Isolated by much of the world for its conduct of the war in Vietnam, the United States saw British support as a key component of its efforts to sway public opinion. This is the first serious examination of the impact of the Vietnam War on the Anglo-American "special relationship" during the years of the Johnson presidency. Using recently released government papers, oral interviews, and transcripts of presidential phone conversations, Ellis discusses the discord between the United Kingdom and the United States over the war in Southeast Asia. She focuses on the pressures placed on Prime Minister Harold Wilson's Labor Government to provide material aid to the war and to remain squarely behind the U.S. war effort in public. Britain's refusal to send troops to Vietnam and Wilson's insistence on trying to mediate the conflict were both sources of tension between the allies. This study explores the extent to which the United Kingdom was pressured to send troops to the combat zone, the part that the personal relationship between Wilson and Johnson played in the tensions, and the evidence that a deal was done to link the maintenance of British defenses East of Suez with U.S. support for the pound sterling. It concludes that Wilson managed to walk a political tightrope on Vietnam, providing just enough diplomatic support for the Americans to keep Washington satisfied and putting just enough limits on that support to keep an increasingly vociferous domestic anti-war movement at bay.

Genocide--the deliberate destruction, usually through mass murder, of an ethnic, racial or religious group--is the ultimate crime against humanity. Drawing upon a wide variety of disciplines, this study assesses ways to prevent this crime. While most books about genocide focus on the history of a particular event, such as the Holocaust, or compare case studies to derive empirical theories, this book outlines many practical aspects of genocide prevention.

Heidenrich covers a broad spectrum of expert opinions, from Stanley Hoffmann to Henry Kissinger, as well as political opinions regarding genocide that range from Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton. Topics include international law, humanitarian intervention, early warning measures, and the effectiveness of such methods as diplomacy, economic pressure, and nonviolent resistance. Preventing genocide in a tense socio-political environment is no easy task, but such prevention is easier and more cost-effective than trying to put an end to genocide once it is already occurring.

This edited volume discusses the role of innovation and regional integration in economic development in Africa. Over the past five decades, post-colonial African countries have struggled to break loose from the trap of poverty and underdevelopment through the adoption of various development strategies at regional, national, and continental levels. However, the results of both national and regional efforts at advancing development on the continent have been mixed. Although the importance of agglomeration and fusion of institutions have long been recognized as possible path to achieving economic development in Africa, the approach to regionalism has been unduly focused on market integration, while neglecting other dimensions such as social policy, mobility of labor, educational policy, biotechnology, regional legislation, manufacturing, innovation, and science and technology. This volume investigates the link between innovation, regional integration, and development in Africa, arguing that the immediate and long term development of Africa lies not just in the structural transformation of its economies but in the advancement of scientific and innovation capacities. The book is divided into four parts. Part I addresses the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of innovation and regional integration in Africa. Part II presents case studies which examine how regional economic institutions are fostering innovation in Africa. Part III of the book deals with sectoral issues on innovation and integrated development in Africa. Part IV sets the future research on innovation, regional integration, and development in Africa. Combining theoretical analysis and a comparative, interdisciplinary approach, this volume is appropriate for researchers and students interested in economic development, political economy, African studies, international relations, agricultural science, and geography, as well as policymakers in regional economic communities and the African Union.

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the U.S. failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy--missile diplomacy--to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage withNorth Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

This book examines the relations between Nigeria and South Africa and their implications for regional influence across the African continent. With the largest and third largest economies in the region and a historical status as the major peacemakers on the continent, it is often argued that Africa's fate is directly linked to the success or failure of these regional powers. While there is widespread reference to each state's capabilities and regional influence in the extant literature, little analysis is offered on relations between Nigeria and South Africa and their impact on regional governance and provision of public goods on the continent. This book attempts to fill the gap by engaging issues such as the hegemonic competence of the states, their credentials for a permanent seat at the UNSC, their efforts towards regional integration, and their efforts towards combating the dark side of globalization including climate change, drug trafficking and xenophobia. It also engages a gender perspective to these states' relations as well as their experiences of transitional justice. Providing an in-depth comparative analysis of the two so called African powerhouses, this volume will be of interest to policy-makers, academics and students interested in Nigeria and South Africa's foreign policy, regional powerhood, and the African peace, security, and development agenda.

