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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Western philosophy > Ancient Western philosophy to c 500 > General
From Plato's Timaeus onwards, the world or cosmos has been
conceived of as a living, rational organism. Most notably in German
Idealism, philosophers still talked of a 'Weltseele' (Schelling) or
'Weltgeist' (Hegel). This volume is the first collection of essays
on the origin of the notion of the world soul (anima mundi) in
Antiquity and beyond. It contains 14 original contributions by
specialists in the field of ancient philosophy, the Platonic
tradition and the history of theology. The topics range from the
'obscure' Presocratic Heraclitus, to Plato and his ancient readers
in Middle and Neoplatonism (including the Stoics), to the reception
of the idea of a world soul in the history of natural science. A
general introduction highlights the fundamental steps in the
development of the Platonic notion throughout late Antiquity and
early Christian philosophy. Accessible to Classicists, historians
of philosophy, theologians and invaluable to specialists in ancient
philosophy, the book provides an overview of the fascinating
discussions surrounding a conception that had a long-lasting effect
on the history of Western thought.
The last major work of the giant of the field. Martin P. Nilsson
set himself the task of tracing the elements of Greekmythology, as
they appear in Homer's Iliad, to their source in Mycenaean culture,
a much earlier period. His conclusions, drawn from a very limited
empirical material - archaeology, very few relevant Linear B texts
- are remarkably compelling. This title is part of UC Press's
Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California
Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and
give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to
1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship
accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title
was originally published in 1972.
This special supplementary volume of Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy contains the proceedings of the Colloquium on Ancient
Philosophy held at Oberlin, Ohio in 1986. The exceptionally high
quality of the papers, and the format of speaker, reply, and
speaker's reply, has resulted in a volume which furthers some
issues which are currently the object of keen controversy in
ancient philosophy. Contributors include Michael Frede, Terence
Irwin, and Martha Nussbaum.
While the dramatic approach to Plato's dialogues has become popular
over the last decade, little attention has been paid to the poetic
quality of Plato's writing, and the received view of Platonic
philosophy still depends on an unpoetic and largely literalist
reading of the dialogues. The authors of this volume focus on the
text of selected dialogues to identify the thread that unifies each
of them from a literary point of view. The conclusions they reach
in practicing this kind of reading are diametrically opposed to the
largest stream of Platonic scholarship and show the fallacy of
important metaphysical, epistemological, political, and ethical
positions frequently attributed to Plato.
Does the soul have parts? What kind of parts? And how do all the
parts make together a whole? Many ancient, medieval and early
modern philosophers discussed these questions, thus providing a
mereological analysis of the soul. Their starting point was a
simple observation: we tend to describe the soul of human beings by
referring to different types of activities (perceiving, imagining,
thinking, etc.). Each type of activity seems to be produced by a
special part of the soul. But how can a simple, undivided soul have
parts? Classical thinkers gave radically different answers to this
question. While some claimed that there are indeed parts, thus
assigning an internal complexity to the soul, others emphasized
that there can only be a plurality of functions that should not be
conflated with a plurality of parts. The eleven chapters
reconstruct and critically examine these answers. They make clear
that the metaphysical structure of the soul was a crucial issue for
ancient, medieval and early modern philosophers.
"The Ideas of Socrates" offers a unique interpretation of the ideas
(forms, eide) in Plato's writings. In this concise and accessible
study, Matthew S. Linck makes four major claims. Firstly, the ideas
as Socrates discusses them in the "Phaedo", "Parmenides", and
"Symposium" are shown to be integral to the person of Socrates as
presented in Plato's dialogues. Secondly, Linck argues that if we
take Plato's dialogues as an integrated set of writings, then we
must acknowledge that the mature Socrates is perfectly aware of the
difficulties entailed in the positing of ideas. Thirdly, the book
shows that Socrates' recourse to the ideas is not simply an
epistemological issue but one of self-transformation. And finally
Linck examines how Socrates relates to the ideas in two ways, one
practical, the other speculative. As the only group of Plato's
narrated dialogues that are not narrated by Socrates, the "Phaedo",
"Parmenides", and "Symposium" constitute a unique collection. These
three dialogues also contain accounts of Socrates as a young man,
and all of these accounts explicitly discuss the ideas. "The Ideas
of Socrates" serves as a commentary on the relevant passages of
these dialogues and goes on to build up an explicit series of
arguments about the ideas that will transform the way in which we
approach these key texts. This important new book will be of
interest to anyone involved in the study of Ancient Philosophy.
