Number 1 in the Luftwaffe Profile Series describes the design and use of the Messerschmitt Me 262.

Weapons of Mass Destruction are diverse and pose unique challenges to governments attempting to keep them out of the wrong hands and preparing to respond to an attack. This text analyzes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons and terrorist groups with a known interest in them. It presents accessible information about the technical challenges posed by each type of weapon, assesses the threats, and reviews the US governmental responses. It provides structured CBRN case studies and allows for easy comparison of threats, challenges, and responses. The text combines weapons and policy information in one comprehensive and comparative resource for researchers and students interested in key issues in modern terrorism and international security.

TACAMO, an unusual moniker meaning 'Take Charge and Move Out', is the Navy's well-known and respected leg of the nation's national strategic communications, a key element of the US nuclear deterrence posture. But TACAMO has not always been so recognized. For the junior officers in the early days of the 1960s and 1970s, TACAMO was a career-killing backwater, likely to put an end to their careers before they even got started. But in the 1970s, inspired by their commanding officer Bill Coyne, a handful of junior officers made the leap of faith to take a second tour in TACAMO, betting their careers that they could bring this community into existence. This is the story of eleven of those 'True Believers', told in their own words, how each came to make that leap of faith to bring the TACAMO community into existence against all odds, moulding it into what it is today. Out of this pioneering cadre came eleven future commanding officers and three commodores of a Wing yet twenty years in the future. And the 'True Believers' went on beyond TACAMO to make major contributions to all aspects of national strategic communications, some at the level of the White House. This is their story.

Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.

This book examines the moral dilemmas of nuclear dissemination, and the justifications of both nuclear pursuit and avoidance by contemporary states. Applying Constructivist methodologies and moral theory, the author analyses a core set of moral dilemmas that ensnare decision-makers amongst state and non-state nuclear aspirants, as well as amongst states committed to preventing horizontal proliferation. The book shows that the character, structure and implications of these dilemmas have not yet been adequately understood or appreciated, and that such an understanding is necessary for an effective set of nonproliferation policies. Furthermore, it shows that the dilemmas' force and political policy import are evident in the 'discourses' that diverse actors undertake to defend their nuclear choices, and how the dilemmas of nuclear aspirants are implicated in those of nuclear preventers. The author advocates a number of policy recommendations that reinforce some already made by scholars and experts but, more importantly, others that advise significantly different courses of action. The book reveals how the moral dilemmas of nuclear aspiration, avoidance, and prevention constitute the security dilemmas and paradoxes that comprise much of the 21st century security environment. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international relations, ethics, and international security studies.

The 1950s were a vital time in the history of science. In accordance with the intensification of the Cold War, many scientific talents were mobilized to several military-related research and development projects not only in the United States, but also in the Soviet Union. Contrary to the expectation of General Leslie Groves, a leader of the Manhattan Project, the Soviet Union succeeded in their nuclear weapon development in a very short time. And then, by the end of the decade, mankind reached the dawn of the Atomic Age proper with the beginning of the operation of the world's first civil nuclear power plant in Obninsk in 1954. The risky and costly developments of new weapons such as rockets, jet warplanes, and computers were achieved by the Soviet Union in a very short time after World War in spite of the heavy economic damage caused by the battles with German troops in Soviet territory. Why were such a great number of scientific talents mobilized to various Soviet Cold War research and development projects? What were the true natures, and real consequences of the rushed Cold War projects? How did Soviet scientists approach the nuclear age? Thanks to the study of formerly classified Soviet archives, a more nuanced view of Soviet society has become possible. To resolve the above-mentioned questions, Ichikawa analyses the complicated interactions among various factors, including the indigenous contradictions in the historical development of science in the Soviet Union; conflicts among the related interest groups; relationships with the political leadership and the military, the role of ideology and others.