This book deals with transnationalism and captures its singularity as a generalized phenomenon. The profusion of transnational communities is a factor of fluidity in social orders and represents confrontations between contingencies and basic socio-cultural drives. It has created a new era different from the past at essential respects. This is an age of enriching cultural diversity fraught with threatening risks inextricably linked to contemporary globalization. National sovereignty is eroded from above by global processes, from below by aspirations of sub-national groups, and from the sides - by transnational allegiances. This is the backdrop against which this book delves into the fundamental issues relating to the nature, scope and overall significance of transnationalism.

This important volume examines the vast potential of--and critical need for--cooperation among the neighboring states of the Pacific Rim. From economic and security matters to cultural and environmental concerns, the Pacific Century will require increased cross-border education, communication, and cooperation, which can be enhanced by regional organizations and agreements. This work offers a compilation of new thinking from international political, business, and academic leaders on the challenges facing the Pacific Rim in the next century, and proposes the emerging Pacific community as a model for global cooperation.

Celik examines how the easing of the East-West tensions, the end of the Cold War, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union affects Turkey's foreign policy. During the Cold War, Ankara's role as a front-line state in containing Soviet expansionism had greatly influenced its foreign policy orientation as well as its foreign policy behavior. As such, changes in the structure of the international system were bound to alter the ways in which Turkey interacted with other states in the post-Cold War world.

An examination of Turkish foreign policy, however, shows a high degree of continuity and stability. While Turkey's security environment has improved significantly during the 1990s, political and military considerations continue to drive Ankara's behavior. Furthermore, despite shifts in foreign policy behavior--such as closer relations with the former Soviet republics, active involvement in the Persian Gulf War, and military alliance with Israel--there have been no major alterations in foreign policy orientation. Turkey remains staunchly pro-western and the United States continues to be its most important ally. The post-Cold War era, however, also has brought an element of uncertainty to Turkish foreign policy and raises questions about its direction for the future.

A staggering number of post-World War II White House and agency records pertaining to national security are stored in repositories nationwide, but researchers often find it impossible to locate and access these records. This book provides considerable detail on the quantity, nature, and public accessibility of the records at the National Archives, Federal records centers, the agencies themselves, presidential libraries, and smaller repositories. The author also discusses the critical importance of federal records management policies, classification and declassification policies, and the need for improved compliance with these policies.

The public has never had a comprehensive guide to assist in identifying, locating, and gaining access to agency and White House national security records. The author tells the reader where national security-related records are located, which ones are accessible to the public, and which ones are not. He also discusses the vital role of federal records management policies in determining the ultimate disposition of records and where the records are stored. In addition, he sets forth the policies governing the classification and declassification of records and the reasons the vast majority of records are still inaccessible to the public. Both beginning and experienced researchers will find this work to be of great assistance.

The demise of the Cold War continues to pose new challenges to the international system. Central to these challenges is the extent of German and Japanese security commitments within their regions and to the global maintenance of peace and stability. It is important to know whether two of the world's acknowledged economic powers will play significant stabilizing roles. If they choose not to, what are the reasons and what can be done to convince them that their military might and political leadership are critical? Certainly in the first decade since the end of the Cold War, Germany and Japan did not fulfill the roles that their allies and many realist scholars expected they would.

Haar seeks to explain German and Japanese reticence to assume their anticipated roles. In order to undertake this task she evaluates, various models of foreign policy. In the future, Haar asserts, Japanese and German foreign policy are likely to remain torn, with both practicing a have-it-all-ways policy. If their allies, the United States in particular, continue to insist that they bear more of the burdens of world security, then their foreign policy must be better understood. This is a provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to scholars, researchers, and policy makers involved with German and Japanese foreign policy analysis.

Domestic economic and ideological concerns during the Cold War drove many national leaders to promote U.S. international activism. This study presents the domestic sources and goals underlying the creation of America's Cold War policies and the selling of those policies to the public. Its examination of the Advertising Council illustrates how those activist international foreign policies reflected the domestic agenda of the Council's private supporters. By cooperating with the Ad Council, the American business community enlisted in the domestic propaganda programs of the wartime and early postwar years in an attempt to defeat the continued threats they perceived from the New Deal. This emerges as a central goal and consequence of advertising's promotion of President Truman's Cold War policies.

