Research over the past decade has helped to demystify hypnosis and meditation, bringing these practices into the scientific and clinical mainstream. Yet, while hypnosis and meditation overlap on many levels, few scientific accounts have explored their complementary rapprochement. Despite cultural and historical differences, hypnosis and meditation share common phenomenology, cognitive processes, and potential therapeutic merits. This book provides a synthesis of knowledge concerning the bridging of hypnosis and meditation. The authors adopt a trans-disciplinary approach considering cultural, historical, and philosophical perspectives to elucidate contemporary questions in cognitive, neurobiological, and clinical science. The book explores the relationship between hypnosis and meditation in five progressive sections: Part 1 investigates historical, cultural, and philosophical issues to contextualize the scientific study of contemplative practices. Part 2 presents a range of views concerning the similarities and differences between hypnosis and meditation. Part 3 explores the psychological and cognitive mechanisms at work. Part 4 integrates recent brain imaging findings to unravel the neural underpinnings. Finally, part 5 examines how juxtaposing hypnosis and meditation can enhance clinical applications. Hypnosis and Meditation is a valuable resource to both specialists as well as interested lay readers, and paves the road to a more unified science of how attention influences states of brain, body, and consciousness.

Articulating a thought can be astoundingly easy. We generally have no trouble expressing complex ideas that we have never considered before, though not always. Articulating a thought can also be extremely hard. Our difficulties in articulating thoughts pervade many aspects of philosophical inquiry, as well as many ordinary situations. While we may overcome some of the challenges through education and practice, we cannot do away with them altogether. And the hardest thoughts to articulate often come to us unbidden: as we neither assemble them from other thoughts nor get them from any source of external information. They can come from us freely and spontaneously, and frequently we articulate them in order to find out what they are. In many cases, we would not bother articulating our thoughts if we already had this knowledge-yet, when we find the right words, we can often instantly tell that they express our thought. How do we manage to recognize the formulations of our thoughts, in the absence of prior knowledge of what we are thinking? And why is it that producing a public language formulation contributes in any way to the deeply private undertaking of coming to know our own thoughts? In Articulating a Thought, Eli Alshanetsky considers how we make our thoughts clear to ourselves in the process of putting them into words and examines the paradox of those difficult cases where we do not already know what we are struggling to articulate.

How is consciousness possible? What biological purpose does it serve? And why do we value it so highly? In "Soul Dust," the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, a leading figure in consciousness research, proposes a startling new theory. Consciousness, he argues, is nothing less than a magical-mystery show that we stage for ourselves inside our own heads. This self-made show lights up the world for us and makes us feel special and transcendent. Thus consciousness paves the way for spirituality, and allows us, as human beings, to reap the rewards, and anxieties, of living in what Humphrey calls the "soul niche."

Tightly argued, intellectually gripping, and a joy to read, "Soul Dust" provides answers to the deepest questions. It shows how the problem of consciousness merges with questions that obsess us all--how life should be lived and the fear of death. Resting firmly on neuroscience and evolutionary theory, and drawing a wealth of insights from philosophy and literature, "Soul Dust" is an uncompromising yet life-affirming work--one that never loses sight of the majesty and wonder of consciousness.

Over the past three decades, the challenge that conscious experience poses to physicalism--the widely held view that the universe is a completely physical system--has provoked a growing debate in philosophy of mind studies and given rise to a great deal of literature on the subject. Ideal for courses in consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues in this debate: the challenge for physicalism, physicalist responses, alternative responses, the significance of ignorance, and mental causation. Edited by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, the volume features work from such leading figures as Karen Bennett, Ned Block, David J. Chalmers, Frank Jackson, Colin McGinn, David Papineau, and many others. It is enhanced by a thorough general introduction by the editors, which explains the hard problem of consciousness--the question of how any physical phenomenon could give rise to conscious experience.The introduction also provides historical and conceptual background and explains how the consciousness/mind-body problem is related to such theories as the identity theory, dualism, and functionalism. In addition, accessible introductions outline the themes and readings contained in each section.