Combat gliders were called by some as Death Crates, Purple Heart Boxes, Flying Coffins and Tow Targets . They were not pretty and had no graceful lines. Viewed from the front, they had a pug nose and a sloping Neanderthal forehead. Their wings looked like the heavily starched ears of a jackrabbit placed at right angles on a canvas-covered frame. Twice the length of the body, these wings were eighty-four feet in length, 70 per cent as long as the Wright Brothers first powered flight at Kitty Hawk. They could not become airborne, let alone fly, unless assisted by an engine-powered tow plane. And for those riding in the back, it was like flying through the gates of hell . The men who were trained and assigned to guide gliders into battle were said to be the only pilots who had no motors, armament, parachutes and no second chances. Like the aircraft they commanded, they were called inglorious names such as The Bastards Nobody Wanted, Glider Gladiators in Wooden Chariots; Hybrid Jackasses and Glory Boys. Beautifully written, profoundly illustrated and researched, Silent Invaders: Combat Gliders of the Second World War is a work that is dedicated to those brave men under impossible odds from the British and American servicemen on D-Day, the doomed Operation Market Garden in Holland and Hitler s radical commando raid to rescue Mussolini."

At 02.45 hours on the morning of 6 August 1945, a Boeing B-29 Superfortress, named after the pilot's mother, Enola Gay, lifted off from a tiny island deep in the Pacific Ocean on one of the most important missions in human history. The B-29 carried just one bomb; the target was Hiroshima. The dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and of a second nuclear device on Nagasaki three days later, is known throughout the world. But what is often forgotten is that these missions were only possible following the savage battles to seize the Northern Mariana Islands -which, crucially, were within the B-29's operational range of Japan. With the capture of these islands, the defeat of Hirohito's Imperial Japan became a certainty as for the first time in the war land-based heavy bombers could fly all the way to Tokyo and back. The sparsely-populated island of Tinian was turned into the biggest air base in the world. With six runways, four of which were built for the huge Superfortresses, it was from there that atomic destruction of Japan began. But, before all this, had been the battle for the island -the preliminary naval bombardment, the aerial strikes and the amphibious assault. The story of that battle is told here, in the words and images of the men who took part in that memorable, and ultimately epoch-changing, campaign. Part of this is another story, that of the warship USS Indianapolis. This Portland-class heavy cruiser was handed a secret mission of the utmost significance to national security', that of taking the enriched uranium and other vital parts of the atomic weapons to Tinian. Indianapolis succeeded in its mission, but was left to return to Pearl Harbor unescorted, resulting in one of the most unfortunate and gristly episodes in US maritime history. Few stories encapsulate human endeavour, achievement, sacrifice, and failure in quite such stark contrasts as the taking of the island of Tinian, once the centre of USAAF operations in the Pacific and now just a little-visited speck in the largest ocean in the world.

The last two decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer "rogue" states in the international system. The authors of"On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century" argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of "limited" nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement.
Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war, examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use, and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war.

This book suggests a new bargain between the NPT nuclear weapon states and the non-NPT nuclear weapons possessor states, mainly India and Pakistan, through a regional arrangement to help move towards universalization of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The author analyses nuclear proliferation drivers to understand why states acquire and justify possession of nuclear weapons even though most nuclear weapon states no longer are faced with an existential threat to their national security. This study also identifies various challenges being faced by the NPT based nuclear nonproliferation regime, which if left unaddressed, could unravel the nonproliferation regime. It also offers the history of confidence building measures between India and Pakistan, which could be a useful reference for negotiating a Regional Nonproliferation Regime (RNR) in the future.

