In the late 1980s it was felt that World War III could start in the Pacific. Long regarded by the USA as an American lake, the Pacific was now a focus of competition between the superpowers. The USSR, whose nuclear-arms navy was limited to their north Pacific ports, now had a major new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In response to this new threat, the Americans were planning more urgently for nuclear war in the Pacific, adding to their own mighty arsenal in the region and taunting the Soviets with aggressive surveillance and military exercises. The Soviets did the same. For 40 years, Pacific Islanders have had cause to resent the use of their ocean as a nuclear playground: of the five nuclear powers, three - the USA, USSR and China - launched missiles into the Pacific for text purposes; two - the USA and Britain - exploded nuclear devices there but had stopped; and one, France, continued to test nuclear bombs in one of its colonies. Pacific Islanders now have cause to fear that the ocean is becoming a nuclear battleground. Originally published in 1987, this book tells the story of the nuclear men in the Pacific and of those people they 'displaced' and irradiated. It is also about what these people and their governments had begun to do in response. The nuclear issue had transformed the political landscape of Micronesia and the South Pacific in the 1980s, loosening the US grip and making the French increasingly unpopular. The people of these remote communities, largely forgotten or considered dispensable, had a nuclear past made for them. Now they want to make their own future.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

Originally published in 1985, Deterrence in the 1980s offers analyses by leading American and Canadian scholars and decision-makers in the field of strategic studies of the current problems and dilemmas of contemporary international security with deterrence, nuclear and conventional, as the unifying conceptual theme. Deterrence as theory, as history, as psychology, as politics, as ethics and as policy is addressed. The authors outline the complexities of deterrence, in theory and in practice, and offer proposals regarding the future operationalization of deterrence in order both to reassure Western publics and to enhance Western and international security. Soviet-American strategic relations, along with the problems posed for the Western Alliance, are analysed. Within the context of NATO, the dilemmas, for both Europe and North America, of extended deterrence are raised. Despite the current crisis of deterrence, no other security strategy appears viable as long as nuclear weapons are retained for purposes of national security. However, current trends in the operationalization of deterrence - nuclear-war fighting capabilities - have raised concerns about the future of deterrence.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The 'Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for 'nuclear-free zones', and talk of 'megatonnage' and 'fallout' had given way to talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons and 'limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many 'conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not - as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest - undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments' loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections - objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

This report provides up-to-date information on the four main technical issues which will present the greatest challenges to the implementation of the comprehensive test ban treaty being negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: formulating an appropriate definition of the term nuclear test; creating the organization for effective implementation; verifying compliance with the treaty's provisions; and implications of the treaty's prohibition on preparations for testing, whether that prohibition is made explicit or remains implicit. The report is written in such a way that it offers important background to the non-specialist while providing timely guidance to policy-makers and others involved in the public debate of these issues. It is designed to support prompt completion of the treaty by suggesting ways in which disputes over contentious issues can be resolved speedily.

This book addresses the technological evolution of modern warfare due to unmanned systems and the growing capacity for cyberwarfare. The increasing involvement of unmanned means and methods of warfare can lead to a total removal of humans from the navigation, command and decision-making processes in the control of unmanned systems, and as such away from participation in hostilities - the "dehumanization of warfare." This raises the question of whether and how today's law is suitable for governing the dehumanization of warfare effectively. Which rules are relevant? Do interpretations of relevant rules need to be reviewed or is further and adapted regulation necessary? Moreover, ethical reasoning and computer science developments also have to be taken into account in identifying problems. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach the book focuses primarily on international humanitarian law, with related ethics and computer science aspects included in the discussion and the analysis.

The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, a concept more recently broadened to cover all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has been before the international community for decades. In this book, two experts from the region explore why the matter remains unresolved, and outline a comprehensive yet achievable roadmap to a Middle East free of WMD. Weapons of mass destruction pose an existential threat to global peace and security. But nowhere is it more urgent to stem their spread than in the Middle East, a region fraught with mistrust and instability. Accounting for these geopolitical realities, including the ongoing talks to curb Iran's nuclear program, the authors present a practical and innovative strategy to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destructions (WMD). They outline a phased approach toward disarmament in the region, prescribing confidence-building measures and verification tools to create trust among the region's governments. Their vision also sees the realization of a WMD-free zone within a broader regional agenda for security and cooperation to advance socioeconomic and political progress. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, politics and security studies in the Middle East.

