The current concern that ballistic missile technologies are spreading throughout the world is addressed in this book. It examines the missile and missile-armament programmes and technologies, and the ability of countries to acquire such technologies. The concluding chapter investigates the international efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation.

This book addresses the technological evolution of modern warfare due to unmanned systems and the growing capacity for cyberwarfare. The increasing involvement of unmanned means and methods of warfare can lead to a total removal of humans from the navigation, command and decision-making processes in the control of unmanned systems, and as such away from participation in hostilities - the "dehumanization of warfare." This raises the question of whether and how today's law is suitable for governing the dehumanization of warfare effectively. Which rules are relevant? Do interpretations of relevant rules need to be reviewed or is further and adapted regulation necessary? Moreover, ethical reasoning and computer science developments also have to be taken into account in identifying problems. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach the book focuses primarily on international humanitarian law, with related ethics and computer science aspects included in the discussion and the analysis.

The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

Originally published in 1956, atomic policy overshadowed political considerations in the same way that 'the balance of power' had mesmerized European politicians for so long. Admiral Biorklund here makes a general survey of the whole problem. He traces the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs and the history of international atomic policy as revealed by post-war conferences, by official statements, and in official and unofficial publications. His thirty years study of Russia and complete command of the language have enabled him to give a more thorough and authoritative account of the Soviet attitude than has so far appeared in English. He also presents fully the American point of view that the preservation of force is vital to the democracies of the world. Admiral Biorklund makes an expert contribution to a full appreciation of the primary question of the day. He feels that it is unrealistic to attempt a total prohibition of atomic weapons. But it is not therefore necessary to sit with folded arms. By starting with what is politically possible now, he outlines a solution which recognizes that the smaller tactical weapons would have to be tolerated while the heaviest bombs are strictly controlled. Clearly written, his book is extremely readable and of absorbing interest. It presents, soberly and objectively a great deal of information in a readily assimilable form. A large map (available online) plots the position of the world's fissile material (uranium, thorium, lithium, etc.). Assessing every known scrap of information, it has been the most complete map yet published.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Is the appearance of new nuclear weapon states inevitable? Who are the sponsors and apologists of nuclear weapons, and why are others in favour of renouncing them? What are the implications for international security of the increasingly wide use of nuclear energy? How can nuclear threats be defused? Originally published in 1985, SIPRI's study suggests some answers to these questions. The book examines the situation in a number of countries of key importance for non-proliferation: the two nuclear-weapon states which have declined to join the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (China and France); a group of nuclear 'threshold' states also remaining outside the Treaty (Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Spain); and a group of states, both developed and developing, which for various reasons have joined the Treaty (Canada, Egypt, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland and Taiwan). The focus of the book is on motivations for and against nuclear proliferation. An analysis of these motivations leads the editor to make detailed recommendations aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Appendices include a list of nuclear facilities in the countries studied, specifying the degree of their coverage by international controls, and other relevant documentation.

In the late 1980s it was felt that World War III could start in the Pacific. Long regarded by the USA as an American lake, the Pacific was now a focus of competition between the superpowers. The USSR, whose nuclear-arms navy was limited to their north Pacific ports, now had a major new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In response to this new threat, the Americans were planning more urgently for nuclear war in the Pacific, adding to their own mighty arsenal in the region and taunting the Soviets with aggressive surveillance and military exercises. The Soviets did the same. For 40 years, Pacific Islanders have had cause to resent the use of their ocean as a nuclear playground: of the five nuclear powers, three - the USA, USSR and China - launched missiles into the Pacific for text purposes; two - the USA and Britain - exploded nuclear devices there but had stopped; and one, France, continued to test nuclear bombs in one of its colonies. Pacific Islanders now have cause to fear that the ocean is becoming a nuclear battleground. Originally published in 1987, this book tells the story of the nuclear men in the Pacific and of those people they 'displaced' and irradiated. It is also about what these people and their governments had begun to do in response. The nuclear issue had transformed the political landscape of Micronesia and the South Pacific in the 1980s, loosening the US grip and making the French increasingly unpopular. The people of these remote communities, largely forgotten or considered dispensable, had a nuclear past made for them. Now they want to make their own future.

