't just for poker players or economists. You don't have to be a microeconomics or political science expert to understand it _ discover the theory of decision making and optimize your strategic thinking with the help of Gladiators, Pirates and Games of Trust.Have you ever struggled to make a decision? Tried to figure out the winning bidding strategy at an auction? Wondered how best to split the bill in a restaurant? Divide an inheritance? Wished you were better at negotiating? Thought about how to discourage a spouse from cheating?Then Haim Shapira's fascinating exploration of Game Theory and how it affects our everyday life will delight and captivate you. Topics include how to respond to ultimatums, playing chicken, the diner's dilemma, the blackmailer's paradox and matchmaking strategies.Make buying this book your first winning decision.

The advent of noncooperative game theory over the past two decades has brought about a mild revolution in economics. This book presents an accessible, non-technical discussion of the basic concepts from noncooperative theory, and explores the strengths, weaknesses, and future of the theory as a tool for economists.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory-including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information-in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.

Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In "Mathematics and Democracy," Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social-choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly.

One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.