This is the first collection of original essays entirely devoted to
a detailed study of the Pyrrhonian tradition. The twelve
contributions collected in the present volume combine to offer a
historical and systematic analysis of the form of skepticism known
as "Pyrrhonism". They discuss whether the Pyrrhonist is an
ethically engaged agent, whether he can claim to search for truth,
and other thorny questions concerning ancient Pyrrhonism; explore
its influence on certain modern thinkers such as Pierre Bayle and
David Hume; and examine Pyrrhonian skepticism in relation to
contemporary analytic philosophy.
The question of what it means for Christ to be the "image of God,"
or imago dei, lies at the heart of the Christological debates of
the fourth century. Is an image a derivation from its source? Are
they two separate substances? Does an image serve to reveal its
source? Is an image ontologically inferior to its source? In this
book, Gerald P. Boersma examines three Western pro-Nicene
theologies of the imago dei, which tackle the question of whether
human beings and Christ can both be considered to be the "image of
God." Boersma goes on to examine Augustine's early theology of the
imago dei, prior to his ordination (386-391). According to Boersma,
Augustine's early thought posits that Christ is an image of equal
likeness to God, while a human being is an image of unequal
likeness. He argues that although Augustine's early theology of
image builds on that of Hilary of Poitiers, Marius Victorinus, and
Ambrose of Milan, Augustine was able to affirm, in ways that his
predecessors were not, how both Christ and the human person can be
considered the imago dei.
A distinguished group of Aristotelian scholars and contemporary metaphysicians discusses Aristotle's theory of the unity and identity of substances. The questions of ontology, explanation, and methodology with which they deal remain central to metaphysics today. This book sets a new agenda for Aristotelian metaphysics.
This is the first commentary on Lucretius' theory of atomic motion, one of the most difficult and technical parts of De rerum natura. The late Don Fowler sets new standards for Lucretian studies in his awesome command both of the ancient literary, philological, and philosophical background to this Latin Epicurean poem, and of the relevant modern scholarship.
Oxford Scholarly Classics is a new series that makes available
again great academic works from the archives of Oxford University
Press. Reissued in uniform series design, the reissues will enable
libraries, scholars, and students to gain fresh access to some of
the finest scholarship of the last century.
Socrates' greatest philosophical contribution was to have initiated
the search for definitions. In Definition in Greek Philosophy his
views on definition are examined, together with those of his
successors, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Galen, the
Sceptics and Plotinus. Although definition was a major
pre-occupation for many Greek philosophers, it has rarely been
treated as a separate topic in its own right in recent years. This
volume, which contains fourteen new essays by leading scholars,
aims to reawaken interest in a number of central and relatively
unexplored issues concerning definition. These issues are briefly
set out in the Introduction, which also seeks to point out
scholarly and philosophical questions which merit further study.
The open access publication of this book has been published with
the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation. In this book,
Ota Gal presents a new analysis of Plotinus' conception of beauty,
beginning from a close reading of treatises I.6 and V.8, which link
beauty with the unified multiplicity of Intellect. This account is
subsequently placed in a hierarchical and structural context in
VI.2 and VI.6 and connected to illumination in VI.7, enabling us to
determine the meaning of the predicate "beauty" at different
ontological levels. For Plotinus, beauty is ultimately the
illuminated unity in multiplicity of Intellect, which, as the
manifestation of the Good, simultaneously enables the soul's ascent
and threatens to bind the soul to itself.