How does the Soviet Union view the costs and benefits of nuclear arms control? What factors motivate Soviet negotiations with the Western world on this crucial issue? And what, precisely, does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish through nuclear arms control? Originally published in 1988, The Other Side of Arms Control provides an in-depth examination of this too infrequently discussed aspect of the arms race and the ongoing negotiations to halt it. In The Other Side of Arms Control, Alan B. Sherr argues that the time is now right for significant substantive progress to be made on nuclear arms control: the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated greater flexibility and willingness to compromise on a number of difficult issues, including verification. But more important, circumstances within and outside the Soviet Union now make progress on arms control crucial to Soviet political and economic goals as well as foreign policy objectives. Written in accessible, nontechnical language, The Other Side of Arms Control will be of historical interest to students, teachers, policymakers, and others concerned with the future of nuclear arms control.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

Ideological debate is one component of the intellectual background to Soviet policy-making. Originally published in 1987, this paper explores how Soviet writers wrestle with the challenge to their ideology that is posed by the threat of nuclear war. What, for example, is the relationship between the values of peace and of socialism? What drives the arms race? Is capitalism inherently militaristic, or is a demilitarized capitalism conceivable? Is the outcome of history predetermined or open? It is shown that the range of permissible views is wider than often assumed, and that the constraints of Soviet ideology do not exclude evolution towards a more cooperative approach to international security.

There is growing interest world wide in nuclear-free zones. Originally published in 1987, this book explores the question of what constitutes a nuclear-free zone and charts the progress of the movement to establish them. The book shows how definitions of nuclear-free zones vary from those intended to exclude everything nuclear (including nuclear power installations and the dumping of nuclear waste) to those aiming to exclude nuclear weapons in a limited way. Special attention is paid to the three treaties which have established major international nuclear-free zones, (Latin America, South Pacific, Antarctica) examining their strengths and weaknesses as well as areas where the idea has been proposed (Balkans, Africa). The book concludes with a review of problems and prospects for the future.

Only two years after Sputnik, weapons were created for attacking spacecraft. These were based on land. But now there is talk of weapons in space-instant-kill beams like lasers. President Reagan has offered a vision of new inventions that could stop nuclear missile attacks. But will they work? Can lasers make nuclear weapons obsolete? Or would they merely be used to wage Stars Wars? Originally published in 1984, this is mainly the story of the military use of space. It shows how the new technology could trigger nuclear world war. And it looks for a way out...

Originally published in 1985, Deterrence in the 1980s offers analyses by leading American and Canadian scholars and decision-makers in the field of strategic studies of the current problems and dilemmas of contemporary international security with deterrence, nuclear and conventional, as the unifying conceptual theme. Deterrence as theory, as history, as psychology, as politics, as ethics and as policy is addressed. The authors outline the complexities of deterrence, in theory and in practice, and offer proposals regarding the future operationalization of deterrence in order both to reassure Western publics and to enhance Western and international security. Soviet-American strategic relations, along with the problems posed for the Western Alliance, are analysed. Within the context of NATO, the dilemmas, for both Europe and North America, of extended deterrence are raised. Despite the current crisis of deterrence, no other security strategy appears viable as long as nuclear weapons are retained for purposes of national security. However, current trends in the operationalization of deterrence - nuclear-war fighting capabilities - have raised concerns about the future of deterrence.

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not - as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest - undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments' loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections - objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

This report provides up-to-date information on the four main technical issues which will present the greatest challenges to the implementation of the comprehensive test ban treaty being negotiated at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament: formulating an appropriate definition of the term nuclear test; creating the organization for effective implementation; verifying compliance with the treaty's provisions; and implications of the treaty's prohibition on preparations for testing, whether that prohibition is made explicit or remains implicit. The report is written in such a way that it offers important background to the non-specialist while providing timely guidance to policy-makers and others involved in the public debate of these issues. It is designed to support prompt completion of the treaty by suggesting ways in which disputes over contentious issues can be resolved speedily.

