The field of artificial economics (AE) embraces a broad range of methodologies relying on computer simulations in order to model and study the complexity of economic and social phenomena. The overarching principle of AE is the analysis of aggregate properties of artificial economies populated by adaptive agents that are equipped with behavioural rules and specific individual targets. These aggregate properties are neither foreseen nor intended by the artificial agents; conversely they are emerging characteristics of such artificially simulated systems. The book presents a peer-reviewed collection of papers addressing a variety of issues related to macroeconomics, industrial organization, networks, management and finance, as well as purely methodological issues.

Game theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games.

Game theory explains how to make good choices when different decision makers have conflicting interests. The classical approach assumes that decision makers are committed to making the best choices for themselves regardless of the effect on others, but such an approach is less appropriate when cooperation, compromise and negotiation are important. This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. Using classical binary preference relations as a point of departure, the book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others. As these conditional preferences propagate through a group of decision makers, they create social bonds that lead to notions of group concordance. This book is intended for all students and researchers of decision theory and game theory.

This unified treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. Future networks will rely on autonomous and distributed architectures to improve the efficiency and flexibility of mobile applications, and game theory provides the ideal framework for designing efficient and robust distributed algorithms. This book enables readers to develop a solid understanding of game theory, its applications and its use as an effective tool for addressing wireless communication and networking problems. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies including 3G networks, wireless LANs, sensor networks, dynamic spectrum access and cognitive networks. The book also covers a wide range of techniques for modeling, designing and analysing communication networks using game theory, as well as state-of-the-art distributed design techniques. This is an ideal resource for communications engineers, researchers, and graduate and undergraduate students.

Traditional game theory has been successful at developing strategy in games of incomplete information: when one player knows something that the other does not. But it has little to say about games of complete information, for example, tic-tac-toe, solitaire and hex. The main challenge of combinatorial game theory is to handle combinatorial chaos, where brute force study is impractical. In this comprehensive volume, Jozsef Beck shows readers how to escape from the combinatorial chaos via the fake probabilistic method, a game-theoretic adaptation of the probabilistic method in combinatorics. Using this, the author is able to determine the exact results about infinite classes of many games, leading to the discovery of some striking new duality principles. Available for the first time in paperback, it includes a new appendix to address the results that have appeared since the book's original publication.

Viability theory designs and develops mathematical and algorithmic methods for investigating the adaptation to viability constraints of evolutions governed by complex systems under uncertainty that are found in many domains involving living beings, from biological evolution to economics, from environmental sciences to financial markets, from control theory and robotics to cognitive sciences. It involves interdisciplinary investigations spanning fields that have traditionally developed in isolation. The purpose of this book is to present an initiation to applications of viability theory, explaining and motivating the main concepts and illustrating them with numerous numerical examples taken from various fields.

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

Games provide mathematical models for interaction. Numerous tasks in computer science can be formulated in game-theoretic terms. This fresh and intuitive way of thinking through complex issues reveals underlying algorithmic questions and clarifies the relationships between different domains. This collection of lectures, by specialists in the field, provides an excellent introduction to various aspects of game theory relevant for applications in computer science that concern program design, synthesis, verification, testing and design of multi-agent or distributed systems. Originally devised for a Spring School organised by the GAMES Networking Programme in 2009, these lectures have since been revised and expanded, and range from tutorials concerning fundamental notions and methods to more advanced presentations of current research topics. This volume is a valuable guide to current research on game-based methods in computer science for undergraduate and graduate students. It will also interest researchers working in mathematical logic, computer science and game theory.

A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.

