What is the relation between time and change? Does time depend on the mind? Is the present always the same or is it always different? Aristotle tackles these questions in the Physics, and Time for Aristotle is the first book in English devoted to this discussion. Aristotle claims that time is not a kind of change, but that it is something dependent on change; he defines it as a kind of 'number of change'. Ursula Coope argues that what this means is that time is a kind of order (not, as is commonly supposed, a kind of measure). It is universal order within which all changes are related to each other. This interpretation enables Coope to explain two puzzling claims that Aristotle makes: that the now is like a moving thing, and that time depends for its existence on the mind. Brilliantly lucid in its explanation of this challenging section of the Physics, Time for Aristotle shows his discussion to be of enduring philosophical interest.

Over the last four decades, John Dewey's pragmatist philosophy has formed an intellectual core in design research, underpinning Donald Schoen's theory of reflective practice, the experiential perspective in HCI and the democratic commitments of participatory design. Taking these existing connections as a starting point, Brian Dixon explores how deeper alignments may be drawn between Dewey's insights and contemporary design research's concern with practice, meaning and collaboration. Chapter by chapter, a fresh intellectual approach is revealed, one which recognises the transformative power of doing, making and knowing as a force for positive change in the world. We see that, for Dewey, experience comes first. It connects us to surrounding world and the society of which we are part; good things can happen and new realities are possible-we just have to work for them. The implications for design research are vast. We are offered a new way of understanding designerly knowledge production, as well as the methodological implications of adopting Deweyan pragmatism in design research. Taken as a whole, Dewey and Design not only draws out the value of Dewey's work for design research but also, crucially, offers a clear articulation of the value of design itself.

This book is an important gateway through which professional analytic philosophers and their students can come to understand the significance of Hegel's philosophy to contemporary theory of action. As such it will contribute to the ever-increasing erosion of the sterile barrier between the continental and analytic approaches to philosophy. Michael Quante has written the first book to focus on what Hegel has to say about such central concepts as action, person and will, and then to bring these views to bear on contemporary debates in analytic philosophy. Crisply written, this book will thus address the common set of preoccupations of analytic philosophers of mind and action, and Hegel specialists.

The primary purpose for the production of my current book, I Am A Key, is to assist readers in a clearer understanding of my first book, The Mind Factory. My first book dealt with pure theory and, while I made a gallant effort there to soften the language in that field of discourse, it was not a complete success. It still turned out not to be an easy read for the lay reader. As was my goal, I needed to consolidate a lot of information in a relatively short single volume. No doubt, for any diligent student of sociology or philosophy it was a casual read; but I wanted the book to accommodate the lay reader as well. In reviewing this issue of clarity of exposition-after the fact-for my book, The Mind Factory, I was reminded that I did not give interpretations for the anagrams that I presented in that book. Moreover, since defining and exhibiting anagrams was the central feature of the book, I concluded that providing interpretations for those anagrams would be the best way to pursue the immediate goal of opening up one's understanding of the overall theory contained in that book. Consequently, I present my readers with my current book, I Am A Key. In my current book, I give a representation of the extended version of the key defined and presented in the earlier book, I use an example from the first book to detail just how an anagram is derived, and I explain the meaning of an interpretation while also providing interpretations for each of the 288 anagrams contained in my other book. With this additional commentary I am satisfied that I will have done as much as anyone could possibly do to initiate a contemporary discussion and explanation of this theory. That is, to explain the reality of the existence of the latent content in our everyday language. Of course the secondary goal of these two books is to show by way of demonstrate that by implication the word "theory," as used within context here, does not mean something unproven or yet to be proven, and the

The work of Aristotle (384-322 BC) is considered to be one of the great achievements of the ancient world, and is a foundation of both Western and Middle Eastern philosophy and science. Although Aristotle left significant material on almost all branches of learning, what has survived is a somewhat disorganized collection of notes and lectures. Moreover, the centuries of interpretation across various epochs and cultures tend to cloud our understanding of him. Thomas Kiefer breaks through this cloud of interpretation and provides an organized account of one key part of Aristotle's philosophy, namely his theory of knowledge. This theory concerns what is knowledge, what we can know, and how we can do so. Kiefer's book is the first work that takes this theory as its sole focus and reconstructs it systematically. Kiefer's work throughout provides many new interpretations of key parts of Aristotle's philosophy, including an unnoticed -but crucial-distinction between knowledge in general and knowledge for us, the differences between his semantic and psychological requirements for knowledge, and 'nous', which is perhaps the most obscure notion in Aristotle's work. He also concludes with a summary of Aristotle's theory in the terms and style of contemporary epistemology. Kiefer's work should be of interest to anyone involved in the history of philosophy or contemporary epistemology.

