Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea examines the rights and duties of states across a broad spectrum of maritime security threats. It provides comprehensive coverage of the different dimensions of maritime security in order to assess how responses to maritime security concerns are and should be shaping the law of the sea. The discussion sets out the rules regulating passage of military vessels and military activities at sea, law enforcement activities across the different maritime zones, information sharing and intelligence gathering, as well as armed conflict and naval warfare. In doing so, this book not only addresses traditional security concerns for naval power but also examines responses to contemporary maritime security threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, piracy, drug-trafficking, environmental damage and illegal fishing.
While the protection of sovereignty and national interests remain fundamental to maritime security and the law of the sea, there is increasing acceptance of a common interest that exists among states when seeking to respond to a variety of modern maritime security threats. This book argues that security interests should be given greater scope in our understanding of the law of the sea in light of the changing dynamics of exclusive and inclusive claims to ocean use. More flexibility may be required in the interpretation and application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea if appropriate responses to ensure maritime security are to be allowed.

The naval side of the First World War in the Adriatic provides a classic case study in narrow sea warfare. This is the story of the Austro-Hungarian KuK Navy's contribution to the Central Powers' considerable effort in the region. This finely balanced, well-handled navy successfully helped to defend Austria's Adriatic base of power--the Pola-Trieste-Fiume triangle--in the north, to protect the vital sea lane to Cattaro and the south, and to support the army from the sea--all against major odds. Its forces also contributed significantly to the U-boat war.

During initial stages of the conflict, the French were the enemy at sea. Later, Italy switched allegiances, joining the Entente against her former allies. Because the KuK Kriegsmarine was no match for the Italians and the French combined, the battle fleet was thereafter kept in being at Pola, holding the Allies in check. Nonetheless, the Adriatic became an Austrian lake. Using aircraft, U-boats, torpedoes, and mines, the KuK worked toward reducing the odds against it. However, the impasse would continue until the armistice, ruling out a Mahanian showdown in the Adriatic. Koburger provides important geostrategic points of comparison and valuable lessons for other conflicts, even today.

The hunters and the hunted on the high seas of war
This interesting book-containing two book length accounts-views the same conflict-the U-Boat War during the First World War in the North Atlantic, North Sea and English Channel-from both sides. The first, The U-Boat Hunters was written by a professional journalist reporting for Colliers Magazine as he accompanied the United States destroyer force in the final year of the war. The second account, The Diary of a U-Boat Commander, is an interesting insight into the world of a Kreigsmarine officer on active service. It is a traumatic story of battle and mental and physical suffering illuminated by periods of tragic romance making it a classic naval memoir of the German Navy at war in the early 20th century.

This book provides the first comprehensive critical analysis of the regulation of naval weapons during armed conflict. It examines the experience this century with the use of naval mines, submarines and anti-ship missiles, the three main naval weapons. The sources of international law relevant to an assessment of the law, that is the extant conventions, state practice, military manuals, war crimes prosecutions, and the opinions of publicists, are each extensively examined so that a clear picture of the law emerges. The book examines the impact of agreements drawn up in peacetime on wartime conduct and focuses on the growth of law through customary practice. While stating the law as it is today, it also provides suggestions for the practical development of the law.

Admiral Jean François Darlan's Western legacy is that of an opportunist, a fascist collaborator, or, at worst, a traitor during France's struggle for survival in the early years of World War II. This study, however, based upon new research from French, English, and German archival sources, paints a different picture. With a career beginning during the height of France's imperial power and lasting until the nation's rapid wartime decline, Darlan was a pragmatic statesman, a guardian of naval preparedness, a stout opponent of fascism, an earnest patron of the Anglo-French Alliance, and an advocate of combined naval power in the Mediterranean. He defended French naval and colonial interests against all foreign powers before and during the war, and his success in this area eventually resulted in his assassination. Darlan's career was characterized by his loyal service to his government and nation. One of the first to recognize the German threat, he openly favored naval rearmament in the early 1930s. He was also instrumental in the success of the 1937 Nyon Conference on Mediterranean security, which was the only prewar military effort against fascist aggression. During the occupation, Darlan pursued diplomacy to ease the burdens of the French people. Yet, these very negotiations with the Germans, along with his bitter reaction to Britain's surprise attack against the French fleet at Mers el-Kéebir, would result in his reputation as an opportunist and a collaborator with the fascists. This examination of the man whose murder would ease the way for Charles de Gaulle will captivate anyone interested in the political intrigues of World War II.

This book relates the life - and death - of the rebel German seaman who became one of the most successful U-Boat commanders of World War II. The story of Werner Henke - and a narrative outlining the history of his boat, U-515, and its crew - forms the basis for a biography of a man who defies the stereotypes of German character, who never fit in as a career officer in the German Navy, but who chose a suicidal death in acceptance of the code of the military service whose rules he continually bent and broke. Though the story Mulligan relates is engrossing and action-packed, it is also a carefully documented study that breaks new ground in uncovering the sociological background of Henke and his crew; in short, it is a study in German history as well as a biography of a U-Boat commander. Examining the backgrounds and attitudes of the crew - including their views on Hitler and the treatment of the Jews - Mulligan sheds new light on the men who constituted an elite in Hitler's Wehrmacht. The story of U-515 is also closely correlated to the overall conduct of the U-Boat war, including assessments of Karl Donitz's strategy, the influence of technological innovations, and the contributions of Allied signal intelligence. Henke's confrontation with the Gestapo and a detailed account of the sinking of the passenger liner Ceramic further add to the story, revealing the complex reality behind an image too long dominated by propaganda stereotypes.