Many relationships in economics, and also in other fields, are both dynamic and nonlinear. A major advance in econometrics over the last fifteen years has been the development of a theory of estimation and inference for dy namic nonlinear models. This advance was accompanied by improvements in computer technology that facilitate the practical implementation of such estimation methods. In two articles in Econometric Reviews, i.e., Potscher and Prucha {1991a, b), we provided -an expository discussion of the basic structure of the asymptotic theory of M-estimators in dynamic nonlinear models and a review of the literature up to the beginning of this decade. Among others, the class of M-estimators contains least mean distance estimators (includ ing maximum likelihood estimators) and generalized method of moment estimators. The present book expands and revises the discussion in those articles. It is geared towards the professional econometrician or statistician. Besides reviewing the literature we also presented in the above men tioned articles a number of then new results. One example is a consis tency result for the case where the identifiable uniqueness condition fails."

These proceedings are from a conference held at the Centre for Regional Science (CERUM) at Umea Umea University, Sweden, 17-18 June 2001. Unlike Un1ike many conference proceedings, this volume contains only on1y invited invited contribu- contribu- tions tions on specified topics so as to make the book coherent and self-contained. The authors and editors hope that this coherence will make the volume use- fu1 fuI also as a text for courses in industrial organisation. To this end two chap- ters on the history of oligopoly theory, from the beginnings with Cournot 1838, to the present day, and one chapter on modem methods for analysing iterated discrete time maps, have been inserted at the beginning ofthe book. Unlike Un1ike most current literature on games and oligopoly, this book is not focused on the usual topics of game theory: optimal strategies, dominance, and equilibrium. Rather it is the evolutionary dynamics, often of a complex type, inc1uding deterministic chaos, which are in focus. The contributions, after the historical and the methodological introductions, represent various segments of the research frontier in this area, though pains have been taken to tie some of the models to a number of most promising contributions from the frugal period 1929-1941, which have suffered from unjust neglect in the following industrial organisation literature.

The problem of efficient or optimal allocation of resources is a fundamental concern of economic analysis. This book provides surveys of significant results of the theory of optimal growth, as well as the techniques of dynamic optimization theory on which they are based. Armed with the results and methods of this theory, a researcher will be in an advantageous position to apply these versatile methods of analysis to new issues in the area of dynamic economics.

Here, two highly experienced authors present an alternative approach to optimal stopping problems. The basic ideas and techniques of the approach can be explained much simpler than the standard methods in the literature on optimal stopping problems. The monograph will teach the reader to apply the technique to many problems in economics and finance, including new ones. From the technical point of view, the method can be characterized as option pricing via the Wiener-Hopf factorization.

Attractors, Bifurcations, & Chaos - now in its second edition - begins with an introduction to mathematical methods in modern nonlinear dynamics and deals with differential equations. Phenomena such as bifurcations and deterministic chaos are given considerable emphasis, both in the methodological part, and in the second part, containing various applications in economics and in regional science. Coexistence of attractors and the multiplicity of development paths in nonlinear systems are central topics. The applications focus on issues such as business cycles, oligopoly, interregional trade dynamics, and economic development theory.

This book systematically presents the main solutions of cooperative games: the core, bargaining set, kernel, nucleolus, and the Shapley value of TU games as well as the core, the Shapley value, and the ordinal bargaining set of NTU games. The authors devote a separate chapter to each solution, wherein they study its properties in full detail. In addition, important variants are defined or even intensively analyzed.

Essays on Cooperative Games collates selected contributions on Cooperative Games. The papers cover both theoretical aspects (Coalition Formation, Values, Simple Games and Dynamic Games) and applied aspects (in Finance, Production, Transportation and Market Games). A contribution on Minimax Theorem (by Ken Binmore) and a brief history of early Game Theory (by Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen) are also enclosed.

Dynamic games continue to attract strong interest from researchers interested in modelling competitive as well as conflict situations exhibiting an intertemporel aspect. Applications of dynamic games have proven to be a suitable methodology to study the behaviour of players (decision-makers) and to predict the outcome of such situations in many areas including engineering, economics, management science, military, biology and political science.

Dynamic Games Theory and Applications collects thirteen articles written by established researchers. It is an excellent reference for researchers and graduate students covering a wide range of emerging and revisited problems in both cooperative and non-cooperative games in different areas of applications, especially in economics and management science.

