Behavioral and Neural Genetics of Zebrafish assembles the state-of-the-art methodologies and current concepts pertinent to their neurobehavioral genetics. Discussing their natural behavior, motor function, learning and memory, this book focuses on the fry and adult zebrafish, featuring a comprehensive account of modern genetic and neural methods adapted to, or specifically developed for, Danio rerio. Numerous examples of how these behavioral methods may be utilized for disease models using the zebrafish are presented, as is a section on bioinformatics and "big-data" related questions.

Vision dominates philosophical thinking about perception, and theorizing about experience in cognitive science has traditionally focused on a visual model. In a radical departure from established practice, Casey O'Callaghan provides a systematic treatment of sound and sound experience, and shows how thinking about audition and appreciating the relationships between multiple sense modalities can enrich our understanding of perception and the mind.
Sounds proposes a novel theory of sounds and auditory perception. Against the widely accepted philosophical view that sounds are among the secondary or sensible qualities, O'Callaghan argues that, on any perceptually plausible account, sounds are events. But this does not imply that sounds are waves that propagate through a medium, such as air or water. Rather, sounds are events that take place in one's environment at or near the objects and happenings that bring them about. This account captures the way in which sounds essentially are creatures of time, and situates sounds in a world populated by items and events that have significance for us. Sounds are not ethereal, mysterious entities.
O'Callaghan's account of sounds and their perception discloses far greater variety among the kinds of things we perceive than traditional views acknowledge. But more importantly, investigating sounds and audition demonstrates that considering other sense modalities teaches what we could not otherwise learn from thinking exclusively about the visual. Sounds articulates a powerful account of echoes, reverberation, Doppler effects, and perceptual constancies that surpasses the explanatory richness of alternative theories, and also reveals a number ofsurprising cross-modal perceptual illusions. O'Callaghan argues that such illusions demonstrate that the perceptual modalities cannot be completely understood in isolation, and that the visuocentric model for theorizing about perception --according to which perceptual modalities are discrete modes of experience and autonomous domains of philosophical and scientific inquiry--ought to be abandoned.

Recent research across the disciplines of cognitive science has exerted a profound influence on how many philosophers approach problems about the nature of mind. These philosophers, while attentive to traditional philosophical concerns, are increasingly drawing both theory and evidence from empirical disciplines - both the framing of the questions and how to resolve them. However, this familiarity with the results of cognitive science has led to the raising of an entirely new set of questions about the mind and how we study it, questions which not so long ago philosophers did not even pose, let alone address. This volume offers an overview of this burgeoning field that balances breadth and depth, with chapters covering every aspect of the psychology and cognitive anthropology. Each chapter provides a critical and balanced discussion of a core topic while also conveying distinctive viewpoints and arguments. Several of the chapters are co-authored collaborations between philosophers and scientists.

Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework.
In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative ideas of interest.

Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Although causal reasoning is a component of most of our cognitive functions, it has been neglected in cognitive psychology for many decades. The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning offers a state-of-the-art review of the growing field, and its contribution to the world of cognitive science. The Handbook begins with an introduction of competing theories of causal learning and reasoning. In the next section, it presents research about basic cognitive functions involved in causal cognition, such as perception, categorization, argumentation, decision-making, and induction. The following section examines research on domains that embody causal relations, including intuitive physics, legal and moral reasoning, psychopathology, language, social cognition, and the roles of space and time. The final section presents research from neighboring fields that study developmental, phylogenetic, and cultural differences in causal cognition. The chapters, each written by renowned researchers in their field, fill in the gaps of many cognitive psychology textbooks, emphasizing the crucial role of causal structures in our everyday lives. This Handbook is an essential read for students and researchers of the cognitive sciences, including cognitive, developmental, social, comparative, and cross-cultural psychology; philosophy; methodology; statistics; artificial intelligence; and machine learning.