By definition zombies would be physically and behaviourally just like us, but not conscious. This currently very influential idea is a threat to all forms of physicalism, and has led some philosophers to give up physicalism and become dualists. It has also beguiled many physicalists, who feel forced to defend increasingly convoluted explanations of why the conceivability of zombies is compatible with their impossibility. Robert Kirk argues that the zombie idea depends on an incoherent view of the nature of phenomenal consciousness.
His book has two main aims. One is to demolish the zombie idea once and for all. There are plenty of objections to it in the literature, but they lack intuitive appeal. He offers a striking new argument which reveals fundamental confusions in the implied conception of consciousness. His other main contribution is to develop a fresh and original approach to the true nature of phenomenal consciousness. Kirk argues that a necessary condition is a "basic package" of capacities. An important component of his argument is that the necessary cognitive capacities are not as sophisticated as is often assumed. By focusing on humbler creatures than ourselves he avoids some of the distracting complications of our sophisticated forms of cognition.
The basic package does not seem to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. What is also needed is "direct activity"--a special feature of the way the events which constitute incoming perceptual information affect the system. This is an integrated process, to be conceived of holistically, and contrasts sharply with what is often called the "availability" or "poisedness" of perceptual information.
This original, penetrating, and highly readable book will be of interest to all who have a serious concern with the nature of consciousness: not only professional philosophers and students, but also many psychologists and neuroscientists.

This ground-breaking book provides the first detailed clinical analysis of the various manifestations of catatonia, shutdown and breakdown in autistic individuals, with a new assessment framework (ACE-S) and guidance on intervention and management strategies using a psycho-ecological approach. Based on Dr Amitta Shah's lifetime of clinical experience in Autism Spectrum Disorders, and her research in collaboration with Dr Lorna Wing, this much needed book will be a valuable resource for professionals, autistic individuals and their families and carers.

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

Peter Carruthers's essays on consciousness and related issues have had a substantial impact on the field, and many of his best are now collected here in revised form. The first half of the volume is devoted to developing, elaborating, and defending against competitors one particular sort of reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness, which Carruthers now refers to as 'dual-content theory'. Phenomenal consciousness - the feel of experience - is supposed to constitute the 'hard problem' for a scientific world view, and many have claimed that it is an irredeemable mystery. But Carruthers here claims to have explained it. He argues that phenomenally conscious states are ones that possess both an 'analog' (fine-grained) intentional content and a corresponding higher-order analog content, representing the first-order content of the experience. It is the higher-order analog content that enables our phenomenally conscious experiences to present themselves to us, and that constitutes their distinctive subjective aspect, or feel. The next two chapters explore some of the differences between conscious experience and conscious thought, and argue for the plausibility of some kind of eliminativism about conscious thinking (while retaining realism about phenomenal consciousness). Then the final four chapters focus on the minds of non-human animals. Carruthers argues that even if the experiences of animals aren't phenomenally conscious (as his account probably implies), this needn't prevent the frustrations and sufferings of animals from being appropriate objects of sympathy and concern. Nor need it mean that there is any sort of radical 'Cartesian divide' between our minds and theirs of deep significance for comparative psychology. In the final chapter, he argues provocatively that even insects have minds that include a belief/desire/perception psychology much like our own. So mindedness and phenomenal consciousness couldn't be further apart. Carruthers's writing throughout is distinctively clear and direct. The collection will be of great interest to anyone working in philosophy of mind or cognitive science.

First published in 1974, this book established itself as a seminal text of the magical revival--a thinking person's guide to the unthinkable.

Meditation is a complex field of research and presents many intricate problems which are being tackled by various disciplines of both life sciences and liberal arts. There is a high amount of scientific information gathered so far, however data are rather divergent, sometimes even contradictory and there are also numerous questions without any available data to answer. There are also many inadequacies of study design and methodology. This book introduces the reader to what scientific research can tell us about meditation today. The text is dedicated to life-science aspects of meditation including prompt neuropsychological and psychophysiological changes, long-run psychological and physiological effects and also preventive and clinical use of meditation.

The term 'Implicit Learning' refers to the way in which knowledge of fairly complex, patterned material can be acquired without any conscious effort to learn it and with little to no awareness of what has been learned. Over the past fifty years, Implict Learning has became a vigorously researched area in the social sciences. In The Cognitive Unconscious, Arthur S. Reber and Rhianon Allen bring together several dozen experts from social science and neuroscience to present a broad overview of the exploration of the cognitive unconscious. Each chapter delves deeper into a subject that has become an interdisciplinary domain of research to which contributions have been made by sociologists, neuroscientists, evolutionary biologists, linguists, social and organizational psychologists, and sport psychologists, amongst many others. The book shows that unconscious, implicit cognitive processes play a role in virtually everything interesting that human beings do. As the contributors demonstrate, the implicit and explicit elements of cognition form a rich and complex interactive framework that make up who we are. With contributions from over thirty distinguished authors from nine different countries, The Cognitive Unconscious gives a balanced and thorough overview of where the field is today, over a half-century since the first experiments were run.