This book, first published in 1983, contains articles written as a result of the UN 1978-81 study on the relationship between disarmament and development. They analyse the disruptive, retarding and weakening effects of large-scale military preparations on the economic and social fabric of societies around the world. They discuss the benefits of disarmament, and how resources could be converted into constructive civilian uses and national development, particularly in developing countries.

This book addresses issues of legal and moral governance arising in the development, deployment, and eventual uses of emerging technologies in military operations. Proverbial wisdom has it that law and morality always lag behind technological innovation. Hence, the book aims to identify, enumerate, and constructively address the problems of adequate governance for the development, deployment, and eventual uses of military technologies that have been newly introduced into military operations or which will be available in the near future. Proposals for modifications in governance, the book argues, closely track the anxieties of many critics of these technologies to the extent that they will proliferate, prove destructive in unanticipated ways, and partially or wholly escape regulation under current treaties and regulatory regimes. In addition to such concerns in domestic and especially in international law, the book addresses ethical norms in the professions involved in the design and eventual use of specific technologies, principally involving the professional norms of practice in engineering and the military (as well as biomedical and health care practice), which impose moral obligations on their members to avoid reckless endangerment or criminal negligence in the course of their activities. Thus, in addition to exploring the application of existing legal regimes and moral norms, the book examines how these professions might develop or improve the voluntary constraints on forms of malfeasance that are enshrined in their histories and codes of best practices. This book should prove of great interest to students of ethics, military studies, philosophy of war and peace, law, and international relations.

This book addresses issues of legal and moral governance arising in the development, deployment, and eventual uses of emerging technologies in military operations. Proverbial wisdom has it that law and morality always lag behind technological innovation. Hence, the book aims to identify, enumerate, and constructively address the problems of adequate governance for the development, deployment, and eventual uses of military technologies that have been newly introduced into military operations or which will be available in the near future. Proposals for modifications in governance, the book argues, closely track the anxieties of many critics of these technologies to the extent that they will proliferate, prove destructive in unanticipated ways, and partially or wholly escape regulation under current treaties and regulatory regimes. In addition to such concerns in domestic and especially in international law, the book addresses ethical norms in the professions involved in the design and eventual use of specific technologies, principally involving the professional norms of practice in engineering and the military (as well as biomedical and health care practice), which impose moral obligations on their members to avoid reckless endangerment or criminal negligence in the course of their activities. Thus, in addition to exploring the application of existing legal regimes and moral norms, the book examines how these professions might develop or improve the voluntary constraints on forms of malfeasance that are enshrined in their histories and codes of best practices. This book should prove of great interest to students of ethics, military studies, philosophy of war and peace, law, and international relations.

As part of its general rethinking of America's global strategy, the Bush Administration initiated a reexamination of America's nuclear doctrine that has generated considerable controversy with its focus on maintaining a reliance on nuclear weapons and potentially increasing willingness to use them. Here a group of leading strategic analysts examine the background to the reevaluation, issues of implementation, and potential implications internationally.

