Steve Joubert had always wanted to be a pilot and the only way he could afford to do so, was to join the South African Air Force in the late 1970s.

As an adventurous young man with a wicked sense of humour, he tells of the many amusing escapades he had as a trainee pilot. But soon he is sent to fight in the Border War in northern Namibia (then South West Africa) where he is exposed to the carnage of war. The pilots of the Alouette helicopters were witness to some of the worst scenes of the Border War. Often, they were the first to arrive after a deadly landmine accident.

In the fiercest battles their gunships regularly supplied life-saving air cover to troops on the ground.

This work focuses on the efforts of the Quartermaster Corps to apply the concept of standardization to the Army's motor transportation system. The experiences of the Quartermaster Corps and the automobile industry indicated that the most efficient and cost effective method of motorization was to adopt a fleet of standardized trucks with interchangeable components. To attain this goal, the Quartermaster Corps faced many obstacles: bureaucratic inertia, technological limitations, insufficient funding, and resistance from the truck industry. But, in 1940, as America prepared for war, thanks to the efforts of the Quartermaster Corps, the haphazard policies that had once governed truck procurement were superseded by a standardization policy that purchased predetermined makes and models of trucks manufactured specifically for Army service.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Mutant Ecologies traces the spinning of new synthetic threads into the web of life. It is a critical cartography of the shifting landscapes of capital accumulation conjured by recent developments in genomic science, genome editing and the biotech industry. CRISPR crops, fast-growing salmons, heat-resistant Slick (TM) cows, Friendly (TM) Mosquitoes, humanised mice, pigs growing human organs - these are but a few of the dazzling new life-forms that have recently emerged from corporate and university laboratories around the world, all promising to lubricate the circuits of capital accumulation in distinct ways. The deliberate induction of genetic mutations is increasingly central to business operations in a number of sectors, from agriculture to pharmaceuticals. While the Nobel Committee recently proclaimed the life sciences to have entered 'a new epoch', the authors show how these technological innovations continue to operate within a socio-historical context defined by the iron rules of capitalist competition and exploitation. Capital no longer contents itself with simply appropriating the living bodies of plants and animals. It purposefully designs their internal metabolism, and in that way it redesigns the countless living vectors that constitute the global biosphere. It is driving a biological revolution, which will ripple through the everyday lives of people everywhere.

After surviving three years flying the mighty Phantom, the RAF's greatest and most terrifying fighter (for those in the cockpit), Tug Wilson was sent to RAF Brawdy in Pembrokeshire and then to RAF Valley on the Isle of Anglesey to teach the flying skills he probably should have known when posted on the Cold War front line. At Valley, Wilson quickly discovered that being an instructor was much more than just teaching: it was falling out of the sky after a stall at just 300 feet, inches from pulling the ejection-seat handle; it was zooming into cloud at low level knowing there's a hill somewhere straight ahead; it was suffering the horror of nearly killing your student by chasing him too hard in air combat; it was being a mentor, a father figure, a best friend and a worst enemy if needs be; and it was the joy of guiding the struggling but hard-working ones away from the brink of being 'chopped' and towards their dream of becoming confident aviators, ready to join an operational squadron. Confessions of a Flying Instructor is a gritty, unvarnished, highly entertaining account of what it was like to be a tactics and flying instructor on an RAF squadron in the early 1990s-the banter, the egos, the insecurities, the cock-ups, the tragedies, the friendships, the triumphs, and the pure, unadulterated exhilaration of raging around the sky in a Hawk T1A day after day. Have you ever wondered what a fast-jet pilot needs to go through to learn how to win in air combat? Or how to cheat in dogfighting, for that matter? This book is an intimate, revelatory memoir of an often overlooked but intrinsic aspect of the RAF.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

The MiG-3 fighter plane, like the history of the creation of the Mikoyan and Gurevich (Мико�н и Гуревич) design bureau, is relatively well known to anyone interested in the history of Soviet aviation. Many books and articles have been published about this machine, but information about the circumstances of the birth of the project and the conditions of its creation are very brief and concise. MiG-1 and MiG-3 were the most numerous new generation fighters in Soviet aviation at the time of the German invasion of the USSR. They played a very important role in the first period of the war. Until now, it has been assumed in the literature that this applies mainly to the use of these aircraft during the battle of Moscow, as well as capital's and Leningrad's air defence, but MiGs also took on a large weight of air combat at the front in 1941.

Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how the obscure country of Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the marginalized Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons-or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present. For Soviet officials, Kazakhstan's steppe was not an ecological marvel or beloved homeland, but an empty patch of dirt ideal for nuclear testing. Two-headed lambs were just the beginning of the resulting public health disaster for Kazakhstan-compounded, when the Soviet Union collapsed, by the daunting burden of becoming an overnight nuclear power. Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security.

From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, the first insider exposé of the terrifying dangers of America's hidden, seventy-year-long nuclear policy.

At the same time former presidential advisor Daniel Ellsberg famously took the Pentagon Papers, he also took with him a cache of top-secret documents related to America's nuclear program in the 1960s. Here for the first time he reveals the contents of those now-declassified documents and makes clear their shocking relevance for today.