In 1993 I published a novel kind of theory of psychic phenomena in a book entitled 'Shadow Matter And Psychic Phenomena'. Although I devoted a whole chapter to the issue of possible survival of the human personality after bodily death, I did not go remotely far enough. Contrary to common-sense, it seems physically quite possible that an important component of each of us survives death. It is a part of this component which during life and death carries our memories and our ability to think, feel etc., Perhaps a valuable guide to the possible machinery of death and dying might be obtained by attempts to elucidate the conceivable mechanisms of Near Death Experiences (NDEs). Various people have studied these for many years. My own theorising begins with a critical reappraisal of some of these ideas on NDEs. In the course of the argument I hope to persuade the reader of the advantages of a theory based in the new physics of shadow matter.

A brief, radical defense of human uniqueness from acclaimed philosopher Roger Scruton In this short book, acclaimed writer and philosopher Roger Scruton presents an original and radical defense of human uniqueness. Confronting the views of evolutionary psychologists, utilitarian moralists, and philosophical materialists such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, Scruton argues that human beings cannot be understood simply as biological objects. We are not only human animals; we are also persons, in essential relation with other persons, and bound to them by obligations and rights. Our world is a shared world, exhibiting freedom, value, and accountability, and to understand it we must address other people face to face and I to I. Scruton develops and defends his account of human nature by ranging widely across intellectual history, from Plato and Averroes to Darwin and Wittgenstein. The book begins with Kant's suggestion that we are distinguished by our ability to say "I"--by our sense of ourselves as the centers of self-conscious reflection. This fact is manifested in our emotions, interests, and relations. It is the foundation of the moral sense, as well as of the aesthetic and religious conceptions through which we shape the human world and endow it with meaning. And it lies outside the scope of modern materialist philosophy, even though it is a natural and not a supernatural fact. Ultimately, Scruton offers a new way of understanding how self-consciousness affects the question of how we should live. The result is a rich view of human nature that challenges some of today's most fashionable ideas about our species.

Enactivist Interventions is an interdisciplinary work that explores how theories of embodied cognition illuminate many aspects of the mind, including intentionality, representation, the affect, perception, action and free will, higher-order cognition, and intersubjectivity. Gallagher argues for a rethinking of the concept of mind, drawing on pragmatism, phenomenology and cognitive science. Enactivism is presented as a philosophy of nature that has significant methodological and theoretical implications for the scientific investigation of the mind. Gallagher argues that, like the basic phenomena of perception and action, sophisticated cognitive phenomena like reflection, imagining, and mathematical reasoning are best explained in terms of an affordance-based skilled coping. He offers an account of the continuity that runs between basic action, affectivity, and a rationality that in every case remains embodied. Gallagher's analysis also addresses recent predictive models of brain function and outlines an alternative, enactivist interpretation that emphasizes the close coupling of brain, body and environment rather than a strong boundary that isolates the brain in its internal processes. The extensive relational dynamics that integrates the brain with the extra-neural body opens into an environment that is physical, social and cultural and that recycles back into the enactive process. Cognitive processes are in-the-world rather than in-the-head; they are situated in affordance spaces defined across evolutionary, developmental and individual histories, and are constrained by affective processes and normative dimensions of social and cultural practices.

Everyone knows what consciousness is: it is what vanishes when we fall into dreamless sleep and reappears when we wake up or when we dream. However, we become less and less confident when we are called to answer fundamental questions about the relationships between consciousness and the physical world. Why is the cerebral cortex associated with consciousness, but not the liver, the heart, the cerebellum or other neural structures? Why does consciousness fade during deep sleep, while cortical neurons remain active? Can unresponsive patients with an island of active cortex surrounded by widespread damage be conscious? Is an artificial system that outperforms people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions conscious? Using the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as a guiding principle, Sizing up Consciousness explores these questions, taking the reader along a fascinating journey from the cerebral cortex to the cerebellum, from wakefulness to sleep, anesthesia, and coma, supercomputers, octopuses, dolphins, and much more besides. By translating theoretical principles into practical measurements, the book outlines a preliminary attempt to identify a general rule to size up the capacity for consciousness within the human skull and beyond. Sizing up Consciousness is a short, accessible book, spanning neuronal activity to existential considerations and is essential reading for anyone interested in awareness and cognition.