The Advertising Council's representation of the moderate businessmen of the early postwar years casts a sharp light on the continuing accommodations made with the expansion of governmental power after the war and the shifting cooperation between the moderate and conservative wings of business to reshape that federal power. The Council's private propaganda programs, presented in commercial and public service advertising, related most American problems, such as race relations, labor relations, conservation and even safe driving, among others, to an asserted total foreign threat. That propaganda hoped to convince Americans that their security, prosperity, and freedom all required shaping the world in a way that protected the nation's free-enterprise political economy--presented as the source of all American freedoms.

The Munitions Inquiry, often called the Nye Committee after its chairperson, Senator Gerald Nye, critically examined the pre-World War II military-industrial complex of government agencies, corporations, labor unions, and financial institutions. Cold War-era historians typically presented the inquiry as a naive isolationist search for evil arms dealers who caused wars. Going beyond the concept of the Merchants of Death theory and into the social, intellectual, political, and cultural currents of the 1930s, Coulter expands the dimensions of a topic formerly framed within the narrow confines of isolationism and internationalism. In addition, he shows how the committee's 19th-century values and progressive idealism were unsuited to an era dominated by Hitler and Mussolini. In divesting the Munitions Inquiry of its image as an historical oddity, this book recovers a piece of American history that had been a casualty of World War II and the Cold War.

How did the United States move from position of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1960s to a period of arms control based on nuclear parity the doctrine of mutual assured destruction in 1972? Drawing on declassified records of conversations between three presidents and their most trusted advisors, this book provides a new and fascinating answer to this question. John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon struggled to reconcile their own personal convictions on the nuclear arms race with the very different views of the public and Congress. In doing so they engaged in a double game, hiding their true beliefs behind a facade of strategic language while grappling in private with the complex realities of the nuclear age. The book shows how Kennedy and Johnson consistently worried about the domestic political costs of their actions, pushing ahead with an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system for the United States for fear of the domestic political consequences of scrapping both the system and the doctrine of strategic superiority on which it was based. By contrast, the abrupt change in U.S. public and congressional opinion in 1969 forced Nixon to give up America's first ABM and the U.S. lead in offensive ballistic missiles through agreements with the Soviet Union, despite his conviction that the U.S. needed a nuclear edge over the USSR to maintain the security of the West. By placing this dynamic at the center of the story, the book provides a completely new overarching interpretation of this pivotal period in the development of U.S. nuclear policy.

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the British Government, the banks, and leading individuals in London reached historic decisions that determined the name, shape, nature, and future of the region known as the Middle East. In this fascinating and readable book, Roger Adelson examines who made policy, on what grounds, with what information, and with what results. The setting for the narrative is London, then the world's greatest metropolis and its financial and political center. Adelson evokes the atmosphere of Whitehall, Fleet Street, the City of London, and Westminster, and paints a vivid portrait of the individuals (Churchill, Lloyd George, Curzon, Cromer, and others) who established the international agenda. Using an extensive range of public and private archives, he identifies issues of money, power, and territorial ambition at the heart of policy, and he describes decisions made in ignorance of and often wholly without reference to local interests. The book explores and explains British diplomacy both before and after the 1914-1918 War: the protection of the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf; the fear of a German drive to the East and subjugation of the Turks; the discovery of oil; the post-war suppression of nationalist aspirations and the establishment of collaborative regimes more in tune with London than with the Middle East itself. More clearly than any previous work, it identifies the virtual invention of the modern Middle East and the roots of the ethnic and nationalist antagonisms that characterize the region today.

Relations between Japan and the European Union rarely hit the headlines. And yet, based upon decades of incremental developments, their bilateral partnership has come to cover a wide range of activities. This book traces the history of that mutual interaction and assesses how Japan and the EU together have the potential to offer joint solutions to the problems of the 21st century.