Analysing the reception of contemporary French philosophy in architecture over the last four decades, Adventures with the Theory of the Baroque and French Philosophy discusses the problematic nature of importing philosophical categories into architecture. Focusing particularly on the philosophical notion of the Baroque in Gilles Deleuze, this study examines traditional interpretations of the concept in contemporary architecture theory, throwing up specific problems such as the aestheticization of building theory and practice. Identifying these and other issues, Nadir Lahiji constructs a concept of the baroque in contrast to the contemporary understanding in architecture discourse. Challenging the contemporary dominance of the Neo-Baroque as a phenomenon related to postmodernism and late capitalism, he establishes the Baroque as a name for the paradoxical unity of 'kitsch' and 'high' art and argues that the digital turn has enhanced the return of the Baroque in contemporary culture and architectural practice that he brands a pseudo-event in the term 'neobaroque'. Lahiji's original critique expands on the misadventure of architecture with French Philosophy and explains why the category of the Baroque, if it is still useful to keep in architecture criticism, must be tied to the notion of Post-Rationalism. Within this latter notion, he draws on the work of Alain Badiou to theorize a new concept of the Baroque as Event. Alongside close readings of Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault related to the criticism of the Baroque and Modernity and discussions of the work of Frank Gehry, in particular, this study draws on Jacque Lacan's concept of the baroque and presents the first comprehensive treatment of the psychoanalytical theory of the Baroque in the work of Lacan.

The first essay in David Berman's new collection examines the full range of Berkeley's achievement, looking not only at his classic works of 1709-1713, but also Alciphron (1732) and his final book, the enigmatic Siris (1744). The book also examines a key problem in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision (1709): Why does the moon look larger on the horizon than in the meridian? The third item criticises the view, still uncritically accepted by many, that Berkeley's attacks on materialism are levelled against Locke. Part 2 opens with Berman's two essays of 1982 - the first to show that Berkeley came from a rich and coherent Irish philosophical background. Next comes a discussion of the link between Berkeley and Francis Hutcheson, and particularly their answers to the Molyneux problem, which Berman takes to be the root problem of Irish philosophy. The fourth essay looks at the impact of Golden Age Irish philosophy on eighteenth-century American philosophy, where, again, Berkeley had a central position. The last item examines Berkeley's influence on Samuel Beckett. Part 3 shows the multifaceted nature of Berkeley's career, which is missed by those who concentrate exclusively on his work of 1709-1713. Each section here presents new material on Berkeley's life, or on his works and thought; most of these are new letters, not included in the Luce-Jessop edition of the Works of Berkeley. This volume, therefore, can be seen a supplement to volumes 8 and 9 of the Works and also to Luce's Life of Berkeley.

The philosophy of Spinoza is increasingly recognised as holding a position of crucial importance and influence in early modern thought, and in previous years has been the focus of a rich and growing body of scholarship. In this volume of essays, leading experts in the field offer penetrating analyses of his views about God, necessity, imagination, the mind, knowledge, history, society, and politics. The essays treat questions of perennial importance in Spinoza scholarship but also constitute critical examinations of his worldview. Scholars of modern philosophy will value this volume as a collection of some of the very best work done on Spinoza's philosophy.

This work illustrates China's values and how they are practiced. After introducing readers to the theories, systematical structure, historical status, and influence of traditional Chinese values, it points out major developmental trends in connection with modernization. Further, it explores the significance of the contemporary reconstruction of Chinese values and argues that these values can be divided into three layers: values-based goals of national development, Chinese values concepts, and norms of values in a civil society. On this basis, it subsequently interprets the core socialist values "Prosperity, Democracy, Civility and Harmony," the value concepts "Freedom, Equality, Justice and Rule of Law" and values-based norms "Patriotism, Dedication, Integrity and Friendship."

Much attention has been paid to Wittgenstein's treatment of solipsism and to Cavell's treatment of skepticism. But comparatively little has been made of the striking connections between the early Wittgenstein's view on the truth of solipsism and Cavell's view on the truth of skepticism, and how that relates to the claim that the later Wittgenstein sees privacy as a constant human possibility. This book offers close readings of representative writings by both authors and argues that an adequate understanding of solipsism and skepticism requires taking into account a set of underlying difficulties related to a disappointment with finitude which might ultimately lead to the threat of solipsism. That threat is further interpreted as a wish not to bear the burden of having to constantly negotiate and nurture the fragile connections with the world and others which are the conditions of possibility for finite beings to achieve meaning and community. By presenting Wittgenstein's and Cavell's responses in an order which reflects the chronology of their writings, the result is a cohesive articulation of some under-appreciated aspects of their philosophical methodologies which has the potential of reorienting our entire reading of their work.