Entessar & Afrasiabi's Iran Nuclear Negotiations (Rowman & Littlefied, October 2015) offered a thorough analysis of the negotiation process between Iran and the 5+1 great powers about its nuclear program. This book essentially builds upon it, focusing this time on the final nuclear agreement, the ensuing debates around it, and its global and regional ramifications especially in the Middle East. The first section analyzes the agreement through the prism of international relations theories, using a constructivist-critical theory approach. This is followed by an overview of the intense debates in Iran, the West, and other parts of the world, on the nuclear agreement and its various pros and cons, not to mention the connected, yet separate Iran-IAEA agreement. The second section covers Iran's foreign policy and its various priorities, looking in particular at the impact of the nuclear deal on the country's external relations and orientations, contextualized in terms of pre-existing issues and concerns and the profound influence of the nuclear agreement on the perceptions of Iranian power in the region and beyond. Iran's relations with its Arab, Turkish, Russian, and other neighbors are discussed, focusing on both the direct and indirect impact of the nuclear agreement on these relations, especially the paradoxical implications of the nuclear deal with respect to the non-nuclear crises in the Middle East, such as the Syria-Iraq crisis, and the re-alignments that have put Iran at the crossroads of East and West. Other issues covered include energy security, regional economic cooperation, the endemic sectarianism highlighted by Iran-Saudi competition, and the deadlock on the Middle East peace process. The third section then examines the issue of a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone and the likely consequences of the Iran nuclear deal on this prospect, which, in turn, raises the issue of regional proliferation and counterproliferation. The last section explores some possible various scenarios and the challenges of implementation as a relatively long-term agreement, providing specific policy recommendations for the regional actors and the external powers that are stakeholders in the volatile Middle East.

In the closing days of World War II, scientists working for the U.S. government invented nuclear explosives by splitting the atoms of heavy metals. Germany had already surrendered, but the United States and its allies remained at war with Japan. In the summer of 1945, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was flattened by a single nuclear bomb. A second bombing occurred just a few days later, decimating the city of Nagasaki. These were the first nuclear weapons ever used in war. And - so far - they are the last. Since then, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been manufactured and deployed by governments around the world. Many of these weapons are much more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed the two Japanese cities. None have been used so far, and the absence of nuclear war among nations armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons is a great mystery. While the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States has receded, the possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city by terrorists has taken its place in our official nightmares. So far, no terrorist group has made a serious effort to buy, steal, or build a nuclear weapon. The absence of nuclear terrorism in a world swarming with fanatical terrorists is another great mystery. The slippery slope to a nuclear Armageddon has been present for more than sixty years. In secure locations in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, and Paris, there are buttons to push than could put an end to human civilization, but these buttons have never been pushed. Why not? What has so far kept us safe from these mortal dangers? Those are the questions that Caplow asks and answers in Armageddon Postponed.

"The Globalization of Security" is an important rethinking of the connections between globalization and security, focusing on a conceptual examination of the role of the state combined with key case studies. The book provides an analysis of the changing nature of security issues through three interlinking ways of conceptualizing the globalization of security: the expansion of the scope of threat, thinking about security in 'global' terms, and the development of transnational networks of power. Three cases are examined to provide potential examples of the globalization of security: nuclear weapons and the globalization of threat, the globalization of the arms industry, and the global security aspects of migration and citizenship. The book provides a novel historical sociological approach to the globalization of security, advancing both the understanding of security and the theory of state power in international relations.

Covers the types and usage of German heavy reconnaissance vehicles.

On 6 August and 8 August 1945, the world changed forever with the release of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. In January 1947, the United States informed the British Government that they would not provide technical data for the production of nuclear weapons. It was therefore decided that Britain would produce its own bombs. In July 1944, the first operational jet aircraft, the Meteor, entered service in the RAF and the Government decided to develop jet-powered aircraft capable of dropping nuclear weapons, resulting in the development of the 'V' bombers: Valiant, Vulcan and Victor. As a result of the deteriorating relationship with Russia, the United States, as part of NATO, worked with the UK and co-operated in nuclear operational planning with US bomber aircraft based in the UK. Later, as a result of the development of nuclear power, submarines were fitted with nuclear weapons which resulted in the deterrent role passing from the RAF to the Royal Navy. However, the Cold War provided a unique role and responsibility for the RAF.My Target was Leningrad - V Force: Preserving our Democracy is unique in that it is a human story, not just a list of technical facts and bomber data. With many previously unpublished photographs from the author's private collection, this is the chilling story of what really happened and how close the world came to World War III and a nuclear apocalypse. Unlike other military historians, author Philip Goodall not only flew the mighty V bombers in action, but was also tasked to drop the bomb on Leningrad.