In an age of uncertainties influenced by information technologies and the networking of societies, the maritime domain remains the main global lane of communication, vital for trade and security. The European Union has become a maritime actor, carrying out counter-piracy and maritime capacity-building operations and actively dealing with maritime safety, fisheries protection, port security, maritime surveillance and counter-immigration at sea. The Union's policies, mechanisms and activities related to the maritime domain are now backed by a Maritime Security Strategy, adopted by the Council in June 2014. This cutting edge book accounts for the trends in maritime strategy and seapower politics as well as the recent developments in the field, both at the conceptual and practical level. It discusses the significance of the maritime domain for European security in general and for the EU in particular. Readers are provided with the necessary tools to critically assess the EU's potential as a global maritime actor and evaluate why Europe's prosperity and security rests on its capacity to shape events at sea.

Andidora tells the story of four men who successfully commanded battlefleets in the 20th century: Japan's Heihachiro Togo, England's John Jellicoe, and America's William Halsey and Raymond Spruance. This study provides personality profiles and detailed accounts of their major battles. Analyzing their command decisions based on what each commander knew or could have reasonably inferred at the time decisions were made, Andidora compares their accomplishments to those of Horatio Nelson, who delivered stunning naval victories for England during the Napoleonic Wars. However, he concludes that the Nelsonian standard is inappropriate in the modern naval environment due to the increased size and technological complexity of modern fleets and the political imperative to preserve costly and strategically significant naval assets. Trained in England and acquiring the skill and spirit of Nelson's heirs, Togo annihilated his Russian opponents at the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War and, therefore, produced the 20th century's only facsimile of Nelson's Trafalgar. Despite heavy losses against a numerically inferior German Navy at Jutland, Jellicoe's single-minded adherence to an unpopular strategy would prove instrumental in achieving final victory in the First World War. Although strikingly different in personality and leadership style, Halsey and Spruance would both do their part in the naval battles of the Second World War. In the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Spruance would deal Japanese naval aviation a blow from which it would never recover; while at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Halsey would essentially eliminate the Japanese navy as an effective fighting force.

This 30th anniversary edition of a highly acclaimed classic covers the entire span of the American naval experience from the Revolution to the present. It avoids descending into a dry chronology of naval battles and instead focuses on the use of the navy as a diplomatic instrument in peacetime and wartime. When dealing with war, the authors sketch in the political background and explain the grand strategy before dealing with individual battles and leaders. Each essay about the navy in war concludes with an assessment of the importance of naval operations to the outcome of the war and the significance of the war to America's role in world affairs. This book also traces changes in administrative premises and style, the evolution of technology, and the strategic revolutions characteristic of American naval history. This fully revised, 30th anniversary edition includes new chapters by current experts in the field so as to continue its relevance in the 21st century. An entirely new and up-to-date bibliography containing secondary sources help make this title better than ever.

John H. Schroeder chronicles the expansion of the American Navy's peacetime role in developing the nation's overseas commercial empire during the thirty years before the Civil War. He demonstrates how the rapid acceleration of American commercial activity around the world increased pressure on the Navy to meet new economic and political demands. He analyzes how the Navy's haphazard development in the antebellum years paralleled and interacted with commercial activity, and how the end result impacted dramatically on the economic development of the United States.

Both Tromp-class frigates entered service in 1975/76. Their primary task was area air defence. They acted as flagships for the COMNLTG (Commander Netherlands Task Group). Because of their large radome (wich housed a 3D radar antenna) the ships had the nickname "Kojak" after the bald-headed actor in the famous action crime tv-series.

The ebbs and flows of Indian history can also be charted through the country's "maritime blindness" - its onset and the national endeavour to overcome it. The story of developing India's maritime capacity, since independence, is also about the kind of international and regional footprint it needs to have. In this book, the author discusses India's new and old maritime challenges and contextualises them in terms of its inherent institutional strengths to cope with their bewildering complexity. Their complexity is not just due to their sheer scale; the degrading institutional capacities, within countries and internationally, act as threat multipliers. The dynamics of global geopolitics, the seismic perturbations of global economy, and the dizzying pace of technology belie presuppositions for global future; all strategic analysts recognise our current, persisting conundrums. Taking into account the country's critical strategic weight in the maritime domain, the author suggests an approach - about the right 'mix' of the 'traditional' and the 'non-traditional' threats - in the institutional agendas of various governance mechanisms concerning different water bodies, especially the Indian Ocean Region, which also demands of India both hardware and software capacities, including diplomatic. He concludes that the effect of such an approach would be stabilising, consonant with the civilisational vision of the founders of the modern Indian nation.

As a small nation in a hostile region, Israel has made defense a top priority. Tzalel takes a critical look at the naval branch of Israel's defense forces to consider its history, its performance, and its overall importance to maintaining national security. From a motley collection of illegal immigrant ships operated prior to the birth of the state, the Israelis have since the 1960s established a modern navy. However, Tzalel argues, the modernization and expansion of the Israeli navy has been driven more by an excess of funds and the lack of clearly defined priorities than by any real necessity. Like most small countries, Israel has no need to command the sea during peace or in wartime. The author examines each step of naval development by direct correlation to the perceived need for each new phase and the circumstances that led naval and military leaders to make specific choices, and he discusses the benefits of these choices on the field of battle. He hopes to map the complex relationship between the navy men, the Israeli government, and public sentiment. Although the nation has managed to create a new and impressive class of warship, the Sa'ar FAC(M) and its larger derivatives, Tzalel contends that the military logic behind such naval construction was faulty and that the nation's submarine flotilla constitutes a sheer waste of monetary and human resources.