As the world moves further into the Information Age and the ensuing increased levels of globalization, the ability to harness all of the elements of national power in an integrated, coordinated, and synchronized manner will be even more critical for the United States to successfully defend itself. Gerstein argues that the United States as a nation is largely unprepared to reap the full benefits of the Information Age and unable to address an increasing threat level because its methods, procedures, and ways of thinking remain anchored to the Industrial Age that is rapidly being left behind. To understand and adapt to this emerging environment, the United States must re-examine the development and the implementation of national security strategy. Gerstein examines the history of U.S. national security strategy, and he analyzes the results and conclusions of several capstone documents, including the National Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Homeland Security Strategy of the United States (2002), the Commission of National Security/21st Century, and the 9/11 Commission Report. After evaluating the execution of U.S. national security strategy, Gerstein maintains that U.S. efforts today are more heavily weighted to the use of "hard power"--political, military, and intelligence resources--for achieving strategic goals and objectives. A strategy that incorporates more fully the elements of national power, including "soft power" such as economic, social, cultural, and informational capabilities will better serve the interests of the nation. In addition, Gerstein proposes a new way of looking at strategy. Typically, strategy has been defined as the linking of ways and means toachieve ends while mitigating risk. In the future, we must factor environment into any discussion.

This thought-provoking book points out that the most significant change in international relations in the 20th century was not the defeat of communism, nor the end of the Cold War, but the huge advances in communications technologies. Hisham Nazer, a leading Saudi Arabian intellectual and petroleum industry leader, argues that the West has used its control over these capabilities to superimpose its cultural and political values on the rest of the world. CNN, films and television, and the Internet have become the means of promoting Western products--including soft drinks, detergents, and even the ideals of democracy and human rights--in relatively powerless non-Western nations. This process of creating a global culture through the propagation of Western political and philosophical constructs as world brands poses grave dangers for the entire international community. As countries become aware of their exploitation, the possibilities for frustration and violence become increasingly real.

"Power of a Third Kind" is directed toward Western and non-Western leaders alike. For the former, it provides a new perspective from outside the mirror of our Western culture, pointing out that current practices are actually endangering the security of our hemisphere. The author calls on Western leaders to work on a dialogue with other societies as an alternative to exporting to them a monologue designed for passive absorption. And for the latter, this book will inspire them to steer out of their current course in time to protect their histories and the integrity of their cultures. Through meaningful dialogue, well-meaning nations will find a way for the most beneficial aspects of Western culture--self-rule and basic human rights--to evolve within the context of local cultures, resulting in a world both more stable and more humane.

Analyzes environmental problems and policies in developing countries around the world and discusses new prospects for international cooperation and funding. Considers hard political choices, who is to blame for environmental decay, who should pay to overcome problems, and how policies should be administered. Experts from different countries offer their perspectives about the role of multilateral agencies, the North-South dimensions of environmental problems since 1972, internal and external factors that have affected Third World development, new measures and opportunities since the Rio Summit conference, and case studies of representative countries--India, China, Indonesia, Africa, Nigeria, Chile, and Mexico. A bibliography enhances this authoritative study for the use of political scientists, economists, and public administrators, for teachers, students, and professionals.

Doctrines have been a prevalent form of foreign policy in U.S. history. This study seeks to explain their origins by examining the Reagan Doctrine, pledging aid to anticommunist guerillas in the Third World. Based on original research and interviews with numerous individuals in the Reagan administration, the author applies two alternative explanations: realist theory, focusing on the international level of analysis, and elite beliefs theory, focusing on individual political leaders and their beliefs. What he finds is that while each perspective is necessary to explain the Reagan Doctrine, neither is sufficient by itself.