The Doomsday Machine is Ellsberg's account of the most dangerous arms build-up in the history of civilisation, whose legacy - and proposed renewal under the Trump administration - threatens the very survival of humanity.

Number 8 in the Luftwaffe Profile Series describes the design and use of the Arado Ar 240.

This book addresses the incentives for nations to develop nuclear weapons and the technical expertise needed for that purpose. Ballistic missiles are required by any nation wanting to optimize the effectiveness of deterrence and the threat derived from possessing nuclear weapons. The basic science of ballistic missile programs is discussed using the North Korean program as an example, although to some extent the programs of other countries are also covered. In addition, there is an introduction to the basics of nuclear weapons technology.Unlike most books on these topics, this one includes, besides the technical component, the policy aspects surrounding nuclear weapons. It also shows how nuclear weapons can - and have - stabilized conflicts, discussing why the concept of deterrence may not always be relied upon to prevent war. The origin of terrorism in the Middle East and the possibility of nuclear terrorism originating from that region are other topics of interest.

The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II was the most-produced American supersonic military jet with 5,195 aircraft being produced. By any standards the F-4 has been incredibly successful, used not only by the USAF and US Navy but many air forces around the world including Germany, Israel, Turkey and Japan. The F-4 was designed as a long-range fighter interceptor and fighter bomber, excellent in all roles assigned to it. The Phantom has performed leading roles in multiple conflicts around the world from the Vietnam War through to the Gulf War. Although the F-4 left US service in 1996 it has continued in service with other air forces, only just being retired in 2020 from the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force. This new title in Pen & Sword's highly successful Flight Craft series covers the development and operational use of the F-4 Phantom II and brings to life the variety of colour schemes and markings applied by many of the multiple air arms that have operated the Phantom around the world by including quality colour profiles. Multiple model projects are included covering significant variants of the F-4 like the F-4B, F-4D, F-4E, F-4F, F-4G, F-4J, F-4EJ-Kai; British FGR-2 and F-4J(UK). All the popular model scales are represented: 1:72, 1:48 and 1:32A first for scale modellers everywhere - a book aimed at scale modellers of all levels interested in building the F-4 Phantom II.

To constrain nuclear proliferation, one must, in addition to designing a proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle, identify a set of long-term arms limitation and security policies for the major states. These policies should be capable of satisfying various security and political objectives of non-nuclear weapon states, thereby minimizing their incentives to acquire independent nuclear weapon capabilities, and thus collectively minimizing future nuclear proliferation. Originally published in 1979, this book attempts to identify such a comprehensive arms limitation and security regime. It reviews negotiations concerning the NPT through the end of the Review Conference of the NPT in mid-1975 and the subsequent strategic debate concerning nuclear proliferation.

In the early 1980s there had been an upsurge of public concern over the nuclear threat to Europe. Already saturated with nuclear weapons, Europe faced controversial new deployments and there was alarm over military strategies for nuclear war in the region. It is in this context that the idea of nuclear weapon-free zones had captured the popular imagination and became a political issue in Europe. Not only would such zones build confidence and raise the nuclear threshold, but they would be first steps towards a more comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1983 Nuclear Disengagement in Europe probes the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in the region. Pugwash and SIPRI arranged a meeting at which an international team of lawyers, scientists, politicians and military experts gave background information and provided an appraisal of problems regarding the zone initiatives as well as benefits that would accrue. Possible elements in a European zone arrangement were elaborated on and procedures towards the establishment of such a zone were suggested.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

In the late 1980s it was felt that World War III could start in the Pacific. Long regarded by the USA as an American lake, the Pacific was now a focus of competition between the superpowers. The USSR, whose nuclear-arms navy was limited to their north Pacific ports, now had a major new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In response to this new threat, the Americans were planning more urgently for nuclear war in the Pacific, adding to their own mighty arsenal in the region and taunting the Soviets with aggressive surveillance and military exercises. The Soviets did the same. For 40 years, Pacific Islanders have had cause to resent the use of their ocean as a nuclear playground: of the five nuclear powers, three - the USA, USSR and China - launched missiles into the Pacific for text purposes; two - the USA and Britain - exploded nuclear devices there but had stopped; and one, France, continued to test nuclear bombs in one of its colonies. Pacific Islanders now have cause to fear that the ocean is becoming a nuclear battleground. Originally published in 1987, this book tells the story of the nuclear men in the Pacific and of those people they 'displaced' and irradiated. It is also about what these people and their governments had begun to do in response. The nuclear issue had transformed the political landscape of Micronesia and the South Pacific in the 1980s, loosening the US grip and making the French increasingly unpopular. The people of these remote communities, largely forgotten or considered dispensable, had a nuclear past made for them. Now they want to make their own future.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not - as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest - undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments' loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections - objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The 'Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for 'nuclear-free zones', and talk of 'megatonnage' and 'fallout' had given way to talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons and 'limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many 'conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

How does the Soviet Union view the costs and benefits of nuclear arms control? What factors motivate Soviet negotiations with the Western world on this crucial issue? And what, precisely, does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish through nuclear arms control? Originally published in 1988, The Other Side of Arms Control provides an in-depth examination of this too infrequently discussed aspect of the arms race and the ongoing negotiations to halt it. In The Other Side of Arms Control, Alan B. Sherr argues that the time is now right for significant substantive progress to be made on nuclear arms control: the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated greater flexibility and willingness to compromise on a number of difficult issues, including verification. But more important, circumstances within and outside the Soviet Union now make progress on arms control crucial to Soviet political and economic goals as well as foreign policy objectives. Written in accessible, nontechnical language, The Other Side of Arms Control will be of historical interest to students, teachers, policymakers, and others concerned with the future of nuclear arms control.