Historians often look to ancient Greece as the wellspring of
Western civilization. Perhaps the most ingenious achievement of the
Hellenic mind was the early development of the sciences. The names
we give to science's many branches today--from physics and
chemistry to mathematics, biology, and psychology--echo the Greek
words that were first used to define these disciplines in ancient
times and remain a testament to the groundbreaking discoveries of
these pioneering thinkers. What was it about the Greeks, as opposed
to the far older civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and
China, that gave rise to the uniquely Western, scientific mindset?
This author explores this intriguing question in this authoritative
yet accessible and eloquently told story about the origins of
science. Going beyond individual Greek discoveries in the various
branches of science, Bertman emphasizes why these early
investigators were able to achieve what they did. Among the
exceptional characteristics of Greek culture that created the
seedbed for early science were:
- the Greek emphasis on rationalism--a conviction that human reason
could successfully unravel the mysteries of nature and make sense
of the cosmos
- an early form of humanism--a pride and confidence in human
potential despite the frailty and brief tenure of individual lives
- the drive to excel in every arena from the battlefield to the
Olympic games and arts competitions
- an insatiable curiosity that sought understanding of both human
nature and the world
- a fierce love of freedom and individualism that promoted freedom
of thought--the prelude to science.
Focusing on ten different branches of science, the author shows why
the Greeks gravitated to each specialty and explains the
fascinating theories they developed, the brilliant experiments they
performed, and the practical applications of their discoveries. He
concludes by recounting how these early insights and
achievements--transmitted over the course of two thousand
years--have shaped the scientific attitude that is the hallmark of
today's world. This lively narrative captures the Greek genius and
demonstrates the indelible influence of their discoveries on modern
science and technology.
With the growth of interest in later Greek philosophy, the
importance of Plotinus (AD 205-270) as a seminal influence on later
thinkers, both pagan and Christian, is being increasingly
recognized. The Enneads have been readily available for some time,
both in Greek and in English translation, and there is no shortage
of scholarly writing on the Enneads in general, and on particular
aspects of Plotinus' thought. However, apart from Michael
Atkinson's translation and commentary on Ennead V.1 (Clarendon
Press, 1985), there has been no major commentary in English on any
single treatise. Plotinus' Greek is notoriously obscure, and mere
translation often sheds little light. Barrie Fleet's translation
and commentary on Ennead III.6 elucidates the text of a major
treatise in which Plotinus uses the concept of impassivity to shed
light on three questions of importance to Platonists: the nature of
change in the human soul; its analogue in the Sensible World; and
the nature of Matter. Dr Fleet shows how texts of Plato and
Aristotle, and Hellenistic commentaries on them, were central to
the seminars held in Rome under the leadership of Plotinus. This
treatise is the outcome of one such seminar. All Greek quotations
in the commentary are translated into English, and all Greek terms
are either translated or transliterated, making this edition fully
accessible to readers with or without Greek.
This book examines the revival of antique philosophy in the
Renaissance as a literary preoccupation informed by wit. Humanists
were more inspired by the fictionalized characters of certain wise
fools, including Diogenes the Cynic, Socrates, Aesop, Democritus,
and Heraclitus, than by codified systems of thought. Rich in
detail, this study offers a systematic treatment of wide-ranging
Renaissance imagery and metaphors and presents a detailed
iconography of certain classical philosophers. Ultimately, the
problems of Renaissance humanism are revealed to reflect the
concerns of humanists in the twenty-first century.
These essays reveal a dynamic range of interactions, reactions,
tensions, and ambiguities, showing how Greek literary creations
impacted and provided the background against which Greek philosophy
arose in more intricate and complex ways than previously believed.
The impact of Nietzsche's engagement with the Greek skeptics has
never before been systematically explored in a book-length work -
an inattention that belies the interpretive weight scholars
otherwise attribute to his early career as a professor of classical
philology and to the fascination with Greek literature and culture
that persisted throughout his productive academic life. Jessica N.