The ambition of the theory of imperfectly competitive markets is to explain the working of markets in which the issue of strategic interaction among firms is central. Our analysis of this problem will be based on equilibrium concepts borrowed from Game Theory. This research program arises several questions on its feasibility like the empirical relevance of the results, the substantial theoretical insights obtained in this way, etc. Unfortunately, most of these questions can not be answered in the short run. This book is written in the hope that this research strategy is meaningful, but about its final success no body can tell. Another important question is if simpler models could deliver the essential insights offered by the theory of imperfectly competitive mar kets. This Introduction will be devoted to argue that, currently, there is no alternative to the approach presented in this book. Consider the following fact: A square inch of soil in the Explanada of Ali cante (located in front of the sea, right in the middle of downtown) cost several times more than a square inch of soil in San Vicente del Raspeig (located sev eral miles toward the interior of the peninsula). l How can we explain such a thing? First notice that because of the large quantity of possible traders involved in this market, we can safely assume that any agent has to accept the market price, i. e. is a price-taker."

This book offers the basic grasp of general equilibrium theory that is a fundamental background for advanced work in virtually any sub-field of economics, and the thorough understanding of the methods of welfare economics, particularly in a general equilibrium context, that is indispensable for undertaking applied policy analysis. The book uses extensive examples, both simple ones intended to bolster basic concepts, and those illustrating application of the material to economics in practice.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

Game theory is central to understanding human behavior and relevant to all of the behavioral sciences--from biology and economics, to anthropology and political science. However, as "The Bounds of Reason" demonstrates, game theory alone cannot fully explain human behavior and should instead complement other key concepts championed by the behavioral disciplines. Herbert Gintis shows that just as game theory without broader social theory is merely technical bravado, so social theory without game theory is a handicapped enterprise. This edition has been thoroughly revised and updated.

Reinvigorating game theory, "The Bounds of Reason" offers innovative thinking for the behavioral sciences.

Jaroslaw Morawski offers a practicable and theoretically well-founded solution to the problems encountered when investing in illiquid assets and develops a model of the liquidation process for this category of investments. The result is a coherent investment decision framework designed specifically for private real estate but applicable also to other illiquid assets.

Long-rangedependent, or long-memory, time seriesarestationarytime series displaying a statistically signi?cant dependence between very distant obs- vations. We formalize this dependence by assuming that the autocorrelation function of these stationary series decays very slowly, hyperbolically, as a function of the time lag. Many economic series display these empirical features: volatility of asset prices returns, future interest rates, etc. There is a huge statistical literature on long-memory processes, some of this research is highly technical, so that it is cited, but often misused in the applied econometrics and empirical e- nomics literature. The ?rst purpose of this book is to present in a formal and pedagogical way some statistical methods for studying long-range dependent processes. Furthermore, the occurrence of long-memory in economic time series might be a statistical artefact as the hyperbolic decay of the sample autoc- relation function does not necessarily derive from long-range dependent p- cesses. Indeed, the realizations of non-homogeneous processes, e.g., switching regime and change-point processes, display the same empirical features. We thus also present in this book recent statistical methods able to discriminate between the long-memory and change-point alternatives. Going beyond the purely statistical analysis of economic series, it is of interest to determine which economic mechanisms are generating the strong dependence properties of economic series, whether they are genuine, or spu- ous. The regularities of the long-memory and change-point properties across economic time series, e.g., common degree of long-range dependence and/or common change-points, suggest the existence of a common economic cause

For the last few years researchers in business administration have increasingly become aware of the central role of small and medium enterprises for the prosperity of an economy. As a consequence, "entrepeneurship" has grown a most relevant sub-discipline in business administration. This special issue focuses on the specific problems in the field of finance that are essential for small and medium enterprises. The articles offer an excellent overview of research questions lying at the very heart of entrepreneurial finance and thus may serve as the starting point for further interesting investigations.