Originally published in 1993, this volume was unique in its scope and approach: Unlike most literature on nuclear weapons proliferation at the time, the essays in this volume offer theoretical discussions and suggest testable hypotheses about the causes and effects of nuclear weapons proliferation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ideal subject for social science scholarship, and such scholarship is especially timely now. Among the topics discussed in The Proliferation Puzzle are: The building of nuclear weapons is a complex task touching upon many of the subjects of study at the core of social science and international relations. Nuclear weapons may be acquired as a hedge against external threat, for reasons of national prestige, or as a result of pressures by domestic coalitions among scientists, bureaucrats, and the military. They may be sought for defensive purposes or to support hegemonic aspirations. Nuclear weapons also raise questions about civilian command and control, especially in crisis situations. During the last two decades the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been proscribed by the non-proliferation regime. The decisions countries made about acquiring these weapons and the manner they chose to build them serve as a test of the efficacy of this particular regime, and of international regimes more generally. Nuclear weapons were introduced at the time bipolarity became the international order. As the world moves away from bipolarity, there is a need to answer questions such as: What would be the effect of nuclear weapons in a multipolar order? How will the spread of nuclear weapons affect the distribution of capabilities among states? If nuclear weapons spread to additional countries, will they enhance stability or exacerbate instability? Can the spread of these weapons be managed or controlled? This book brings together scholars from different schools within international relations and the social sciences to address the question of why nuclear weapons spread. A disciplined, rigorous examination of proliferation is important not only for scholarship but also for informed policymaking. The purpose of social science is to formulate hypotheses and devise theories that advance our understanding of society and aid in the fashioning of enlightened policy. The essays in this volume show how explicit hypotheses about the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation provide a deeper understanding of the problem and suggest specific, theory-informed policy recommendations.

This volume is based on a multidisciplinary approach towards biological and chemical threats that can, and have been previously used in bioterrorism attacks around the globe. Current knowledge and evidence-based principles from the fields of synthetic biology, microbiology, plant biology, chemistry, food science, forensics, tactics, infective medicine, psychology and others are compiled to address numerous aspects and the complexity of bioterrorism attacks. The main focus is on biological threats, especially in the context of synthetic biology and its emerging findings that can be observed as possible threat and tool. The book examines microorganisms and their possible use in forensics, i.e. as possible detection tool that could enable fast and precise detection of possible treats. A number of plant derived components are also discussed as possible agents in bioterrorism attacks, and in relation to infectious disease pathology. Another integral part is food safety, especially in terms of large food supply chains, like airline caterings, institutionalized kitchens etc. Food can be observed as a possible mean of delivery of various agents (biological and chemical) for bioterrorism attacks. Steps on how to recognize specific critical points in a food supply chain, along with proposed corrective activities are discussed. Examples from around the globe, along with the methodological approach on how to differentiate bioterrorism attacks from other epidemics are provided. However, epidemics are also discussed in the context of migrations, with the special emphasis on the current refugee migrations that affect not only Europe, but also the United States. The book will be of interest to experts from various fields of science as well as professionals working in the field. The book encompasses examples and tools developed for easier, more specific, and faster detection of possible bioterrorism treats, along with proposed actions for some aspects of a bioterrorism attack.

After surviving three years flying the mighty Phantom, the RAF's greatest and most terrifying fighter (for those in the cockpit), Tug Wilson was sent to RAF Brawdy in Pembrokeshire and then to RAF Valley on the Isle of Anglesey to teach the flying skills he probably should have known when posted on the Cold War front line. At Valley, Wilson quickly discovered that being an instructor was much more than just teaching: it was falling out of the sky after a stall at just 300 feet, inches from pulling the ejection-seat handle; it was zooming into cloud at low level knowing there's a hill somewhere straight ahead; it was suffering the horror of nearly killing your student by chasing him too hard in air combat; it was being a mentor, a father figure, a best friend and a worst enemy if needs be; and it was the joy of guiding the struggling but hard-working ones away from the brink of being 'chopped' and towards their dream of becoming confident aviators, ready to join an operational squadron. Confessions of a Flying Instructor is a gritty, unvarnished, highly entertaining account of what it was like to be a tactics and flying instructor on an RAF squadron in the early 1990s-the banter, the egos, the insecurities, the cock-ups, the tragedies, the friendships, the triumphs, and the pure, unadulterated exhilaration of raging around the sky in a Hawk T1A day after day. Have you ever wondered what a fast-jet pilot needs to go through to learn how to win in air combat? Or how to cheat in dogfighting, for that matter? This book is an intimate, revelatory memoir of an often overlooked but intrinsic aspect of the RAF.