The concept of schizoanalysis is Deleuze and Guattari's fusion of psychoanalytic-inspired theories of the self, the libido and desire with Marx-inspired theories of the economy, history and society. Schizoanalysis holds that art's function is both political and aesthetic - it changes perception. If one cannot change perception, then, one cannot change anything politically. This is why Deleuze and Guattari always insist that artists operate at the level of the real (not the imaginary or the symbolic). Ultimately, they argue, there is no necessary distinction to be made between aesthetics and politics. They are simply two sides of the same coin, both concerned with the formation and transformation of social and cultural norms. Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Visual Art explores how every artist, good or bad, contributes to the structure and nature of society because their work either reinforces social norms, or challenges them. From this point of view we are all artists, we all have the potential to exercise what might be called a 'aesthetico-political function' and change the world around us; or, conversely, we can not only let the status quo endure, but fight to preserve it as though it were freedom itself. Edited by one of the world's leading scholars in Deleuze Studies and an accomplished artist, curator and critic, this impressive collection of writings by both academics and practicing artists is an exciting imaginative tool for a upper level students and academics researching and studying visual arts, critical theory, continental philosophy, and media.

This volume presents a series of essays published by Charles Kahn over a period of forty years, in which he seeks to explicate the ancient Greek concept of Being. He addresses two distinct but intimately related problems, one linguistic and one historical and philosophical. The linguistic problem concerns the theory of the Greek verb einai, "to be:: how to replace the conventional but misleading distinction between copula and existential verb with a more adequate theoretical account. The philosophical problem is in principle quite distinct: to understand how the concept of Being became the central topic in Greek philosophy from Parmenides to Aristotle. But these two problems converge on what Kahn calls the veridical use of einai. In the earlier papers he takes that connection between the verb and the concept of truth to be the key to the central role of Being in Greek philosophy. In the later papers he interprets the veridical in terms of a more general semantic function of the verb, which comprises the notions of existence and instantiation as well as truth.

The German philosopher Robert Spaemann provides an important contribution to a number of contemporary debates in philosophy and theology, opening up possibilities for conversation between these disciplines. He engages in a dialogue with classical and contemporary positions and often formulates important and original insights which lie beyond common alternatives. In this study Holger Zaborowski provides an analysis of the most important features of Spaemann's philosophy and shows the unity of his thought.
The question 'Who is a person?' is of increasing significance: Are all human beings persons? Are there animals that can be considered persons? What does it mean to speak of personal identity and of the dignity of the person? Spaemann provides an answer to these questions: Every human being, he argues, is a person and, therefore, 'has' his nature in freedom. In order to understand the person, Spaemann explains, we have to think about the relation between nature and freedom and avoid the reductive accounts of this relation prevalent in important strands of modern thought.
Spaemann develops a challenging critique of modernity, incorporating analysis of modern anti-modernisms and showing that these are also subject to a dialectical development, perpetuating the problematic shortcomings of many features of modern reasoning. If we do not want to abolish ourselves as persons, Spaemann reasons, we need to find a way of understanding ourselves that evades the dialectic of modernity. Thus, he reminds his readers of 'self-evident' knowledge: insights that we have once already known, but tend to forget.

This book looks at Kierkegaard with a fresh perspective shaped by the history of ideas, framed by the terms romanticism and modernism. 'Modernism' here refers to the kind of intellectual and literary modernism associated with Georg Brandes, and such later nineteenth and early twentieth century figures as J. P. Jacobsen, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky, Ibsen (all often associated with Kierkegaard in early secondary literature), and the young Georg Lukacs. This movement, currently attracting increasing scholarly attention, fed into such varied currents of twentieth century thought as Bolshevism (as in Lukacs himself), fascism, and the early existentialism of, e.g., Shestov and the radical culture journal The Brenner (in which Kierkegaard featured regularly, and whose readers included Martin Heidegger). Each of these movements has, arguably, its own 'Romantic' aspect and Kierkegaard thus emerges as a figure who holds together or in whom are reflected both the aspirations and contradictions of early romanticism and its later nineteenth and twentieth century inheritors. Kierkegaard's specific 'staging' of his authorship in the contemporary life of Copenhagen, then undergoing a rapid transformation from being the backward capital of an absolutist monarchy to a modern, cosmopolitan city, provides a further focus for the volume. In this situation the early Romantic experience of nature as providing a source of healing and an experience of unambiguous life is transposed into a more complex and, ultimately, catastrophic register. In articulating these tensions, Kierkegaard's authorship provided a mirror to his age but also anticipated and influenced later generations who wrestled with their own versions of this situation.