This volume is based on a multidisciplinary approach towards biological and chemical threats that can, and have been previously used in bioterrorism attacks around the globe. Current knowledge and evidence-based principles from the fields of synthetic biology, microbiology, plant biology, chemistry, food science, forensics, tactics, infective medicine, psychology and others are compiled to address numerous aspects and the complexity of bioterrorism attacks. The main focus is on biological threats, especially in the context of synthetic biology and its emerging findings that can be observed as possible threat and tool. The book examines microorganisms and their possible use in forensics, i.e. as possible detection tool that could enable fast and precise detection of possible treats. A number of plant derived components are also discussed as possible agents in bioterrorism attacks, and in relation to infectious disease pathology. Another integral part is food safety, especially in terms of large food supply chains, like airline caterings, institutionalized kitchens etc. Food can be observed as a possible mean of delivery of various agents (biological and chemical) for bioterrorism attacks. Steps on how to recognize specific critical points in a food supply chain, along with proposed corrective activities are discussed. Examples from around the globe, along with the methodological approach on how to differentiate bioterrorism attacks from other epidemics are provided. However, epidemics are also discussed in the context of migrations, with the special emphasis on the current refugee migrations that affect not only Europe, but also the United States. The book will be of interest to experts from various fields of science as well as professionals working in the field. The book encompasses examples and tools developed for easier, more specific, and faster detection of possible bioterrorism treats, along with proposed actions for some aspects of a bioterrorism attack.

In December 1994 Ukraine gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world and signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, having received assurances that its sovereignty would be respected and secured by Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Based on original and heretofore unavailable documents, Yuri Kostenko's account of the negotiations between Ukraine, Russia, and the US, reveals for the first time the internal debates of the Ukrainian government, as well as the pressure exerted upon it by its international partners. Kostenko presents an insider's view on the issue of nuclear disarmament and raises the question of whether the complete and immediate dismantlement of the country's enormous nuclear arsenal was strategically the right decision, especially in view of the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, one of the guarantors of Ukraine's sovereignty under denuclearization.

A deeply researched international history and exemplary study (New York Times Book Review) of how a divided world ended and our present world was fashioned, as the world drifts toward another great time of choosing. Two of America's leading scholar-diplomats, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, have combed sources in several languages, interviewed leading figures, and drawn on their own firsthand experience to bring to life the choices that molded the contemporary world. Zeroing in on the key moments of decision, the might-have-beens, and the human beings working through them, they explore both what happened and what could have happened, to show how one world ended and another took form. Beginning in the late 1970s and carrying into the present, they focus on the momentous period between 1988 and 1992, when an entire world system changed, states broke apart, and societies were transformed. Such periods have always been accompanied by terrible wars -- but not this time. This is also a story of individuals coping with uncertainty. They voice their hopes and fears. They try out desperate improvisations and careful designs. These were leaders who grew up in a postwar world, who tried to fashion something better, more peaceful, more prosperous, than the damaged, divided world in which they had come of age. New problems are putting their choices, and the world they made, back on the operating table. It is time to recall not only why they made their choices, but also just how great nations can step up to great challenges. Timed for the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, To Build a Better World is an authoritative depiction of contemporary statecraft. It lets readers in on the strategies and negotiations, nerve-racking risks, last-minute decisions, and deep deliberations behind the dramas that changed the face of Europe -- and the world -- forever.

This book is open access under a CC BY-NC 2.5 license. On April 22, 1915, the German military released 150 tons of chlorine gas at Ypres, Belgium. Carried by a long-awaited wind, the chlorine cloud passed within a few minutes through the British and French trenches, leaving behind at least 1,000 dead and 4,000 injured. This chemical attack, which amounted to the first use of a weapon of mass destruction, marks a turning point in world history. The preparation as well as the execution of the gas attack was orchestrated by Fritz Haber, the director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem. During World War I, Haber transformed his research institute into a center for the development of chemical weapons (and of the means of protection against them). Bretislav Friedrich and Martin Wolf (Fritz Haber Institute of the Max Planck Society, the successor institution of Haber's institute) together with Dieter Hoffmann, Jurgen Renn, and Florian Schmaltz (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) organized an international symposium to commemorate the centenary of the infamous chemical attack. The symposium examined crucial facets of chemical warfare from the first research on and deployment of chemical weapons in WWI to the development and use of chemical warfare during the century hence. The focus was on scientific, ethical, legal, and political issues of chemical weapons research and deployment - including the issue of dual use - as well as the ongoing effort to control the possession of chemical weapons and to ultimately achieve their elimination. The volume consists of papers presented at the symposium and supplemented by additional articles that together cover key aspects of chemical warfare from 22 April 1915 until the summer of 2015.