Beyond the Arab Cold War brings the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68, to the forefront of modern Middle East History. During the 1960s, in the wake of a coup against Imam Muhammad al-Badr and the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Yemen was transformed into an arena of global conflict. Believing al-Badr to be dead, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and most countries recognized the YAR. But when al-Badr unexpectedly turned up alive, Saudi Arabia and Britain offered support to the deposed Imam, drawing Yemen into an internationally-sponsored civil war. Throughout six years of major conflict, Yemen sat at the crossroads of regional and international conflict as dozens of countries, international organizations, and individuals intervened in the local South Arabian civil war. Yemen was a showcase for a new era of UN and Red Cross peacekeeping, clandestine activity, Egyptian counterinsurgency, and one of the first largescale uses of poison gas since WWI. Events in Yemen were not dominated by a single power, nor were they sole products of US-Soviet or Saudi-Egyptian Arab Cold War rivalry. Britain, Canada, Israel, the UN, the US, and the USSR joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia in assuming varying roles in fighting, mediating, and supplying the belligerent forces. Despite Cold War tensions, Americans and Soviets appeared on the same side of the Yemeni conflict and acted mutually to confine Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the borders of South Arabia. The end of the Yemen Civil War marked the end of both Nasser's Arab Nationalist colonial expansion and the British Empire in the Middle East, two of the most dominant regional forces. This internationalized conflict was a pivotal event in Middle East history, overseeing the formation of a modern Yemeni state, the fall of Egyptian and British regional influence, another Arab-Israeli war, Saudi dominance of the Arabian Peninsula, and shifting power alliances in the Middle East that continue to lie at the core of modern-day conflicts in South Arabia.

The relationship between Britain and Greece, situated at the opposite ends of Europe has been close and troubled, especially since the emergence of Greece as an independent state in the 1830s. The essays in this book, some previously unpublished, focus on aspects of British-Greek relations, military, diplomatic and academic, during the 20th century. A particular area of interest is the Second World War, when British involvement in Greek affairs reached it climax, just before she surrendered her role as Greece's principal external patron to the United States.

Oswald argues that European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs-their ability to take care of their own crises-will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management. At the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the postcommunist transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, the U.S.-led NATO alliance found itself without its erstwhile primary enemy. While NATO found new purpose as guarantor of stability for an increasing membership and crisis manager in Southeast Europe, the alliance's expansion also advanced its transformation from a collective defense organization into a security community. While NATO was redefining itself, the European Union created the institutional and political prerequisites for a European security and defense policy. In his analysis of Europe's emancipation from security dependence on the United States, Oswald expects the economic strength of the European bloc to translate into responsibility for regional security. Yet this is not to say that the EU is emerging as the primary challenger to U.S. hegemony. Instead, Oswald argues, European security autonomy will lead to a more balanced transatlantic partnership, even though American military might will remain far superior. As U.S. leaders indicate a willingness to disengage from their former European protectorate, the Europeanization of Europe's own security needs-their ability to take care of their own crises-will proceed apace. An understanding of this process is key to an American foreign policy that recognizes Europe as a strategic actor in its own right, an indispensable ally with its own military and nonmilitary instruments of crisis management.

R. William Johnstone served on the transportation security staff of the 9/11 Commission, and wrote this book to build upon and supplement the Commission's work. In its pages, he explains the aviation security system failure on 9/11, uses that as a means for evaluating post-9/11 transportation security efforts, and proposes remedies to continued shortcomings. 9/11 and the Future of Transportation Security is based on information originally provided to the 9/11 Commission, augmented by unpublished reports and a wealth of other material that has come to light since the issuance of the Commission's own report in July 2004. Part One analyzes the aviation security system's history and institutions to explain why the system failed on 9/11. Part Two looks at what has been done in aviation and transportation security since 9/11, including the Commission's recommendations and the congressional response to them. Finally and most significantly, Part Three outlines a suggested approach for improving current U.S. transportation security. It begins with fundamental policy questions that must be answered if we are to optimize transportation security efforts, and concludes with both underlying principles for action and specific recommendations.

In 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to the newly founded People's Republic of China. But it took 22 years for Britain to establish full diplomatic relations with China. How far was Britain's China policy a failure until 1972? This book argues that Britain and China were involved in the 'everyday Cold War', or a continuous process of contestation and cooperation that allowed them to 'normalize' their confrontation in the absence of full diplomatic relations. From Vietnam and Taiwan to the mainland and Hong Kong, China's 'everyday Cold War' against Britain was marked by diplomatic ritual, propaganda rhetoric and symbolic gestures. Rather than pursuing a failed policy of 'appeasement', British decision-makers and diplomats regarded engagement or negotiation with China as the best way of fighting the 'everyday Cold War'. Based on extensive British and Chinese archival sources, this book examines not only the high politics of Anglo-Chinese relations, but also how the British diplomats experienced the Cold War at the local level.