Trust is at the root of all positive relationships. This accessible and empowering book teaches how to form an inner circle of trusted confidants in your workplace and at home that will allow you to live a more peaceful and more effective life, reduce stress, and better deal with negative emotions. Building trust is crucial for effective leadership, and trusting others is a necessary part of working with others. But knowing whom to trust-and whom not to trust-eludes many people. A surprising number of people report that being betrayed by someone in their "inner circle" either at work or in their personal lives is one of the most devastating things they have endured. Lack of trust is also expensive in that it costs companies money to surveil employees; and in our personal lives, if we live with people we cannot trust, we expend needless amounts of energy protecting ourselves from these untrustworthy people. How do we increase trust, bounce back from betrayal, and form alliances and positive relationships with those who ARE trustworthy? This book provides a unique examination of trust and its often-overlooked importance to our work and personal lives. It identifies the characteristics of a trusting relationship, considers the decision-making process that people should make before granting individuals admission to their own "inner circle," and teaches how to tell the "good guys" from the "bad guys" in our work environments and life in general. This revised and updated edition contains new information on the negative mental and physical aspects of telling lies; how to better manage our emotions, which allows us to become "better guys" ourselves; strategies for building more trusting relationships in our families; and how trust works-and doesn't work-online in the Internet age. It also includes a useful "Family Board Meeting" tool for having family meetings in a way that encourages honest and open dialogue between family members regardless of age or family structure. Presents a system for assessing "the good guys and the bad guys"-in other words, the trustworthy and untrustworthy people that surround all of us in every arena of life Provides tools for assessing our own trustworthiness as well as for evaluating our own willingness to trust another Gives readers effective methods for dealing with forgiveness, coping, and reconciliation; managing "conditional" trust relationships; and for becoming more trustworthy to themselves Suggests a practical "Honesty Challenge" that dares readers to be more truthful-and as a result, more successful

The Chomskian revolution in linguistics gave rise to a new orthodoxy about mind and language. Michael Devitt throws down a provocative challenge to that orthodoxy. What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there a 'language faculty'? These questions are crucial to our developing understanding of ourselves; Michael Devitt offers refreshingly original answers. He argues that linguistics is about linguistic reality and is not part of psychology; that linguistic rules are not represented in the mind; that speakers are largely ignorant of their language; that speakers' intuitions do not reflect information supplied by the language faculty and are not the main evidence for grammars; that the rules of 'Universal Grammar' are largely, if not entirely, innate structure rules of thought; indeed, that there is little or nothing to the language faculty. Devitt's controversial theses will prove highly stimulating to anyone working on language and the mind.

Our experience of objects (and consequently our theorizing about them) is very rich. We perceive objects as possessing individuation conditions. They appear to have boundaries in space and time, for example, and they appear to move independently of a background of other objects or a landscape. In Ontology Without Boundaries Jody Azzouni undertakes an analysis of our concept of object, and shows what about that notion is truly due to the world and what about it is a projection onto the world of our senses and thinking. Location and individuation conditions are our product: there is no echo of them in the world. Features, the ways that objects seem to be, aren't projections. Azzouni shows how the resulting austere metaphysics tames a host of ancient philosophical problems about constitution ("Ship of Theseus," "Sorities"), as well as contemporary puzzles about reductionism. In addition, it's shown that the same sorts of individuation conditions for properties, which philosophers use to distinguish between various kinds of odd abstracta-universals, tropes, and so on, are also projections. Accompanying our notion of an object is a background logic that makes cogent ontological debate about anything from Platonic objects to Bigfoot. Contemporary views about this background logic ("quantifier variance") make ontological debate incoherent. Azzouni shows how a neutral interpretation of quantifiers and quantifier domains makes sense of both philosophical and pre-philosophical ontological debates. Azzouni also shows how the same apparatus makes sense of our speaking about a host of items-Mickey Mouse, unicorns, Martians-that nearly all of us deny exist. It's allowed by what Azzouni shows about the background logic of our ontological debates, as well as the semantics of the language of those debates that we can disagree over the existence of things, like unicorns, without that background logic and semantics forcing ontological commitments onto speakers that they don't have.