Berry fills this gap in the literature on Nietzsche by
demonstrating how an understanding of the Pyrrhonian skeptical
tradition illuminates Nietzsche's own reflections on truth,
knowledge, and ultimately, the nature and value of philosophic
inquiry. This entirely new reading of Nietzsche's epistemological
and ethical views promises to make clear and render coherent his
provocative but often opaque remarks on the topics of truth and
knowledge and to grant us further insight into his ethics-since the
Greek skeptics, like Nietzsche, take up the position they do as a
means of promoting well-being and psychological health. In
addition, it allows us to recover a portrait of Nietzsche as a
philologist and philosophical psychologist that has been too often
obscured by commentaries on his thought.
"The book addresses a number of central issues in Nietzsche's
philosophy, including perspectivism and his conception of truth.
The idea that his views in these areas owe much to the ancient
Pyrrhonists casts them in an important new light, and is well
supported by the texts. A lot of people from a lot of different
areas in philosophy will have good reason to take notice." -
Richard Bett, Johns Hopkins University
Throughout history philosophers have sought to define, understand,
and delineate concepts important to human well-being. One such
concept is "knowledge." Many philosophers believed that absolute,
certain knowledge, is possible--that the physical world and ideas
formulated about it could be given solid foundation unaffected by
the varieties of mere opinion.
Sextus Empiricus stands as an example of the "skeptic" school of
thought whose members believed that knowledge was either
unattainable or, if a genuine possibility, the conditions necessary
to achieve it were next to impossible to satisfy. In other words,
in the absence of complete knowledge, one must make do with the
information provided by an imperfect world and conveyed to the mind
through sense impressions that can often deceive us. Throughout his
life Sextus Empiricus entered into intellectual combat with those
who confidently claimed to possess indubitable knowledge. For
skeptics, the best one can hope to achieve is a reasonable
suspension of judgment--remaining ever mindful that claims to
knowledge require careful scrutiny, thoughtful analysis, and
critical review if we are to prevent ourselves and others from
plunging headlong into mistaken notions.
This volume, the twenty-ninth year of published proceedings,
contains six papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area
Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during academic year 2012-13. The
paper topics include: Glaucon's fate in the Republic, divine
creation and human responsibility in the Timaeus, Aristotle on
orexis in generation, on the biological use of analogy and finally
on dialectic as proto-phenomenological, and lastly, Proclus on
likeness and unlikeness as ontological first principles.
Chinese and Greco-Roman ethics present highly articulate views on
how one should live; both of these traditions remain influential in
modern philosophy. The question arises how these traditions can be
compared with one another. Comparative ethics is a relatively young
discipline, and this volume is a major contribution to the field.
Fundamental questions about the nature of comparing ethics are
treated in two introductory chapters, followed by chapters on core
issues in each of the traditions : harmony, virtue, friendship,
knowledge, the relation of ethics to morality, relativism. The
volume closes with a number of comparative studies on emotions,
being and unity, simplicity and complexity, and prediction.
Much has been written about Heidegger's reappropriation of
Aristotle, but little has been said about the philosophical import
and theoretical context of this element of Heidegger's work. In
this important new book, Michael Bowler sheds new light on the
philosophical context of Heidegger's return to Aristotle in his
early works and thereby advances a reinterpretation of the
background to Heidegger's forceful critique of the primacy of
theoretical reason and his radical reconception of the very nature
of philosophical thinking. This book offers a detailed analysis of
the development of Heidegger's thought from his early enagagement
with neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology. Through this
reading, a criticism of the theoretical conception of philosophy as
primordial science, especially in relation to life and
lived-experience (Erlebnis), emerges. It is in this context that
Bowler examines Heidegger's reappropriation of key aspects of
Aristotle's thought. In Aristotle's notions of movement, life and
activity proper (praxis), Heidegger perceives a new approach to the
dilemma presently facing philosophy, namely how philosophy is
situated within life and human existence.
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