Originally published in 1993, this volume was unique in its scope and approach: Unlike most literature on nuclear weapons proliferation at the time, the essays in this volume offer theoretical discussions and suggest testable hypotheses about the causes and effects of nuclear weapons proliferation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ideal subject for social science scholarship, and such scholarship is especially timely now. Among the topics discussed in The Proliferation Puzzle are: The building of nuclear weapons is a complex task touching upon many of the subjects of study at the core of social science and international relations. Nuclear weapons may be acquired as a hedge against external threat, for reasons of national prestige, or as a result of pressures by domestic coalitions among scientists, bureaucrats, and the military. They may be sought for defensive purposes or to support hegemonic aspirations. Nuclear weapons also raise questions about civilian command and control, especially in crisis situations. During the last two decades the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been proscribed by the non-proliferation regime. The decisions countries made about acquiring these weapons and the manner they chose to build them serve as a test of the efficacy of this particular regime, and of international regimes more generally. Nuclear weapons were introduced at the time bipolarity became the international order. As the world moves away from bipolarity, there is a need to answer questions such as: What would be the effect of nuclear weapons in a multipolar order? How will the spread of nuclear weapons affect the distribution of capabilities among states? If nuclear weapons spread to additional countries, will they enhance stability or exacerbate instability? Can the spread of these weapons be managed or controlled? This book brings together scholars from different schools within international relations and the social sciences to address the question of why nuclear weapons spread. A disciplined, rigorous examination of proliferation is important not only for scholarship but also for informed policymaking. The purpose of social science is to formulate hypotheses and devise theories that advance our understanding of society and aid in the fashioning of enlightened policy. The essays in this volume show how explicit hypotheses about the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation provide a deeper understanding of the problem and suggest specific, theory-informed policy recommendations.

In the early 1980s there had been an upsurge of public concern over the nuclear threat to Europe. Already saturated with nuclear weapons, Europe faced controversial new deployments and there was alarm over military strategies for nuclear war in the region. It is in this context that the idea of nuclear weapon-free zones had captured the popular imagination and became a political issue in Europe. Not only would such zones build confidence and raise the nuclear threshold, but they would be first steps towards a more comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1983 Nuclear Disengagement in Europe probes the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in the region. Pugwash and SIPRI arranged a meeting at which an international team of lawyers, scientists, politicians and military experts gave background information and provided an appraisal of problems regarding the zone initiatives as well as benefits that would accrue. Possible elements in a European zone arrangement were elaborated on and procedures towards the establishment of such a zone were suggested.

The Ka-50 (NATO reporting name: Hokum A) helicopter made its maiden flight 40 years ago on 17 June 1982. After undergoing extensive tests and tweaks, the helicopter was ready for full-scale production almost 10 years later. However, by then Russia had entered an economic crisis, and the money had run out. Only in 2011, almost another 20 years later, did deliveries of the redesigned Ka-52 begin to military units. The Ka-52 Hokum B has a unique co-axial rotor design, with a two-person crew seated side by side in ejection seats, and an extremely powerful weapons and self-defence suite. Along with the original Ka-52s, a ship-borne Ka-52K variant has been developed for the Russian Navy and an improved KA-52M ( modernised') version is being tested. From February 2022, Ka-52s were used by Russian forces in their invasion of Ukraine. With over 200 photographs, this book explores the history of the Ka-50 and Ka-52, their development, setbacks and successes, designs, armament and combat capabilities, presenting a holistic overview of these helicopters.

The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II was the most-produced American supersonic military jet with 5,195 aircraft being produced. By any standards the F-4 has been incredibly successful, used not only by the USAF and US Navy but many air forces around the world including Germany, Israel, Turkey and Japan. The F-4 was designed as a long-range fighter interceptor and fighter bomber, excellent in all roles assigned to it. The Phantom has performed leading roles in multiple conflicts around the world from the Vietnam War through to the Gulf War. Although the F-4 left US service in 1996 it has continued in service with other air forces, only just being retired in 2020 from the Japanese Air Self-Defence Force. This new title in Pen & Sword's highly successful Flight Craft series covers the development and operational use of the F-4 Phantom II and brings to life the variety of colour schemes and markings applied by many of the multiple air arms that have operated the Phantom around the world by including quality colour profiles. Multiple model projects are included covering significant variants of the F-4 like the F-4B, F-4D, F-4E, F-4F, F-4G, F-4J, F-4EJ-Kai; British FGR-2 and F-4J(UK). All the popular model scales are represented: 1:72, 1:48 and 1:32A first for scale modellers everywhere - a book aimed at scale modellers of all levels interested in building the F-4 Phantom II.