Originally published in 1956, atomic policy overshadowed political considerations in the same way that 'the balance of power' had mesmerized European politicians for so long. Admiral Biorklund here makes a general survey of the whole problem. He traces the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs and the history of international atomic policy as revealed by post-war conferences, by official statements, and in official and unofficial publications. His thirty years study of Russia and complete command of the language have enabled him to give a more thorough and authoritative account of the Soviet attitude than has so far appeared in English. He also presents fully the American point of view that the preservation of force is vital to the democracies of the world. Admiral Biorklund makes an expert contribution to a full appreciation of the primary question of the day. He feels that it is unrealistic to attempt a total prohibition of atomic weapons. But it is not therefore necessary to sit with folded arms. By starting with what is politically possible now, he outlines a solution which recognizes that the smaller tactical weapons would have to be tolerated while the heaviest bombs are strictly controlled. Clearly written, his book is extremely readable and of absorbing interest. It presents, soberly and objectively a great deal of information in a readily assimilable form. A large map (available online) plots the position of the world's fissile material (uranium, thorium, lithium, etc.). Assessing every known scrap of information, it has been the most complete map yet published.

Originally published in 1985, Deterrence in the 1980s offers analyses by leading American and Canadian scholars and decision-makers in the field of strategic studies of the current problems and dilemmas of contemporary international security with deterrence, nuclear and conventional, as the unifying conceptual theme. Deterrence as theory, as history, as psychology, as politics, as ethics and as policy is addressed. The authors outline the complexities of deterrence, in theory and in practice, and offer proposals regarding the future operationalization of deterrence in order both to reassure Western publics and to enhance Western and international security. Soviet-American strategic relations, along with the problems posed for the Western Alliance, are analysed. Within the context of NATO, the dilemmas, for both Europe and North America, of extended deterrence are raised. Despite the current crisis of deterrence, no other security strategy appears viable as long as nuclear weapons are retained for purposes of national security. However, current trends in the operationalization of deterrence - nuclear-war fighting capabilities - have raised concerns about the future of deterrence.

Ideological debate is one component of the intellectual background to Soviet policy-making. Originally published in 1987, this paper explores how Soviet writers wrestle with the challenge to their ideology that is posed by the threat of nuclear war. What, for example, is the relationship between the values of peace and of socialism? What drives the arms race? Is capitalism inherently militaristic, or is a demilitarized capitalism conceivable? Is the outcome of history predetermined or open? It is shown that the range of permissible views is wider than often assumed, and that the constraints of Soviet ideology do not exclude evolution towards a more cooperative approach to international security.

Originally published in 1993, this volume was unique in its scope and approach: Unlike most literature on nuclear weapons proliferation at the time, the essays in this volume offer theoretical discussions and suggest testable hypotheses about the causes and effects of nuclear weapons proliferation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ideal subject for social science scholarship, and such scholarship is especially timely now. Among the topics discussed in The Proliferation Puzzle are: The building of nuclear weapons is a complex task touching upon many of the subjects of study at the core of social science and international relations. Nuclear weapons may be acquired as a hedge against external threat, for reasons of national prestige, or as a result of pressures by domestic coalitions among scientists, bureaucrats, and the military. They may be sought for defensive purposes or to support hegemonic aspirations. Nuclear weapons also raise questions about civilian command and control, especially in crisis situations. During the last two decades the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been proscribed by the non-proliferation regime. The decisions countries made about acquiring these weapons and the manner they chose to build them serve as a test of the efficacy of this particular regime, and of international regimes more generally. Nuclear weapons were introduced at the time bipolarity became the international order. As the world moves away from bipolarity, there is a need to answer questions such as: What would be the effect of nuclear weapons in a multipolar order? How will the spread of nuclear weapons affect the distribution of capabilities among states? If nuclear weapons spread to additional countries, will they enhance stability or exacerbate instability? Can the spread of these weapons be managed or controlled? This book brings together scholars from different schools within international relations and the social sciences to address the question of why nuclear weapons spread. A disciplined, rigorous examination of proliferation is important not only for scholarship but also for informed policymaking. The purpose of social science is to formulate hypotheses and devise theories that advance our understanding of society and aid in the fashioning of enlightened policy. The essays in this volume show how explicit hypotheses about the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation provide a deeper understanding of the problem and suggest specific, theory-informed policy recommendations.