Conversations on Consciousness is just that - a series of twenty lively and challenging conversations between Sue Blackmore and some of the world's leading philosophers and scientists. Written in a colloquial and engaging style, the book records the conversations Sue had when she met these influential thinkers, whether at conferences in Arizona or Antwerp, or in their labs or homes in Oxford or San Diego. The conversations bring out their very different personalities and styles and reveal a wealth of fascinating detail about their theories and beliefs. Why is consciousness such a special and difficult issue for twenty-first century science? Sue, herself a researcher into this controversial and difficult topic, begins by asking each of her colleagues this simple question and is immediately plunged into the depths of the debate: how do the subjective experiences we call consciousness arise from the physical brain? Is this even the right question to ask? Can zombies - people who behave outwardly just like others but have no inner mental life - exist? What can dreams tell us about consciousness? Should we all be learning to meditate?Do we have free will, and if not is it possible to live without it? With an introduction setting out the broad structure of the debate on consciousness, and an extensive glossary, this book provides an engaging and accessible account of the most challenging problem of all, through the words of some of the leading figures involved in seeking to solve it.

The past two decades have seen a surge of interest in the topic of consciousness, with the result that the research literature has expanded greatly. However, until now, there has been little consensus on just which methods are the most effective for the study of consciousness. As a result, a wide range of experimental paradigms have been employed, sometimes making it difficult to compare and contrast experimental findings. 'Behavioral Methods in Consciousness Research' is the first book of its kind, providing an overview of methods and approaches for studying consciousness. The chapters are written by leading researchers and experts, who describe the methods they actually use in their own studies, along with their pitfalls, problems, and difficulties. For all students and researchers embarking on research in this area - and even seasoned researchers - this book is a valuable source of information in helping them design, perform, and analyze scientifically rigorous experiments.

The concept of the archetype is crucial to Jung's radical interpretation of the human mind. Jung believed that every person partakes of a universal or collective unconscious that persists through generations. The origins of the concept can be traced to his very first publication in 1902 and it remained central to his thought throughout his life. As well as explaining the theoretical background behind the idea, in Four Archetypes Jung describes the four archetypes that he considers fundamental to the psychological make-up of every individual: mother, rebirth, spirit and trickster. Exploring their role in myth, fairytale and scripture, Jung engages the reader in discoveries that challenge and enlighten the ways we perceive ourselves and others.

Table of Contents

Introduction 1, From “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” first published in the Eranos-Jahrbuch 1934, and later revised and published in Von den Wurzeln des Bewusstseins (Zurich, 1954), from which version the present translation is made. The translation of the original version, by Stanley Dell, in The Integration of the Personality (New York, 1939; London, 1940), has been freely consulted.—E DITORS ; Part 1 Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype; pt1_Chapter 1 On the Concept of the Archetype; pt1_Chapter 2 The Mother Archetype; pt1_Chapter 3 The Mother-Complex; pt1_Chapter 4 Positive Aspects of the Mother-Complex; pt1_Chapter 5; Conclusion; Part 2 Concerning Rebirth; pt2_Chapter 1 Forms of Rebirth; pt2_Chapter 2 The Psychology of Rebirth; pt2_Chapter 3 A Typical set of Symbols Illustrating the Process of Transformation; Part 3 The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales; pt3_Chapter 1 The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales 1, First published as a lecture, “Zur Psychologie des Geistes,” in the Eranos-Jahrbuch 1945. Revised and published as “Zur Phänomenologie des Geistes im Märchen,” in Symbolik des Geistes (Zurich, 1948), from which the present translation was made. This translation was published in a slightly different form in Spirit and Nature (Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, 1; New York, 1953; London, 1954).—E DITORS ; Part 4 On the Psychology of the Trickster-Figure; pt4_Chapter 1 On the Psychology of the Trickster-Figure 1, Originally published as Part 5 of Der göttliche Schelm, by Paul Radin, with commentaries by C. G. Jung and Carl Kerényi (Zurich, 1954). The present translation then appeared in the English version of the volume: The Trickster; A Study in American Indian Mythology (London and New York, 1956); it is republished here with only minor revisions.—E DITORS ;