Three Knots to Nowhere: A Cold War Submariner on the Undersea Frontline follows my experiences in the United States Navy, from 1966 through 1972 They include my background, Boot Camp, Electricians School, United States Naval Nuclear Program, USS Henry Clay, SSBN overhaul in Charleston S.C., transit to Hawaii, and deterrent patrols out of Guam. The work begins with me and the crew of one of the most powerful weapons on Earth, the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine, USS Henry Clay manning Battle Station Missile. What follows is a fresh perspective of the secret world of submarine life. It blends introspective insights, interesting and humorous antidotes, and many undocumented aspects of submarine life. It also exposes aspects about life under the sea no one else has revealed. It is the most complete representation of submarine duty to date. The narrative focuses on the enlisted men-the backbone of the submarine service. Its level of detail will appeal to submariners and laypeople.

The book reflects the author's experience across more than forty years in assessing and forming policy about nuclear weapons, mostly at senior levels close to the centre both of British governmental decision-making and of NATO's development of plans and deployments, with much interaction also with comparable levels of United States activity in the Pentagon and the State department. Part I of the book seeks to distill, from this exceptional background of practical experience, basic conceptual ways of understanding the revolution brought about by nuclear weapons. It also surveys NATO's progressive development of thinking about nuclear deterrence, and then discusses the deep moral dilemmas posed - for all possible standpoints - by the existence of such weapons. Part II considers the risks and costs of nuclear-weapon possession, including proliferation dangers, and looks at both successful and unsuccessful ideas about how to manage them. Part III illustrates specific issues by reviewing the history and current policies of one long-established possessor, the United Kingdom, and two more recent ones, India and Pakistan. Part IV turns to the future, examines the goal of eventually abolishing all nuclear armouries, and then discusses the practical agenda, short of such a goal, which governments can usefully tackle in reducing the risks of proliferation and other dangers while not surrendering prematurely the war-prevention benefits which nuclear weapons have brought since 1945.
This book is a project of the Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War.

"Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, the National Book Award, and the National Book Critics Circle Award"
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS after its initial publication, "The Making of the Atomic Bomb "remains the seminal and complete story of how the bomb was developed, from the turn-of-the-century discovery of the vast energy locked inside the atom to the dropping of the first bombs on Japan.
Few great discoveries have evolved so swiftly--or have been so misunderstood. From the theoretical discussions of nuclear energy to the bright glare of Trinity, there was a span of hardly more than twenty-five years. What began as merely an interesting speculative problem in physics grew into the Manhattan Project, and then into the bomb, with frightening rapidity, while scientists known only to their peers--Szilard, Teller, Oppenheimer, Bohr, Meitner, Fermi, Lawrence, and von Neumann--stepped from their ivory towers into the limelight.
Richard Rhodes gives the definitive story of man's most awesome discovery and invention. Told in rich human, political, and scientific detail, "The Making of the Atomic Bomb "is a narrative tour de force and a document with literary power commensurate with its subject.