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC 2.5 license. On April 22, 1915, the German military released 150 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium. Carried by a long-awaited wind, the chlorine cloud passed within a few minutes through the British and French trenches, leaving behind at least 1,000 dead and 4,000 injured. This chemical attack, which amounted to the first use of a weapon of mass destruction, marks a turning point in world history. The preparation as well as the execution of the gas attack was orchestrated by Fritz Haber, the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem. During World War I, Haber transformed his research institute into a center for the development of chemical weapons (and of the means of protection against them). Bretislav Friedrich and Martin Wolf (Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society, the successor institution of Haber's institute) together with Dieter Hoffmann, Jurgen Renn, and Florian Schmaltz (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) organized an international symposium to commemorate the centenary of the infamous chemical attack. The symposium examined crucial facets of chemical warfare from the first research on and deployment of chemical weapons in WWI to the development and use of chemical warfare during the century hence. The focus was on scientific, ethical, legal, and political issues of chemical weapons research and deployment - including the issue of dual use - as well as the ongoing effort to control the possession of chemical weapons and to ultimately achieve their elimination. The volume consists of papers presented at the symposium and supplemented by additional articles that together cover key aspects of chemical warfare from 22 April 1915 until the summer of 2015.

In mid-1980 a second conference for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would take place in Geneva. Given the importance of preventing, or at least slowing down, nuclear weapon proliferation, this conference would be a crucial event in the field of arms control and disarmament. For many countries the technical and economic barriers to proliferation had disappeared, and the only remaining barriers were political. In an attempt to contribute to the discussions at the NPT Review Conference, SIPRI assembled a group of experts from a number of countries to discuss the technical aspects of the control of fissionable materials in non-military applications. The meeting took place in Stockholm, 12-16 October 1978. Originally published in 1979, this book on nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation contains the papers presented at the symposium and reflects the discussions at the meeting.

This book investigates drivers and trends in nuclear proliferation in the Global South. Based on an in-depth analysis of South Africa's nuclear history, it examines general causes of proliferation, such as technical capabilities and constraints; a country's motivation to build a nuclear bomb; and particular domestic and international situations. It also highlights Britain's role in the development of technological capability in South Africa and explains how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Finally, the study offers effective solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in developing countries.

Creating Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force, 1945-2015 is a timely contribution to postwar Japan security studies. It is the first comprehensive account of Japan's post-1945 army, including a comprehensive institutional history, together with the evolution of roles and missions and the adoption of successive professional identities. The organizational history is embedded within a thorough examination of Japan's own defense policy, as well as of America's policy of alliance with Japan. The book examines and challenges assumptions about the drafting and adoption of the War Renunciation clause of Japan's postwar Peace Constitution, Article 9, which uniquely not only renounces war, but the arms to wage war. Thus Japan's army is not called an army, but the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF). The work also examines the place of an army and soldiers in the formation of Japan's national identity after its last devastating war, and explores the impact of constitutional, legal and policy restrictions, as well as the power of the legacy of the still-largely vilified Imperial Japanese Army on GSDF members who seek to serve because "there are people we want to protect." The study is rounded by an examination of the place of soldiers in Japan's popular culture, focused on movies, manga and anime, assessing the impact on the GSDF of a public imagination that most often ignores or villainizes soldiers, though ending with a note that some positive images of soldiers and of the GSDF members themselves have started to appear in the last few years. The book's author, a retired U.S. Army soldier who spent more than twenty years working, studying and training with the GSDF, offers a broad-ranging exploration of a unique organization. This work is extensively researched, using English and Japanese sources, and will appeal to anyone interested in Japanese security studies, alliance studies, and military imagery in Japanese pop culture, as well as to students of military history, international security, international relations, and cultural identity.

This is a sequel to Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence-Building Measures edited by E. Geissler (OUP/SIPRI 1989). During work on that book, it was felt that there was a need for more concrete discussion of how to provide the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with useful verification measures. Since the verification aspects of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will complement the BWC, and vice versa, it is often argued that the CWC must be finalized before concrete verification measures for the BWC can be addressed. However, it is already rather clear what measures will be in effect under the CWC, and this information can be utilized to provide input to the preliminary technical work on verification measures for the BWC. This publication will identify and develop suggestions for verification measures for the BWC, and their possible dual function for verification and confidence-building will also be explored in contributions by ten leading experts in the field.