The Psychology of Learning and Motivation publishes empirical and theoretical contributions in cognitive and experimental psychology, ranging from classical and instrumental conditioning to complex learning and problem solving. Volume 46 contains chapters on category learning, prototypes, prospective memory, event memory, memory models, and musical prosody.
*Discusses the concepts of category learning, prototypes, prospective memory, event memory, memory models, and musical prosody
*Volume 46 of the highly regarded Psychology of Learning and Motivation series
*An essential reference for researchers and academics in cognitive science

Magnetic resonance imaging methods have taken a commanding position in brain studies because they allow scientists to follow brain activities in the living human. The ability to measure cerebral anatomy, neuronal firing and brain metabolism has extended and re-invigorated hopes of understanding the role that brain activity plays in human life. The brain has assumed a central role in our thinking of the world that can be traced back to the philosophies that are expressed in psychology, religion, literature, and everyday life. Brain scientists, planning and measuring brain activities by imaging methods, have consciously or unconsciously been influenced by these philosophical views. This book, in describing the experiments using imaging methods, traces how assumptions about the nature of brain function made in planning scientific experiments are the consequences of philosophical positions. Experiments that relate brain activities to observable behavior are shown to avoid the philosophical and psychological assumptions about mental processes that have been proposed to underlie these behaviors. These promising, empirical experiments are consistent with the philosophy of Pragmatism which, in judging hypotheses about understanding by their consequences, has questioned the value of everyday conceptualizations of brain activity for imaging studies.

Time Distortions in Mind brings together current research on aspects of temporal processing in clinical populations, in the ultimate hope of elucidating the interdependence between perturbations in timing and disturbances in the mind and brain. Such research may inform not only typical psychological functioning, but may also elucidate the psychological consequences of any pathophysiological differences in temporal processing. This collection of current knowledge on temporal processing in clinical populations is an excellent reference for the student and scientist interested in the topic, but it also serves as the stepping-stone to share ideas and push forward the advancement in understanding how distorted timing can lead to a disturbed brain and mind or vice versa. Contributors to this volume: Ryan D. Ward, Billur Avlar, Peter D Balsam, Deana B. Davalos, Jamie Opper, Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell, Helene Wilquin, Mariama Dione, Anne Giersch, Laurence Lalanne, Mitsouko van Assche, Patrick E. Poncelet, Mark A. Elliott, Deborah L. Harrington, Stephen M. Rao, Catherine R.G. Jones, Marjan Jahanshahi, Bon-Mi Gu, Anita J. Jurkowski, Jessica I. Lake, Chara Malapani, Warren H. Meck, Rebecca M. C. Spencer, Dawn Wimpory, Brad Nicholas, Elzbieta Szelag, Aneta Szymaszek, Anna Oron, Melissa J. Allman, Christine M. Falter, Argiro Vatakis, Alexandra Elissavet Bakou

Language plays a major role in our daily lives. Humans are specialized to live in a social environment, and our brains are "designed" to manage interactions with others which are, for the most part, accomplished through words. Language allows us to function both cognitively and interpersonally, and without language there are constraints on our ability to interact with others. Language also plays a major role in that specialized form of interpersonal interaction that we call psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. In that setting we use words to express and communicate meaning clearly, and through spoken language we help our patients to organize and modify their experiences of self and of the world, fostering adaptive change. Like the air we breathe, when our language serves its function it is transparent to us. We notice it most when it fails. When it does fail its basic function, in life and in psychotherapy, it fails to reliably, effectively, and comfortably help us to connect with others, as we deal with the world around us. In Language and Connection in Psychotherapy: Words Matter, Dr. Mary Davis addresses the role of language in our lives, both internally, in creating psychic structure and regulating affect, and interpersonally, in facilitating relationships with the figures that have shaped our development and that inhabit our adult lives. Using clinical material to illustrate, Davis looks at the development of language and its role in creating our personalities, at the life events which can distort our use of language to interact with others, and the ways that language can lead to misunderstanding as well as to understanding. Throughout, Language and Connection in Psychotherapy: Words Matter explores various facets of the ways in which words matter as well as the times when words are important but not sufficient to our ability to communicate interpersonally. Davis suggests that the psychotherapist is a master in bridging the gap between being and saying: she can be conceptualized as an "interpreter," one who turns behavioral language into verbal language, action language into words, emotions into thoughts, who focuses and uses the capacity of words to help us connect both with our internal selves and with others.