In the Post-Cold War era, US nuclear foreign policies towards India witnessed a major turnaround as a demand for 'cap, reduce, eliminate' under the Clinton administration was replaced by the implementation of the historic 'civil nuclear deal' in 2008 by Bush, a policy which continued under Obama's administration. This book addresses the change in US nuclear foreign policy by focusing on three core categories of identity, inequality, and great power narratives. Building upon the theoretical paradigm of critical constructivism, the concept of the 'state' is problematised by focusing on identity-related questions arguing that the 'state' becomes a constructed entity standing as valid only within relations of identity and difference. Focusing on postcolonial principles, Pate argues that imperialism as an organising principle of identity/difference enables us to understand how difference was maintained in unequal terms through US nuclear foreign policy. This manifested in five great power narratives constructed around peace and justice; India-Pakistan deterrence; democracy; economic progress; and scientific development. Identities of 'race', 'political economy', and 'gender', in terms of 'radical otherness' and 'otherness' were recurrently utilised through these narratives to maintain a difference enabling the respective administrations to maintain 'US' identity as a progressive and developed western nation, intrinsically justifying the US role as an arbiter of the global nuclear order. A useful work for scholars researching identity construction and US foreign and security policies, US-India bilateral nuclear relations, South Asian nuclear politics, critical security, and postcolonial studies.

Rising concern over the increasing threat of nuclear war impelled the 2017 United Nations (UN) negotiations and adoption by 122 UN member states of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty seeks to ban nuclear weapons globally in the same way chemical and biological weapons have already been prohibited. This book provides the first in-depth comprehensive analysis of the implications and possibilities of the new treaty, drawing on the insights of international relations, international laws, and disarmament experts and specialists from Europe, America, the Asia-Pacific, and the UN. In a context where existing nuclear weapon states have so far declined to be party to the new treaty, the book examines not only its emergence and significance but also the prospects and possibilities for its implementation, the challenges associated with verifying the new agreement, the role of both civil society and governments, and the treaty's wider implications in addressing regional and global nuclear threats. This book was originally published as a special issue of Global Change, Peace & Security but additionally includes the special section articles on the treaty in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

Advocating nuclear war, attempting communication with dolphins and taking an interest in the paranormal and UFOs, there is perhaps no greater (or stranger) cautionary tale for the Left than that of Posadism. Named after the Argentine Trotskyist J. Posadas, the movement's journey through the fractious and sectarian world of mid-20th century revolutionary socialism was unique. Although at times significant, Posadas' movement was ultimately a failure. As it disintegrated, it increasingly grew to resemble a bizarre cult, detached from the working class it sought to liberate. The renewed interest in Posadism today - especially for its more outlandish fixations - speaks to both a cynicism towards the past and nostalgia for the earnest belief that a better world is possible. Drawing on considerable archival research, and numerous interviews with ex- and current Posadists, I Want to Believe tells the fascinating story of this most unusual socialist movement and considers why it continues to capture the imaginations of leftists today.

Phantom in Combat puts you in the cockpit with the missile-age aces as they fight for their lives in the skies of Vietnam and the Middle East.\nStarting with a brief account of the forging of this deadly weapon, Phantom in Combat moves to the wars, campaigns and single engagements in which it was used to such telling effect. Leading USAF ace Steve Ritchie speaks more in sorrow than anger of the politically inspired rules that so frustrated him and his comrades in Vietnam. The story of the gruelling dogfight that made Randy Cunningham and Willie Driscoll the U.S. Navys only aces is redolent of the sweat, toil and terror of high-speed air fighting. And combat reports from some of Israels anonymous aces speak laconically of victories, losses, hairs-breadth escapes, and, above all, the Phantoms ability to give and take enormous punishment.\nProviding a rich background to this testimony is a wealth of rare material, including:\n- Battle-damage and gun-camera photographs\n- Recently declassified U.S. Navy tactical diagrams\n- Photo-sequence showing the destruction of an F-4 by a North Vietnamese missile.\n- Official analysis of the USAFs most successful MiG-trapping operation, led by the famous General Robin Olds.\n- Complete listing of USAF and USN air-to-air victories in Vietnam.\nHere is the human face of modern air warfare, described by the commanders and crews who earned for the Phantom its reputation as the worlds finest fighting aircraft.

Control of the air is the foundation for all conventional military operations against an adversary with an air defence capability. In future warfare, will it be possible for Unmanned Combat Air Systems to undertake the tasks and accept most of the risks that, until now, have been the lot of military aviators?