Taste is recognized as one of the most evocative senses. The flavors of food play an important role in identity, memory, emotion, desire, and aversion, as well as social, religious and other occasions. Yet despite its fundamental role, taste is often mysteriously absent from discussions about food. Now in its second edition, The Taste Culture Reader examines the sensuous dimensions of eating and drinking and highlights the centrality of taste in human experience. Combining both classic and contemporary sources from anthropology, philosophy, sociology, history, science, and beyond, the book features excerpts from texts by David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Pierre Bourdieu, Brillat-Savarin, Marcel Proust, Sidney Mintz, and M.F.K. Fisher as well as original essays by authors such as David Sutton, Lisa Heldke, David Howes, Constance Classen, and Amy Trubek. This edition has been revised substantially throughout to include the latest scholarship on the senses and features new introductions from the editor as well as 10 new chapters. The perfect introduction to the study of taste, this is essential reading for students in food studies, anthropology, sensory studies, philosophy, and culinary arts.

While the past decade has seen a surge of research regarding canine cognition, this newfound interest has not caught the attention of many philosophers. Studies pertaining to dog minds have been pouring out of canine cognition labs all over the world, but they remain relatively ensconced within the scientific, sociological, and anthropological communities, and very little philosophical thought on dog cognition exists. Philosophers certainly have not shied away from theorizing about the nature of nonhuman animal cognition generally. Theories range from Cartesian disavowal of all nonhuman intelligence to arguments that even fish have complex minds and therefore humans should not eat them. Serious philosophical considerations about dogs and their relationship to humans, however, remain incredibly rare. Even less common, if not entirely nonexistent, is a critical examination of the question "What are dogs thinking?" and what asking and attempting to answer this question reveals, not so much about dogs, but about us. With Minding Dogs Michele Merritt attempts to fill two significant gaps in the philosophy of animal cognition. First, she adds to the growing discussion on canine cognition, which has been overlooked until recently and requires more consideration. Second, she takes seriously our dynamic collaborations with our canine friends as crucial to understanding both their minds and our own.

THE WORLD AS WILL AND IDEA By ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER VOLUME I CONTAINING FOUR BOOKS Ob nicht Natur zuletzt sich doch ergrunde Goitbi LONDON ROUTLEDGE KEGAN PAUL LIMITED BROADWAY HOUSE, 68 - 74 CARTER LANE, E. C. CONTENTS FIRST BOOK. THE WORLD AS IDEA FIRST ASPECT. THE IDEA SUBOBDI NATF. P TO THE PRINCIPLE or SUFFICIENT REASON THK OBJECT OF EXPERIENCE AND SCIENCE, SECOND BOOK, THE WORLD AS WILL FIRST ASPECT. THE OBJECTIFICATIO OF THE WILL THIRD BOOK. THE WORLD AS IDEA SECOND ASPECT. THE IDEA INDEPEN DENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT RKASON THE PLATONIC IDEA THE OBJECT OF ART . 217 FOURTH BOOK. THE WORLD AS WILL SECOND ASPECT. AFTER THE ATTAIN MENT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE. ASSERTION AND DENIAL OF THE WILL TO LIVE 347 TRANSLATORS PREFACE THE style of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung is sometimes loose and involved, as is so often the case in German philosophical treatises. The translation of the book has consequently been a matter of no little diffi culty. It was found that extensive alteration of the long and occasionally involved sentences, however likely to prove conducive to a satisfactory English style, tended not only to obliterate the form of the original but even to imperil the meaning. Where a choice has had to be made, the alternative of a somewhat slavish adherence to Schopenhauers ipsissima verba has accordingly been pre ferred to that of inaccuracy. The result is a piece of work which leaves much to be desired, but which has yet consistently sought to reproduce faithfully the spirit as well as the letter of the original. As regards the rendering of the technical terms about which there has been so much controversy, the equiva lents used have only been adopted after careful consideration of their meaning in the theory of knowledge. For example, Vorstellung has been rendered by idea, in preference to representation, which is neither accurate, intelligible, nor elegant. Idee, is translated by the vi TRANSLATORS 9 PREFACE. same word, but spelled with a capital, Idea. Again, Anschauung has been rendered according to the con text, either by perception simply, or by intuition or perception 1 Notwithstanding statements to the contrary in the text, the book is probably quite intelligible in itself, apart from, the treatise On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It has, however, been considered desirable to add an abstract of the latter work in an appendix to the third volume of this translation. R B. H, J. 1C PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION I PROPOSE to point out here how this book must be read in order to be thoroughly understood. By means of it I only intend to impart a single thought. Yet, notwith standing all my endeavours, I could find no shorter way of imparting it than this whole book. I holdjhisjbhought to be that which has very long been sought for under the name of philosophy, and the discovery of which is therefore regarded by those who are familiar with his tory as quite as impossible as the discovery of the philoso phers stone, although it was already said by Pliny Quam multa fieri non posse, priu quam sint facta, judicantur 1 Hist, riat 7, I. According as we consider the different aspects of this one thought which I am about to impart, it exhibits itself as that which we call metaphysics, that which we call ethics and that which we call aesthetics and cer tainly it must be all this if it is whatTTfave already acknowledged I take it to be. Asystem of thought must always have an architectonic connection or coherence, that is, a connection in which one part always supports the other, though the latter does not support the former, in which ultimately the foundation supports all the rest without being supported by it, and the apex is supported without supporting. On the other hand, a single thought, however compre riii PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. hensive it may be, must preserve the most perfect unity...

The reading of Emerson on the Over-Soul, on the Law of Compensation, on the relationship between man and nature, on first principles and moral courage, self-realization, has had a formative influence on many readers. Often they first encounter his work by chance, but on reading him have gradually become confirmed Emersonians in their outlook. In the quiet of the Old Manse at Concord, Emerson could reflect at leisure and stretch the great wings of his imaginative insight. He gave substance to those things which, though aware of, we find difficult to match with words. Nature was Emerson's first published work and already there is evident Emerson's 'characteristic signature affirmation.' Emerson called his generation back to the primary conditions of man, to the 'insistent now of individual experience.' Emerson would feel a stranger in our world. Yet part dreamer, part realist, he is with us still, 'touching the very well springs of our moral courage' as a reading of The Conduct of Life will show, with its central theme of living with one's limitations