The science of intelligence has created a plethora of theories and measurements, which have various applications of both computational, social, and managerial significance. Relational Thinking Styles and Natural Intelligence: Assessing Inference Patterns for Computational Modeling explores a specific set of intelligence theories, unifying and quantifying to create a verifiable model of various inferencing habits. Relational Thinking Styles suggests that the inferencing patterns described and demonstrated by this model may provide a platform from which to examine and integrate various aspects of natural intelligence and how these are expressed. This research provides valuable information for businesses, social services, and any decision-making process involving intelligence assessment.

How can we best describe the processes by which we visually perceive our environment? Contemporary perceptual theory still lacks a coherent theoretical position that encompasses both the limitations on the information that can be retained from a single eye fixation and the abundant phenomenal and behavioral evidence for the perception of an extended and coherent world. As a result, many leading theorists and researchers in visual perception are turning with new or renewed interest to the work of Julian Hochberg.
For over 50 years, in his own experimental research, in his detailed consideration of examples drawn from a wide range of visual experiences and activities, and most of all in his brilliant and sophisticated theoretical analyses, Hochberg has persistently engaged with the myriad problems inherent in working out the kind of coherent theoretical position the field currently lacks. The complexity of his thought and the wide range of areas into which Hochberg has pursued the solution to this central problem have, however, limited both the accessibility of his work and the appreciation of his accomplishment.
In this volume we seek to bring the full range of Hochberg's work to the attention of a wider audience by offering a selection of his key works, many taken from out-of-print or relatively inaccessible sources. To facilitate the understanding of his accomplishment, and of what his work has to offer to contemporary researchers and theorists in visual perception, we include commentaries on salient aspects of his work by 20 noted researchers.
In the Mind's Eye will be of interest to researchers working on topics such as perceptual organization, visual attention, spaceperception, motion perception, visual cognition, the relationship between perception and action, picture perception, and film, who are striving to obtain a deeper understanding of their own fields, and who want to integrate this understanding into a broader, unified view of visual perceptual processing.

The four authors of this book recognize that no one on the common human journey to the 21st century can pick the best route without consulting a map--that is to say, an interconnected set of understandings about what in a given situation is important, what demands action and attention, and what does not. The problem, they contend, is that the picture of the world we each carry in our mind may not be a true mapping of the reality that surrounds us. This picture, the cognitive map, could always be sharper. The authors prompt us to become more conscious of our own cognitive map, and explain how it can be adapted to the exigencies of our changing world so that it can be better-used to guide our steps toward the 21st century.

We all carry a picture of the world in our mind, but is that map an assuredly true layout of the reality that surrounds us? If not, how can we use it to guide our steps toward the 21st century and beyond without creating shocks and surprises that impair our well-being and threaten our survival?

We shall not survive, either as individuals or as a species, if our maps fail to reflect accurately the nature of the world that surrounds us. The authors attempt, through reviewing the origins, development, and current changes in individual and social cognitive maps, to prompt readers to become more conscious of their own map, and hence be better able to adapt it to the exigencies of our changing world. The book ends with a vision of the global bio- and socio-sphere: the unified cognitive map which is emerging in laboratories and workshops of the new physics, the new biology, the new ecology, and the avant-garde branches of the social and historical sciences. But "Changing Visions" recognizes that these sciences alone cannot promote the formation of faithful maps of lived reality, and that religion, common sense, and even art can fill in and sharpen one's world-picture.