In this engaging book, diverse phenomena associated with death, such as apparent after-death communication and near-death experiences, are examined through a scientific lens and evaluated for the degree to which they offer evidence for the survival of consciousness after death. Is death the end of everything? Is life after death really possible? Considerable scientific support has emerged in recent years for the idea that death is best described as an altered state of consciousness. This survival hypothesis contrasts with predominant materialist thinking, which holds that there is only oblivion upon death. Chapters in this book investigate scientific evidence for mediumship, instrumental transcommunication, near-death experiences, after-death communication, and past-life experiences, among other anomalous death-related occurrences, and a framework is presented for understanding the nature of a potential afterlife. The phenomena described in this book will broaden the perspective of consciousness researchers, and fill an educational need for caregivers, grief counselors, and all who are interested in this understudied and misunderstood area.   

Blindsight is an unusual condition where the sufferer can respond to visual stimuli, while lacking any conscious feeling of having seen the stimuli. It occurs after a particular form of brain injury.
The first edition of Blindsight, by one of the pioneers in the field - Lawrence Weiskrantz, reported studies of a patient with this condition. It was an important, much cited publication. In the past twenty years, further work has been done in this area, and this new edition brings the book up to date. Retaining the original text, but adding a substantial new chapter and colour illustrations, the first section of the book summarizes findings on DB since the last published account in 1986. The second part includes information on other new research that has occurred since the last edition. As well as giving an account of research over a number of years into a particular case of blindsight, it provides a discussion of the historical and neurological background, a review of cases reported by other investigators, and a number of theoretical and practical issues and implications.
The book will be valuable for cognitive psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists, as well as philosophers of mind.

In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. The Frontiers of Consciousness is a major interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a 'who's who' of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is a truly interdisciplinary volume, which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness.
The book includes chapters considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on leading research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology.
Distinctive in its accessibility, authority, and its depth of coverage, Frontiers of Consciousness will be a groundbreaking and influential addition to the consciousness literature.

Although psychoanalytic criticism has long been established as a practice in its own right, dialogue between the clinical and aesthetic has so far been perfunctory. This innovative book sets out to show in detail that there is a poetics of the unconscious equally at work in both domains, the critical potential of which has been missed by both sides.

In Part I, Wright focuses on the discoveries of Freudian psychoanalysis and demonstrates how the fundamental fantasies emerging in clinical practice are uncannily shared by works of art. This devotion of the unconscious to its phantasmic history is illustrated with examples from Freud, surrealist painting and Julia Kristeva's work on melancholia. In Part II, the focus shifts to Lacan's view of language as a means of agitating the unconscious of the reader. Part III takes examples from the rhetoric of clinical discourse, showing how practitioners are aware of a range of poetic meanings for both patient and analyst. The three parts demonstrate that all language is inescapably figural, as it betrays the operations of desire and fantasy in both aesthetic and clinical discourse.

This book is suitable for second- and third-year undergraduate students and above in literature and literary theory, feminism and gender studies, and psychoanalysis.

A carefully selected volume tracing the development of countertransference-the emotional reaction of an analyst to their subject In Essential Papers on Countertransference, Benjamin Wolstein has carefully gathered the classic essays which trace the development of countertransference as a psychoanalytic concept and explore the various ways in which it has been defined and used by various psychoanalytic schools. The volume includes selections from the work of Sigmund Freud, D. W. Winnicott, Clara Thompson, Harold F. Searles, and Heinrich Racker, among others. Wolstein's introduction offers a provocative perspective on the concept of countertransference and places in context the many controversies surrounding its use by analysts. Contributors: Mabel Blake Cohen, Ralph M. Crowley, Lawrence Epstein, Arthur H. Feiner, Sandor Ferenczi, Sigmund Freud, Merton M. Gill, Douglas W. Orr, Heinrich Racker, Otto Rank, Theodor Reik, Janet MacKenzie Rioch, Harold F. Searles, Leo Stone, Edward S. Tauber, Clara Thompson, Lucia E. Tower, and D. W. Winnicott.