Kant's Elliptical Path explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's Critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later Critical works provide a plausible defence of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures and several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work.
The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of the Amerik's 'moderate' interpretation of transcendental idealism. Other essays evaluate Kant's concept of will and reliance on a 'fact of reason' in his practical philosophy, as well as his critique of traditional theodicies, and the historical character of his defense of religion and the concepts of creation and hope within 'the boundaries of mere reason'. Kant's Elliptical Path will be of value to historians of modern philosophy and Kant scholars, while its treatment of several literary figures and issues in aesthetics, politics, history, and theology make it relevant to readers outside of philosophy.

This book is a consideration of Hegel's view on logic and basic logical concepts such as truth, form, validity, and contradiction, and aims to assess this view's relevance for contemporary philosophical logic. The literature on Hegel's logic is fairly rich. The attention to contemporary philosophical logic places the present research closer to those works interested in the link between Hegel's thought and analytical philosophy (Stekeler-Weithofer 1992 and 2019, Berto 2005, Rockmore 2005, Redding 2007, Nuzzo 2010 (ed.), Koch 2014, Brandom 2014, 1-15, Pippin 2016, Moyar 2017, Quante & Mooren 2018 among others). In this context, one particularity of this book consists in focusing on something that has been generally underrated in the literature: the idea that, for Hegel as well as for Aristotle and many other authors (including Frege), logic is the study of the forms of truth, i.e. the forms that our thought can (or ought to) assume in searching for truth. In this light, Hegel's thinking about logic is a fundamental reference point for anyone interested in a philosophical foundation of logic.

Engaging with several emerging and interconnected approaches in the social sciences, including pragmatism, system theory, processual thinking and relational thinking, this book leverages John Dewey and Arthur Bentley's often misunderstood concept of trans-action to revisit and redefine our perceptions of social relations and social life. The contributors gathered here use trans-action in a more specific sense, showing why and how social scientists and philosophers might use the concept to better understand our social life and social problems. As the first collective sociological attempt to apply the concept of trans-action to contemporary social issues, this volume is a key reference for the growing audience of relational and processual thinkers in the social sciences and beyond.

For Kierkegaard the most important thing in life is to become a single individual or a true self. We are all born as human beings, but this makes us only members of a crowd, not true selves. To become a true self, we must transcend what we are at any given time and orient ourselves to the possible and to the actuality of the possible, to which all that is possible owes itself. True selves exist only in becoming, they are fragile, and that is their strength. They are not grounded by their own activities, but in a reality extra se, the flip side of which is a deep passivity that underlies all their activity and allows them to continually leave themselves and move beyond their respective actualities toward the new and the possible. Therefore, without the passion of possibility, there is no truly single individual. This study of Kierkegaard's post-metaphysical theology outlines his existential phenomenology of the self by exploring in three parts what Kierkegaard has to say about the sense of self (finitude, uniqueness, self-interpretation, and alienation), about selfless passion (anxiety, trust, hope, and true love), and about how to become a true self (a Christian in Christendom and a neighbor of God's neighbors).

Salomon Maimon was one of the most important and influential Jewish intellectuals of the Enlightenment. This is the first English translation of his principal work, first published in Berlin in 1790. "Essay on Transcendental Philosophy" presents the first English translation of Salomon Maimon's principal work, originally published in Berlin in 1790. This book expresses his response to the revolution in philosophy wrought by Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason". Kant himself was full of praise for the book and it went on to exercise a decisive influence on the course of post-Kantian German idealism. Yet, despite his importance for the work of such key thinkers as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, Maimon never achieved the prominence he deserved. Today interest in Maimon's work is increasing rapidly, thanks in large part to prominent acclaim by Gilles Deleuze. This long-overdue translation brings Maimon's seminal text to an English-speaking audience for the first time. The text includes a comprehensive introduction, a glossary, translator's notes and a full bibliography. It also includes translations of correspondence between Maimon and Kant and a letter Maimon wrote to a Berlin journal clarifying the philosophical position of the Essay, all of which bring alive the context of the book's publication for the modern reader.

Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of the most important and influential thinkers of the Enlightenment period and, indeed, of the whole history of philosophy. His political theory heavily influenced the French Revolution, development of socialist theory and the growth of nationalism. Clearly and thematically structured, covering all Rousseau's key works, Starting with Rousseau leads the reader through a thorough overview of the development of Rousseau's thought, resulting in a more thorough understanding of the roots of his philosophical concerns. Offering coverage of the full range of Rousseau's ideas, the book firmly sets his work in the context of the Enlightenment and explores his contributions to social theory, theories of human nature, philosophy of education, political philosophy and autobiography. Crucially the book introduces the major thinkers and events that proved influential in the development of Rousseau's thought. This is the ideal introduction for anyone coming to the work of this hugely important thinker for the first time.